INTRODUCTION 


,  TO   THE 


HISTORY 


OF 


MODERN  PHILOSOPHY- 


BY 

ARTHUR  STONE  DEWING 


PHILADELPHIA   AND    LONDON 

J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT    COMPANY 
1903 


•'•  '• :  :•'  :**  :*•/"  •    :  /•. '  '• 


GENERAL 

COPYRIGHT,  1903 
BY  J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY 

Published  June,  1903 


ELECTROTYPED   AND    PRINTED    BY   J.  B.   LIPPINCOTT    COMPANY,    PHILADELPHIA,    U.S.A. 


TO 

MY  MOTHER 
I   DEDICATE   THIS   BOOK 


PREFACE. 


THERE  are  at  the  present  time  accessible  to  the  English 
reader  many  excellent  and  comprehensive  histories  of  philoso- 
phy. And  the  only  reason  for  treating  the  subject  again  has 
arisen  from  the  hope  that  a  more  simple  treatment  would  prove 
useful  to  those  readers  unfamiliar  with  the  technicalities  of 
recent  philosophical  systems.  For  various  reasons  the  histori- 
cal side  serves  as  perhaps  the  only  broad  and  permanently 
valuable  approach  to  the  whole  field  of  philosophy,  while  it  is 
a  firm  conviction  with  many  that  some  slight  acquaintance 
with  the  development  of  philosophical  problems  is  indispensable 
to  their  appreciation.  This  work  is  intended  as  an  introduction 
to  the  subject,  and  is  not  the  expression  of  a  critical  or  recon- 
structive attitude;  it  makes  no  attempt  to  trace  the  logico- 
genetic  development  of  modern  thought,  nor  does  it  pretend 
to  consider  every  aspect  of  historical  development. 

This  definite  point  of  view  has  made  it  necessary  to  keep 
certain  matters  clearly  in  mind.  As  few  technical  terms  as 
possible  have  been  used  and  those  which  were  considered  neces- 
sary have  been  defined  either  in  the  introductory  chapter  or 
later  on  in  the  book.  Again,  the  writer  has  striven  to  avoid 
two  difficulties  which  might  be  urged  against  an  "  Introduc- 
tion/'— stress  on  an  array  of  unrelated  facts  and  too  broad  a 
point  of  view.  The  minute  details  of  the  various  philosophical 
systems  have  been  omitted  as  far  as  possible,  and  for  this 
reason  many  features  have  been  neglected  which  in  a  more 
subjective  and  critical  account  might  be  considered  of  im- 
portance. An  exhaustive  catalogue  of  these  details  would  not 
assist  the  reader  to  the  understanding  of  the  definite  world-atti- 
tude for  which  every  great  thinker  stands;  and,  furthermore, 


6  PREFACE. 

these  particulars  may  be  learned  much  better  from  the  writings 
of  the  philosophers  themselves  than  from  any  historical  sketch. 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  lack  of  detail  has  a  tendency  to  bring 
into  the  foreground  too  general  or  superficial  a  view-point. 
We  are  dealing  with  men  and  movements,  but  not  movements 
alone.  Any  broad  characterization  of  a  certain  tendency  is 
necessarily  superficial, — especially  when  written  with  the  pres- 
ent aim  in  mind, — yet  it  is  hoped  that  this  objection  may 
prove  less  serious  if  supported  by  a  distinct  exposition  of  each 
philosophical  system.  For  various  reasons  the  biographies  of 
the  different  men  have  been  emphasized,  with  the  belief  that 
the  facts  of  a  man's  life  and  character  are  often  the  clearest 
approach  to  the  position  that  he  has  occupied  in  the  world. 

In  regard  to  the  arrangement  of  the  subject-matter  of  the 
book:  the  first  chapter  aims  to  present  an  explicit  definition 
of  the  ordinary  conceptions  of  philosophy.  This  introductory 
chapter  observes  in  the  main  the  traditional  interpretations  of 
terms,  even  in  those  instances  in  which  recent  criticism  has 
tended  to  invest  old  words  with  new  meanings.  The  second 
chapter  describes  the  general  background  on  which  strictly 
modern  philosophy  rests.  The  brief  resume  of  earlier  history 
is  given  more  to  furnish  points  of  reference  than  to  supply  an 
outline.  The  important  pre-Kantian  thinkers  have  been  ar- 
ranged according  to  two  general  attitudes  towards  philosophy, 
— the  Eationalistic  and  the  Empiric.  This  method  of  treat- 
ment expresses  the  outward  differences  and  frequent  internal 
resemblances  of  the  Continental  and  English  schools  of 
thought.  It  also  defines  clearly  the  position  of  Kant  with 
respect  to  those  problems  for  the  solution  of  which  he  developed 
the  "  Critical  Philosophy."  The  emphasis  on  Kant  both  in 
the  sketch  of  his  life  and  in  the  outline  of  his  system  is  not 
due  to  individual  prejudice,  but  is  rather  in  accordance  with 
the  philosophical  tendencies  of  the  present  time.  The  treat- 
ment of  German  transcendentalism  is  necessarily  brief  and 
superficial,  considering  the  depth  and  magnitude  of  the  prob- 


PREFACE.  7 

lems  at  issue ;  but  it  is  hoped  that  it  will  present  some  definite 
meaning  to  the  person  who  has  intelligently  followed  the 
previous  chapters.  The  last  chapter  outlines  more  recent  phases 
of  philosophy.  There  is  no  unanimity  of  opinion  concerning 
the  relative  importance  of  the  earlier  thinkers,  while  the  com- 
parative estimation  of  recent  systems  of  philosophy  is  little 
else  than  A  matter  of  personal  taste.  In  this  closing  chapter 
it  will  be  observed  that  the  monistic  point  of  view  is  given 
considerable  prominence,,  while  the  last  few  pages  suggest  an 
interpretation  of  the  present  tendencies  in  this  direction. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER    I. 

INTRODUCTION. 

PAGE 

THE  MEANING  OF  PHILOSOPHY 13 

THE  SCOPE  OF  PHILOSOPHY  18 

THE  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY  22 

CHAPTER    II. 
THE  BIRTH  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

THE  HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY  IN  GENERAL 45 

THE  RENAISSANCE   52 

NICOLAS  OF  CUSA  54 

GIORDANO  BRUNO 57 

MYSTICISM  - 62 

JACOB  BOEHME   64 

FRANCIS  BACON 66 

THOMAS  HOBBES  70 

CHAPTER    III. 
CONTINENTAL  RATIONALISM. 

THE  SCEPTICISM  OF  THE  RENAISSANCE 76 

RENE  DESCARTES   77 

Method    79 

Foundations  of  Philosophy 81 

Metaphysics    84 

CARTESIAN  SCHOOL 87 

BENEDICT  DE  SPINOZA   89 

Life  90 

Metaphysics   93 

Epistemology    100 

Ethics    101 

GOTTFRIED  WILHELM  LEIBNITZ   106 

Metaphysics 108 

THE  RATIONALISTS  AS  A  WHOLE 115 

9 


10  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER   IV. 

LOCKE  AND  HIS  INFLUENCE. 

PAGE 

RATIONALISM  AND  EMPIRICISM  CONTRASTED 119 

JOHN  LOCKE    120 

Object  of  Locke's  Philosophy 125 

Nature  of  Ideas   127 

Knowledge    132 

Ethics    134 

FRENCH  SENSATIONALISM  137 

THE  DEISTS  142 

LOCKE'S  INFLUENCE  ON  ETHICS 143 

THE  EMPIRICAL  STAND-POINT   .                                                          .  147 


CHAPTER   V. 
BERKELEY  AND  HUME. 

GEORGE  BERKELEY  150 

Stand-point  153 

Metaphysics 155 

DAVID  HUME  164 

Stand-point  168 

Metaphysics  169 

Ethics  175 

HUME'S  POSITION  IN  PHILOSOPHY  .         176 


CHAPTER   VI. 

IMMANUEL  KANT. 

THE  Two  EPISTEMOLOGICAL  STAND-POINTS  179 

LIFE  AND  CHARACTER  OF  KANT 180 

PROBLEMS  OF  THE  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 189 

THE  "  CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON" 191 

THE  "  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  REASON" 212 

THE  "  CRITIQUE  OF  JUDGMENT" 220 

RETROSPECT  AND  PROSPECT  .  .  223 


CONTENTS.  11 

CHAPTER   VII. 
THE  GERMAN  TRANSCENDENT ALISTS. 

PAGE 

THE  POST-KANTIAN  TENDENCIES 226 

JOHANN  FRIEDRICH  HERBABT 230 

Metaphysics 231 

KARL  LEONHARD  REINHOLD   236 

JOHANN  GOTTLIEB  FICHTE  237 

Stand-point    240 

The  Primacy  of  the  Ego 241 

THE  ROMANTICISTS    250 

FRIEDRICH  WILHELM  JOSEPH  SCHELLING   251 

Stand-point    252 

GEORG  WILHELM  FRIEDRICH  HEGEL  257 

Relation  to  Former  Idealists 259 

Fundamental  Conceptions    260 

The  "  Phenomenology  of  Mind"   265 

System    268 

ARTHUR  SCHOPENHAUER   274 

Stand-point    276 

System 280 


CHAPTER   VIII. 
RECENT  TENDENCIES  IN  PHILOSOPHY. 

PHILOSOPHICAL  ASPECTS  OF  SCIENCE 286 

Auguste  Comte  287 

Hypotheses  in  Science 290 

Evolution  292 

PSYCHOLOGY 299 

THEORIES  OF  ETHICS 303 

Utilitarianism 305 

Idealism  of  Green 308 

IMPORTANT  STAND-POINTS  IN  RECENT  METAPHYSICS 309 

Rudolph  Hermann  Lotze 309 

Josiah  Royce 312 

F.  H.  Bradley 313 


12  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

SIGNIFICANT  TENDENCIES  IN  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  PRESENT 

TIME    314 

The  Meaning  of  Presupposition 317 

The  Dual  Presupposition  of  Philosophy 319 

Experience   320 

Thought    325 

The  Absolute  .  .   329 


OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY 

X  \       °r 


HISTORY 


OF 


MODERN   PHILOSOPHY,. 


CHAPTEK   I. 

INTRODUCTION. 

THE  MEANING  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

THE  prominence  of  philosophical  study  has  exerted  a  re- 
markable influence  on  the  intellectual  life  of  Europe.  It  has 
deeply  affected  the  history  of  religion;  it  is  accountable,  in  a 
large  measure,  for  the  origin  and  growth  of  scientific  theory, 
and  even  in  recent  times  it  is  philosophy  which  has  been  the 
indirect  cause  for  notable  advances  in  the  applied  arts.  Phi- 
losophy served  as  the  basis  of  Greek  culture,  it  kept  alive  the 
germ  of  learning  during  the  darkness  of  the  Middle  Ages,  and 
gave  impetus  and  permanent  value  to  the  wide-spread  en- 
lightenment of  the  Kenaissance.  The  truly  great  and  original 
discoveries  in  mathematics  have  been  made  by  men  whose 
interest  was  primarily  philosophical,  and  through  mathematics 
the  sciences,  the  arts,  and  civilization  have  advanced.  There 
is  no  other  branch  of  learning  arising  from  a  wider  view-point, 
nor  is  there  any  other  science  or  art  which  defines  for  itself  an 
ideal  so  near  to  the  ultimate  meaning  of  truth.  The  appre- 
ciation of  the  value  of  philosophy  is  thus  intimately  associated 
with  the  intellectual  progress  of  mankind,  yet  the  various 
descriptions  of  the  subject  have  led  to  considerable  confusion. 
Our  general  understanding  of  the  term  has  been  derived  from 

13 


14  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

the  Greeks,  but  from  them  we  obtain  no  thoroughly  uniform 
definition  of  philosophy.  The  difficulty  in  defining  our  sub- 
ject seems  to  have  arisen  from  the  depth  and  scope  of  its  mate- 
rial, for  it  is  not  easy  to  condense  a  wealth  of  meaning  into  a 
few  words. 

Traditional  Meaning. — From  the  very  beginning  of  phi- 
losophy, when  it  seemed  to  be  emerging  for  the  first  time  from 
.the, mists <  o£  <tra$i£ion  and  mythology,  it  has  appeared  in  the 
light'  of  -a'-searcH  'for  .the  permanent  reason  of  things.  It  is 
,  almost;  univ^sally/ -inferred,  both  from  the  character  of  its 
1 1<  subject-matter  arid  from  the  proverbial  obscurity  of  its  classic 
productions,  that  the  world  of  philosophy  is  somewhere  beyond 
the  confusion  and  heterogeneity  of  the  world  of  common  life; 
that  it  is  concerned  with  the  deeper  problems  of  life  and 
nature.  The  derivation  of  the  word  philosophy — "  love  of  wis- 
dom"— would  seem  to  imply  this,  especially  when  wisdom  is 
regarded  as  facts  permanently  true  under  all  conditions.  The 
ancients  taught  us  to  go  beneath  the  surface  of  things  and  dis- 
cover the  permanent  in  the  increasing  changes  of  the  world, 
and  to  this  science  of  the  permanent,  tradition  has  given  the 
name  of  philosophy.  We  regard  its  material  to  be  those  ques- 
tions which  are  seldom  brought  to  the  foreground  in  the  ordi- 
nary course  of  daily  life,  those  enigmas  of  human  conscious- 
ness which  are  relegated  to  the  quieter  moments  of  study  and 
reflection,  or  else  passed  over  entirely  with  a  half-conscious 
faith  in  the  adequacy  of  religion  to  solve  them.  Not  infre- 
quently, however,  philosophy  has  been  degraded  to  the  position 
of  a  doctrine  of  magic,  owing  to  a  literal  interpretation  of  its 
foundation  in  the  mysterious.  And  still  again  it  has  been 
sometimes  confused  with  religion,  since  the  fields  of  the  two 
seem  difficult  to  separate.  With  the  exception  of  a  few  such 
!  errors  the  popular  conception  of  philosophy,  as  the  science  of 
the  permanent,  is  justly  correct.  This  search  for  the  perma- 
nent may  carry  us  into  many  regions,  but  it  is  still  philosophy 
so  long  as  the  object  of  the  quest  is  clearly  before  us. 


THE   MEANING   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  15 

Two  Attitudes  towards  Philosophy. — Throughout  the 
whole  history  of  our  subject  there  have  appeared  two  general 
attitudes  towards  philosophy,  each  of  which  has  had  its  classic 
representations.  These  may  be  briefly  summarized  as  the 
Humanistic  and  the  Naturalistic,  according  as  the  stress  of 
definition  is  laid  on  man  or  on  nature.  The  former  seeks  to 
explain  man  not  only  as  the  measure  but  also  as  the  centre  of 
all  things.  The  latter  regards  him  as  merely  a  product  or 
insignificant  part  of  the  universal  processes  of  Nature. 

The  Humanistic  Attitude.- — It  has  been  the  favorite  cus- 
tom of  many  writers,  especially  those  who  have  approached 
philosophy  from  the  stand-points  of  morality  and  history,  to 
regard  man  as  the  central  figure  in  the  drama  of  nature  and 
to  consider  philosophy  as  simply  the  record  of  the  laws  of  his 
being  and  the  epitome  of  his  progress.  Such  views  are  charac- 
teristic of  all  ages  and  peoples.  This  humanistic  philosophy 
has  had  its  counterpart  in  the  man-like  gods  of  religion,  in 
poetry,  and  in  literature  generally.  It  is  this  stand-point  which 
led  Montaigne  to  quote  Cicero  as  saying  "that  to  Philosophy 
is  no  other  thing,  than  for  a  man  to  prepare  himself  to  death."  * 
When  Greek  philosophy  was  at  the  height  of  its  power  the 
attention  of  the  foremost  thinkers  was  directed  to  man.  Soc- 
rates is  said  to  have  declared  that  the  field  of  human  knowledge 
was  restricted  to  man  himself,  and  tradition  portrays  another 
thinker  of  that  period  as  saying  that  "  Man  was  the  measure 
of  all  things."  2  Again  at  the  beginning  of  modern  thought 
the  humanistic  tendencies  were  very  marked.  The  reaction 
against  the  traditional  customs  and  institutions  of  the  Middle 
Ages  showed  itself  in  an  over-emphasis  of  the  privileges  and 
dignity  of  the  individual  man,  accompanied  by  a  philosophy  to 
substantiate  such  views.  And  in  our  own  time  it  is  by  no 
means  uncommon  to  find  the  field  of  philosophy  confined  to 

1  Essays,  Florio's  translation,  Book  I.,  Chapter  xix. 

2  Protagoras  J   iravrwv  xprjfjid.T(av  perpov  avOpoiwos. 


16  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

human  action  and  its  problems  restricted  to  life,  the  soul  and 
its  immortality. 

The  Naturalistic  Attitude.  —  In  contrast  to  this  former 
attitude  towards  philosophy  there  has  always  existed  another 
and  far  broader  stand-point.  Even  from  the  time  of  the  earliest 
Greeks,  when  Thales  identified  the  world  with  water,  and 
Heraclitus  with  the  eternal  flux  of  fire,  there  have  always  been 
attempts  to  discover  the  original  nature  of  the  Universe.  These 
attempts  have  appeared  under  the  name  of  philosophy,  and  the 
object  of  their  search  has  been  the  goal  of  the  human  intellect. 
Philosophy  thus  appears  as  the  science  of  sciences,  which,  rec- 
ognizing the  office  and  necessary  place  of  every  field  of  knowl- 
edge, endeavors  to  harmonize  the  disparate  and  bring  unity 
into  the  farthest  recesses  of  Nature.  In  this  sense  philosophy 
i  becomes  strictly  the  science  of  nature, — when  this  term  is  inter- 
\  preted  to  mean  the  sum  of  all  things.  It  recognizes  the  contra- 
1  dictions  and  enigmas  that  surround  man  on  every  side  and  tries 
to  simplify  them.  In  this  struggle  with  the  almost  impossible 
the  nature  philosophy,  like  the  empirical  sciences,  breathes  its 
own  interpretation  into  nature,  suggests  its  own  hypotheses  and 
tests  them  in  the  court  of  common  experience.  It  is  thus  simi- 
lar to  the  sciences  themselves  in  the  general  attitude  towards 
nature,  but  far  broader  and  deeper  in  scope  than  any  one  of 
them,  since  it  is  concerned  with  these  very  principles  and  laws 
upon  which  all  possible  empirical  sciences  must  ultimately 
rest. 

A  Provisional  Definition. — We  have  just  mentioned  the 
difficulty  of  any  attempt  to  define  our  subject.  Yet  it  is  the 
undefinable  which  any  philosophy  must  conscientiously  fear. 
And  besides,  no  clear  treatment  of  philosophical  problems  is 
possible  unless  we  understand  their  general  character.  A 
definition  of  philosophy  cannot  be  so  broad  as  to  include  all 
possible  knowledge  within  it,  although  in  its  deepest  sense 
philosophy  truly  lies  at  the  foundation  of  knowledge;  nor,  on 
the  other  hand,  can  the  definition  be  so  narrow  as  to  exclude 


THE  MEANING  OF  PHILOSOPHY.         17 

some  of  the  special  problems.  A  provisional  definition  of  our 
subject  is  possible  only  if  we  succeed  in  uniting  the  two  atti- 
tudes already  referred  to — the  humanistic  and  the  natural- 
istic— with  the  traditional  understanding  of  the  term  as  the 
search  for  the  permanent  in  our  experience. 

The  humanistic  philosophies  sought  to  explain  the  inner 
nature  of  man,  the  peculiar  power  of  his  reason,  his  relation  to 
his  environment,  and  the  value  of  the  moral  law.  In  the 
treatment  of  all  these  problems  it  has  been  found  necessary 
to  compare  with  one  another  the  many  perceptions  and 
thoughts  which  together  comprise  the  conscious  life  of  man. 
In  this  comparison  the  philosopher  seeks  to  discover  the  unity 
of  life  behind  the  heterogeneity  of  our  experiences.  The  hu- 
manistic philosophy  is  thus  a  science  of  the  permanently  real 
in  man, — such  as  the  inner  laws  of  his  character.  And  from 
the  broader  range  of  the  nature  philosophies  this  same  pur- 
pose is  observable.  They  seek  to  unfold  the  connection  between 
the  human  mind  and  the  Absolute  Eeason,  the  unity  of  phe- 
nomena and  the  harmony  of  natural  law. 

In  both  of  these  attitudes  there  seems  to  be  this  common 
element, — they  each  seek  for  a  unity.  In  one  it  is  the  unity  of 
human  life,  while  in  the  other  it  is  the  unity  of  nature.  And 
besides  this  inquiry  for  the  ultimate  unity  of  things,  there  are 
two  other  characteristics  observable  in  all  the  humanistic  and 
nature  philosophies.  These  are  the  methods  by  which  a  unity 
may  be  discovered  and  4he  starting-point  which  furnishes  the 
requisite  material.  The  former  is  the  reason,  the  latter  is 
experience.  In  whatever  form  and  under  whatever  outward 
conditions  any  system  of  philosophy  has  appeared,  it  is  pos- 
sible only  through  the  medium  of  the  human  reason.  With  what 
ostentation  its  conclusions  may  be  displayed,  it  is  still  the 
reason  which  makes  this  mockery  possible;  and  in  whatever 
manner  we  seek  to  avoid  its  meshes,  it  still  holds  us  with  an 
irresistible  power.  On  the  other  hand,  this  is  equally  true  of 
experience.  Without  a  firm  foundation  in  the  world  of  mere 

2 


18  HISTORY   OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

fact  no  philosophy  can  discover  a  starting-point  for  its  specu- 
lations or  a  foothold  for  its  conclusions.  Even  to  deal  with 
pure  thought  it  is  necessary  to  consider  experience  as  its  object, 
else  the  concept  of  thought  itself  would  be  unattainable. 

In  view  of  these  common  elements,  which  we  observe  in 
every  system  of  philosophy  under  whatever  conditions  it  has 
appeared,  we  would  suggest  the  following  provisional  defini- 
tion,— Philosophy  is  the  rational  unification  of  the  facts  of 
experience.  Experience  is  the  starting-point,  reason  the  method 
or  efficient  cause,  and,  finally,  unity  is  the  ultimate  purpose  of 
all  systems  of  philosophy.  And  this  is  universally  true,  whether 
we  consider  the  speculations  of  Hindoo,  Greek,  Anglo-Saxon, 
or  German. 

SCOPE  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

This  attempt  to  characterize  philosophy  as  if  concerned 
wholly  with  the  rational  unity  in  all  our  experience  may  seem 
at  first  sight  to  be  nothing  else  than  a  description  of  the  entire 
field  of  knowledge;  that  we  have  perhaps  given  an  undue 
prominence  to  our  subject  in  view  of  the  purpose  and  results 
of  both  natural  science  and  religion.  In  answer  to  this  criti- 
cism we  might  remark  that  by  defining  philosophy  as  the 
science  of  the  real  unity  in  our  experience  we  have  certainly 
raised  it  to  an  extremely  important  place,  yet  possibly  not 
greater  than  it  deserves;  but  we  have  by  no  means  exhausted 
the  whole  expanse  of  human  interests.  The  scope  of  philo- 
sophical studies  is  much  more  restricted  than  this  definition 
would  imply,  for  it  is  seldom  that  an  ultimate  unity  is  sought 
for  within  any  limited  range  of  our  experience.  Sometimes 
the  objective  or  non-mental  world,  sometimes  the  emotions 
and  not  the  reason,  receive  too  great  an  emphasis  to  admit  of 
a  place  within  its  clearly  marked  limits.  Undoubtedly  the 
scope  of  philosophical  studies  is  often  exaggerated  and  treated 
in  so  general  a  manner  as  to  include  almost  any  science  within 
its  horizon.  In  order  to  obtain  a  clear  appreciation  of  their 
definite  bounds  it  will  be  found  advisable  to  consider  the  dis- 


SCOPE   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  19 

tinctions  which  separate  this  field  from  the  natural  sciences  on 
the  one  hand  and  religion  on  the  other. 

Philosophy  Different  from  Science. — The  clearest  distinc- 
tion between  philosophy  and  the  physical  sciences  is  concerned 
with  the  treatment  of  material.  The  former  deals  only  with 
the  general  conceptions,  while  science  advances  by  considering 
the  smallest  and  simplest  details.  It  is  a  scientific  fact  that 
the  extinct  armadillo  resembles  the  modern  and  existing  species 
of  the  same  type  of  animal  in  all  respects  except  size,  that  the 
variability  of  the  light  of  the  star  Algol  occurs  periodically,  or 
that  the  colors  of  many  copper  salts  in  dilute  solution  are  near 
some  shade  of  blue.  An  extensive  array  of  such  facts  as  these 
constitute  the  special  sciences  of  biology,  astronomy,  and  chem- 
istry. They  are,  however,  far  from  being  facts  of  philosophy. 
The  generalizations  or  laws  upon  which  each  depends — evolu- 
tion, gravity,  and  the  ion  theory — may  very  well  find  a  place 
in  philosophy,  but  the  details  and  minute  facts  are  the  material 
of  science  alone. 

Another  distinction  of  a  similar  character  rests  upon  the 
division  of  labor.  Science  has  neither  the  time  nor  the  inclina- 
tion to  examine  its  presuppositions ;  it  prefers  to  take  the  world 
of  sense  perception  as  it  is  found,  without  trying  to  inquire  fur- 
ther into  its  true  nature.  Philosophy,  on  the  other  hand,  re- 
gards nothing  to  be  too  simple  or  apparent  for  investigation. 
It  delights  in  the  discarded  problems  of  science,  constructs 
theories  of  its  own,  and  derives  general  explanations  which  are 
altogether  unintelligible  to  the  descriptive  scientist. 

A  less  important  distinction  between  these  two  fields  lies  in 
the  method  of  procedure.  The  scientist  takes  no  step  forward 
until  firmly  fortified  by  direct  experience.  He  has  constantly 
a  microscope,  a  telescope,  or  a  test-tube  in  his  hand  as  the 
sure  guide  to  knowledge.  In  other  words,  the  scientist  pro- 
gresses by  a  first-hand  acquaintance  with  a  limited  part  of  the 
vast  realm  of  nature.  Philosophy  is  too  broad  to  allow  of  such 
a  jDaethptji.  Jjk  j^ust  take  the  concerted  opinion  of  specialists 


20  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

when  it  requires  the  knowledge  of  some  fact,  rather  than  to 
instigate  separate  investigations  itself.  The  philosopher 
accepts  the  results  accomplished  by  the  patient  investigations 
of  the  expert  astronomer  or  chemist.  He  looks  forth  upon  the 
vast  expanse  of  human  knowledge  as  if  from  some  high  emi- 
nence. The  extensive  panorama  spread  before  him,  while 
losing  the  details  and  close  definitions  of  a  nearer  view,  gains 
in  width,  comprehensiveness,  and  generality.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  followers  of  the  special  sciences  search  with  con- 
scientious minuteness  all  the  little  by-ways  of  knowledge,  bring- 
ing into  view  the  details,  yet  remaining  ignorant  of  what  is 
beyond  their  limited  scope. 

Philosophy  Different  from  Religion.  —  Ever  since  the 
earliest  dawn  of  human  history  man  has  been  a  religious  being. 
Modern  science  is  ignorant  of  a  race  of  men  so  ancient  or  so 
remote  that  they  are  devoid  of  any  form  of  religion.  It  is  the 
strongest  and  simplest  bond  which  harmonizes  civilized  man 
with  the  primitive  savage.  Through  the  prominence  of  emo- 
tions it  points  to  a  lower  plane  of  life,  yet  at  the  same  time  it 
raises  man  to  the  highest  level  of  intellectual  achievement 
through  the  concept  of  a  Personified  Infinite.  From  the  rudest 
condition  of  man  we  learn  that  science  and  philosophy  were  at 
one  time  identical  with  religion.  It  was  only  through  a  process 
of  slow  differentiation  that  each  gradually  acquired  an  indi- 
viduality of  its  own.  It  is  therefore  very  natural  that  phi- 
losophy and  religion  should  have  much  in  common,  and  that 
many  of  the  questions  investigated  by  philosophy  should  have 
a  corresponding  place  in  religion. '  This  apparent  identity  of 
both  origin  and  subject-matter  has  often  led  to  a  confusion 
of  aim  and  an  ignorance  of  the  fundamental  distinction  which 
separates  them.  To  make  this  clearer  it  is  necessary  to  indi- 
cate briefly  the  psychic  basis  of  religion,  and  to  point  out  the 
elements  that  constitute  its  mental  foundations  as  well  as  the 
side  of  human  character  to  which  it  appeals. 

The  problem  of  the  mental  origin  of  religion  is  one  of 


SCOPE   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  21 

extreme  complexity.  It  has  received  considerable  attention 
from  those  who  have  endeavored  to  treat  religion  from  an  ana- 
lytic stand-point  and  explain  the  laws  which  underlie  the  relig- 
ious life.  Sometimes  religion  is  based  on  the  emotions  alone,  as 
in  the  instance  of  Friedrich  Schleiermacher,  a  celebrated  Ger- 
man thinker  of  the  early  part  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Be- 
ligion  to  him  was  a  feeling  of  absolute  dependence  on  the  uni- 
verse personified  as  God.  Again  there  are  many  philosophers 
who  regard  the  emotional  elements  of  religion  as  the  outward 
covering  of  a  purely  rational  centre.  With  such  the  synthetic 
powers  of  the  reason  are  alone  responsible  for  all  the  elements 
of  religious  life.  Both  theories  are  alike  narrow  in  so  far  as 
each  neglects  the  aspect  made  prominent  by  the  other.  The 
former  forgets  that  feeling  alone  can  never  attain  the  concept 
of  the  Infinite,  while  the  latter  disregards  the  obvious  fact  that 
religion  is  always  accompanied  by  an  emotional  feeling  towards 
God  or  Nature.  Could  we  look  back  into  the  past  and  see  early 
man  at  the  time  when  he  first  became  conscious  of  the  vast 
complexity  of  his  environment,  one  would  find  wonder  and 
fear  intermingled  with  an  instructive  desire  to  understand  his 
surroundings  as  the  chief  expressions  of  his  attitude  towards 
nature.  Wonder  and  fear  would  appear  only  at  times  of  un- 
usual occurrences,  such  as  earthquakes  or  death;  whereas  the 
desire,  gradually  becoming  instinctive,  to  explain  and  under- 
stand this  world  would  attain  complete  mastery  over  the  mind 
of  the  primitive  man.  We  cannot,  therefore,  sympathize  with 
Lucretius  in  his  attempt  to  found  religion  on  fear,  nor  with  a 
modern  hypothesis  that  it  is  based  on  wonder. 

The  easiest  and  simplest  explanation  of  the  universe  which 
the  savage  mind  could  bring  forth  would  be  a  reflection  of  his 
own  consciousness  in  the  external  world.  Every  physical  event, 
such  as  the  rise  of  a  river,  a  volcano,  or  even  the  growth  of  a 
plant,  would  be  the  outward  manifestation  of  a  consciousness 
similar  to  his  own.  Towards  the  conscious  Being  would  arise 
feelings  of  awe  and  respect,  since  its  all-powerful  hand  con- 


22  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

trolled  the  fortunes  of  the  child-like  savage.  The  first  rudi- 
ments of  religion  would  thus  spring  from  this  instinctive 
demand  for  an  explanation  of  the  universe  intelligible  to  the 
poetic  mind  of  primitive  man.  These  two  elements,  the  in- 
stinctive feeling  and  the  rational  explanation  of  the  world, 
have  always  remained  of  paramount  importance  in  any  form  of 
religion,  and  they  may  be  regarded  as  salient  points  in  our 
comparison  of  philosophy  and  religion. 

We  earlier  characterized  philosophy  as  a  study  of  universals 
with  the  special  object  of  bringing  harmony  into  the  variety 
of  our  world.  Explanation  of  the  world  is  thus  a  common 
element  in  both  philosophy  and  religion.  But  here  the  simili- 
tude ends.  In  religion  there  is  also  the  element  of  feeling 
towards  God,  or  the  Power  of  the  world  personified.  This 
is  entirely  lacking  in  philosophy.  There  is  absolutely  no  emo- 
tional expression  of  any  kind  towards  its  results;  no  feeling 
of  reverence  towards  the  Universal  of  universals.  It  is  very 
possible  that  philosophy  may  develop  a  concept  by  no  means 
unlike  the  omniscient  God  of  the  higher  forms  of  religion, 
but  such  a  concept  exists  for  philosophy  as  an  object  only.  It 
develops  from  a  rational  analysis  of  the  universe, — nothing 
more. 

PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

These  broad  generalizations  of  the  nature  of  philosophy  are 
altogether  too  indefinite  for  ordinary  purposes.  It  has  been 
found  convenient  and  almost  necessary  to  divide  philosophy  as 
a  whole  into  numerous  branches  according  to  the  field  of 
experience  in  which  the  unity  is  sought.  The  development  of 
philosophy  as  well  as  science  has  been  characterized  by  the  in- 
crease in  number  of  these  special  fields  and  the  assertion  of  new 
problems  within  them.  In  general  form  each  is  concerned  with 
universalizing  some  aspect  of  the  world, — such,  for  instance, 
as  the  facts  of  mental  life  or  the  laws  controlling  moral  action. 
These  subdivisions  of  philosophy  are  intended  to  exhaust  the 
field  of  knowledge;  to  be  so  broad  as  to  afford  an  outline  for 


PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  23 

every  fact,  law,  or  science.  Owing  to  this  breadth  of  purpose 
philosophy  has  no  occasion  or  space  to  enter  minutely  into 
the  details  of  every  fact,  for  this  is  the  work  of  the  special 
sciences.  When  referring  to  any  single  experience  or  observa- 
tion it  relies  on  the  concerted  opinions  of  specialists.  Each 
branch  of  philosophy  is  content  with  harmonizing  the  facts  of 
extensive  observation  within  its  own  definite  boundaries. 

These  subbranches  of  philosophy  may  be  arranged  about  a 
centre,  which  may  be  regarded  as  the  basis  for  all  reference. 
This  centre  of  philosophy  comprises  the  empirical  science  of 
the  various  mental  states,  the  theory  of  knowledge,  and  prob- 
lem of  ultimate  reality.  In  addition  to  these  subjects  there 
are  on  the  one  side  the  various  investigations  concerning  the 
ideals  which  the  human  mind  may  define  for  itself,  and  on  the 
other  side  the  philosophical  analysis  of  the  laws  and  presuppo- 
sitions involved  in  science,  history,  and  religion. 

Psychology. — The  most  consistent  approach  to  the  various 
subdivisions  of  philosophical  inquiry  may  be  made  through 
those  subjects  which  are  of  fundamental  importance  to  phi- 
losophy as  a  whole,  leaving  until  later  the  consideration  of 
human  ideals,  science,  history,  and  religion.  No  investigation, 
however,  can  take  place  unless  it  is  in  some  way  connected 
with  the  human  mind,  no  fact  or  process  can  be  considered 
unless  it  can  be  related  to  a  mental  state.  On  this  account  it 
might  seem  as  if  the  most  apparent  demand  on  the  part  of 
philosophy  in  general  would  arise  from  a  desire  to  under- 
stand these  mental  states  as  they  are  in  themselves.  Such 
a  science  of  mental  states  is  called  Psychology.  It  is  in  fact  a 
natural  science  like  physics  or  chemistry,  since  it  regards  the 
mental  states  as  the  empirical  data  which  it  must  describe  and 
explain,  only  the  importance  of  mental  states  to  philosophy 
in  general  seems  to  warrant  a  consideration  of  psychology 
in  this  connection.  Psychology  does  not  concern  itself  with 
the  source  or  ultimate  nature  of  these  mental  states,  but  simply 
describee  our  thoughts,  feelings,  and  sensations,  endeavoring 


24  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

perhaps  to  explain  the  one  by  the  other,  but  never  pursuing 
the  investigation  beyond  the  limits  of  an  empirical  science. 

Element  of  Psychology.  —  Physical  science  recognizes  a 
certain  hypothetical  unit,  called  the  atom,  as  the  base  for  all 
its  investigations.  In  the  same  manner  psychology  accepts  a 
provisional  unit  which  may  be  designated  as  sensation.  This  is 
the  simple  unthinking  element  derived  from  the  action  of  the 
senses  on  the  external  world;  it  is  the  psychological  genesis 
of  all  the  higher  states  of  consciousness.  When  the  mind  rec- 
ognizes the  existence  of  a  sensation  we  have  a  perception  or  a 
conscious  sensation.  And  when  again  these  perceptions  are 
joined  together  by  comparison,  association,  or  abstraction, 
there  arises  the  flow  of  feelings,  ideas,  and  thoughts  of  which 
the  conscious  mind  is  composed. 

Psycho-physical  Parallelism. — As  an  explanation  of  the 
apparent  similitude  between  this  series  of  mental  states,  which 
incessantly  flows  through  the  conscious  mind,  and  another 
series  of  phenomena,  physical  in  character,  which  takes  place 
within  the  nervous  system  and  the  brain,  the  psychologist  has 
invented  an  hypothesis  known  as  the  Psycho-physical  Parallel- 
ism. This  presupposes  that  for  every  change  in  the  mind  or 
psychic  world  there  is  a  corresponding  change  in  the  world  of 
material  phenomena,  yet  there  is  only  parallelism  and  no 
causal  connection  between  these  two  series  of  mental  and  phys- 
iological states.  When  my  mind  perceives  a  flash  of  light,  for 
instance,  the  hypothesis  demands  that  there  must  have  been 
a  series  of  changes  in  the  physical  world  which  ran  parallel 
to  the  conscious  mental  processes  of  light  perception, — as  the 
excitation  and  accompanying  chemical  changes  upon  the  retina 
of  the  eye,  the  optic  nerve,  and  the  optical  lobes  of  the  brain. 
For  the  purposes  of  exposition  we  may  imagine  two  series  of 
phenomena,  each  controlled  by  its  own  laws  and  yet  each  series 
absolutely  separated  from  the  other.  Now  imagine  that  for 
every  point  or  event  in  one  series  there  is  always  a  point  or 
event  in  the  other,  but  yet  at  the  same  time  the  two  corre- 


PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  25 

spending  events  have  no  direct  causal  influence  on  one  another. 
The  laws  and  the  terms  of  one  series  are  absolutely  independ- 
ent of  those  in  the  other  series,  yet  there  is  a  constant  corre- 
spondence, part  for  part.  Upon  some  such  hypothesis  as  this 
the  empirical  science  of  psychology  is  able  to  deal  with  the 
mental  facts  strictly  as  they  are,  without  endangering  its 
conclusions  by  any  positive  theory  of  the  relation  between  mind 
and  matter. 

This  parallelism  well  illustrates  a  rigid  distinction  which 
has,  until  recently,  prevailed  throughout  the  whole  field  of  phi- 
losophy,— the  opposition  of  subjective  to  objective,  the  self  to 
its  condition,  thought  to  its  content.  On  one  side  is  the  mind 
or  psychic  world,  restricted  entirely  to  the  mere  flow  of  feel- 
ings, thoughts,  or  ideas;  on  the  other  stands  the  physical 
world,  including  all  the  objects  of  sense  as  well  as  our  own 
body,  nerves,  and  brain.  We  shall  see  later  how  the  true  rela- 
tion between  the  psychical  and  physical  world  becomes  a  ques- 
tion of  extreme  importance  throughout  the  history  of  modern 
philosophy. 

Epistemology. — Psychology,  as  we  have  seen,  deals  with  a 
description  of  the  mental  states  as  they  are  in  the  mind,  but 
does  not  concern  itself  with  their  origin.  It  is  thus  an  em- 
pirical science,  in  so  far  as  it  receives  the  given  facts  of  expe- 
rience without  seeking  to  determine  their  ultimate  nature. 
It  is  the  special  field  of  Epistemology  to  go  one  step  deeper 
than  psychology  and  discover  the  source  and  possibility  of  these 
mental  states.  It  thus  moves  in  the  direction  of  what  might 
be  called  the  presuppositions  of  empirical  psychology.  The 
investigations  of  epistemology  seek  to  explain  the  nature  and 
ultimate  origin  of  our  knowing  processes;  they  endeavor  to 
define  the  details  of  a  theory  of  knowledge. 

We  are  accustomed  to  regard  what  we  call  knowledge  or 
facts  as  fundamental  to  our  conscious  life.  This  assumption 
early  checked  all  attempts  to  go  deeper  than  the  simple  expe- 
rience, and  it  is  only  within  a  comparatively  recent  time  that 


26  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

a  special  branch  of  philosophy  has  been  assigned  to  examine 
the  character  of  our  thinking  process.  When  we  say  that  the 
"  whole  is  greater  than  any  of  its  parts,"  or  that  a  "  straight 
line  is  the  shortest  distance  between  two  points,"  we  assert 
what  we  consider  a  fact  of  knowledge;  and  it  is  the  task  of 
epistemology  to  consider  what  truth  there  is  in  such  an 
assumption  and  upon  what  basis  that  truth  depends.  Episte- 
mology is  especially  interested  in  what  might  be  called  the 

;  criterion  of  knowledge.  With  psychology,  this  branch  of  phi- 
losophy recognizes  that  the  given  experience,  as  we  know  it, 
is  all  the  original  material  that  the  human  mind  can  obtain, 
no  matter  how  complicated  a  system  of  knowledge  it  may  con- 

\  struct.  With  this  in  view  it  naturally  inquires  why  one  expe- 
rience should  become  a  fact  of  knowledge,  while  another  should 

(be  discarded  as  the  product  of  illusion  or  imagination.  The 
statement  "that  the  earth  revolves  around  the  sun"  is  a  fact 
of  knowledge,  while  the  contrary  statement  "that  the  sun 
revolves  around  the  earth"  is  considered  an  illusory  experience. 
Such  a  comparison  suggests  that  perhaps  the  reason  is  instru- 
mental in  the  transition  from  mere  experience  to  knowledge, 

land  epistemology  seeks  to  determine  the  exact  relation  be- 

.  tween  sense  and  reason  in  the  constitution  of  true  knowledge. 

Empiricism. — The  central  problem  of  epistemology  is  just 
this  question  of  the  component  elements  of  knowledge;  as  to 
whether  it  is  entirely  derived  from  the  sensuous  impressions  of 
the  external  world  on  the  one  hand,  or,  on  the  other,  whether 
it  consists  of  both  elements  obtained  from  the  mind  and  from 
sensation.  The  former  theory,  which  regards  all  of  our  knowl- 
edge as  the  direct  product  of  experience,  or  sensuous  impres- 
sions, is  called  Empiricism.  It  is  the  favorite  theme  of  those 
writers  who  seek  to  explain  the  complexity  of  thought  by  the 
apparent  simplicity  of  human  sensations.  Such  a  view  gives 
to  the  reason  and  understanding  nq^greater  dignity  or  use  than 
that  of  a  blank  tablet  upon  which  experience  writes  its  facts 
and  from  which  it  draws  its  conclusions.  The  truths  of  science 


PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  27 

are  such  only  because  of  long-continued  experience,  and  even 
the  feeling  of  assured  knowledge  or  necessary  truth  is  derived 
merely  from  repeated  experiences  and  recurring  series  of 
phenomena. 

Rationalism.  —  However  plausible  this  empirical  view  of 
knowledge  may  appear,  there  has  always  existed  beside  it 
another  theory  of  an  opposite  character.  This  latter  gives 
to  the  power  of  reason  the  higher  and  more  important  position 
in  the  constitution  of  knowledge.  Rationalism,  the  second  of 
the  epistemological  theories,  recognizes  the  value  of  the  human 
reason  and  believes  it  to  be  the  only  criterion  with  which  man 
is  able  to  determine  truth.  It  is  possible  that  reason  may  lead 
us  astray,  but  rationalism  places  it  in  this  exalted  position  so 
long  as  it  is  impossible  to  find  a  surer  method  for  the  dis- 
covery of  true  knowledge.  The  error  of  the  classic  examples 
of  rationalism  has  been  a  tendency  to  disregard  the  all-impor- 
tant truth  that  the  starting-point  of  our  facts  and  our  sciences 
is  in  the  simple  experience  of  sense  impressions.  The  thinkers 
of  this  school  have  been  prone  to  erect  complicated  systems 
of  philosophy  without  due  regard  to  the  facts  of  observation 
and  sense,  forgetting  that  an  over-emphasis  on  reason  can  very 
easily  lead  beyond  the  limits  of  philosophy  and  into  the  field 
of  the  imagination. 

Metaphysics.  —  We  found  that  epistemology  dealt  with 
what  was  presupposed  by  psychology.  There  is  also  another 
branch  of  philosophy  which  is  concerned,  not  only  with  the 
presuppositions  of  epistemology,  but  also  with  those  of  every 
other  science,  subject,  or  fact.  This  basis  of  philosophy,  or 
rather  science  of  the  ultimate  nature  of  the  universe,  is  called 
Metaphysics,  or  ontology.  There  are  three  general  methods  of 
characterizing  metaphysics,  each  of  which  exhibits  its  funda- 
mental nature  in  a  different  manner.  One  can  define  it  as  the 
base  of  all  the  physical  sciences, — as  that  branch  of  philosophy 
which  has  as  its  subject-matter  the  presuppositions  and  foun- 
dation-elements of  all  the  other  sciences.  The  reality  of 


28  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

"matter"  and  "energy"  are  presupposed  by  physics  and  the 
phenomena  of  life  by  biology;  then,  too,  the  concepts  of  time, 
space,  and  causality  find  an  almost  necessary  place  in  every 
science.  All  these  fundamental  ideas,  the  nature  of  which  is 
apparently  so  simple  that  they  are  taken  for  granted  by  the  less 
critical  sciences,  are  carefully  examined  and  compared  by 
metaphysics.  Even  the  sensations  and  the  reason,  the  exist- 
ence of  which  was  presupposed  by  both  psychology  and  episte- 
mology,  are  subjected  to  unrelenting  criticism  by  this  branch 
of  philosophy.  Metaphysics  asks  what  is  the  ultimate  nature 
of  mind  and  matter,  what  is  the  meaning  of  pure  existence  and 
of  simple  being  without  any  definable  character.  Any  prob- 
lem which  is  insoluble  in  the  ordinary  development  of  a  special 
science  is  relegated  to  metaphysics  with  the  assurance  that 
here,  if  anywhere,  it  can  find  place,  if  not  an  explanation. 

There  is  still  another  way  of  looking  at  metaphysics, — 
namely,  as  the  final  unity  of  all  branches  of  philosophy.  It 
was  earlier  suggested  that  the  general  characteristic  of  each 
of  the  subdivisions  of  our  subject  was  the  demand  for  a 
rational  unity  in  the  facts  of  our  experience.  Employing  this 
same  phrase,  one  may  regard  metaphysics  as  that  branch  of 
philosophy  which  harmonizes  into  a  consistent  whole  the  nar- 
rower unities  of  all  the  other  subdivisions  of  philosophy.  It 
has  therefore  for  its  material  general  ideas  of  an  extremely 
abstract  nature,  thus  making  very  difficult  the  style  of  its 
literature. 

There  is  a  third  stand-point  which  we  may  assume  in  de- 
fining the  nature  of  metaphysics.  We  may  regard  it  as  the 
science  of  reality,  employing  this  word  in  its  broadest  signifi- 
cance. According  to  such  a  view  the  goal  of  metaphysical 
research  is  the  determination  of  what  is  absolutely  Eeal.  By 
this  term  is  meant  that  something  which  is  so  ultimately  deep, 
so  true,  and  so  essentially  fundamental  as  to  include  within  it 
the  endless  variety  of  all  possible  experience.  This  reality  of 
the  metaphysician  is  so  broad  and  fundamental  that  it  is  often 


I        PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  29 

spoken  of  as  something  which  requires  its  own  existence,  of 
such  a  character  that  the  world  would  be  inconceivable  without 
it.  The  question  of  such  a  Eeality  lying  behind  all  phenomena 
is  the  same  question  as  the  Unity  of  all  unities,  referred  to  in 
a  previous  paragraph.  The  conception  of  a  Unity  which  un- 
derlies this  world  of  changing  experience  would  be  so  much  the 
expression  of  all  else  that  it  could  only  be  regarded  as  the 
ultimate  Eeality.  And  conversely,  should  metaphysics  define 
what  was  sufficiently  real  to  include  all  lesser  reality,  it  is  ob- 
viously necessary  that  it  must  contain  or  unite  every  possible 
element  of  experience.  Absolute  reality  and  ultimate  unity 
are  metaphysically  synonymous. 

Monism. — We  have  just  mentioned  that  metaphysics  seeks 
to  discover  the  unitary  real  lying  at  the  base  of  the  universe. 
The  school  of  thinkers  who  believe  that  this  real  is  a  single, 
simple,  undifferentiated  unity  may  be  called  Monists,  in  con- 
tradistinction to  the  Pluralists,  who  affirm  the  mulitiplicity  of 
the  world  elements.  The  Monists  reduce  both  mind  and  mat-  | 
ter  to  either  one  or  the  other,  or  else  to  a  something  more  j 
fundamental  than  either.  For  example,  the  religious  teacher 
who  characterized  God  as  a  Divinity,  "  For  in  Him  we  live, 
and  move,  and  have  our  being"  (Acts  xvii.  28),  was  asserting 
the  monistic  metaphysics,  for  he  meant  to  make  the  idea  of 
God  so  universal  as  to  include  every  phase  of  man  and  nature. 
And  again,  when  Thales  asserted  that  water,  and  Anaximenes 
that  air,  were  the  primary  elements  of  the  world,  each  recog- 
nized a  monistic  metaphysic.  Science  approaches  this  stand- 
point when  it  regards  some  form  of  energy  as  the  condition  to 
which  all  physical  phenomena  may  be  reduced ;  or  again  when 
it  seeks  to  determine  a  unitary  element  to  explain  the  periodic 
variation  of  the  atomic  weights. 

Pluralism. — Pluralism,  that  theory  of  the  universe  which 
regards  several  fundamental  elements  to  be  equally  real,  is 
by  no  means  as  common  as  monism  in  modern  thought.  It\ 
may  take  the  form  of  dualism,  which  believes  in  two  final  real- 


30  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 


ities,  such  as  mind  and  matter,  —  eTtfoy  and  vb),  —  thought 
and  extension.  Again,  there  is  a  much  more  complicated  form 
of  pluralism,  which  sometimes  provides  an  infinite  collection 
of  Eeals.  A  Greek  thinker,  Empedocles,  tried  to  explain  the 
world  as  the  interrelation  of  water,  air,  earth,  and  fire;  while 
his  follower  Anaxagoras  increased  the  number  of  these  ele- 
ments indefinitely  by  regarding  them  as  qualities. 

Theology.  —  Even  this  brief  review  of  metaphysics  would 
be  incomplete  without  some  reference  to  the  traditional  mean- 
ing of  the  term,  as  it  comes  down  to  us  from  the  mediaeval 
schools.  During  the  Middle  Ages  the  interest  taken  in  these 
same  questions,  which  we  have  here  referred  to  metaphysics, 
was  centred  about  the  conception  of  God.  These  philosophers  — 
or,  rather,  theologians,  as  they  would  now  be  called  —  were 
concerned  wholly  with  the  problem  of  the  nature  of  the  Deity. 
Like  metaphysics,  the  end  sought  was  the  ultimate  unity  of 
the  universe,  but  they  interpreted  this  unity  in  terms  of  a 
Divine  Personality.  This  science,  which  might  include  almost 
everything  within  it,  was  called  Theology. 

Confusion  will  undoubtedly  arise  as  to  the  exact  relation 
between  theology  and  metaphysics  on  the  one  hand,  and  theol- 
ogy and  religion  on  the  other.  The  aim  of  metaphysics,  we 
have  just  discovered,  is  the  hypothetical  unity  of  the  two  enti- 
ties, the  self  and  nature.  This  unity  of  the  two  is  a  matter 
of  reason  alone;  it  is  developed  by  the  philosopher  as  the 
most  rational  explanation  of  the  whole  field  of  man  and  the 
world.  The  God  of  theology,  on  the  other  hand,  is  nothing  else 
than  this  metaphysical  unity  transformed  by  the  addition  of 
personal  attributes  into  a  Subject  of  divine  and  omniscient 
power.  The  foundations  of  theology  and  the  evidence  upon 
which  its  conclusions  rest  are  identical  with  metaphysics,  only 
the  result  of  the  latter  is  abstract  and  colorless,  while  the 
Unity  of  theology  is  a  conscious  Being  who  personifies  the 
ideals  of  mankind. 

When  this  Divine  Being  of  theology  is  regarded  as  an 


f  UNIVERSITY  J 
PROBLEMS   (X  PHILOSOPHY.  31 

omnipotent  Power  to  whom  all  human  beings  owe  devotion  and 
praise,  then  the  Personality  of  theology  becomes  the  God  of 
religion.  Thus  religion  is  the  emotional  feeling  towards  the 
personal  God,  who  sympathizes  with  the  limitations  and  pas- 
sions of  man.  The  connection  between  these  three  subjects 
may  be  briefly  stated  as  follows:  Metaphysics  constructs  a 
purely  rational  Unity  of  man  and  nature;  this  is  interpreted 
in  terms  of  Personality  by  theology;  and,  finally,  religion 
gives  to  it  the  elements  of  sympathy  and  emotional  devotion. 

These  then,  Psychology,  Epistemology  and  Metaphysics, 
form  the  three  central  and  primary  branches  of  philosophy. 
The  first  concerns  itself  with  the  feelings  and  ideas  of  the 
mind  without  considering  their  origin;  epistemology,  on  the 
contrary,  seeks  to  explain  the  origin  of  these  ideas ;  while 
metaphysics  inquires  into  the  reality  and  the  nature  of  that 
origin.  The  three  thus  form  a  graded  sequence  in  which  the 
last  member  sums  up  and  qualifies  the  other  two. 

The  Normative  Sciences. — But,  aside  from  psychology, 
epistemology,  and  metaphysics,  there  are  numerous  side 
branches  and  less  general  topics  which,  although  important, 
have  not  the  primary  nature  of  the  three  above  mentioned. 
The  more  prominent  of  these  latter  are  the  Normative  Sciences, 
which  are  concerned  with  the  unification  of  human  ideals.  The 
distinguishing  feature  of  these  subdivisions  of  philosophy  lies 
in  the  mobility  of  their  material, — the  use  of  the  concept  of 
ought  or  change  towards  some  ideal. 

The  three  branches  of  philosophy  which  we  have  summarized 
above  are  concerned  with  what  is  rather  than  what  should  be. 
Psychology  takes  the  mental  states  as  they  are,  without  any 
reference  to  what  they  might  have  been.  Epistemology  and 
metaphysics  are  equally  the  sciences  of  facts,  and  not  of  possi- 
bilities. But  the  normative  sciences  deal  with  laws  and  for- 
mulae for  the  accomplishment  of  certain  specific  ends.  They 
tell  us  how  we  must  or  rather  ought  to  act  in  order  to  reach 
the  goals  we  seek  to  attain.  Their  common  characteristic  is 


32  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

the  purposeful  or  ideological  character  of  their  subject-matter 
and  the  primacy  of  the  concept  "ought."  Philosophy  as  a 
whole  is  concerned  with  universals  and  universalizing;  and 
the  normative  sciences,  like  the  other  subjects  of  philosophy, 
recognize  this  quest  for  the  universal.  Only  instead  of  con- 
ducting their  search  in  the  realm  of  given  fact,  the  normative 
sciences  seek  for  the  universal  behind  the  phenomena  of  action 
and  purpose.  They  inquire  into  the  laws  which  we  ought  to 
observe  in  order  to  attain  the  end  in  view,  be  it  truth,  goodness, 
or  beauty.  These  laws  are  considered  universal,  since  they  are 
to  be  regarded  as  valid  for  all  similar  circumstances  of  action. 
The  normative  sciences  are  classified  according  to  the  nature 
of  the  end  in  view,  whether  it  is  truth  in  thinking,  morality  in 
conduct,  or  beauty  in  art.  It  is  Logic  which  prescribes  the 
universal  laws  for  the  attainment  of  truth,  Ethics  for  the  reali- 
zation of  moral  goodness,  and  ^Esthetics  for  the  portrayal  and 
judgment  of  the  beautiful. 

Logic. — The  first  definite  attempt  to  collect  and  arrange 
the  laws  of  right  thinking  is  to  be  found  in  the  works  of 
Aristotle,  a  Greek  of  the  fourth  century  before  Christ.  Aristotle 
attempted  to  prescribe  the  principles  and  rules  by  the  ob- 
servance of  which  the  human  intellect  might  hope  to  reach  the 
desired  end  of  truth.  During  the  Middle  Ages  the  study 
of  logic  was  regarded  as  the  necessary  introduction  to  a  com- 
prehension of  philosophy,  and  it  was  in  the  mediaeval  schools 
that  the  principles  of  logic  were  definitely  formulated  into 
a  system.  During  recent  times  the  subject  has  been  much 
amplified,  especially  on  account  of  the  application  of  mathe- 
matics to  the  thinking  process,  through  the  efficient  labors  of 
the  Englishman,  Boole.  At  the  present  time  the  meaning  of 
logic  has  assumed  new  importance,  owing  to  its  reference  to 
the  form  of  thought,  rather  than  to  the  ideal  of  correct  think- 
ing. This  view  is  far  preferable  to  the  traditional  interpre- 
tation, since  it  gives  to  logic  a  scientific  value  and  enables  it 
to  define  as  its  special  field  the  analysis,  definition,  and  inter- 


PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  33 

pretation  of  abstract  concepts,  such  as  quantity  or  number. 
Logic  thus  becomes  a  supplement  to  metaphysics;  the  one 
deals  with  the  form  of  thought,  the  other  with  the  reality  of 
its  content. 

Axioms  of  Logic. — We  have  said  that  logic  treats  of 
the  universal  laws  of  right  thinking.  There  must,  however, 
be  certain  elements,  or  rather  axiomatic  principles,  which 
logic  must  regard  as  fundamental  to  the  process  of  thought. 
These  are  generally  recognized  to  be  three  in  number,  and 
may  be  briefly  stated  as  follows:  A  thing  is  identical  with 
itself, — A  —  A, — it  must  either  exist  or  not  exist,  and,  finally, 
the  principle  of  contradiction  which  requires  that  an  assertion 
and  its  contrary  cannot  be  both  true  at  the  same  time.  These 
three  principles,  apparently  simple,  but  hardly  as  self-evident 
as  might  appear  at  first  sight,  are  regarded  as  the  lowest  terms 
of  our  thinking  process.  They  occupy  in  logic  the  same  posi- 
tion that  the  axioms  of  Euclid  do  in  geometry,  or  the  simple 
process  of  counting  in  arithmetic. 

Rules  of  Logic. — From  these  principles  as  a  starting-point 
it  has  been  possible  to  work  out  certain  laws,  like  the  formulae 
of  mathematics,  which  express  in  a  general  way  the  rules 
which  must  be  observed  in  order  to  think  consistently.  When 
these  laws  are  neglected  there  arise  certain  errors  or  fallacies 
which  are  the  types  of  erroneous  thinking.  As  an  example  of 
fallacious  reasoning  consider  these  statements, — "  All  apple- 
trees  are  organisms  and  all  pear-trees  are  organisms;"  there- 
fore, "all  pear-trees  are  apple-trees,  because  two  things  equal 
to  the  same  thing  must  be  equal  to  each  other/'  The  error 
here  lies  in  the  fact  that  neither  apple-trees  nor  pear-trees 
exhaust  the  class  of  organisms,  which  is  tacitly  assumed  in 
the  conclusion.  This  fallacy  has  a  special  name,  which  depends 
on  the  fact  that  neither  premise  refers  to  all  organisms. 

Methods  of  Logic. — Thought  has  sometimes  been  defined 
as  the  process  of  drawing  correct  conclusions  from  given  data. 
One  will  readily  perceive,  however,  that  some  conclusions  seem 

3 


34  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

to  possess  a  greater  generality  or  extension  than  others.  It  is 
possible  to  distinguish  two  ways  in  which  we  may  proceed  in 
arriving  at  the  results  of  thought, — namely,  from  the  general 
to  the  specific  or  from  the  specific  fact  to  the  general  principle. 
The  laws  governing  the  former  method  comprise  deductive 
logic,  and  the  latter  inductive  logic.  For  example,  the  geome- 
ter tells  us  as  a  general  fact  that  the  radii  of  a  sphere  are  all 
equal  in  length.  From  this  general  statement  it  may  be  de- 
duced, according  to  the  laws  of  deductive  logic,  that  all  the 
radii  of  a  certain  rubber  ball  are  practically  equal  in  length, 
as  well  as  the  fact  that  all  the  lines  to  the  centre  of  the  earth — 
if  it  were  a  perfect  sphere — would  be  equal  to  each  other.  In 
the  same  way  we  employ  deductive  logic  when  we  assert  that 
a  certain  block  of  granite  not  yet  quarried  possesses  weight, 
knowing  that  all  stones,  including  the  granite,  have  weight. 

We  have  stated  that  it  is  necessary  to  start  with  some  gen- 
eral or  rather  universal  statement  in  order  to  proceed  accord- 
ing to  deductive  logic,  but  to  determine  the  generality  or 
universality  of  a  statement  the  opposite  or  inductive  method  is 
required.  This  latter  process  of  reasoning  begins  by  consider- 
ing a  vast  number  of  particular  cases  and  from  them  deter- 
mines the  general  law,  or  rule,  which  includes  them  all.  The 
inductive  method  is  employed  in  science,  where  the  general  law 
is  inferred  from  many  experiments.  Thus  from  a  vast  num- 
ber of  observations  concerning  moving  bodies  the  general  law 
of  gravity  is  determined.  From  numerous  experiences  the 
mariner  feels  himself  able  to  predict  the  weather  with  some 
degree  of  accuracy.  Travellers  have  observed  that  many  Bush- 
men are  short  in  stature,  and  from  these  observations  we  assert 
as  a  scientific  fact  that  the  race  of  Bushmen,  as  a  whole,  is 
below  the  average  of  mankind  in  height.  All  these  examples 
of  induction  show  a  process  of  reasoning  from  the  particular 
to  the  general.  They  are  based  upon  the  presupposition  that 
the  mind  can  abstract  from  numerous  experiences  those  char- 
acteristics which  are  common  to  all.  Perfect  induction,  how- 


PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  35 

ever,  giving  rise  to  absolute  certainty,  is  possible  only  when 
every  particular  case  is  examined  before  the  general  law  is 
stated. 

Ethics. — The  second  of  the  normative  sciences  is  Ethics, 
dealing  with  the  ought  of  conduct.  Ethics  is  concerned  with 
the  questions  of  right  action,  the  meaning  of  goodness  and 
morality;  with  the  nice  distinctions  between  right  and  wrong 
and  the  true  value  of  life.  It  is  this  subject  of  inquiry  which 
has  evolved  the  classic  codes  of  the  moral  law,  such  as  those 
of  Moses,  Buddha,  Christ,  and  Mohammed.  These  have  been 
generally  embodied  in  some  religious  faith;  but  one  must 
very  carefully  distinguish  between  the  ethical  elements  of  the 
broad  world  religions  and  those  more  significant  portions 
which  refer  to  God  and  Nature.  No  more  common  error  exists 
in  the  popular  understanding  than  to  recognize  a  necessary 
connection  between  morality  and  religion.  The  two  subjects 
have  as  little  in  common  as  religion  and  logic,  or  religion  and 
psychology.  Tradition  has  united  the  science  of  conduct  with 
the  religious  belief  in  God,  but  fundamentally  they  deal  with 
altogether  different  sides  of  mental  life.  Owing  to  the  fact 
that  the  science  of  ethics  deals  with  perhaps  the  most  vital  of 
all  the  subjects  of  human  interest,  many  have  been  prone  to 
believe  that  it  constitutes  the  basis  of  philosophy.  This  was 
referred  to  in  an  earlier  part  of  this  chapter  as  the  humanistic 
attitude,  and  it  well  illustrates  the  importance  with  which  the 
science  of  conduct  is  regarded.  Among  the  early  Persians 
and  Hebrews  of  the  ancient  nations  the  interest  in  practical 
problems  formed  a  very  essential  element  in  national  life.  The 
period  of  Socrates,  Plato,  and  Aristotle  among  the  Greeks 
was  a  time  when  all  classes  were  deeply  concerned  with  ques- 
tions of  an  ethical  nature.  Among  the  thinkers  of  the  modern 
world  the  English,  up  to  the  last  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
have  shown  the  most  marked  interest  in  questions  of  conduct. 
Such  men  as  Locke,  Shaftesbury,  and  the  Mills  have  done  much 
for  the  advancement  of  philosophy  by  their  clear  and  concise 


36  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

statements  of  the  ethical  problems.  After  the  opening  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  however,  the  German  philosophers  were 
perhaps  the  most  original  in  this  direction.  Their  subtle 
analyses  and  acute  reasoning  tended  to  clear  away  the  mists 
that  had  been  gathering  about  the  foundations  of  ethics  since 
the  time  of  Plato. 

Axioms  of  Ethics. — Every  science  has  some  fundamental 
axioms.  In  geometry  they  are  always  stated,  without  proof, 
at  the  beginning  of  any  treatise  on  the  subject.  In  logic  we 
have  found  them  to  consist  of  those  simple  principles  which 
every  one  involuntarily  assumes  in  all  thinking.  The  science 
of  ethics  is  no  exception  to  the  general  rule,  only  here  we  deal 
with  a  presupposition  of  an  altogether  different  character.  We 
have  said  that  each  of  the  normative  sciences  is  concerned  with 
an  ought  of  some  kind, — with  a  comparison  between  what  is 
and  what  should  be.  With  ethics  it  is  the  moral  comparison 
between  the  present  act  and  some  future  course  of  conduct. 
This  comparison,  however,  assumes  that  the  person  can  or 
cannot  guide  himself  by  the  results  of  the  decision.  In  other 
words,  ethics  implicitly  affirms  that  man  possesses  the  power 
to  choose  between  two  or  more  courses  of  action.  It  seems  to 
be  the  common  assumption  among  us  all  that  each  person  has 
the  power  and  privilege  to  contribute  to  his  own  moral  devel- 
opment by  the  free  choice  of  action.  This  primal  axiom  of 
morality  is  the  ground  not  only  of  the  problems  of  ethics,  but 
also  of  our  simple  and  involuntary  judgments  of  praise  and 
blame.  Philosophy  has  denned  two  opposite  and  contradictory 
theories  regarding  human  action;  the  one  postulates  freedom, 
the  other  denies  it. 

Libertarianism.  —  The  former  and  more  natural  theory 
accepts  uncritically  the  dictates  of  one's  own  consciousness 
and  gives  to  the  human  personality  the  unique  dignity  of  de- 
termining its  own  course  of  conduct.  This  view,  which  appears 
under  the  name  of  Libertarianism,  declares  that  the  only  means 
of  answering  any  question  is  by  employing  to  its  full  extent  the 


PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  37 

authority  of  our  own  consciousness,  for  this  is  the  necessary 
setting  to  every  fact  of  life  and  experience.  And  the  liber- 
tarians further  declare  that  our  own  consciousness  leaves  no 
doubt,  but  that  at  every  moment  of  decision  each  person  is  at 
liberty  to  freely  choose  his  next  succeeding  act,  provided  there 
is  no  physical  hinderance  or  obstacle.  Furthermore,  it  is  con- 
tended by  the  "  f ree-willist"  that  unless  freedom  is  conceded 
to  man  the  conceptions  of  praise  and  blame  lose  their  force 
and  meaning.  It  is  freedom  that  distinguishes  man  from  the 
brute,  gives  dignity  to  life,  value  to  virtue,  and  authority  to 
the  conscience.  Without  it  man  would  be  like  the  mechanisms 
of  nature,  the  direct  product  of  circumstances,  and  a  mere 
function  of  his  environment. 

Determinism.  —  Black  as  this  picture  of  the  freedomless 
man  appears  when  painted  by  the  libertarian  brush,  there  are 
thinkers  who  accept  it  with  all  its  apparent  horrors.  Deter- 
minism is  the  opposite  of  libertarianism,  since  it  denies  the 
ancient  tradition  of  the  freedom  of  the  will.  This  school  of 
ethics  declares  that  we  have  no  right  to  distinctly  part  off  man 
from  the  rest  of  nature  and  declare  that  below  him  all  is  under 
the  control  of  blind  necessity,  whereas  this  being  alone  is  en- 
dowed with  the  heavenly  power  of  choice.  The  determinists 
do  not  hesitate  to  rank  man  with  all  the  other  members  of  the 
animal  kingdom,  and  refuse  to  recognize  any  other  difference 
than  that  of  degree  in  mental  power.  According  to  them  our 
every  act  is  the  resultant  of  two  irresistible  forces, — the  present 
environment  and  all  our  past  actions  as  summed  up  in  what 
might  be  called  character.  It  is  the  present  environment  which 
unfolds  to  us  the  various  possible  lines  of  conduct;  and  it  is 
the  individual  character,  personifying  for  that  moment  our 
past  actions  and  the  lives  of  an  indefinite  series  of  ances- 
tors,— with  their  good  and  evil  actions,  their  instincts,  and 
their  passions, — which  irresistibly  guides  the  moment  of  deci- 
sion. A  tree  is  stunted  and  ill-shaped  because  of  an  unhealthy 
seed  or  decadent  conditions  of  growth;  while  another  of  the 


38  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

same  species  is  healthy  and  beautiful  to  look  at  because  of 
opposite  conditions.  The  determinists  contend  that  the  varia- 
tions in  human  character  and  conduct  are  the  result  of  similar 
variations  in  inheritance  and  environment.  The  human  plant 
prospers  and  grows  beautiful  in  character  and- life  because  of 
circumstances  over  which  it  has  absolutely  no  control.  For 
this  reason,  if  for  no  other,  the  ideas  of  praise  and  blame,  of 
sin  and  virtue,  have  no  other  meaning  than  that  of  maturity 
or  decadence.  Pity,  sympathy,  honor,  and  love  have  no  exalted 
place  in  determinism,  especially  in  its  classic  examples.  All 
is  nature  and  natural  law,  —  man  is  one  of  its  peculiar 
products.3 

Theoretical  Ethics. — Aside  from  this  central  problem  of 
freedom  there  are  numerous  other  disputed  questions  within 
the  field  of  ethics.  It  is  often  convenient  to  divide  the  various 
topics  which  cluster  about  conduct  into  two  groups, — the  first 
of  which  would  include  those  of  a  distinctly  theoretical  nature 
like  the  one  already  mentioned,  while  the  second  group  would 
comprehend  those  problems  which  approach  nearer  to  the 
ordinary  questions  and  perplexities  of  daily  life.  The  former 

*In  connection  with  this  fatalistic  attitude  towards  the  world — 
especially  prominent  in  Oriental  literature  and  again  in  Christian 
predestination — one  may  call  to  mind  Fitzgerald's  classic  transla- 
tion of  Omar  Khayyam's  Rubaiyat : 

"  LXXII. 

"  And  that  inverted  Bowl  they  call  the  Sky, 
Whereunder  crawling  coop'd  we  live  and  die, 

Lift  not  your  hands  to  IT  for  help,  for  It 
As  impotently  moves  as  you  or  I. 

"  LXXIII. 

"  With  Earth's  first  Clay  They  did  the  Last  Man  knead, 
And  there  of  the  Last  Harvest  sow'd  the  Seed: 

And  the  first  Morning  of  Creation  wrote 
What  the  Last  Dawn  of  Reckoning  shall  read." 


PROBLEMS  OF   PHILOSOPHY.  39 

we  may  call  theoretical  ethics,  and  the  latter  practical 
ethics. 

Possibly  one  of  the  most  perplexing  questions  of  theoretical 
ethics  is  concerned  with  the  ultimate  spring  or  impetus  which 
turns  us  towards  righteousness, — the  moral  sanction,  as  it  is 
called.  To  what  final  criterion  do  we  appeal  when  we  seek  to 
determine  the  good  or  the  evil  of  a  certain  act?  Upon  what 
ground  does  the  human  mind  base  its  decisions  of  right  and 
wrong?  The  history  of  European  philosophy  has  had  some 
kind  of  a  reply  to  this  query  since  the  Greek  Cyrenaics  made 
individual  pleasure  the  determining  factor  of  human  conduct. 
The  followers  of  this  general  attitude  have  been  called 
Hedonists  (from  the  Greek  equivalent  for  pleasure),  because 
of  their  intense  emphasis  on  the  momentary  pleasure  of  the 
individual.  Subsequent  English  thinkers  have  modified  the 
hedonistic  stand-point  making  universal,  instead  of  individual, 
happiness  to  be  the  determining  moral  sanction.  This  theory 
of  universal  happiness  attained  considerable  prominence  in 
England  some  thirty  or  forty  years  ago  under  the  name  of 
Utilitarianism.  In  contrast  to  these  pleasure-seeking  systems 
of  morality  there  has  always  existed  an  opposite  tendency 
which,  for  want  of  a  better  and  less  threadbare  term,  we  may 
call  Idealism  or  Intuitionalism.  This  view  gives  to  morality 
an  existence  altogether  beyond  the  transient  determinations 
of  pleasure  and  pain.  We  follow  the  dictates  of  conscience 
because  we  believe  it  to  be  right;  the  decisions  of  the  moral 
judgment  may  or  may  not  agree  with  the  momentary  require- 
ments of  pleasure,  but  this  in  no  wise  affects  our  attitude 
towards  them.  With  some  of  the  idealists  the  authority  of 
morality  is  a  divine  gift  from  God  to  man ;  with  others  it  is  a 
self -conceived  feeling  of  altruism;  and  still  again  it  has  been 
founded  on  a  certain  "moral  sense"  of  indeterminate  origin. 

While  the  question  of  the  ultimate  sanction  of  the  moral  law 
is  of  paramount  importance  to  theoretical  ethics,  there  are 
others  quite  as  vital.  The  old  discussion  between  the  optimists 


40  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

and  the  pessimists  here  finds  its  appropriate  place.  According 
to  the  former  school,  life  is  worth  the  effort  of  living.  On  the 
contrary,  the  pessimists,  impressed  with  the  evil  and  misery 
inherent  to  human  life,  feel  that  some  state  of  death  and  per- 
haps non-existence  would  be  preferable  to  the  desire  and  strug- 
gle of  humanity.  It  was  among  the  ancient  Hindoos,  a  race 
of  marked  philosophical  power,  that  the  pessimistic  theory 
received  its  strongest  support.  In  fact,  Buddhism,  the  most 
truly  metaphysical  of  all  the  broad  world  religions,  is  founded 
upon  pessimism  as  the  ground  of  its  theory  of  being  and  of 
human  reality.  In  the  history  of  thought  the  Occident  has 
been  distinctly  optimistic  in  its  theories  of  ethics,  while  the 
Orient  has  always  exhibited  a  pessimistic  tinge. 

Practical  Ethics. — The  field  of  practical  ethics  is  concerned 
with  the  application  of  the  theoretical  questions  to  the  routine 
of  our  ordinary  life.  The  scope  of  this  branch  is  far  broader, 
but  less  philosophical,  than  that  of  theoretical  ethics.  It  has 
for  its  inquiry  the  practical  questions  of  the  moral  life.  Thus 
we  might  easily  agree  on  theoretical  grounds  that  "  lying  is  an 
evil/'  but  it  is  an  altogether  different  matter  when  we  come 
to  declare  that  there  are  no  cases  in  which  lying  is  right. 
Perhaps  a  lie  will  save  an  honorable  life,  will  prevent  some 
atrocious  crime,  or  even  turn  the  course  of  history. 

Esthetics. — Now  leaving  our  rapid  survey  of  ethics,  we 
come  to  the  third  and  least  important  of  the  normative 
sciences,  namely  ^Esthetics.  This  is  concerned  with  the  ought 
of  beauty;  the  universal  laws  which  we  must  observe  if  we 
wish  to  attain  an  ideal  of  beauty  constant  for  all  mankind  at 
all  times.  ^Esthetics  may  be  considered  the  science  of  the  fine 
arts.  It  is  in  no  wise  concerned  with  the  creation  of  an  artistic 
object;  nor  does  it  prescribe  minute  principles  for  artistic 
criticism,  many  of  which  arise  from  personal  taste.  It  tries  to 
construct  a  rational  understanding  of  the  meaning  of  beauty; 
after  which  it  considers  the  various  means  by  which  beauty 
may  be  obtained,  estimating  each  in  view  of  its  value  as  a  uni- 


PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  41 

versal  element.  The  mere  feeling  of  pleasure  towards  an  ob- 
ject of  beauty  is  avoided  and  the  analytic  rather  than  the 
appreciative  stand-point  is  assumed.  The  attempt  is  made  to 
determine  the  universal  principles,  such  as  unity,  symmetry, 
harmony,  and  expression,  which  give  to  the  object  this  char- 
acter of  beauty.  It  compares  the  various  branches  of  the  fine 
arts,  such  as  music,  poetry,  the  graphic  and  plastic  arts,  with 
a  view  to  determine  in  what  manner  and  to  what  degree  each 
is  an  expression  of  universal  principles. 

Other  Branches  of  Philosophy.  —  The  three  subjects, 
Logic,  Ethics,  and  ^Esthetics,  complete  the  trio  of  the  nor- 
mative sciences.  The  list,  however,  of  the  various  branches 
of  philosophy  is  by  no  means  exhausted  even  with  these.  Just 
as  there  is  a  permanently  valuable  as  well  as  an  accidental  way 
of  doing  anything,  so  also  there  are  certain  elements  of  every 
subject  which  deserve  to  be  regarded  as  universal,  and  therefore 
of  philosophical  interest.  It  is  the  universal  element  of  com- 
merce to  derive  profit,  or  of  biology  to  deal  with  life,  and  of 
mathematics  to  concern  itself  with  the  pure  forms  of  space  and 
time.  And  since  the  very  essence  of  philosophy  is  to  deter- 
mine, compare,  and  evaluate  the  universal  whenever  and  wher- 
ever it  is  found,  then  there  must  be  a  place  in  philosophy  for 
universals  occurring  in  the  most  diversified  fields  of  human 
knowledge. 

In  view  of  this  demand  there  have  arisen  innumerable  in- 
quiries, each  concerned  with  the  universals  peculiar  to  some 
restricted  portion  of  scientific  investigation.  These  studies, 
concerned  with  the  fundamental  or  universal  principles,  are 
generally  regarded  as  branches  of  philosophy,  and  appear  to 
the  world  as  such.  Of  the  many  subjects  which  have  been 
treated  in  this  manner  we  will  mention  but  four, — the  phi- 
losophy of  science,  the  philosophy  of  society,  the  philosophy  of 
history,  and  the  philosophy  of  religion. 

Philosophy  of  Science. — Ever  since  the  beginning  of 
modern  scientific  studies  there  has  been  a  desire  among  the 


42  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

deeper  thinkers  to  further  investigate  the  terms,  definitions, 
and  formulae  employed  in  the  descriptive  sciences.  These  in- 
quiries, restricted  to  universal  and  invarient  processes,  were 
different  in  character  from  the  laboratory  and  class-room 
experiments  which  formed  the  outward  material  of  the  sciences 
themselves.  They  attempted  rather  to  breathe  a  deeper  and 
broader  meaning  into  the  common  phrases  of  accepted  teach- 
ings. Such  investigations  may  be  regarded  as  comprising  the 
philosophy  of  science,  for  they  form  a  branch  of  our  subject 
in  so  far  as  they  deal  with  universals.  As  an  example  of  the 
topics  which  occur  in  this  very  interesting  and  important  field 
may  be  mentioned  the  attempts  to  systematize  the  axioms  of 
mathematics,  the  struggle  to  define  some  absolute  physical 
constant,  the  various  evolutionary  hypotheses,  or  the  interpre- 
tation of  the  general  principle  of  scientific  causalty.  It  is 
plainly  seen  that  such  questions  as  these  are  of  a  far  more 
universal  character  than  the  problems  which  generally  arise  in 
the  progress  of  a  single  one  of  the  special  sciences. 

Philosophy  of  Society.  —  The  philosophy  of  science  was 
concerned  with  the  universals  of  the  objective  and  generally 
non-human  side  of  nature.  There  are,  however,  just  as  inter- 
esting, just  as  invariable  laws  which  are  concerned  entirely 
with  the  operations  of  man  in  the  aggregate.  When  these 
actions  are  carefully  examined,  without  reference  to  any  par- 
ticular time  or  place,  we  have  the  philosophy  of  society,  or 
sociology.  This  deals  with  the  universal  elements  which  gov- 
ern the  changes,  the  progress,  and  decay  of  great  social  groups. 
It  concerns  itself  with  the  invariable  features  of  civilization, 
the  laws  which  have  been  gradually  evolved  through  a  long 
process  of  trial  and  error.  Here  man  is  considered  purely  as 
a  social  animal,  as  a  mere  reflection  of  his  time,  his  environ- 
ment, and  the  condition  of  his  fellow-men.  The  broad  laws 
which  control  the  migration  of  large  bodies  of  men,  such  as 
scanty  food  supply,  conquest,  or  the  search  for  gold,  are  here 
considered.  Also  the  gradual  development  of  those  institu- 


PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY.  43 

tions,  such  as  marriage  or  civil  law,  which  especially  mark  off 
man  from  the  beast  and  the  civilized  community  from  the 
savage  tribe. 

Philosophy  of  History. — These  universal  laws  of  sociology 
have  no  reference  to  any  special  race  or  time,  but  are  equally 
applicable  to  the  Anglo-Saxon  and  the  aboriginal  Australian. 
There  are,  however,  certain  invariant  or  unchangeable  forces 
which  exhibit  themselves  with  special  reference  to  some  par- 
ticular race  or  stage  of  civilization.  And  it  is  the  details  of 
these  laws  which  constitute  the  history  of  a  nation  or  a  race. 
The  philosophy  of  history  is  therefore  nothing  else  than  a  de- 
scription, comparison,  and  estimation  of  those  primal  laws 
and  forces  the  manifestation  of  which  is  the  history  of  man- 
kind. The  difference  between  sociology  and  history  is  not  so 
much  a  natural  distinction  as  one  of  convenience.  Thus  the 
great  law — that  lack  of  food  supply  results  in  migration — is 
generally  considered  in  sociology,  for  in  its  abstract  nature  it 
concerns  human  society  at  large.  Whereas  the  conditions  of 
the  Eoman  Empire  of  the  first  century  A.D.  were  especially 
conducive  to  the  development  of  colonial  dependencies,  or  that 
the  great  Irish  famine  distinctly  increased  the  rate  of  emigra- 
tion from  Ireland,  are  facts  which  would  be  considered  under 
the  philosophy  of  history,  because  they  refer  to  some  particular 
time  and  place. 

Philosophy  of  Religion. — One  of  the  favorite  themes  for 
philosophical  treatment  is  concerned  with  the  various  forms 
and  aspects  of  religion.  Owing  to  the  extent  and  depth  of 
religious  feeling  the  subject  is  of  universal  interest.  The  phi- 
losophy of  religion,  like  the  philosophy  of  science  or  of  his- 
tory, tries  to  determine  the  universal  elements  prominent  in 
every  form  of  religion,  including  those  of  savage  tribes  as  well 
as  those  of  civilized  nations.  It  thus  compares  what  may  be 
regarded  as  the  basal  elements  of  a  purely  natural  religion 
and  endeavors  to  discover  their  mental  origin  and  principles 
of  development.  By  such  a  careful  analysis  of  what  is  essen- 


44  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

tial  to  religion  it  is  possible  to  remove  from  it  the  feeling  of 
reverence  and  to  regard  it  from  a  purely  objective  or  scientific 
stand-point,  thereby  treating  it  from  the  same  stand-point  as 
other  human  institutions.  Thus  the  philosophy  of  religion 
discusses  the  much-controverted  question  as  to  whether  religion 
is  primarily  founded  on  feeling  or  reason;  also  what  was  the 
origin  of  religion  and  in  what  form  did  it  first  appear.  Often 
there  is  a  comparative  study  of  the  various  interpretations  of 
God  or  of  the  many  representations  of  an  after-world.  It  is 
the  philosophy  of  religion  which  compares  the  various  proofs 
for  the  existence  of  God,  or  for  the  immortality  of  the  human 
soul.  It  exhibits,  if  possible,  the  deeper  conditions  of  environ- 
ment and  temperament  which  have  influenced  the  development 
of  the  world  religions,  and  often  points  to  the  effect  of  mere 
accidental  conditions  upon  intellectual  movements  of  universal 
consequence. 


CHAPTEK   II. 

THE   BIRTH   OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 
HISTORY  OF  PHILOSOPHY  IN  GENERAL. 

HISTORY  is  generally  associated  with  political  movements 
and  national  events  of  extreme  importance.  The  history  of 
philosophy,  however,  is  distinctly  different,  dealing  with  the 
development  of.  conceptions  rather  than  with  the  concerted 
actions  of  men.  By  tracing  the  gradual  alterations  in  the 
philosophical  theories  of  mankind,  it  exhibits  the  national 
traits  of  mind  and  the  deeper  character  of  race.  From  the 
apparent  chaos  of  individual  opinions,  clashing  one  with  an- 
other, it  weaves  the  thread  of  true  intellectual  progress.  As 
the  history  of  the  state  develops  by  the  struggles  and  ambitions 
of  individual  men,  so  also  the  history  of  philosophy  rests  on 
the  character,  opinions,  and  philosophical  systems  of  a  few 
brilliant  thinkers.  Sometimes  these  men  possess  themselves 
extreme  originality  together  with  breadth  and  depth  of  thought. 
They  are  able  to  influence  their  contemporaries  and  successors 
solely  by  their  unusual  insight.  Then  again  there  are  men 
endowed  with  a  certain  native  faculty  for  order  and  system 
which  enables  them  to  cast  into  connected  form  the  opinions 
and  ideals  of  their  own  time.  And  there  is  still  a  third  class 
of  men  who  are  extremely  narrow  and  one-sided  in  their  philo- 
sophical stand-point  but  yet  who  possess  a  certain  persistency 
in  carrying  to  the  extreme  the  logical  implications  of  a  single 
conception.  They  help  along  the  general  current  of  thought 
by  clearly  defining  the  old  issues  and  by  suggesting  new  prob- 
lems. The  history  of  philosophy  portrays  the  struggles  of  men, 
more  or  less  like  these  types,  to  define  a  conscious  attitude 
towards  man  and  nature. 

45 


46  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

Its  General  Divisions. — The  history  of  philosophy  may 
be  divided  conveniently  into  four  great  periods,  each  clearly 
distinguished  from  the  others  by  the  type  of  problem  con- 
sidered and  by  the  method  of  its  treatment.  These  may  be 
designated  as  the  Hindoo,  the  Greek,  the  Mediceval  or  Scholas- 
tic, and  the  Modern  periods.  All  such  broad  divisions  of  any 
intellectual  movement  are  necessarily  little  more  than  con- 
venient artifices.  The  exact  dates  which  mark  off  one  period 
of  the  history  of  philosophy  from  the  others  are  always  uncer- 
tain. The  general  attitude  of  mind,  which  alone  is  its  dis- 
tinguishing character,  is  discernible  only  in  broad  abstraction. 
The  same  problems,  with  perhaps  a  change  in  their  setting, 
appear  in  different  ages  and  among  different  peoples.  It  is 
only  the  comparative  distinctness  which  national  temperament 
gives  to  the  treatment  of  a  few  important  subjects  which 
enables  us  to  refer  to  general  divisions  in  the  history  of  phi- 
losophy with  any  exactness  of  meaning. 

In  each  broad  period  of  philosophy  one  may  discover  a  time 
of  birth  and  youth,  when  enthusiasm  and  assurance  combined 
with  narrowness  of  view  are  the  distinguishing  characteristics. 
Following  this  there  is  another  and  generally  shorter  period 
when  philosophy  reaches  its  culmination,  a  time  when  a  few 
great  intellects  sum  up  and  immortalize  their  whole  epoch. 
Succeeding  this  short  term  of  maturity  there  is  a  long  and 
generally  unprofitable  interval  of  decay  in  which  general  doubt 
or  scepticism  is  used  to  refute  traditional  authority.  And 
finally  towards  the  close  of  this  period  of  stagnation  there  are 
signs  of  a  new  philosophy  soon  to  be  born  under  new  condi- 
tions. 

Hindoo  Philosophy. — Neglecting  for  our  purpose  the  rude 
but  interesting  philosophy  of  the  early  savages,  we  meet  in 
the  religious  writings  of  ancient  India  a  system  of  thought 
worthy  of  very  high  estimation.  Hindoo  philosophy  began 
with  the  Vedic  hymns,  a  series  of  devotional  chants  addressed 
to  the  personified  forces  and  phenomena  of  nature.  The  true 


GREEK   PHILOSOPHY.  47 

metaphysics  of  the  Hindoo  is  to  be  found  in  the  Upanishads, 
a  series  of  commentaries  on  the  more  ancient  Vedas.  The 
central  theme  of  their  philosophy  is  the  Absolute  Unity  of 
internal  and  external  phenomena  in  a  single  subjective  con- 
sciousness. This  all-inclusive  and  indwelling  self,  or  Brahma, 
represents  the  Soul  of  the  Universe.  All  the  objects  of  the 
world  and  the  human  self  or  Ego  in  a  higher  degree  are  reflec- 
tions of  the  great  universal  self.  The  ultimate  goal  of  human 
thought  is  to  recognize  this  truth  and  perceive  that  there  is 
but  one  true  Being,  the  Brahma,  while  all  the  objects  of  the 
world  of  sense  are  unreal  in  themselves,  if  regarded  apart  from 
the  immanent  reality  of  Brahma. 

Aside  from  this  pure  Monism,  or  what  may  be  called  from  a 
religious  stand-point  a  pantheism,  the  Hindoos  were  the  authors 
of  the  truly  philosophical  religion  of  Buddhism.  This  religion 
took  its  name  from  a  teacher  born  about  369  B.C.,  whom  tradi- 
tion portrays  as  a  man  of  the  highest  ethical  ideals.  Buddha 
taught  that  all  our  sensuous  life  is  built  upon  the  chimera  of 
unfulfilled  desire,  that  existence  is  in  itself  evil,  and  that  the 
highest  ideal  of  life  is  the  recognition  of  this  great  truth  of 
universal  pessimism.  This  will  be  referred  to  again  in  con- 
nection with  Schopenhauer,  a  modern  German  exponent  of 
this  same  attitude  of  mind. 

Greek  Philosophy. — Perhaps  a  little  later  as  a  whole,  but 
for  the  most  part  contemporaneous  with  Hindoo  philosophy, 
extended  the  varied  history  of  Greek  thought.  It  began  with 
several  narrow  monistic  theories  of  the  world  and  gradually 
broadened  and  deepened  until  the  time  of  Plato  and  Aristotle, 
when  Greek  philosophy  reached  its  climax.  During  this  period 
of  its  brilliant  activity  Greek  philosophy  was  distinctly  human- 
istic, emphasizing,  as  no  other  period  has  done,  the  importance 
of  ethics  and  the  eminent  position  of  man  in  nature.  Socrates, 
Plato,  Aristotle,  Epicurus,  and  the  Stoics  were  all  ethical  phi- 
losophers of  the  first  rank;  all  of  them  interpreted  nature  in 
terms  of  some  aspect  of  human  life. 


48  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

Plato,  probably  following  his  master  Socrates,  opposed  a 
theory  of  materialistic  metaphysics — then  widely  taught  in 
Greece — by  the  first  system  of  thorough  idealism  to  be  found 
in  strictly  European  thought.  The  only  ultimate  reality  con- 
sisted in  the  ideas,  which  under  certain  circumstances  could 
be  objectively  expressed  as  the  sense-world,  or  subjectively 
manifested  as  the  inner  nature  of  the  soul.  Human  knowledge 
consisted  in  the  reflection  on  ideas,  human  goodness  in  the 
organic  harmony  of  ethical  ideals. 

Aristotle  stands  for  the  scientific  or  analytic  tendency  in 
Greek  thought.  Instead  of  a  monism  of  ideas,  he  found  it  im- 
possible to  express  nature  in  simpler  terms  than  the  dualism 
of  form  and  matter.  Every  sense-object  represented  the  ex- 
pression of  these  two  world  elements;  above  all  the  objective 
nature  was  the  perfect  embodiment  of  form,  a  sort  of  form- 
ideal  without  matter,  which  serve.d  as  the  end  in  view  for  all 
natural  processes  and  human  activities.  The  influence  of 
Aristotle  has  been  far  greater  than  that  of  any  other  Greek 
thinker,  owing  to  the  fact  that  he  later  became  the  accepted 
authority  for  Christian  speculation. 

The  salient  feature  of  the  Epicurean  school  was  the  desire 
to  better  the  condition  of  man  by  prescribing  a  system  of  con- 
duct intended  to  lead  to  the  most  constant  happiness.  The 
Stoics,  on  the  other  hand,  sought  to  raise  the  moral  plane  of 
man  by  bringing  his  finite  will  into  accord  with  the  laws  of  the 
universe;  they  are  said  to  have  originated  the  well-known 
aphorism,  "  Live  according  to  nature." 

Mediaeval  Philosophy. — After  the  founding  of  the  four 
great  schools  of  Greek  thought,  the  Platonic,  the  Aristotelian, 
the  Epicurean,  and  the  Stoic,  the  interest  in  philosophy  began 
to  decline,  until  finally,  about  the  sixth  or  seventh  century  of 
the  Christian  era,  it  may  be  said  to  have  wholly  disappeared. 
It  was  not  until  the  Catholic  Church  was  well  established  that 
men  began  again  to  interest  themselves  in  the  problems  of 
philosophy.  The  whole  setting  of  these  problems  had  been 


MEDIEVAL   PHILOSOPHY.  49 

altered,  in  the  intervening  time,  by  the  introduction  of  Chris- 
tian ideas;  so  that  the  older  views  were  no  longer  tenable  in 
their  pagan  form,  but  required  to  be  reconciled  and  harmonized 
with  Christianity.  It  was  this  work  which  fell  upon  the  school- 
men, and  the  elaborate  results  of  this  attempted  reconciliation 
is  called  the  Scholastic  or  Mediceval  Philosophy.  Its  most 
notable  feature,  especially  during  the  later  periods,  was  the 
systematic  and  exhaustive — one  might  almost  say  ponderous — 
character  of  its  systems.  Scholastic  philosophy  stood  for  a 
general  and  systematic  treatment  of  the  whole  universe :  God, 
angels,  man,  and  physical  nature. 

Controversy  over  General  Ideas. — Prominent  among  the 
philosophical  problems  which  confused  the  schoolmen  was  the 
controversy  over  the  reality  to  be  ascribed  to  general  ideas,  a 
topic  which  is  constantly  reappearing  in  the  history  of  philoso- 
phy. Eegarding  this  question  there  were  two  opposing  answers, 
according  as  stress  was  laid  on  universal  or  particular  terms 
in  connection  with  the  interpretation  of  Christian  dogmas. 
Much  confusion  arose  in  the  early  Church  as  to  the  proper  inter- 
pretation of  the  relation  between  man  and  God.  If  we  should 
regard  God  as  the  only  reality,  then  all  the  dignity  of  man,  the 
authority  of  the  Church  over  the  individual,  and  even  the 
meaning  of  sin,  would  be  lost;  then  the  absolute  reality  of 
God  would  include  the  finite  life  of  man.  On  the  contrary, 
should  the  Church  give  to  man  a  reality  outside  of  God's  exist- 
ence, then  the  Divine  Power  would  fall  short  of  being  omnipo- 
tent and  absolute.  Between  this  Scylla  and  Charybdis  the 
Church  endeavored  to  steer  its  course.  It  wished  to  make  the 
individual  man  responsible  for  his  own  actions  at  the  same 
time  that  it  included  human  frailty  within  God's  omnipotence. 
With  this  contradictory  problem  the  Christian  Church  is  still 
struggling,  and  even  in  our  own  time  meets  with  less  success 
in  its  solution  than  in  the  days  of  Augustine  and  Pelagius. 

EEALISM. — On  the  whole  the  authentic  doctrine  of  the 
medieval  Church  gradually  acquired  the  form  of  Realism, 

4 


50  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

obtained  chiefly  through  the  study  of  the  Arabic  interpretations 
of  Aristotle.  This  view  of  the  world  gave  to  the  general  or 
universal  ideas  an  absolute  reality  independent  of  varying 
forms  or  modes.  That  is,  the  general  idea  of  a  man,  of  a 
horse,  or  of  a  dog,  was  absolutely  real  in  itself,  whereas  the  par- 
ticular man,  Thomas  or  William,  the  particular  horse,  and 
the  particular  dog  had  no  reality  except  as  specific  expressions 
of  the  general  concept.  In  brief,  the  abstract  general  ideas 
alone  possessed  reality.1  The  factors  which  determined  the 
doctrines  of  the  Church  in  this  regard  were  very  various. 
Realism  gave  to  the  Church,  as  a  human  institution,  a  per- 
fectly definite  reality  apart  from  the  churches,  orders,  and  indi- 
viduals which  composed  it;  thereby  increasing  its  temporal 
authority,  power,  and  dignity.  Then,  too,  Christ,  as  the  Son 
of  God,  could  mediate  between  man  and  God  only  on  the  hy- 
pothesis that  He  personified  at  once  the  frailty  of  universal  man 
and  the  spirit  of  God.  And  still  again,  from  another  point  of 
view,  the  dogma  of  original  sin  retained  its  force  only  on  the 
supposition  that  the  fall  of  Adam  affected  all  generations  of 
mankind  through  their  reality  in  the  general  idea  of  man. 

NOMINALISM. — The  orthodox  Realism  of  the  mediaeval 
Church  was  opposed  by  two  brilliant  thinkers, — Roscellinus,  a 
native  of  Brittany  who  flourished  in  the  eleventh  century,  and 
William  of  Occam,  an  Englishman  of  the  fourteenth  century. 
These  men  advocated  a  theory  of  metaphysics,  appearing  under 
the  name  of  Nominalism,  which,  as  well  as  Realism,  took  its 
rise  from  the  study  of  Aristotle.  It  regarded  the  general  ideas 
as  names  only,  possessed  of  absolutely  no  external  reality.  The 
Realism  of  the  Church,  as  we  have  just  seen,  declared  that  the 
abstract  idea,  or  thing  in  general,  was  alone  real  and  that  the 
individual  object  was  unreal;  while  Nominalism,  on  the  other 
hand,  gave  to  the  separate  individual  elements  of  the  world  a 
positive  existence  and  a  definite  reality.  It  regarded  the  gen- 

1  Universalia  sunt  realia. 


MEDIEVAL   PHILOSOPHY.  51 

eral  idea,  which  expressed  the  common  qualities  of  these  indi- 
viduals, as  merely  a  convenience  of  speech  or  name.2 

CONCEPTUALISM. — Throughout  most  of  the  early  period  of 
Scholasticism  a  war  of  words  was  kept  up  between  these  con- 
flicting schools.  An  attempt  at  reconciliation,  however,  was 
made  by  an  original  thinker  named  Pierre  Abelard,  a  native  of 
France,  who  lived  from  1079  to  1142.  Abelard  opposed  the 
extremes  of  both  Eealism  and  Nominalism,  by  advocating  a 
theory  known  in  the  history  of  philosophy  as  C 'onceptualism . 
He  interpreted  the  general  idea,  not  as  absolutely  real,  as  did 
the  Eealists,  nor  as  altogether  unreal,  as  did  the  Nominalists, 
but  as  real  in  the  mind.  This  is  the  most  .plausible  view  from 
the  stand-point  of  "  common  sense/'  The  classic  expressions 
of  conceptualism  regard  the  universal  idea  of  a  horse  as  real 
in  both  the  mind  of  God  and  in  the  mind  of  man,  for  it  is  by 
such  general  ideas  that  the  thinking  process  is  able  to  operate. 
Conceptualism  by  no  means  contends  that  man  in  general  has 
some  kind  of  reality  out  there  in  the  world  beyond,  but  only 
that  the  mind  is  capable  of  understanding  and  employing  such 
expressions.  As  such  the  general  ideas  are  concepts,  real  only 
in  processes  of  thought. 

It  has  been  a  favorite  procedure  on  the  part  of  modern 
writers  to  show  contempt  and  endeavor  to  cast  ridicule  upon 
the  methods  of  the  mediseval  schoolmen.  They  forget  for  the 
moment  the  incalculable  debt  which  modern  philosophy  owes 
to  the  subtle  and  acute  analyses  of  their  respective  genius. 
They  conscientiously  nourished  and  kept  alive  the  glimmer  of 
intellectual  light  which  the  Arabians  passed  on  to  them  from 
the  dying  embers  of  the  ancient  world.  They  tempered  the 
dogmatism  of  the  Church  and  gave  to  the  Christian  religion 
the  firmest  philosophical  basis  which  it  has  ever  had.  Notwith- 
standing the  futility  of  many  of  their  discussions,  their  over- 
emphasis on  an  uncritical  deductive  method,  and  general  con- 

2  Universalia  sunt  nomina. 


52  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

tempt  for  scientific  induction,  they  deserve  far  more  credit  for 
what  they  have  done  than  is  generally  admitted  among  writers 
desirous  of  showing  their  own  superiority. 


THE  EENAISSANCE. 

Leaving  now  the  long  period  of  mediaeval  philosophy,  we 
approach  the  opening  of  modern  thought.  No  exact  dates  can 
be  fixed  to  distinguish  the  two  periods,  and  no  distinct  lines 
can  be  drawn  even  among  the  thinkers  themselves.  The  years 
from  about  1400  to  1600  are  often  regarded  as  the  time  when 
the  barren  and  futile  investigations  of  the  Middle  Ages  were 
being  transformed  into  the  life  and  activity  of  the  modern 
world.  It  is  distinctly  a  period  of  transition  and  of  change. 
The  traditional  institutions  and  the  old  ways  of  living  were 
undergoing  complete  alteration.  Fire-arms  superseded  the 
ancient  implements  of  war ;  the  mediaeval  castle  was  abandoned 
for  the  fort,  the  knight  and  esquire  gave  way  to  the  hireling 
soldier.  With  these  changes  there  followed  a  new  social  life 
acting  and  reacting  on  the  industrial,  political,  and  intellectual 
temper  of  the  age. 

Tendencies  of  the  Renaissance. — These  changes  in  the 
outside  world  could  not  but  affect  the  trend  of  philosophy.  The 
old  orthodox  Church  formulae  were  given  new  meanings  and  a 
freer  interpretation.  The  spirit  of  a  strict  ethical  code  was 
avoided,  and  churchmen  and  laymen  alike  recognized  few  prin- 
ciples of  morality  in  their  private  life.  It  was  an  age  when 
the  individual  man  was  asserting  himself  with  the  extreme 
enthusiasm  of  his  newly- discovered  importance.  This  asser- 
tion of  the  individual  may  be  recognized  as  having  three  lines 
of  development, — the  intellectual,  the  political,  and  the  artistic. 
The  first  is  characterized  by  a  new  philosophy,  a  new  religion, 
and  a  new  science.  In  the  political  field  the  individual  man 
asserted  himself  all  over  Western  Europe,  especially  in  the 
new  social  and  industrial  conditions,  as  opposed  to  the  mediae- 


THE  RENAISSANCE.  53 

val  empire ;  while  in  the  fine  arts  this  period  gave  to  the  future 
reformed  principles  and  new  ideals. 

Intellectual  Awakening. — It  is  the  intellectual  awakening 
that  alone  interests  us,  and  it  is  its  three  branches — philosophy, 
religion,  and  science,,  each  taking  root  in  a  different  country — 
that  may  be  associated  with  the  true  birth  of  modern  philoso- 
phy. We  may  regard  the  nature  philosophers  of  Italy,  men  of 
extreme  brilliancy  of  mind,  as  the  precursors  of  our  modern 
technical  philosophy.  They  stated  the  vital  and  pressing  ques- 
tions of  metaphysics  in  terms  of  nature  rather  than  of  God,  from 
the  stand-point  of  philosophy  rather  than  from  that  of  religion. 
In  consequence  of  their  rashness  many  of  them  were  prosecuted 
by  the  Church,  but  their  work  remains  and  their  influence  may 
be  traced  throughout  modern  thought.  The  philosophical  side 
of  the  intellectual  awakening  developed  in  Italy,  whereas  the 
religious  Renaissance  was  restricted  to  the  more  northern 
countries.  During  this  period  Protestantism  first  presented 
itself  as  a  factor  in  the  religious  life  of  Europe.  The  religious 
reformation  passed  readily  into  extreme  forms,  of  which  Ger- 
man mysticism  is  perhaps  the  most  interesting  from  our  stand- 
point. And,  finally,  the  scientific  side  of  the  intellectual  un- 
folding of  this  period  seems  to  have  been  concentrated  in 
England,  where  an  interest  in  the  empirical  study  of  nature  has 
been  apparent  from  early  times.  Even  certain  of  her  school- 
men, notably  Duns  Scotus,  Occam,  and  Roger  Bacon,  were  far 
ahead  of  their  contemporaries  in  their  regard  for  natural 
science. 

National  Characteristics. — The  distinct  traits  of  character 
peculiar  to  each  of  the  three  racial  types — Italian,  German,  and 
English — are  well  exhibited  by  the  three  attitudes  of  mind 
above  referred  to,  the  speculative,  the  religious,  and  the  em- 
pirical. The  Italian,  brilliant,  quick,  and  imaginative,  easily 
reaches  the  heights  of  metaphysics ;  but  the  shallowness  of  his 
mind  and  his  lack  of  perseverance  failed  to  withstand  the  decay 
of  an  uncritical  scepticism.  The  German,  on  the  contrary, 


54  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

fails  perhaps  to  possess  the  brilliant  imagination  of  the  Latin, 
but  is  more  than  compensated  for  this  defect  by  his  greater 
depth  and  constancy.  German  mysticism  soon  disappeared, 
but  its  departure  only  awakened  a  new  interest  in  philosophy, 
instead  of  quenching  it  altogether.  The  Anglo-Saxon,  with 
whom  modern  science  first  found  protection,  combines  the 
quickness  of  the  South  with  the  cool,  calculating  perseverance 
of  the  North,  and  adds  still  a  third  element  peculiar  to  his  own 
t}rpe  of  mind.  This  is  the  fondness  for  the  simple,  the  natural, 
and  the  near  at  hand.  He  despises  all  imaginative  theories  and 
elaborate  hypotheses  in  philosophy  as  well  as  in  science.  He 
defines  reality  by  what  is  close  to  his  own  consciousness ;  never 
by  the  complex,  if  the  simple  will  answer.  The  English  phi- 
losophers are  empirical  in  their  epistemology,  and  exhibit  far 
greater  success  in  their  psychology  than  in  their  metaphysics. 
They  approach  the  field  of  philosophy  with  the  acuteness  of  the 
scientist  and  the  exactness  of  the  mathematician. 

We  may  regard  the  history  of  modern  philosophy  as  first 
beginning  to  formulate  itself  in  connection  with  the  tendency 
to  regard  God  and  Nature  as  One.  The  earliest  name  to  be 
associated  with  this  movement  is  that  of 

NICOLAS   CHRYPPS   OP  CUSA. 

LIFE. 

He  was  born  in  1401,  at  Cues,  or  Cusa,  a  small  place  on 
the  Moselle.  After  having  studied  philosophy,  mathematics, 
and  law  at  the  University  of  Padua,  he  abandoned  the  latter 
profession  and  devoted  himself  to  theology.  He  attained 
marked  distinction  in  the  Church  and  travelled  extensively  on 
various  missions  connected  with  his  work.  It  is  interesting  to 
note  that  Nicolas  defined  unconsciously  tendencies  of  thought 
which,  when  more  fully  developed  in  the  following  century, 
stood  in  marked  contrast  to  the  established  teachings  of  his 
Church. 


NICOLAS   CHRYPPS   OF   CUSA.  55 

Philosophy. — The  base  of  the  philosophy  of  Nicolas  is  his 
conception  of  the  nature  of  God.  Instead  of  deducing  God 
from  Aristotle  and  the  Bible,  he  endeavored  to  construct  a 
rational  conception  of  the  Deity  which  should  accord  with  the 
wealth  and  variety  of  the  world  about  him.  Constantly 
throughout  nature  Nicolas  recognizes  the  partial  and  incom- 
plete union  of  opposite  elements.  God  was  to  him  the  perfect 
and  absolute  harmony  of  all  conflicting  terms.  God  was  so 
Infinite  as  to  include  or  transcend  both  the  finite  and  the 
infinite,  the  one  and  the  many,  mind  and  matter,  identity  and 
plurality. 

Owing  to  the  immeasurable  chasm  which  separates  the  com- 
plete infinity  of  God  from  the  potential  and  only  partial  in- 
finity of  man,  human  knowledge  is  unable  to  comprehend  the 
Divine  nature.  The  faintest  glimmer  of  this  perfect  knowledge 
is  attained  only  from  the  irrational  suggestions  of  intuition. 
This  intuition  of  the  Being  of  God,  or  "  learned  ignorance,"  3 
is  the  highest  condition  of  mind.  Just  below  the  intuitional 
knowledge  of  God,  but  separated  from  it  by  an  incalculable 
difference,  are  the  partial  truths  derived  from  the  activity  of 
the  intellect 4  in  its  struggles  with  subtle  metaphysical  ques- 
tions. Below  the  intellect  Nicolas  places  the  analytic  reason 5 
which  harmonizes  the  facts  of  experience.  While  lowest  of  all 
is  the  sensuous  knowledge  obtained  from  the  particular  ex- 
periences of  the  external  world.  This  fourfold  classification  of 
human  knowledge  is  strongly  suggestive  of  a  similar  division 
to  be  found  considerably  later  in  the  philosophical  systems  of 
Spinoza  and  Immanuel  Kant. 

Following  Nicolas  came  a  long  series  of  Eenaissance  names : 
Paracelsus,  a  rather  eccentric  character  who  tried  to  unite 
philosophy  with  medicine;  Pomponatius,  who  remodelled  the 
old  Aristotle  after  the  Eenaissance  view  of  nature;  Taurellus, 
who  tries  to  define  the  relation  between  philosophy  and  theol- 
ogy, speculation  and  church  dogma;  Telesius,  who  founded 

8  Docta  ignorantia.  *  Intellectus.  5  Ratio. 


56  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

a  fraternity  for  the  avowed  purpose  of  opposing  Aristotle; 
and  much  later  Campanella,  who  anticipated  the  Frenchman, 
Descartes,  by  resting  the  certainty  of  philosophy  on  the  exist- 
ence of  the  self,  and  the  English  empiricists  by  his  emphasis 
on  the  importance  of  a  theory  of  knowledge. 

THE  ADVANCES  IN  PHYSICS. 

In  connection  with  this  period  it  may  be  well  to  consider  for 
a  moment  the  scientific  influences  which  helped  to  mould  the 
speculative  philosophy.  In  1543  Copernicus  had  published  his 
monumental  work  on  astronomy,  which  defined  for  the  first 
time  our  modern  conception  of  the  heliocentric  nature  of  the 
universe.  Following  the  lead  of  Aristotle  and  the  Bible,  the 
Arabic  and  Scholastic  philosophers  had  accepted  unreservedly 
the  older  conception  of  the  heavens  in  which  the  earth  was  the 
centre,  while  the  stars,  the  sun,  and  other  planets  revolved 
about  it  in  circular  orbits.  This  was  strictly  in  accordance 
with  divine  revelation.  It  regarded  the  earth  as  the  centre  of 
the  solar  system,  and  man,  in  the  divine  likeness  of  God,  the 
spiritual  and  metaphysical  centre  of  the  universe.  When,  how- 
ever, a  system  of  physics  should  arise  which  dared  to  oppose 
the  convictions  of  twenty  centuries,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the 
whole  Church  should  have  been  stirred  to  its  foundations  and 
should  have  made  use  of  all  the  instruments  within  its  power 
to  wipe  out  the  heresy.  It  perceived  that  the  dignity  of  man 
was  shaken,  that  a  dogma  of  faith  had  been  opposed  by  the 
observations  of  nature.  The  Copernicans  asserted  that  the 
earth  was  only  one  of  many  worlds,  and  the  Church  inferred 
from  this  that  it  could  be  regarded  no  longer  as  the  work  of 
God  created  solely  for  the  purpose  of  serving  man. 

Together  with  the  growing  influence  of  the  heliocentric  as- 
tronomy, the  atomism  of  the  Greeks  began  to  reappear.  The 
apparent  success  with  which  it  explained  the  physical  world  in 
terms  of  moving  particles  of  matter  led  the  Church  to  regard 
it  as  an  attempt  to  dispense  with  the  spiritual  guidance  of 


GIORDANO   BRUNO.  57 

God,  or  at  least  to  minimize  His  immediate  control.  In  con- 
nection with  these  physical  theories  may  be  mentioned  Kepler, 
whose  three  laws  of  planetary  motion  anticipate  Newton's 
theory  of  attraction,  and  who  rests  universal  mechanism  on 
universal  harmony.  In  this  connection  one  must  not  forget 
the  physicist  Galileo,  and  at  a  little  later  time  the  atomist 
Gassendi. 

The  deepest  of  the  Italian  nature-philosophers,  one  who  com- 
bines the  speculative  interests  of  Nicolas  and  the  older  scholas- 
tics with  a  keen  appreciation  of  the  value  of  scientific  in- 
quiry, is 

GIORDANO  BRUNO. 
LIFE. 

He  early  entered  the  Dominician  order  of  monks,  but, 
influenced  by  Nicolas,  he  exhibited  too  much  freedom  in  his 
teachings  to  harmonize  well  with  his  monastic  surroundings. 
Owing  to  certain  heretical  opinions  concerning  the  dogma  of 
the  Trinity,  Bruno  was  considered  dangerous  by  the  authorities. 
He  emigrated  across  the  Alps  to  Geneva  on  hearing  that  his 
conduct  had  met  with  the  disapproval  of  the  Church.  During 
these  years  of  unrest  it  has  been  reported  that  he  taught  a 
children's  school,  and  it  is  well  known  that  some  years  later  he 
delivered  lectures  at  the  University  of  Toulouse.  He  visited 
Oxford,  where  his  new  ideas  were  regarded  with  disfavor  by  the 
British  scholars.  On  leaving  England  he  travelled  through  the 
length  and  breadth  of  Europe,  lecturing  at  the  various  univer- 
sities. He  produced  during  this  period  of  wandering  numerous 
works  on  almost  every  known  subject, — philosophy,  theology, 
logic,  astronomy,  and  other  natural  sciences.  While  at  Frank- 
fort he  accepted  an  invitation  to  visit  Venice  and  instruct  a 
young  nobleman  in  logic.  Suspicions  having  arisen  in  regard 
to  his  orthodoxy,  he  was  delivered  by  his  pupil  to  the  Inquisi- 
tion, and  later  transferred  to  Eome,  where  he  was  confined  for 
seven  years  in  a  papal  prison.  At  his  trial  Bruno  bore  himself 


58  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

with  fortitude.  He  rejected  a  proposal  of  reconciliation  offered 
him  by  the  Pope,  and  repeatedly  declared  that  there  was 
nothing  in  his  opinions  or  works  which  was  opposed  to  the 
deeper  meaning  of  a  truth-seeking  Christianity.  On  February 
9,  1600,  Bruno  was  convicted  of  heresy,  and  burned  at  the  stake 
on  the  17th  of  the  same  month.  To  his  sentence  he  replied, 
"  Ye  who  judge  me  have  more  to  fear  that  I  who  am  judged;" 
and  nearly  three  centuries  after  his  death  Italy  raised  a  monu- 
ment to  commemorate  the  greatest  of  her  philosophers.  The 
life  of  Bruno  was  an  expression  not  only  of  his  own  philosophy, 
but  likewise  of  the  whole  Renaissance.  Intense,  feverish  at  the 
restraint  of  authority,  he  felt  only  dimly  the  fundamental 
nature  of  his  mental  struggles.  While  keenly  appreciating  the 
interest  in  natural  science  which  sprung  up  around  the  labors 
of  Leonardo  da  Vinci  and  Copernicus,  he  was  yet  unable  to 
understand  the  difference  in  stand-point  between  the  old 
Church  and  the  new  science.  Seeking  to  the  end  the  harmony 
of  all  truth  which  came  to  his  intensive  nature  from  every  side, 
he  nevertheless  neglected  to  harmonize  his  successive  points  of 
view. 

Pantheism. — The  concept  of  a  Divinity,  in  and  through 
nature,  was  suggested  by  Nicolas  and  approached  by  many  of 
the  thinkers  of  the  time,  but  attains  its  deepest  significance  in 
the  thought  of  Bruno.  God  may  be  briefly  summarized  as  the 
soul  of  the  universe.  Deprived  of  the  Christian  attributes  and 
terms,  He  closely  resembles  the  Brahma  of  the  Hindoos.  This 
same  conception  of  a  pantheistic  world  we  shall  presently  meet 
in  a  more  abstract  form  among  the  German  mystics  and  after- 
wards in  the  profound  metaphysics  of  Spinoza.  The  difference 
between  pantheism  and  mysticism  lies  in  an  attitude  of  mind, 
a  method  of  approach  to  ultimate  truth,  rather  than  in  any 
definite  conception.  Both  recognize  a  monistic  unity  of  the 
world,  but  pantheism  struggles  to  appreciate  this  in  terms  of 
the  reason,  whereas  mysticism  arises  from  a  faith  in  the  divine 
intuition  of  its  truth.  But  without  regard  to  this  distinction 


GIORDANO   BRUNO.  59 

of  method,  the  conception  of  Bruno's  Nature-Deity  was  richer 
than  any  form  of  pantheism  which  had  yet  appeared.  God  is 
the  absolute  °  and  complete  unity  of  the  world ;  the  source  of 
all  things  which  includes  within  itself  all  phases,  antitheses, 
and  contradictions  to  be  found  in  heaven  or  on  earth.  In  Him 
are  united  freedom  and  necessity,  for  He  is  determined  only 
by  His  omniscience.  God  not  only  created  the  universe,  but  He 
is  the  Universe.  He  not  only  dictates  the  eternal  laws  of  the 
world,  but  is  those  very  laws  themselves  through  their  manifes- 
tation in  natural  phenomena.  God  is  generative  nature,  in- 
finite in  time  and  space ;  and  at  the  same  time  the  unity  of  the 
finite,  generated  forms.  He  is  the  efficient  and  ideal  cause  for 
the  harmonious  evolution  of  the  universe  towards  an  ultimate 
realization  of  truth,  goodness,  and  beauty.7  From  Him  ema- 
nate, and  to  Him  return,  all  the  processes  of  nature.  The  plant 
produces  the  man,  the  man  dies,  and  from  his  dust  again  arises 
the  plant ;  and  running  through  all  these  changes  is  the  eternal 
law  of  evolution,  the  true  expression  of  God's  will. 

This  doctrine  of  the  immanent  being  of  God  in  nature  was 
regarded  as  atheism  by  the  Church,  chiefly  because  of  the 
narrow  interpretation  given  to  Bruno's  philosophy.  The  dis- 
tinction lies  entirely  in  regard  to  the  stress  of  emphasis.  The 
Church  gave  to  God  an  existence  outside  of  nature,  the  latter 
being  an  expression  of  God's  creative  act.  Bruno,  on  the 
contrary,  made  God  the  creator  and  Nature  the  created  one  and 
the  same.  With  Bruno  the  universe  is  the  never-ceasing  ex- 
pression of  God,  the  eternal  act  of  creation. 

Physics. — Bruno  was  too  much  under  the  influence  of  the 

6 "  Deus  ergo  est  substantia  universalis  in  essendo,  .  .  .  Summa  Ter- 
minorum  Metaphysicorum ;  De  Deo  sev  Mente,  I." — Collected  Latin 
Works,  vol.  i.,  Part  4.  (The  work  is  a  very  concise  and  clear  account 
of  Bruno's  philosophy,  especially  in  its  relation  to  Scholasticism.  The 
metaphysical  rather  than  the  mystical  element  is  here  prominent.) 

7 "  Deus  est  amor,  emciens,  claritas,  lux." — De  Triplici  Minimo  et 
Mensura,  Book  I.,  Chapter  i. 


60  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

prevalent  enthusiasm  for  mathematics  and  the  new  stimulus 
given  to  science  by  the  Copernican  astronomy  to  rest  satisfied 
with  a  purely  pantheistic  explanation  of  the  world.  He  sought 
rather  to  explain  how  from  a  scientific  as  well  as  a  pantheistic 
stand-point  he  might  exhibit  the  underlying  unity  of  the  world. 
Not  that  the  truth  of  this  unity  can  appear  in  two  different 
forms, — the  purposive  and  the  mechanical, — but  only  that 
there  can  be  two  ways  of  interpreting  it. 

He  regarded  every  object  of  phenomena  of  the  physical  world 
as  a  little  reality  in  itself,  uniting  two  opposite  elements  in  a 
manner  which  approximates,  but  cannot  attain,  the  absolute 
unity  of  nature.  These  two  elements  may  be  variously  defined 
as  mind  and  matter,  form  and  substance,  purpose  and  inertia, 
activity  and  passivity.  Each  object  is  thus  the  expression  of 
the  two  great  world  elements,  the  conceptions  of  which  can  find 
their  complete  harmony  only  in  God.  From  its  position  in 
each  atom  Bruno  thus  raises  mere  "matter"  above  the  place 
assigned  to  it  by  scholastic  metaphysics.  Its  existence  is  a 
divine  necessity  8  permeating  every  form  of  life, — a  ground- 
work for  the  manifestation  of  mind.  Every  object  or  atom, 
owing  to  this  harmony  of  opposites,  is  the  arena  for  the  conflict 
of  two  motives  or  forces,  the  one  expansive,  the  other  contrac- 
tile. The  former  leads  upward  and  outward  towards  God, 
while  the  contractile  force  tends  towards  the  stagnation  and 
death  of  the  object.  Through  the  uninterrupted  action  of 
these  two  forces  upon  the  component  elements  of  mind  and 
matter,  every  atom  in  nature  is  constantly  changing  its  relative 
position.  Those  combinations  which  exhibit  a  lack  of  the  pur- 
posive or  mental  element  quickly  fade,  whereas  those  others 
remain  which  are  more  the  expression  of  law  than  of  accident. 
Accordingly  there  arises  in  the  universe  a  perfectly  graded 
scale  of  beings,  in  which  the  lower  members  approximate  a  con- 
tracted and  inert  state  of  existence,  while  those  of  higher  dig- 

8Cosa  divina. 


GIORDANO   BRUNO.  61 

nity  approach  the  fulness  of  the  Nature-God.  Here  is  a  new 
expression  of  ancient  atomism  and  an  early  statement  of  the 
system  of  evolving  monads  destined  to  occupy  a  prominent 
position  in  the  later  philosophy  of  Leibnitz. 

Ethics. — The  relative  importance  of  man  in  Bruno's  phi- 
losophy is  distinctly  in  accord  with  the  evolutionary  hypothesis 
of  the  modern  world.  Although  he  recognizes  that  everything 
represents  a  unity  of  mind  and  matter,  he  believes  that  man  is 
the  highest  fulfilment  of  this  harmony.  Human  knowledge, 
deep  and  wonderful  as  it  may  appear,  can  never  attain  a  com- 
plete understanding  of  God, — in  this  Bruno  follows  the 
"  learned  ignorance"  of  Mcolas, — but  yet  man  is  endowed  with 
the  dignity  of  expressing  the  will  of  God  through  moral  action. 
In  his  valuation  of  human  ideals  Bruno  places  the  pursuit  and 
attainment  of  truth  as  the  highest.  He  extols  the  virtues  of 
the  heart,  as  hope,  sympathy,  and  love;  he  emphasizes  the 
feelings  and  the  emotions,  since  they  represent  the  mental  and 
moral  harmony  of  opposites.  The  necessary  conflict  of  oppo- 
sition leads  upward  and  outward  to  an  ultimate  supremacy  of 
the  good  over  the  evil,  the  exalted  over  the  degraded,  the  reason 
over  the  passion.  Everything  is  good  because  it  expresses  in 
its  own  unique  way  the  harmonious  will  of  God;  all  things 
are  perfect  because  each  expresses  an  individuality  of  its 
own. 

Position  of  Bruno. — The  execution  of  Bruno  marks  the  de- 
cline of  Italian  philosophy ;  it  sprung  suddenly  into  being  only 
to  fade  with  the  same  quickness  and  mystery  that  surrounded 
the  brilliancy  of  its  appearance.  Bruno  summed  up  in  an 
immortal  form  the  prevalent  ideas  of  his  time.  His  mind  had 
all  the  quickness,  intensity,  and  passionate  struggle  for  an 
ideal  which  characterizes  the  Latins.  His  system,  however, 
lacked  clearness  of  detail  and  cogency  of  parts,  although  the 
broad  outline  of  his  metaphysics  well  represented  many  feat- 
ures of  later  modern  philosophy.  In  his  writings  are  elements 
which  are  found  in  every  later  school,  suggestions  which  are 


62  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

amplified  into  systems  by  such  minds  as  those  of  Spinoza,  Leib- 
nitz, and  even  Kant,  Schelling,  and  Hegel. 

The  philosophical  movement  of  Italy  was  only  one  of  the 
three  ways  in  which  the  intellectual  awakening  of  the  Benais- 
sance  reacted  on  the  thought  of  Europe.  The  Reformation 
introduced  a  new  life  into  the  strictly  religious  sentiment  of 
the  age.  Although  Protestantism  was  interpreted  strictly  as 
a  religion  of  faith,  and  the  leading  spirit  of  its  early  history, 
Martin  Luther.,  showed  a  distinct  abhorrence  for  philosophical 
problems,  yet  in  Philip  Melanchthon  philosophy  found  a  true 
student.  Educated  in  the  German  universities,  he  developed 
a  preference  for  the  philosophy  of  Aristotle,  the  teachings  of 
whom  he  struggles  to  accommodate  to  Protestantism.  The 
moral  principle  of  Aristotle  was  interpreted  as  God's  will,  while 
virtue  was  simply  a  knowledge  of  the  Divine  Law. 

MYSTICISM. 

General  Character. — By  far  the  most  interesting  of  the 
movements  directly  connected  with  the  new  religious  enthusi- 
asm was  the  development  of  what  has  been  called  Mysticism. 
In  our  previous  discussions,  notably  in  the  case  of  Nicolas  of 
Cusa,  we  have  approached  very  near  to  this  type  of  philosophi- 
cal religion.  Among  the  Hindoos  we  find  the  first  expression 
of  its  doctrine,  only  to  reappear  again  in  the  later  forms  of 
Christian  Platonism.  The  central  theme  of  the  mystic  creed, 
in  whatever  forms  it  has  appeared,  is  the  simple  belief  in  a 
spiritual  Essence  of  the  Universe,  or  God,  unknowable  to  human 
reason,  but  yet  suggested  by  the  higher  forms  of  intuition. 
Various  terms  and  circumlocutions  are  employed  to  testify  to 
the  inexpressibleness  of  the  mystic  One.  Sometimes  He  is 
called  the  Unknowable,  owing  to  the  finite  limits  of  human 
knowledge;  again  He  is  identified  with  all  knowledge,  because 
of  His  immanent  existence  in  all  the  objects  of  human  thought 
and  feeling.  So  far  as  may  be  judged  every  form  of  mysticism 
recognizes  God,  or  this  undifferentiated  essence  of  the  world, 


GIORDANO    BRUNO.  63 

to  be  the  creator  of  all  things.  The  universe,  as  we  knew  it, 
is  merely  an  outpouring  or  effusion,  which  comes  forth  from 
the  limitless  personality  of  the  Divine  Being.  His  nature  is 
infinite,  it  includes  and  transcends  all  truth,  all  goodness,  and 
all  beauty.  He  is  pure  thought,  pure  mind,  or  pure  reason,  of 
which  the  human  forms  are  but  meagre  expressions.  He  is 
superior  to  law  because  He  is  law;  higher  than  will  because 
He  is  will.  Towards  this  highest  power  of  the  universe  the 
human  soul  yearns  with  inexpressible  feelings  and  emotions. 
And  it  is  by  these  intuitions  alone  that  man  is  able  to  recognize 
the  existence  and  supreme  reality  of  the  Mystic  Absolute. 

Christian  Mystics. — The  Christian  Mystics  differ  but  little, 
in  the  deeper  meaning  of  their  thought  and  life,  from  the 
Hindoo,  Greek,  or  Arabic  Mystics.  The  undifferentiated  unity 
of  the  Absolute  is  the  same  to  the  Mystic  whether  it  is  called 
Brahma,  Allah,  or  God.  Although  this  doctrine,  so  peculiar  and 
yet  so  universal  in  its  nature,  could  not  be  easily  amalgamated 
with  the  outward  forms  of  Christianity,  it  often  appeared  even 
within  the  Catholic  Church  itself.  The  early  Father  Origen 
leaned  perceptibly  towards  mysticism,  possibly  owing  to  the 
fact  that  his  master  Saccas  and  his  fellow-pupil  Plotinus  are 
generally  recognized  as  the  founders  of  the  mysticism  of  an- 
tiquity. Later  Thomas  a  Eempis,  in  his  "  Imitation  of  Christ," 
gave  to  the  world  an  immortal  statement  of  mysticism  shrouded 
in  the  words  of  the  subjective  conflict  of  good  and  evil. 

The  mystics  of  the  thirteenth  and  fourteenth  centuries  sought 
to  replace  the  complex  externality  of  the  Church  by  a  simple 
personal  faith,  very  much  akin  to  Protestantism.  Prominent 
among  these  was  Meister  Eckliart,  who  was  born  about  the  mid- 
dle of  the  thirteenth  century,  at  a  time  when  the  power  and 
influence  of  the  Church  was  at  its  height.  As  a  Dominican 
monk  he  preached  at  Cologne  and  taught  in  the  University  of 
Paris.  Finally  the  Church  ordered  an  inquiry  concerning  his 
orthodoxy,  during  the  process  of  which  he  died,  probably  about 
1330.  In  his  teachings  Eckhart  approached  very  near  to  Pan- 


64  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

theism.  Keality,  existence,  life,  even  knowledge,  are  to  him 
but  mere  expressions  of  a  single  Unit.  From  this  unitary 
being  of  God  emanate  all  the  forms  of  the  world  and  all  the 
thoughts  of  men.  The  soul  or  permanent  substance,  which  lies 
at  the  basis  of  every  form  of  mind  and  matter,  is  a  reflection 
from  God.  The  human  soul  in  its  fundamental  nature  is  iden- 
tical with  the  world  soul  of  God ;  from  Him  the  immortal  part 
of  man  springs  and  to  Him  it  returns.  Such  teachings  were 
by  no  means  -uncommon  among  the  Mystics,  but  they  appear 
in  strange  contrast  to  the  formal  Catholicism  of  the  times. 
Eckhart's  teachings  were  widely  spread  in  Germany,  especially 
by  John  Tauler,  whose  name  is  generally  associated  with  his 
own. 

JACOB  BOEHMB. 
LIFE. 

Christian  mysticism  of  a  later  period  found  a  sympathetic 
disciple  in  Jacob  Boehme.  Born  in  1575,  he  was  apprenticed 
at  an  early  age  to  a  shoemaker,  and  received  but  the  meagre 
education  of  a  small  village  school.  He  worked  steadily  at  his 
craft  in  the  little  German  town  of  Gorlitz,  and  produced  at 
the  same  time  a  number  of  works  which  have  exerted  a  marked 
influence  on  subsequent  German  thought.  The  first  of  these 
was  the  "Aurora''  which  purported  to  be  the  record  of  a 
divine  revelation  from  God  to  man. 

Theology. — Boehme  combined  in  his  nature  a  strong  re- 
ligious feeling  with  a  firm  belief  in  the  power  of  personal 
inspiration.  Unlike  the  classic  forms  of  pantheism,  Boehme's 
philosophy  found  a  place  for  evil  in  the  world  without  detract- 
ing from  the  goodness  of  God.  The  Divine  Spirit  was  all, — 
creator  and  created, — self-knowledge  and  knowledge  of  the 
world.  This  perfect  unity,  however,  could  not  be  the  com- 
pletely good  unless  it  contained  the  opposing  elements  of  which 
perfect  unity  and  harmony  is  necessarily  formed,  and  among 
these  evil  must  find  its  place.  Instead  of  detracting  from  the 


JACOB   BOEHME.  65 

goodness  of  God  the  presence  of  evil  really  adds  to  His  glory, 
it  being  one  of  the  forms  through  which  the  Divine  Spirit 
expresses  the  dualism  and  conflict  involved  in  the  process  of 
creation. 

Cosmology. — The  process  of  creation  is  the  successive  mani- 
festation of  certain  activities  arising  directly  from  God.  Every 
activity  involves  a  duality,  and  this  duality  in  turn  is  com- 
pletely harmonized  in  the  Divine  Nature.  Here  unite  fire  and 
water,  heat  and  cold,  good  and  evil, — opposite  and  contradictory 
elements  of  every  character.  Creation  is  the  eternal  expression 
of  the  unity  of  God  through  the  assertion  and  absorption  of 
duality.  All  nature  is  endowed  with  life  and  value,  all  laws  of 
nature  are  the  will  activities  of  the  Spirit.  The  physical  evo- 
lution of  the  universe  takes  place  according  to  certain  primary 
activities,  seven  in  number.  Each  is  given  a  metaphorical 
interpretation  by  the  religious  enthusiasm  of  Boehme, — on  the 
one  hand  as  a  physical  force,  and  on  the  other  as  a  psycho- 
logical or  moral  principle.  The  elementary  principles  of  crea- 
tion are  represented  by  two  forces;  the  one  expansive,  giving 
rise  to  physical  fluidity  and  moral  sweetness ;  the  other  a  con- 
tractive force,  expressing  itself  as  solidity  and  acute  pain. 
These  two  forces  unite  in  a  third,  the  principle  of  sensuality, 
desire,  and  anxiety.  It  is  the  union  of  the  two  elementary 
forces  in  the  desires  of  sense  which  is  expressed  by  the  Mosaic 
account  of  the  fall  of  man.  The  other  activities  which  Boehme 
discovers  in  the  world  process  are,  in  general,  fire,  love,  sound, 
and  matter.  As  a  whole,  despite  his  metaphorical  illustrations, 
the  mysticism  of  Boehme  represents  the  first  strictly  German 
speculation.  It  is  a  religious  appreciation  of  the  initial  prin- 
ciple of  all  evolutionary  theory, — a  unity  manifesting  itself  in 
successive  oppositions. 

The  philosophical  spirit  of  the  Eenaissance  showed  itself  in 
England  not  as  Italian  pantheism  nor  as  German  mysticism, 
but  rather  as  a  new  interest  in  the  empirical  method  of  science. 

5 


66  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  English  mind  long  held  a  covert  longing  to  substitute  a 
philosophy  of  experience  for  the  traditional  formalism  of  the 
Church.  Feelings  of  repugnance  towards  Aristotelian  and 
scholastic  logic,  its  methods  and  its  results,  were  gradually 
attaining  in  England,  throughout  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth 
centuries,  the  magnitude  of  a  national  character  of  mind.  In- 
stead of  the  sudden  appearance  and  disappearance  of  the 
Italian  reformers,  sharply  defined  against  a  background  of 
mediaevalism,  the  English  nation  was  assuming  the  garb  of  a 
whole  race  of  reformers.  For  from  the  dominant  influence  of 
a  decaying  church  the  clear-headed  Anglo-Saxon  was  rising  step 
by  step  above  the  intellectual  plane  of  his  ancestors.  His 
fondness  for  the  reality  of  his  senses  combined  with  the  ac- 
quired distrust  of  scholastic  dialectic,  produced  a  new  attitude 
towards  the  world,  capable  only  of  contributing  to  a  true  ad- 
vance in  natural  science.  The  progress  of  British  philosophy 
has  been  slow  and  steady,  seldom  evincing  remarkable  bril- 
liancy, but  never  exhibiting  signs  of  decay. 

FRANCIS  BACON. 
LIFE. 

This  empirical  attitude  of  mind,  peculiar  to  the  Eng- 
lish Eenaissance,  finds  in  Francis  Bacon,  Baron  of  Verulam 
and  Viscount  St.  Albans,  its  fullest  individual  expression.  He 
was  born  at  London  in  1561,  a  son  of  Mcolas  Bacon,  keeper 
of  the  great  seal  under  Queen  Elizabeth.  He  early  entered 
the  University  of  Cambridge,  where  he  acquired  the  charac- 
teristic dislike  for  scholastic  traditions,  especially  in  the  field 
of  the  sciences.  Leaving  his  studies,  he  travelled  in  France 
in  order  to  become  somewhat  acquainted  with  men,  and  his 
Essays  testify  to  the  success  with  which  he  learned  this  lesson. 
He  was  left  to  his  own  resources  by  the  early  death  of  his 
father,  and  turned  towards  politics  and  the  law  as  the  quickest 
and  easiest  means  of  attaining  prominence.  In  this  he  was 
not  disappointed,  for  he  steadily  rose  in  public  office,  especially 


FRANCIS   BACON.  67 

after  the  accession  of  James  I.,  until  in  1618  he  became  Lord 
Chancellor  and  was  a  little  later  vested  with  the  titles  of  Baron 
of  Verulam  and  Viscount  St.  Albans.  While  at  the  height  of 
his  glory  he  was  charged  with  bribery,  fined,  and  sentenced  to 
imprisonment.  The  King,  however,  never  permitted  the  full 
execution  of  the  penalties.  The  closing  years  of  his  life  were 
occupied  by  literary  labors  and  scientific  studies.  In  1626  he 
died,  "  loved  and  admired,"  it  is  said,  by  all  who  knew  him. 

THE  GREAT  BEGENERATION. 

Bacon's  place  in  the  history  of  thought  is  secured  for  him 
by  an  extensive  project  of  which  only  a  fragment  reached  com- 
pletion. This  undertaking  was  no  less  than  the  attempt  to 
sum  up  the  then  present  stage  of  human  knowledge,  point  out 
the  defects  which  would  hinder  its  future  progress,  and  finally 
to  mark  out  in  broad  outlines  the  method  and  direction  of 
future  science.  This  remarkable  attempt  to  evaluate  the  human 
reason  has  been  called  the  " Instauratio  Magna"  or  great  regen- 
eration, having  as  its  expressed  purpose  the  "  restoration  of 
the  sciences."  Bacon's  original  plan  is  recognized  to  have  been 
arranged  according  to  six  separate  divisions,  of  which  only  the 
first  two  approached  anywhere  near  their  complete  and  per- 
manent form.  The  first  part  of  the  "Instauratio  Magna' 
began  with  a  survey  of  the  present  condition  of  science.  Ba- 
con's final  views  on  this  topic  were  published  in  1623  as  "  De 
Dignitate  et  Augmentis  Scientiarum"  the  same  being  an  en- 
largement of  the  "Advancement  of  Learning"  which  had  made 
its  appearance  seventeen  years  earlier.  The  second  part  of  the 
great  plan  was  occupied  with  the  proper  method  of  scientific 
inquiry.  It  treated  of  the  "  Novum  Organum"  or  inductive 
method,  in  contradistinction  to  the  old  method  of  Aristotelian 
logic.  In  the  third  part  Bacon  wished  to  treat  of  the  data  of 
science ;  while  the  fourth  was  intended  to  exemplify  the  results 
to  be  attained  by  the  use  of  his  inductive  method.  The  fifth 
and  sixth  parts  treated  respectively  of  Bacon's  expectations  in 


68  HISTORY   OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

his  new  philosophy  and  the  part  which  future  generations  shall 
contribute  towards  the  application  of  his  method  to  the  world 
of  scientific  experience. 

Imperfections  of  Knowledge. — In  Bacon's  treatment  of 
science  he  directs  attention  to  the  three  requisites  necessary  to 
the  successful  investigator  of  nature, — namely,  a  starting-point 
in  experience,  a  sure  method,  and  a  gradual  rather  than  a  rapid 
progress.  In  the  pursuit  of  knowledge  man  is  hindered  by 
four  phantoms  or  groups  of  "idols,"  which  lead  the  human 
intellect  into  false  paths.  The  first  of  these  Bacon  called  idols 
of  the  tribe,9  of  which  he  enumerated  seven.  They  represent 
the  misguiding  characters  which  are  common  to  every  human 
mind  because  of  its  organic  structure.  They  are  inherent  in 
the  nature  of  man  and  corrupt  the  understanding  by  their  uni- 
versality. For  instance,  we  all  make  the  facts  fit  some  favorite 
theory;  and  passions  influence  all  our  judgments.  Another 
class  are  the  idols  of  the  den 10  which  arise  from  the  peculiar 
nature  of  each  individual;  these  are  traceable  to  habit,  educa- 
tion, or  accident.  Some  people,  for  example,  are  prone  to 
observe  differences,  while  others  lay  stress  upon  resemblances. 
A  third  class  are  the  idols  of  the  market-place  "  which  arise 
from  the  deficiencies  and  ambiguity  of  our  language;  words 
of  a  fanciful  or  fictitious  origin  and  meaning.  And,  finally, 
there  are  the  idols  of  the  theatre  12  which  recount  the  errors  of 
past  systems  of  philosophy, — errors  which  are  caused  either  by 
too  narrow  a  basis,  too  little  experiment,  or  too  much  assurance 
in  tradition.  The  development  of  knowledge  is  like  a  theatre 
in  which  customs,  opinions,  and  systems  of  philosophy  appear 
and  disappear  like  the  scenes  of  a  drama. 

Division  of  Sciences.— This  purely  negative  treatment  of 
knowledge  served  only  as  an  introduction  to  his  positive  teach- 

^      8  Idola  tribus.    Novum  Organum,  Book  I.,  Section  41. 

10  Idola  specus.    Ibid.,  Section  42. 

11  Idola  fori.    Ibid.,  Section  43. 
"Idola  theatri.    Ibid.,  Section  44.' 


FRANCIS  BACON.  69 

ings.  Bacon's  philosophy,  if  such  a  term  may  be  used  to  cover 
its  breadth,  was  more  an  attempt  to  define  a  general  classifica- 
tion and  arrangement  of  all  possible  branches  of  human  in- 
quiry than  to  develop  any  systematic  theory  of  reality.  The 
only  unity  that  pervades  the  almost  measureless  extent  of  the 
"  Instauratio  Magna"  is  its  general  empirical  stand-point. 
The  criterion  which  Bacon  employs  to  differentiate  the  sciences 
depends  more  often  on  empirical  and  frequently  accidental 
data  derived  from  psychological  evidence,  than  on  the  meaning 
of  the  sciences  themselves.  In  this  respect  he  defines  in  its 
classic  form  the  assurance  which  the  English  mind  has  always 
felt  in  the  simple  facts  of  experience  and  the  sufficiency  of 
psychological  explanations. 

The  general  classification  of  all  knowledge  depends  on  a 
threefold  division  of  the  faculties  of  the  mind ;  history  relates 
to  the  memory,  poetry  to  the  imagination,  and  philosophy  to  the 
reason.  It  is  history  which  simply  reviews  the  images  or  im- 
pressions received  from  sense,  "  which  is,  as  it  were,  the  port  or 
entrance  to  the  understanding/' 13  Civil  history  records  the 
works  and  acts  of  mankind ;  natural  history  describes  the  gen- 
erative processes  of  nature  and  the  use  of  material  objects. 
Poetry  comes  from  a  fanciful  rearrangement  of  sense-impres- 
sions without  reference  to  true  individuals.  Philosophy,  which 
alone  arises  from  the  reason,  is  concerned  with  knowledge  of 
God,  of  Nature,  and  of  Man.  Theology,  however,  has  taken  to 
itself  the  problems  which  refer  to  God  and  the  human  soul, 
thus  leaving  to  philosophy  in  its  stricter  sense  the  investigation 
of  the  laws  of  nature,  the  activities  and  interests  of  man. 

It  is  in  the  field  of  the  natural  sciences  that  the  reason  has    , 
perhaps  its  firmest  hold.     Here  the  inductive  method,  upon 
which  Bacon  laid  so  much  emphasis,  finds  an  almost  unlimited 
opportunity  for  the  exercise  of  its  authority.     It  is  this  em- 
phasis on  the  importance  of  the  inductive  approach  to  science 

"  De  Dignitate  et  Augmentis  Scientiarum,  Book  II.,  Chapter  i. 


70  HISTORY   OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

that  gives  to  Bacon  the  prominence  which  he  deserves  in  modern 
thought.  The  authority  of  experience  and  the  method  of  induc- 
tion defines  the  position  of  Bacon,  and  it  is  through  the  con- 
fidence in  these  two  factors  that  the  natural  science  of  modern 
times  has  been  able  to  fulfil  the  predictions  of  its  founder. 

Position  of  Bacon. — One  looks  in  vain  for  a  complete  and 
clearly  articulated  system  of  metaphysics  in  the  works  of  Bacon. 
His  analytical  and  psychological  account  of  the  divisions  of 
knowledge  belongs  more  to  the  history  of  science  than  to  specu- 
lative thought.  The  whole  object  of  his  undertaking  was  the 
advancement  of  natural  science,  although  the  accomplishment 
of  this  might  initiate  a  decay  in  philosophy  proper.  The 
tribute  which  the  modern  world  owes  to  Bacon  and  his  asso- 
ciates rests  upon  the  stimulation  which  they  gave  to  the  em- 
pirical and  scientific  tendency  of  the  whole  English  race.  Ger- 
man historians  of  philosophy  are  prone  to  decry  the  importance 
of  the  position  allotted  to  him  by  Englishmen,  and  can  see 
,  little  worthy  of  praise  in  his  character  or  in  his  life-work.  He 
may  have  lacked  the  extreme  originality  accredited  to  him  by 
his  admirers,  and  perhaps  borrowed  many  of  his  conceptions 
from  prevalent  scientific  notions;  he  might  have  been  un- 
scrupulous in  character  and  uncompromising  in  the  pursuit  of 
his  ambition,  but  notwithstanding  he  supplied  the  distinct  de- 
mands of  his  age.  His  scientific  aspiration  and  his  character, 
to  a  greater  degree  than  we  are  willing  to  admit,  portrayed  the 
ambitions  of  the  modern  world. 


THOMAS   HOBBES. 

LIFE. 

If  Bacon  approached  philosophy  from  science,  one  may 
easily  point  to  a  contemporary  and  friend  of  his,  Thomas 
Hobbes,  who  came  to  science  with  a  metaphysical  theory  already 
formed.  He  was  the  son  of  the  Vicar  of  Malmesbury,  a  person 
who  is  said  to  have  lacked  both  intellectual  and  moral  refine- 


THOMAS  HOBBES.  71 

ment.  Thomas  was  prematurely  born  in  1588.  His  hasty  en- 
trance into  the  world  is  ascribed  to  the  wide-spread  fear  caused 
by  the  Spanish  Armada.  He  early  attended  the  village  school, 
and  at  fifteen  years  of  age  began  the  study  of  scholastic  learn- 
ing at  Oxford.  Hobbes  seems  to  have  attained  considerable 
proficiency  in  Greek,  although,  like  Bacon,  he  was  rather  re- 
pelled by  the  classicism  and  ecclesiastical  pedantry  of  the  Uni- 
versity. After  leaving  the  University,  Hobbes  travelled  exten- 
sively on  the  Continent,  meeting  the  foremost  thinkers  of 
France  and  Italy.  While  waiting  in  a  drawing-room  for  the 
arrival  of  a  friend,  he  accidentally  raised  from  the  table  a  copy 
of  Euclid's  Geometry.  From  that  time  forth  his  whole  attitude 
of  mind  was  changed.  Mathematics,  mathematical  methods, 
and  mechanical  explanations  became  the  fundamental  element 
in  all  his  thought.  Although  never  a  professional  mathemati- 
cian, and  latterly  involved  and  distinctly  defeated  in  several 
discussions  on  mathematical  topics,  he  moulded  his  own  phi- 
losophy on  mathematical  standards  and  indirectly  defined  the 
attitude  of  subsequent  English  naturalism.  Hobbes  died  at 
the  advanced  age  of  ninety-one,  retaining  to  the  last  the  vigor 
of  his  faculties  and  the  acuteness  of  his  mind. 

Epistemology. — It  has  been  often  observed,  especially  by 
historians  of  English  and  French  philosophy,  that  a  material- 
istic metaphysics  is  universally  associated  with  an  empirical 
epistemology.  This  generalization  possesses  the  strongest  force 
in  the  case  of  Hobbes.  He  may  be  regarded  as  the  spiritual 
father  of  the  long  line  of  English  empiricists.  The  human 
organism,  higher  only  in  degree  than  that  of  the  brute,  can 
only  attain  to  knowledge  through  the  medium  of  sensation.  In 
fact  what  we  recognize  as  knowledge,  even  of  the  most  abstract 
character,  is  derived  from  the  union  of  sensation.  "  Originally 
all  conceptions  proceed  from  the  action  of  the  thing  itself, 
whereof  it  is  the  conception,"  Hobbes  tells  us  in  his  "Dis- 
course on  Human  Nature/'  and  repeats  it  in  his  political 
treatise,  "Leviathan"  And  further,  that  the  "coherence  of 


72  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

thought,"  which  we  would  call  the  flow  of  consciousness,  is 
(  the  result- of  sensations  related  to  one  another  in  a  single  stream 
of  time.  Imagination  and  memory  are  "  decaying  senses ;"  14 
experience  is  the  collection  of  these  past  sensations  and  the 
•^  understanding  is  their  representation  by  words.  An  object  in 
the  external  world  excites  the  end  organs  of  sense  by  means  of 
'its  own  movement,  and  this  motion  is  transmitted  through  the 
nerves  to  the  brain.  The  brain  transformations,  and  not  the 
true  movements  of  the  external  object,  are  what  constitute  the 
cognitions  of  our  thought ;  we  can  perceive  the  "  sentient"  but 
not  the  true  qualities  which  inhere  in  the  object  itself.  "  Im- 
age or  color  is  but  an  apparition  unto  us  of  the  motion,  agita- 
tion, or  alteration  which  the  object  worketh  in  the  brain"  15 
This  theory  of  sense-qualities  was  earlier  defined  by  the  physi- 
cist Galileo  and  became  a  point  of  almost  universal  agreement 
among  subsequent  English  philosophers. 

Metaphysics. — TJie  system  of  Hobbes  divides  itself  very 
conveniently  into  three  parts, — the  metaphysics,  ethics,  and 
politics, — all  of  which  are  erected  on  the  empirical  foundation 
just  outlined.  In  metaphysics  Hobbes  represents  the  first 
modern  interpreter  of  materialism.  Every  phenomenon  of 
the  universe  is  interpreted  in  terms  of  "matter"  and  "mo- 
tion;" and  thought  becomes  simply  a  peculiar  form  of  the 
latter.  To  account  for  the  endless  variety  of  the  forms  of 
matter,  Hobbes  premises  the  broad  generalization  that  all 
changes  or  transformations  represent  different  forms  of  mo- 
tion. The  processes  of  thought,  as  well  as  the  development  of 
worlds,  are  all  mere  expressions  of  moving  coagulations  of 
matter.  Although  matter  is  therefore  synonymous  with  reality 
and  existence,  Hobbes  believes  that  an  ultimate  law  of  nature 
lies  behind  its  activities.  This  he  finds  in  the  principle  of 
causality,  the  sequence  of  cause  and  effect.  An  understanding 

14  Leviathan,  Part  I.,  Chapter  ii. 

15  Human  Nature,  Chapter  ii. 


THOMAS   HOBBES.  73 

of  its  various  specific  applications  constitutes  ultimate  truth; 
philosophy  itself  is  nothing  else  than  the  knowledge  of  cause 
and  effect,  and  the  correct  method  of  philosophy  consists  in  the 
"  shortest  way  of  finding  out  effects  by  their  known  causes,  or 
of  causes  by  their  known  effects."  16 

The  terms  and  general  conceptions  which  Hobbes  employs 
readily  bring  to  mind  his  early  studies  of  Aristotelian  and 
Scholastic  philosophy.  Space  is  the  appearance  of  any  external 
thing,  and  time  the  before  and  after  relation.  Body  is  a 
specially  existent  thing  independent  of  our  thought  processes; 
the  accidents  of  body  are  the  external  sources  of  our  concep- 
tions. From  these  views  one  recognizes  that  Hobbes  has  trans- 
formed the  scholastic  doctrines  into  a  materialism,  in  which 
"  substance"  of  the  earlier  thinkers  becomes  the  "  matter"  of  a 
mechanical  universe.  Its  mathematical  laws  of  motion  exclude 
the  possibility  of  purposes  or  ends  in  nature,  no  "  Final 
causes"  as  in  the  Aristotelian  systems.  Hobbes  is  thoroughly 
straightforward  in  his  materialism,  and  does  not  hesitate  to 
draw  the  most  disagreeable  conclusions  if  the  rigidity  of  his 
mathematical  method  seems  to  demand  it.  The  conception 
of  a  thoroughly  mechanical  universe,  in  which  thought  processes 
are  regarded  as  movements  of  matter,  does  not  meet  with  much 
sympathy  among  the  philosophers  directly  following  Hobbes; 
and  materialism  cannot  be  regarded  as  of  much  consequence 
until  the  time  of  the  French  Encyclopaedists,  during  the  latter 
part  of  the  eighteenth  century. 

The  Nature  of  Man. — The  empiricism  and  materialism  of 
Hobbes  is  apparent  in  his  treatment  of  human  relations.  He 
develops  what  may  be  called  a  naturalism, — a  term  which  well 
describes  any  theory  of  ethics  which  regards  man  merely  as  the 
causal  product  of  his  environment ;  a  highly  organized  machine, 
properly  adjusted  to  complicated  surroundings.  Pleasure  and 
pain,  beauty,  morality,  and  truth  exist  for  no  other  purpose 

16  Computation  or  Logic,  Part  I.,  Chapter  vi. 


74  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

than  to  assist  man  to  accommodate  himself  to  his  environment. 
Fundamental  to  human  character  is  an  insatiable  love  of  life 
and  power,  the  satisfaction  of  one's  natural  appetities,  and  the 
primitive  emotions  of  pleasure  and  pain,  good  and  evil,  express 
its  gratification  or  its  disappointment.  Freedom  of  will  is  an 
error  of  individual  prejudice ;  it  springs  from  a  misinterpreted 
consciousness.  Man,  like  every  other  species  of  animal,  is 
controlled  in  his  actions  by  the  passions  and  inclinations  of  the 
moment.  Volition  is  only  the  expression  of  consent  to  an 
irretrievable  fate,  a  fate  founded  on  the  principle  of  sufficient 
reason  and  operative  on  the  ground  of  the  psychical  demand 
for  the  greatest  pleasure.  Goodness,  morality,  and  such  terms 
are  convenient  words  for  the  evaluation  of  conduct,  but  in  an 
absolute  sense  void  of  any  meaning.  Praise  and  blame  are 
ideas  which  are  inapplicable  to  the  estimation  of  moral  value, 
they  are  of  service  only  as  expression  of  the  relative  utility  of 
modes  of  conduct. 

Philosophy  of  Society. — In  connection  with  Hobbes's 
theory  of  sociology  his  name  is  best  known.  Earlier,  Jean 
Bodin  and  Hugo  Grotius  attempted  a  naturalistic  explanation 
of  society,  but  lack  as  a  starting-point  the  unwavering  material- 
ism of  Hobbes.  The  latter  begins  with  the  assumption  that 
primitive  man  was  without  social  organization, — a  premise 
which  Hegel  later  denies  as  contrary  to  the  very  nature  of  man 
as  a  social  being.  Under  such  conditions  each  individual  is  in 
constant  conflict  with  the  rights  of  all  other  men,  a  war  of  all 
against  all,  without  moral  law  or  justice.  "To  this  warre  of 
every  man  against  every  man,  this  also  is  consequent;  that 
nothing  can  be  Unjust."  1T  Peace,  the  attainment  of  which 
constitutes  the  first  law  of  social  progress,  is  possible  only  on 
some  mutual  understanding  or  agreement.  Each  man,  there- 
fore, reliquishes  a  portion  of  his  natural  rights  in  order  that 
those  remaining  to  him  may  be  more  secure.  From  this  mutual 

"Leviathan,  Chapter  xiii. 


THOMAS   HOBBES.  75 

agreement  arises  a  universal  compact  vested  either  in  a  monarch 
or  in  some  constituted  assembly.  It  is  the  function  of  this 
centralized  government  to  receive  from  each  certain  of  his 
natural  rights  and  at  the  same  time  to  assure  to  every  person 
the  rights  and  privileges  of  a  peaceful  life.  The  state  is  thus 
a  product  of  fear  on  the  one  hand  and  prudence  on  the  other. 
Estimate  of  Hobbes. — Hobbes  and  Bacon  present  to  us 
very  well  the  attitude  of  the  English  thinkers  during  the  seven- 
teenth century.  The  one  initiated  a  new  advance  in  physical 
science,  the  other  defines  the  characteristic  English  empiricism. 
Hobbes  cannot  be  called  a  man  of  extreme  originality,  nor,  on 
the  other  hand,  is  his  philosophy  stimulated  by  a  remarkable 
depth  of  insight.  His  importance  lies  more  in  the  hidden  cur- 
rents of  thought  which  later  defined  the  character  of  English 
philosophy  than  in  the  immediate  influence  of  his  stand-point. 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Hobbes  is  condemned  or  else  neg- 
lected altogether  by  nearly  all  of  his  successors,  yet  his  attitude 
and  method,  and  not  uncommonly  his  theories,  are  uncon- 
sciously assimulated  by  opponent  and  disciple  alike.  His 
breadth  of  view  and  power  of  analysis  are  perhaps  greater  than 
in  the  case  of  the  next  illustrious  English  philosopher,  Locke, 
but  the  influence  of  the  latter  has  been  much  more  pronounced. 


CHAPTER   III. 
CONTINENTAL   RATIONALISM. 

SCEPTICISM  OF  THE  RENAISSANCE. 

IN  the  foregoing  pages  we  traced  the  early  movements  of 
modern  thought  as  they  appeared  in  the  nature  philosophy  of 
Italy,  the  religious  enlightenment  of  Germany,  and  the  critical 
empiricism  of  England,  The  era  of  these  movements,  each  in- 
dicative of  the  subsequent  national  stand-point,  may  he  re- 
garded as  the  transition  period  between  mediaeval  and  strictly 
modern  thought.  The  problems  of  the  ancients  were  restated 
in  the  light  of  the  Renaissance,  the  traditions  of  the  old  were 
compared  with  the  ideals  of  a  new;  the  humanistic  philosophy 
of  the  Greeks  and  the  theology  of  the  Schoolmen  were  replaced 
by  a  simple  philosophy  of  nature.  The  influence  of  this  transi- 
tion period  was  felt  in  France  as  well  as  in  the  countries 
already  mentioned,  although  here  the  reaction  away  from 
Catholicism  first  appeared  as  a  general  attitude  of  doubt  or 
scepticism.  The  Frenchman  of  the  Renaissance  possessed  the 
deep  imagination  of  the  Italian  but  lacked  sufficient  intensity 
to  give  reality  to  his  mental  dream.  On  the  other  hand  he 
shared  with  the  Englishman  an  interest  in  science,  but  failed 
to  possess  the  reliance  of  the  latter  on  the  facts  of  experience. 
A  general  tendency  to  philosophize  was  the  only  possible  result 
of  this  peculiar  condition  of  character,  but  a  tendency  which 
was  devitalized  by  a  deep  feeling  of  scepticism.  The  French 
philosophy  of  the  early  Renaissance  lacked  confidence  in  both 
the  reason  and  the  senses. 

Significant  of  this  whole  type  of  thought  is  Michael  de  Mon- 
taigne, who  is  really  less  of  a  sceptic  than  his  critics  often 
admit.  Born  in  Southern  France  in  1533,  he  lived  a  quiet  and 
retired  life  until  his  death  in  1592.  Montaigne  was  a  true 
76 


RENE   DESCARTES.  77 

child  of  the  Renaissance,  individualistic,  intense,  and  intro- 
spective. He  writes  for  the  mere  pleasure  of  self-culture.  He 
penetrates  by  analysis  and  philosophizes  by  subtle  distinctions. 
Like  other  figures  of  the  Eenaissance  he  places  nature  as  the 
standard  of  life,  but  unfortunately  fails  to  grasp  this  standard. 
He  is  a  humanistic  philosopher  impressed  with  the  dignity  of 
man  and  the  shallowness  of  the  life  of  passion;  ignorance  is 
preferable  to  artificiality,  servitude  of  mind  is  too  dear  a  price 
to  pay  for  civilization.  The  ancient  Stoics  rather  than  the 
Sceptics  were  his  teachers.  Nature,  and  life  according  to 
nature,  sum  up  his  metaphysics  and  his  ethics. 


RENE  DESCARTES. 
LIFE. 

Not  long  after  this  time  of  general  doubt  and  dissatisfaction, 
both  with  the  old  and  the  new,  there  appeared  in  France  a 
man  who  belongs  to  the  age  succeeding  the  period  of  transi- 
tion to  the  distinctly  modern  world.  Descartes  was  born  in  a 
period  when  the  spirit  of  the  French  Eenaissance  had  lost  the 
vigor  of  its  freshness  and  when  even  the  "life  according  to 
nature"  seemed  to  demand  a  firmer  foundation  in  some  con- 
sistent metaphysic  of  nature.  Descartes  was  born  on  March 
31, 1596,  at  the  village  of  La  Haye,  in  the  province  of  Touraine, 
as  the  son  of  a  noble  family.  The  young  Descartes  passed  the 
first  eight  years  of  his  life  at  home,  where  he  showed  sufficient 
signs  of  originality  to  be  dubbed  the  "Little  Philosopher." 
The  years  from  1604  to  1612  he  spent  at  the  Jesuit  college  of 
La  Fleche.  Here  he  acquired  a  considerable  knowledge  of 
Latin,  an  antipathy  towards  scholasticism,  and  a  rather  pro- 
nounced conceit  of  his  own  powers.  On  leaving  the  seclusion 
of  the  Jesuit  college  we  find  him  at  Paris,  enacting  the  part  of 
a  man  of  the  world,  but  later  devoting  all  his  attention  to 
study.  Becoming  anxious  to  visit  the  various  countries  of 
Europe,  he  entered  the  army  of  the  Netherlands,  taking  part 


78  HISTORY   OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

in  several  campaigns  of  the  Thirty- Years'  War.  On  November 
10,  1619,  while  at  Neuburg,  a  small  town  on  the  Danube,  he 
records  that  the  first  intimation  of  the  central  thesis  of  his 
philosophy  came  to  him  like  a  vision.  He  then  retired  for 
some  hours  that  he  might  have  an  opportunity  of  estimating 
the  true  value  of  his  new  discovery.  An  account  of  this  strange 
incident  appears  in  the  "Discourse  concerning  Method/'1 
published  in  1637,  which  may  be  regarded  as  the  first  work 
which  belongs  strictly  to  modern  philosophy. 

This  incident  at  Neuburg  was  the  decisive  point  in  the  career 
of  Descartes,  as  well  as  in  the  history  of  philosophy.  From 
that  time  forth  his  whole  life  was  controlled  by  the  ideal  of 
study,  as  it  appeared  in  the  light  of  his  new  discovery.  To 
accomplish  this  purpose  of  study  he  took  up  his  residence  in 
the  Netherlands.  The  only  person  who  was  acquainted  with 
the  place  of  his  retirement  was  Pere  Mersenne,  whose  friend- 
ship began  in  the  early  days  of  the  Jesuit  school.  Through 
this  friend  he  held  communication  with  the  outside  world. 
By  him  he  was  kept  informed  concerning  the  scientific  and 
literary  progress  in  France,  and  also  it  was  through  his  in- 
strumentality that  the  works  of  Descartes  were  printed.  In 
the  seclusion  and  intellectual  freedom  of  the  various  Dutch 
cities  which  he  visited,  Descartes  devoted  himself  to  an  exten- 
sive work  on  natural  science,  entitled  " The  World" 2  This 
was  probably  completed  about  1634,  but  the  Inquisition  had  the 
previous  year  enjoined  Galileo  from  teaching  the  Copernican 
cosmology,  and  condemned  as  heretics  all  who  accepted  the 
heliocentric  astronomy.  Descartes  rejected  the  scholastic  the- 
ory of  the  heavens  and  rested  the  elements  of  his  treatise  on 
the  physical  hypotheses  of  Copernicus,  Kepler,  and  Galileo, 
with  the  express  intention  of  developing  a  mechanical  theory 
of  the  universe.  Owing,  however,  to  the  action  of  the  Church, 
he  withheld  the  publication  of  his  work.  Descartes  wrote  to 

1Discours  de  la  M6thode.  aLe  Monde. 


RENtf   DESCARTES.  79 

Mersenne  at  the  time,  that  he  wished  in  no  wise  to  conflict  with 
the  faith  and  teachings  of  the  Church,  a  desire  which  arose 
in  a  large  measure  from  fear  and  love  of  quietude.  Nothing 
of  the  Cartesian  philosophy  was  made  known  until  1637,  when 
Descartes  published  the  very  important  introduction  to  his 
system,  under  the  title  of  "  A  Discourse  concerning  Method"  3 
the  first  four  parts  of  which  were  devoted  to  a  discussion  of  the 
circumstances  of  the  discovery  and  the  general  nature  of  the 
Cartesian  presuppositions,  to  which  were  added  two  sections 
treating  of  the  application  of  the  "method"  to  the  physical 
world.  Together  with  the  "Discourse  concerning  Method" 
which  is  largely  of  metaphysical  import,  there  appeared  three 
other  articles,  the  whole  forming  the  "  Philosophical  Essays." 4 
Of  these  latter  the  "  Dioptrics"  was  concerned  with  the  applica- 
tion of  mathematics  to  physics;  the  " Meteores"  with  physics 
proper;  while  the  "  Geometric"  laid  the  foundations  of  modern 
analytic  geometry.  In  1641  Descartes  published  a  series  of 
"Meditations"  together  with  a  series  of  criticisms  and  the 
replies  of  Descartes.  The  work  had  been  circulated  in  manu- 
script among  prominent  thinkers,  Hobbes  included.  The 
last  of  his  important  works  was  an  interesting  ethical  essay 
entitled  the  "  Emotions  of  the  Soul."  6 

Descartes  was  assailed  by  Protestants  and  Catholics  alike, 
and  the  latter  part  of  his  life  was  embittered  by  both  religious 
and  philosophical  controversies.  In  1649  he  accepted  an  invi- 
tation extended  to  him  by  Queen  Christina  of  Sweden,  at 
whose  court  his  death  occurred  a  year  later,  caused  probably  by . 
the  severity  of  the  climate  and  the  radical  change  in  his  habits 
of  living. 

METHOD. 

The  history  of  philosophy  agrees  with  Descartes  in  regarding 
the  method  of  philosophical  analysis  as  the  important  element 

•Discours  de  la  MSthode. 

4  Essais  Philisophiques. 

5  Les  Passions  de  1'Ame. 


80  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

in  the  Cartesian  system.  Its  founder  seeks  above  all  to  develop 
some  method  by  which  he  may  discover  the  basal  presupposi- 
tions of  philosophy.  To  do  this  he  must  estimate  the  value  of 
the  different  faculties  of  the  mind  as  means  to  the  end  in 
view.  The  history  of  ancient  peoples,  poetry,  rhetoric,  the 
study  of  foreign  languages,  all  lead  towards  the  cultivation  of 
the  memory,  imagination,  or  emotions,  but  fail  to  assist  in  the 
discovery  of  ultimate  truth.  Even  ethics  did  not  suffice  in 
this  regard,  for  he  entertained  a  special  antipathy  towards 
complicated  systems  of  morality,  likening  them  to  "  impressive 
and  magnificent  palaces  founded  on  sand  and  mud."  6 

Primacy  of  the  Mathematical  Method. — Mathematics  ap- 
pealed to  Descartes  above  all  else,  its  firm  basis  in  the  faculty 
of  the  reason  alone,  its  precision  and  apparent  certitude  ex- 
cited his  wonder  and  admiration.  With  the  method  of  this 
science  clearly  before  him,  Descartes  next  endeavored  to  apply 
its  principles  towards  an  analysis  of  himself;  observing,  how- 
ever, four  simple  rules  of  procedure.  The  first  of  these  was  to 
discountenance  every  fact  whose  truth  was  not  perfectly  certain 
and  true.  The  next  step  was  to  conduct  his  analysis  by  slow 
and  well-graded  advances,  always  proceeding  from  the  simpler 
to  the  more  complex;  and  finally  making  frequent  reviews  in 
order  to  avoid  omissions.  Geometry  had  already,  by  following 
this  method,  developed  truths  of  remarkable  certainty  and 
complexity,  and  Descartes  hoped  by  the  use  of  these  simple 
rules  to  introduce  the  same  certainty  within  the  field  of  meta- 
physics. 

Rules  for  Living. — While  engaged  in  this  process  of  self- 
examination  it  was  necessary  to  observe  some  fixed  code  of 
morals,  just  as  a  temporary  house  is  required  by  one  who  is 
intent  upon  rebuilding  an  old  structure.  In  the  first  place 
he  resolved  to  obey  the  laws  of  the  people  with  whom  he  resided, 
to  rest  in  the  faith  of  his  childhood,  and  to  avoid  extremes  of 

•  Discours  de  la  MSthode,  Part  I.,  Section  10. 


REN£   DESCARTES.  81 

all  kinds.  The  second  maxim  of  his  conduct  was  to  hold  stead- 
fast to  his  purpose  and  not  deviate  for  insignificant  reasons 
from  his  chosen  line  of  thought;  any  direction  if  pursued 
far  enough  will  lead  one  out  from  the  maze  of  a  forest.  Again 
he  would  avoid  any  ill  feeling  towards  fortune,  whatever  might 
occur,  remembering  that  beyond  our  own  individual  thoughts 
there  is  little  within  the  power  of  man.  And,  finally,  Descartes 
decided  that  a  life  of  study  and  reflection  was,  above  all  other 
occupations,  the  one  best  suited  to  the  accomplishment  of  his 
purpose  and  the  attainment  of  truth. 

FOUNDATIONS  OF  His  PHILOSOPHY. 

With  these  various  rules  of  thought  and  maxims  of  conduct 
Descartes  looked  about  him  for  the  discovery  of  some  ultimate 
truth  upon  which  to  base  his  philosophical  system.  It  was  not 
impossible  that  the  senses,  which  men  generally  regard  as  in- 
dicative of  absolute  certainty,  might  deceive  us.  And  still 
further,  all  the  syllogisms  of  logic  and  deductions  of  mathe- 
matics, in  fact  all  the  ideas  and  thoughts  which  enter  into  the 
minds  of  men, — either  in  the  waking  or  the  dreaming  states, — 
all  might  be  founded  on  error  and  deception.  But  when,  how- 
ever, one  had  rejected  all  these  it  was  necessary  to  believe  that 
the  person  who  was  thus  exhibiting  the  activity  of  thought  pos- 
sessed some  kind  of  existence.  In  other  words,  the  fact  that 
I  doubt,  requires  that  the  I  exists. 

Existence  of  the  Self. — Although  one  might  reject  all  the 
data  of  sense  and  thought,  there  still  remains  the  perfectly 
certain  axiom  of  the  existence  of  the  self,  absolutely  necessary 
for  the  very  process  of  thought.  "  I  think,  therefore  I  am"  7  is 
a  truth  of  so  deep  a  character  that  it  defines  the  thinking  self  as 
the  necessary  criterion  of  existence, — "  a  substance  whose  very 

7  "  Cogito,  ergo  sum." 
"  Je  pense,  done  je  suis." — 

Discourse  de  la  M6thode,  Part  IV.,  Section  1. 
6 


82  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

essense  and  nature  consists  in  thought  alone."  8  In  replying 
to  one  of  his  critics,  Descartes  expressly  declares  that  the  mere 
objective  act  of  thinking  does  not  constitute  the  force  of  the 
argument.  The  really  significant  element  lies  in  consciousness 
rather  than  in  judgment, — as  a  mere  psychical  process.  I  am 
conscious  that  I  am  thinking  is  the  full  premise,  and  the  logical 
amplification  of  any  thought-activity.  "I  walk,  therefore  I 
am"  9  may  be  substituted  for  "  I  think,  therefore  I  am,"  pro- 
vided the  act  of  walking  is  accompanied  by  the  full  conscious- 
ness of  the  activity. 

Descartes,  by  thus  predicating  the  existence  of  the  self  to 
every  assertion  concerning  the  existence  of  anything  else,  gives 
to  the  thinking  subject  a  logical  antecedence  over  the  reality 
of  either  the  external  world  or  of  God.  Ancient  philosophy 
regarded  both  universe  and  man  from  a  purely  objective  stand- 
point, without  attention  to  the  instrument  or  method  of  in- 
quiry. Mediaeval  philosophy  builds  an  objective  theology  on 
nature,  irrespective  of  the  psychological  motives  which  gave 
it  birth.  Modern  philosophy  has  learned  from  Descartes  the 
invaluable  lesson  of  criticism.  We  realize  to-day,  with  all  our 
progress  in  science  and  philosophy,  that  no  theory  of  either 
man,  the  external  world,  or  of  God  is  sufficient  without  first 
an  assurance  of  the  existential  basis  of  the  human  mind,  with- 
out the  medium  of  which  no  philosophy  is  even  possible.  To- 
day philosophy  approaches  God  and  the  world  through  man, 
and  not  man  through  God  and  the  world. 

Existence  of  God. — Among  the  many  ideas  which  we 
have,  the  one  of  doubting  is  especially  significant.  Every  one 
would  agree  that  certainty  is  at  least  more  desirable,  more 
satisfactory,  more  near  an  ideal  of  perfection,  than  doubt. 


8 " .  .  .  je  connus  de  la,  que  j'etais  une  substance  dont  toute  1'essence 
ou  la  nature  n'est  que  de  penser." — Discours  de  la  Methode,  Part  IV., 
Section  2. 

•  Les  Principes  de  la  Philosophic,  Part  I.,  Prop.  9. 


RENE   DESCARTES.  83 

When,  therefore,  I  am  conscious  of  the  act  of  doubting,  I  am 
also  conscious  of  a  contrast  between  an  imperfect  and  a  perfect. 
This  idea  of  the  Perfect  could  not  have  arisen  from  the  im- 
perfect nature  of  man  as  a  doubting  being,  any  more  than 
something  could  have  arisen  from  nothing.  It  must,  there- 
fore, have  been  placed  in  the  mind  of  man  by  a  Being  "  that 
comprehended  within  itself  all  the  perfection  of  which  man 
has  any  idea,  or,  in  a  single  word,  God."  10  And,  furthermore, 
Descartes  reinforced  his  belief  in  the  existence  of  God  by  an 
old  proof  which  may  be  traced  back  to  the  scholastic  teacher 
Saint  Anselm.  This  ontological  proof f  as  it  is  generally  known 
to  philosophy,  regards  the  attribute  of  existence  as  a  necessary 
element  of  perfection.  The  idea  of  God,  in  order  for  it  to 
refer  to  a  completely  perfect  Being,  must  possess  existence  "  in 
the  same  way  that  the  equality  of  three  angles  to  two  right 
angles  is  comprised  in  the  idea  of  a  triangle."  n  God  would  not 
be  perfect,  and  hence  would  not  be  God,  unless  He  existed,  for.- 
that  which  is  possessed  of  existence  is  obviously  more  perfect 
than  that  which  does  not  possess  it.  It  is  interesting  here  to 
note  that  the  validity  of  this  proof  of  the  existence  of  God  has 
been  variously  treated  by  more  recent  philosophers.  Some  have 
believed  it  of  sufficient  weight  to  support  the  whole  superstruc- 
ture of  theology  and  natural  religion,  while  others  have  regarded 
it  as  little  else  than  sophistry.  The  most  forcible  objection 
that  has  been  brought  against  it  refuses  to  regard  existence  as 
a  necessary  attribute  of  perfection,  contending  that  an  im- 
aginary object  is  none  the  less  perfect  even  if  only  its  idea 
exists  in  the  mind. 

Existence  of  the  External  World. — Although  Descartes 
regarded  the  existence  of  the  thinking  self  and  of  God  as  the 


10 "...  et  m§me  qui  efit  en  soi  toutes  les  perfections  dont  je  pouvaia 
avoir  quelque  id6e,  c'est-a-dire,  pour  m'expliquer  en  un  mot,  qui  fut 
Dieu."— Discours  de  la  M6thode,  Part  IV.,  Section  4. 

11  Discours  de  la  M6thode,  Part  IV.,  Section  5. 


84  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

most  certain  axioms  of  knowledge,  he  has  by  no  means  ex- 
plained the  vast  array  of  objects  which  collectively  we  call  the 
external  world.  These  objects  of  the  external  world  must  be 
given  the  certainty  of  existence,  else  the  Cartesian  philosophy 
would  contradict  common  sense  and  oppose  any  advance  in 
science.  Our  ordinary  belief  in  the  reality  of  the  objects  of 
experience  is  thoroughly  substantiated  if  all  thoughts  or 
activities  of  deception  are  excluded  from  the  perfection  of  God. 
We  all  believe  in  the  existence  of  the  world  of  sensuous  per- 
ception; and  since  this  belief  has  its  source  in  the  perfection 
God,  we  must  regard  this  testimony  of  the  senses  as  truth, 
since  universal  deception  is  altogether  foreign  to  the  perfect 
nature  of  God.  "  For  God  has  given  me  a  very  strong  inclina- 
tion to  believe  that  certain  ideas  arise  from  corporeal  things, 
and  I  do  not  perceive  how  it  is  possible  to  excuse  him  from 
deception,  if  in  reality  these  ideas  arise  elsewhere,  .  .  .  and 
therefore  it  is  necessary  to  conclude  that  there  are  corporeal 
things  which  exist."  12  Thus  in  Descartes's  mind  a  knowledge 
of  the  reality  and  truth  of  God  necessarily  precedes  the  assur- 
ance of  the  reality  of  experience.  He  even  goes  so  far  as  to 
assert  that  no  possible  confidence  in  the  existence  of  the  ex- 
ternal world  can  arise  without  the  previous  faith  in  the  Perfect 
and  Infinite  Being  of  God. 

METAPHYSICS. 

Upon  the  triple  foundations  of  the  existence  of  the  self,  God, 
and  nature,  Descartes  conceived  himself  capable  of  erecting 
a  self-sufficient  and  consistent  system  of  philosophy.  He  must, 
however,  give  to  these  three  primary  entities  a  reality  which 
would  distinguish  them  from  the  complicated  facts  of  our 
experience.  He  employed  the  scholastic  term  substance  to 
indicate  God,,  the  human  soul,  and  external  nature,  while 

12  Meditation  sixi£me,  Section  9. 


RENtf  DESCARTES.  85 

all  the  individual  forms  in  which  they  may  appear  were  called 
modes.  Of  the  three  substances,  God  is  highest,  for  he  com- 
prehends both  nature  and  man. 

The  Three  Substances. — Descartes  is  by  no  means  clear  as 
to  the  relation  between  the  three  substances,  beyond  the  primal 
unity  of  soul  and  nature,  mind  and  matter,  in  God.  The  God 
of  Descartes,  however  important  it  may  appear  at  first  sight, 
is  of  little  real  consequence  except  as  a  convenient  conception 
which  may  be  brought  in  when  everything  else  seems  to  fail. 
The  really  significant  parts  of  his  system  are  contained  in  the 
two  opposing  elements,  man  and  external  nature,  mind  and 
matter. 

Man. — The  essence  of  man,  that  which  distinguishes  him 
from  all  else,  is  the  power  of  thought.  The  human  soul  or 
faculty  of  thought  is  a  simple,  immaterial  substance  which 
serves  as  the  substratum  or  basis  for  all  our  sensations,  percep- 
tions, and  ideas.  It  supplies  that  unity  whereby  thought  is 
possible  and  the  freedom  which  enables  it  to  select  the  true 
ideas  from  the  false.  These  ideas,  which  have  their  seat  in  the 
soul,  may  be  divided  into  three  general  classes  according  to  the 
"substance"  from  which  they  arise.  Those  which  arise  from 
the  accidental  sensations  of  the  external  world,  those  which  are 
a  product  of  our  own  intellect,  and  finally  a  third  class  called 
eternal  truths.13  These  latter,  of  which  "  The  Perfect"  is  an 
example,  are  impressed  on  the  mind  by  the  hand  of  God,  and 
therefore  are  invariably  true.  Besides  acting  as  the  medium 
for  our  ideas,  the  soul  has  certain  emotions  of  its  own  of  which 
wonder,  love,  hate,  desire,  joy,  and  sorrow  may  be  regarded  as 
the  most  elemental.14  Morality  in  its  highest  sense  consists 
in  the  pursuit  of  truth  and  in  the  self-satisfaction  of  that 


13  Les  Principes  de  la  Philosophic,  Part  L,  Props.  48  and  49. 

14 "  I/admiration,  1'amour,  1'haine,  le  de"sir,  la  joie,  et  la  tristesse, 
et  que  toutes  les  autres  sont  compose'es  de  quelques-unes  de  ces  six, 
ou  bien  en  sont  des  especes." — Les  Passions  de  1'Axne,  Part  II.,  Art.  69. 


86  HISTORY   OF   MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

tranquility  and  mental  repose  which  arises  only  from  the  con- 
trol and  regulation  of  these  various  emotions.15 

Matter. — Intimately  associated  with  mind  is  the  domain  of 
matter,  the  substance  of  extension.  These  two  realms  are  abso- 
lutely distinct  from  one  another,  finding  their  only  means 
of  communication  through  the  close  relationship  of  the  think- 
ing soul  and  the  extended  body  of  man.  The  "  pineal  gland," 
a  small  protuberance  shaped  like  a  pea  and  lying  at  the  base  of 
the  brain,  Descartes  supposed  to  be  the  seat  of  the  soul  and 
the  means  of  communication  between  the  soul  and  the  body. 
All  the  lower  animals,  as  well  as  plants  and  inorganic  nature, 
belong  to  the  kingdom  of  matter.  Here  rules  unchangeable 
mechanical  law,  mathematical  certainty,  and  invariable  caus- 
ality. God  is  the  Ultimate  Will  which  originally  started  the 
motions  of  the  minute  particles  of  which  all  forms  of  matter 
are  composed ;  mechanical  law  is  therefore  an  expression  of  the 
thought  of  God.  In  his  theory  that  the  motion  of  the  universe 
is  constant  Descartes  suggested  the  conservation  of  energy,  an 
hypothesis  of  extreme  importance  in  modern  physics. 

INFLUENCE  OF  DESCARTES. 

In  character  Descartes  does  not  altogether  represent  the  true 
philosopher  and  his  originality  has  been  perhaps  overestimated. 
The  really  important  and  influential  elements  of  his  thought 
may  be  traced  in  earlier  and  now  almost  forgotten  writings. 
The  existence  of  the  self  as  the  axiom  of  all  possible  philoso- 
phy had  been  suggested  several  years  before  by  the  Italian 
Campanella.  The  ontological  proof  for  the  existence  of  God 
forms  a  very  fundamental  feature  in  the  theology  of  Anselm, 
who  employs  it  as  a  rational  substantiation  of  faith  and  revela- 
tion. The  subsequent  importance  of  Descartes  is  due,  in  a 
great  measure,  to  the  lucidity  and  beauty  of  his  style,  the 
clearness  and  brevity  of  his  arguments,  and  the  significant  fact 

"Lea  Passions  de  1'Ame,  Part  III.,  Art.  190. 


CARTESIAN   SCHOOL.  87 

that  he  wrote  in  the  language  of  the  people.  Nevertheless, 
modern  philosophy  rightly  regards  Descartes  as  its  real  founder, 
for  he  was  the  first  to  define  the  central  problem  of  subsequent 
philosophy, — the  criterion  of  existence.  He  established  phi- 
losophy on  a  firm  basis  by  requiring  a  criticism  of  method 
before  all  else.  He  is  the  spiritual  source  of  a  movement  in 
modern  thought  of  incalculable  importance,  and  in  this  respect 
he  is  comparable  with  Locke  and  Kant. 

CARTESIAN  SCHOOL. 

The  philosophy  of  Descartes  stirred  to  its  foundations  the 
intellectual  life  of  Western  Europe.  Besides  arousing  objec- 
tors on  every  side  and  causing  numberless  polemical  attacks,  it 
attracted  to  its  standard  many  younger  men,  especially  those 
who  had  inherited  the  Baconian  distrust  of  scholastic  learning. 
Prominent  among  this  number  were  the  Port  Royalists  Arnauld 
and  Nicole,  also  the  great  French  churchman  F melon.  But 
by  far  the  most  influential  of  the  Cartesians  were  two  young 
men  named  Arnold  Geulincx  and  Nicolas  Malebranche.  The 
former  was  born  in  the  Netherlands  in  1625,  and  studied  at 
Lyons  and  Leyden,  afterwards  serving  as  a  teacher.  He  died 
in  1669.  Malebranche  was  the  son  of  the  secretary  of  Louis 
XIII.  He  was  born  in  1638,  and  passed  an  uneventful  and 
retired  life  as  a  member  of  the  Catholic  Order  of  the  Oratory. 
He  died  in  1715,  in  consequence,  it  is  said,  of  an  interview  and 
controversy  with  the  English  philosopher,  George  Berkeley. 
To  Geulincx  is  generally  accredited  the  elaboration  of  the  doc- 
trine of  "  Occasionalism"  although  it  has  been  suggested  that 
a  Parisian  lawyer,  Cordemoy,  was  the  real  founder. 

Occasionalism. — The  difficulties  and  vagueness  which  at- 
tended the  explanation  of  Descartes  regarding  the  true  relation 
between  the  three  substances,  God,  mind,  and  matter,  led  to 
various  attempts  to  deduce  some  consistent  hypothesis  to  solve 
this  central  problem  of  the  rationalistic  metaphysic.  It  was 
the  work  of  the  Cartesians  to  point  out  that  the  independency 


88  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

of  both  mind  and  matter,  together  with  the  primal  reality  of 
God,  could  be  reconciled  only  by  supposing  that  the  Deity 
represented  the  real  unity  and  interaction  between  the  inde- 
pendent realms  of  mind  and  matter.  Thus  mind,  thought, 
desire,  cannot  express  itself  in  bodily  or  material  form  without 
calling  to  its  aid  the  mediating  power  of  God.  My  thought 
only  " occasions"  the  act,  it  is  merely  the  ff  occasional  cause"  16 
while  the  will  of  God  is  the  true  cause.  In  the  same  manner 
that  modern  psychology  recognizes  the  laws  of  Nature,  the 
operation  of  which  we  are  ourselves  unconscious  of,  as  the 
media  for  the  projection  of  thought  into  the  external  world. 
None  of  us  are  conscious  of  the  mechanism  that  raises  our  arm ; 
our  thoughts  may  be  said  simply  to  occasion  the  movement. 

Seeing  all  Things  in  God. — Besides  the  theory  of  occa- 
sional causes,  Malebranche  emphasized  a  rather  mystical 
aspect  of  Cartesianism.  He  carries  to  its  logical  conclusion  the 
occasionalism  of  the  previous  members  of  the  school  by  giving 
mind  an  existence  in  and  through  the  nature  of  God.1T  All 
our  ideas  of  material  things,  in  fact  all  our  thought  itself, 
exists  in  the  Supreme  Intelligence  of  God.  Whatever  is 
considered  the  object  of  our  thought  is  really  the  reflection  in 
our  own  finite  consciousness  of  the  Idea  of  the  Perfect  God. 
Thus  in  a  certain  sense  all  our  thoughts  are  modifications  of 
the  one  thought  of  God,  all  our  ideas  are  seen  through  His  all- 
embracing  mind.  We,  the  finite  minds,  perceive  all  sensations, 
think  all  thoughts,  and  will  all  volitions  in  God.  The  ultimate 
conclusion  of  Malebranche's  doctrine  of  ff  seeing  all  things  in 
God"  is  really  the  non-existence  of  the  third  substance,  mat- 
ter; although  he  was  too  much  under  the  influence  of  Des- 
cartes to  recognize  the  logical  outcome  of  his  philosophy. 

16  Causes  occasionnelles. 

17 "  .  .  .  parce  qu'en  effet  1'attention  de  1'esprit  n'est  que  son  retour 
et  sa  conversion  vers  Dieu  qui  est  notre  seul  maitre,  et  qui  seul  nous 
instruit  de  toute  vSi-ite"." — Preface  to  Malebranche, — De  la  Recherche 
de  la  V^rite". 

\ 


BENEDICT   DE   SPINOZA.  89 

Malebranche  was  a  contemporary  of  Spinoza,  Locke,  and  Leib- 
nitz, men  who  belong  to  a  distinctly  later  period  of  thought. 
In  the  history  of  philosophy  he  may  be  looked  upon  as  repre- 
senting the  transition  from  Descartes  to  Spinoza.  His  mysti- 
cism is  the  connection  between  the  pluralism  of  the  former 
and  the  pantheism  of  the  latter. 

BENEDICT  DE  SPINOZA. 
RATIONALISTIC  TENDENCY. 

In  Descartes  one  feels  a  new  power  or  force  first  becoming 
aware  of  its  strength.  The  human  reason  was  turned  upon 
itself  and  required  to  examine  the  instruments  of  its  own  opera- 
tion. Instead  of  erecting  its  structure  on  the  precarious  array 
of  facts  brought  to  us  through  the  half-conscious  medium 
of  uncriticised  reason  and  sense-impressions,  modern  philoso- 
phy began  to  delve  into  the  mysteries  of  this  reason  and  de- 
mand of  it  an  explanation  of  its  own  being.  Delighted  with 
its  newly-discovered  power,  we  are  by  no  means  surprised  to 
find  that  Descartes  and  his  immediate  followers  should  wish  to 
base  upon  it  the  entire  stress  of  philosophical  authority.  If  a 
new  reliance  on  the  power  of  reason,  as  it  expressed  itself  in 
the  method  of  mathematical  induction,  had  raised  the  modern 
world  above  the  philosophical  plane  of  the  past,  it  might  be 
expected  that  the  early  thinkers  should  neglect  the  world  of 
sense-experience  in  order  to  over-emphasize  the  power  of  the 
mind.  As  might  be  expected,  therefore,  the  epistemological 
trend  of  the  followers  of  Descartes  is  distinctly  opposed  to  a 
simple  empirical  reliance  on  "  common  sense." 

We  have  called  the  subject  of  this  chapter  the  "  Continental 
Rationalists,"  simply  wishing  to  designate  by  this  term  those 
few  truly  original  men  who  dominated  the  thought  of  conti- 
nental Europe,  during  the  seventeenth  century,  with  their  at- 
tempts to  derive  a  system  of  knowledge  primarily  from  a  study 
of  the  human  reason.  The  distinction  between  rationalism 
and  empiricism  is  a  convenient,  but  superficial,  means  for 


90  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

classifying  the  earlier  modern  thinkers.  Hobbes  himself  em- 
ploys reason  to  discover  facts  of  experience,  and  Descartes 
bases  his  system  upon  the  empirical  datum  "  I  think/*  and  the 
reality  of  the  external  world  on  the  certainty  of  sense-im- 
pressions. When  strictly  applied  the  distinction  is  valueless, 
for  the  history  of  philosophy  has  failed  to  produce  a  system 
erected  entirely  on  either  reason  or  sense-impressions.  It  is 
extremely  useful,  however,  to  distinguish  two  types  of  mind; 
the  one  that  finds  the  criterion  of  philosophical  truth  in 
abstract  construction,  the  other  in  concrete  experience. 

LIFE. 

Early  Life. — Baruch  (or  Benedict)  de  Spinoza,  the  greatest 
of  the  Eationalists,  was  the  foremost  mind  of  the  seventeenth 
century,  as  we  shall  find  Kant  to  be  of  the  eighteenth.  His 
parents  were  Spanish  Jews  who,  together  with  others  of  their 
sect,  had  fled  to  Amsterdam  to  avoid  the  persecution  of  the 
Inquisition.  Baruch,  who  afterwards  changed  his  name  to 
Benedict,  was  probably  born  on  November  24,  1632.  His  early 
education  was  conducted  by  a  Eabbi,  Moses  Morteira,  who  was 
a  trusted  member  of  the  Semitic  community.  From  a  study 
of  the  Talmud,  one  of  the  Jewish  scriptures  composed  mainly 
towards  the  beginning  of  the  Christian  Era,  and  of  the  Semitic 
philosophers  of  the  late  Middle  Ages,  he  acquired  a  mystical 
and  fatalistic  tendency.  When  still  a  young  man  he  became 
interested  in  physical  science;  and  later,  in  order  to  perfect 
himself  in  Latin,  he  attended  the  school  of  a  physician,  Van 
Ende, — a  scholar  of  ill  repute  on  account  of  his  heretical 
opinions.  From  Ludwig  Meyer  he  learned  the  then  prevailing 
physical  theories,  and  was  introduced  by  him  to  the  philosophy 
of  Descartes.  When  the  attention  of  Spinoza  was  thus  turned 
into  channels  distinctly  different  from  those  approved  by  his 
Jewish  brethren,  he  found  himself  confronted  with  two  alter- 
natives: he  could  either  retract  his  opinions,  reform  his  con- 
duct, and  again  devote  himself  exclusively  to  the  Jewish  scrip- 


BENEDICT   DE   SPINOZA.  91 

tures,  or  continue  as  he  was,  with  the  prospect  of  alienation 
from  his  people.  Spinoza  chose  the  latter.  On  August  6, 
1656,  he  was  excommunicated  from  the  Jewish  Synagogue  and, 
so  far  as  lay  in  the  power  of  man,  expelled  from  the  race  of  his 
fathers. 

The  Outcast. — Thus  thrown  upon  the  world  without  friends 
or  sympathy,  a  lesser  man  than  Spinoza  might  have  regretted 
his  choice  and  used  every  possible  means  to  soften  the  feelings 
of  his  people  towards  him,  or  else  have  become  embittered 
towards  the  world  and  enwrapped  himself  in  a  shroud  of  nar- 
rowed cynicism.  Spinoza,  however,  was  possessed  of  too  little 
sentiment  or  emotional  feeling  to  be  moved  by  the  passion  of 
remorse  or  vindictiveness.  True  genius  does  not  arise  from  a 
poetic  fancy,  nor  from  any  ephemeral  sympathy  with  the  emo- 
tions of  man,  but  rather  from  the  extra-human  reason.  Thus 
the  greatest  men  have  been  those  least  swayed  by  the  common 
emotions  of  weaker  humanity.  The  world  of  to-day  recognizes 
a  simple  greatness  in  the  lone  Jew  of  Amsterdam,  it  can  see  a 
poetry  in  the  colorlessness  of  his  literary  style,  and  even  a 
religion  has  been  discovered  in  the  depths  of  his  personality.18 
All  this  because,  in  a  distinctly  humanistic  period,  Spinoza 
showed  a  decided  tendency  towards  the  nature  view  of  man.  In 
his  mind  the  mechanical  side  of  nature,  the  stern  requital  of 
natural  law,  combined  with  the  exactness  of  mathematical 
methods,  embodied  the  ideals  of  human  life. 

After  his  separation  from  the  Jewish  community  Spinoza 
resided  a  short  time  in  Amsterdam.  But  he  soon  found  it 
necessary  to  remove  from  the  city,  owing  to  continued  persecu- 
tion by  the  Protestant  authorities.  He  settled  in  a  neighboring 
town,  where  he  obtained  a  scanty  living  by  grinding  optical 
lenses,  a  trade  he  learned  while  a  rabbinical  student.  Here 
there  commenced  to  gather  about  him  a  small  company  of 
friends,  to  whom  he  would  communicate  his  philosophical 

18  Royce,  Spirit  of  Modern  Philosophy. 


92  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

opinions  as  they  gradually  assumed  form  in  his  own  mind. 
At  this  time  Spinoza  was  distinctly  influenced  by  the  Italian 
nature-philosophy,  probably  by  the  writings  of  Bruno;  he 
also  felt  the  strength  of  the  Cartesian  method,  although  one  of 
his  earliest  writings,  an  attempt  to  formulate  the  philosophy 
of  Descartes  after  the  manner  of  geometrical  demonstration, 
was  regarded  with  disfavor  by  the  truer  disciples  of  Descartes. 
Later  Life. — After  a  residence  of  some  years  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Amsterdam,  he  removed  to  Khynsburg,  near  Leyden, 
and  afterwards  to  The  Hague.  During  all  this  time  his  life  was 
of  the  simplest  character.  A  few  intimate  friends  were  all 
who  may  be  said  to  have  known  him.  The  prominent  men  of 
the  time  were  acquainted  with  him  through  correspondence, 
but  few  had  ever  met  him.  In  1670  Spinoza  published  the 
"  Theological  Political  Treatise," 19  in  which  he  advocated  com- 
plete freedom  of  thought  in  all  matters,  and  sought  to  derive 
religion  from  the  individual  consciousness  rather  than  from 
formal  dogma.  Spinoza  had  been  working  for  some  years  on 
his  great  work  the  "  Ethics/'  which,  however,  was  not  published 
until  after  his  death.  The  chair  of  philosophy  at  Heidelberg 
was  offered  to  him,  but  his  fondness  for  unrestrained  thought 
and  his  distaste  for  notoriety  of  any  kind  forbid  its  acceptance, 
although  perfect  freedom  of  expression  was  assured  to  him. 
Spinoza  died  in  1677,  of  consumption,  a  disease  which  he  is 
said  to  have  inherited. 

THE  "ETHICS." 

Parts. — Chief  among  the  writings  of  Spinoza  is  his 
"  Ethics/'  This  work,  the  fruit  of  many  years  of  thought  and 
labor,  ranks  with  Aristotle's  "Metaphysics/'  Kant's  "Pure 
Reason/'  and  Hegel's  "Logic"  as  the  truly  great  classics  of 
philosophical  literature.  The  "Ethics"  is  divided  into  five 
parts,  of  which  the  first  two  are  of  extreme  importance.  Part 

19  Tractatus  Theologico-Politicus. 


BENEDICT  DE  SPINOZA.  93 

I.  is  concerned  with  "  God"  20  in  which  Spinoza  deduces  the 
most  general  propositions  regarding  the  deeper  problems  of  a 
monistic  metaphysics.  In  Part  II.  he  treats  of  the  "nature 
and  origin  of  mind"  21  considering  this  problem  from  a  psy- 
chological stand-point.  The  first  part,  "  Concerning  God/'  is 
strictly  rationalistic.  The  definitions,  axioms,  and  demonstra- 
tions are  as  far  as  possible  removed  from  experience.  Whereas 
in  the  second  part  the  demonstrations  are  based  on  axioms 
which  are  themselves  psychological  facts  of  experience.  The 
third  part  treats  of  the  " passions"  22  the  fourth  of  " human 
bondage/' 23  and  the  fifth  of  an  " intellectual  freedom"  24 

Method. — Spinoza  describes  his  book  "  as  after  the  plan  of 
geometrical  demonstration,"  a  phrase  which  very  well  illus- 
trates the  character  and  arrangement  of  the  work.  A  set  of 
definitions  and  axioms,  which  are  truly  the  metaphysical  ele- 
ments of  his  whole  system,  precede  the  text  proper.  This  latter 
is  in  the  form  of  Euclidian  theorems,  to  each  of  which  is  suf- 
fixed a  deductive  proof,  depending  on  the  previous  axioms  or 
theorems.  The  details  of  the  work  show  a  marvellous  ingenuity 
and  a  keenness  of  insight,  which  in  its  unique  combination  of 
synthesis  and  analysis  is  even  superior  to  the  strict  formality 
of  its  mathematical  ideal.  Spinoza's  mind  was  of  a  type  which 
is  seldom  met  with.  A  great  mathematician  he  never  was ;  but,  ! 
like  Hobbes,  he  possessed  the  rare  ability  of  applying  the  spirit 
of  the  mathematical  method  to  the  variety,  the  complexity,  and 
the  depth  of  human  life. 

METAPHYSICS. 

It  is  somewhat  confusing  to  find  a  work  of  rare  metaphysical 
importance  bearing  the  title  of  " Ethics"    Spinoza,  as  well  as 

20  De  Deo. 

21  De  Natura  et  Origine  Mentis. 

22  De  Origine  et  Natura  Affectuum. 

23  De  Servitute  Humana,  sue  de  Affectuum  Viribus. 

24  De  Potentia  Intellectus,  seu  de  Libertate  Humana. 


94  HISTORY   OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

Hume  and  Kant  in  later  thought,  regarded  the  problems  of  the 
moral  life  as  at  once  the  most  familiar  and  at  the  same  time  the 
most  difficult  of  treatment.  He  therefore  finds  it  necessary  to 
base  ethics  on  the  sure  foundation  of  metaphysics.  He  was  the 
first  thinker  of  the  modern  world  to  recognize  the  logical 
priority  of  metaphysics  at  the  same  time  that  he  felt  the  im- 
portance and  the  depth  of  the  problems  of  human  life  and  char- 
acter. With  Spinoza  nature  and  man  are  in  exact  equipoise: 
each  exist  for  the  other.  His  philosophy  unites  the  three 
prominent  tendencies  of  the  Renaissance  referred  to  in  a 
previous  chapter:  the  pantheism  of  the  South,  the  mysticism 
of  the  North,  and  the  logical  clearness  in  method  of  the  early 
English  mind. 

Substance. — The  initial  premise  of  Spinoza's  metaphysics 
is  the  doctrine  of  Substance.  In  this  he  advances  from  the 
pluralism  of  Descartes  to  an  absolute  monism.  Substance  was 
I  to  Spinoza  the  ultimate  unity  of  mind  and  matter,  thought  and 
•  extension.^  Although  this  is  the  true  meaning  of  substance,  as 
later  developed,  he  preferred  to  define  it  first  in  terms  of 
"  self -being,"  25  believing  this  to  be  the  first  premise  of  any 
philosophy.  In  the  third  definition,  prefixed  to  the  first  book  of 
the  "Ethics"  we  have  the  following  formal  description  of 
Substance:  "By  substance  I  understand  that  which  exists  in 
itself,  and  is  conceived  through  itself  alone;  that  is,  the  con- 
ception of  which  does  not  require  for  its  formation  the  concep- 
tion of  anything  else." 26  The  object  of  this  rather  formal  defi- 
nition was  to  convey  to  the  reader  what  in  Spinoza's  mind  was 
the  most  elementary  concept  attainable  by  human  thought. 
His  whole  method  was  distinctly  deductive,  and  in  order  to  be 
consistent  with  an  absolute  monism  it  was  necessary  to  define 


»"Causa-sui."— Ethics,  Part  I.,  Def.  1. 

28 "  Per  substantiam  intelligo  id,  quod  in  se  est  et  per  se  concipitur : 
hoc  est  id,  cujus  conceptus  non  indiget  conceptu  alterius  rei,  a  quo 
formari  debeat."— Ethics,  Part  I.,  Def.  3. 


BENEDICT  DE  SPINOZA.  95 

at  the  outset  some  concept  the  breadth  of  which  could  include 
every  aspect  of  reality.27  The  three  characteristics  of  Substance 
are  existence,  unity,  and  infinity.28  The  self -being  of  substance 
simply  implies  its  necessary  fundamentally,  its  logical  priority 
before  all  else.  Should  one  conceive  of  some  other  concept 
more  fundamental  than  Substance,  Spinoza  could  with  thor- 
ough consistency  call  this  other  concept  the  true  substance.  In 
this  sense,  of  having  nothing  beyond  it,  substance  is  its  own 
cause,  although  such  a  conception  must  not  be  confused  with 
the  self -creation  of  the  Scholastics.  Moreover,  its  very  breadth 
unites  within  itself  such  contradictory  ideas  as  those  of  liberty 
and  necessity;  for  all  its  activities  are  free  with  respect  to 
each  other.  In  brief,  Substance  is  controlled  only  by  the  self- 
conceived  laws  of  its  own  being. 

From  an  earlier  treatise  it  is  evident  that  Spinoza  was  at  first 
doubtful  regarding  an  adequate  foundation  for  his  monism. 
At  one  time  he  seems  to  have  approached  very  near  to  a  pure 
naturalism,  in  which  mere  nature  occupied  the  primal  position. 
Again  in  a  pantheistic  mood  he  regards  God  as  the  ultimate 
source  of  the  mind  and  matter,  leaning  more  nearly  towards 
Cartesianism.  His  complete  thought,  however,  identifies  both 
concepts  with  Substance.  Eegarded  from  a  naturalistic- 
scientific  stand-point,  one  may  refer  to  Substance  as  Nature. 
When  so  interpreted  we  emphasize  the  mechanical  and  mathe- 
matical side  of  Spinoza's  philosophy  and  are  inclined  perhaps 
to  connect  him  with  the  school  of  Hobbes.  Again  this  same 
self-being  may  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  religion.  The  Deus 
or  God  of  Spinoza  thus  becomes  identified  with  the  "  One"  of 
the  Mystics  and  the  Jehovah  of  the  Jews.  And  still  from  a 
third  aspect  we  may  regard  Spinoza's  monism  from  a  purely 
metaphysical  stand-point, — for  we  shall  later  see  that  it  is 

27 "  Quicquid  est,  in  Deo  est,  et  nihil  sine  Deo  esse  neque  concipi 
potest." — Ethics,  Part  I.,  Prop.  15. 

28  See  letter  of  April  20,  1663,  Spinoza  to  L.  Meyer. 


t 


96  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

strongly  suggestive  of  the  "Absolute"  in  German  Idealism. 
However  interpreted  as  Nature,  God,  or  Substance,  Spinoza 
has  no  reference  to  a  transcendent  Being  of  any  kind.  His 
Substance  is  an  Immanent  Reality  which  exists  in  and  through 
Nature;  in  the  same  sense  that  the  God  of  pantheism  or  the 
"natural  law"  of  physics  are  expressions  of  some  esoteric 
force  operating  in  and  through  the  Universe. 

Defined  in  such  elemental  terms  one  would  certainly  consider 
that  a  direct  proof  for  the  existence  of  God  or  Substance  would 
be  either  superfluous  or  impossible.  Yet  Spinoza  makes  the 
attempt  in  no  less  than  five  different  forms.  All  are  stages  and 
modifications  of  the  "  Ontological  Proof,"  as  given  by  Anselm 
and  Descartes,  only  instead  of  deducing  existence  from  the 
nature  of  Goodness  or  Perfection,  Spinoza  employs  the  concept 
of  "  Self-being."  Yet  recognizing  the  abstractness  of  his  con- 
cept of  God, — Nature, — Spinoza  distinguished  between  Sub- 
stance, immanent  in  and  through  nature,  called  by  him  "  natura 
naturans,"  and  nature  in  fthe  ffin^e  nf  flie  sum  of  all-existent 
objects,  or  " natura  naturata"  The  former  is  the  true  Eeal, 
while  the  latter  is  only  the  sum  of  the  finite  phases  of  the 
world.  A  similar  distinction  was  pointed  out  in  connection 
with  Bruno,  only  the  Italian  conceived  God  to  represent  the 
mere  identity  of  both  generating  and  generated  nature. 

Attributes. — The  barrenness  of  Spinoza's  substance,  its  com- 
plete abstraction  and  lack  of  anything  in  the  least  appreciable, 
is  at  first  repugnant  to  ordinary  thought.  He  has  made  his 
foundation  so  broad  that  it  really  amounts  to  nothing.  Spinoza 
recognizes  this  difficulty,  and  next  advances  to  the  doctrine  of 
attributes  where  the  boundlessness  of  Substance  begins  to  take 
form.  These  attributes  are  the  terms  applied  to  the  manner  in 
which  the  existence  of  substance  is  made  known  to  man.  J[n- 
finite  Substance,  as  the  truly  unconditioned,  possesses  an  in- 
finite number  of  characters,  each  of  which  may  be  regarded  as 
an  attribute.  Of  this  infinite  number  of  attributes,  however, 
two  only  are  known  to  finite  man.  These  are  mind  and  matter, 


BENEDICT   DE   SPINOZA.  97 

thought  and  extension,  subject  and  object,  the  self  and  the 
not-self.  Each  of  these  expresses  to  its  full  extent  a  single 
aspect  of  the  infinite  character  of  Substance,  without  in  any 
wise  depreciating  the  value  of  the  other  attributes.  Each  of 
them  is  therefore  relatively  independent  of  the  other,  and  co- 
incidently,  because  of  its  reference  to  the  infinite  Substance,  is 
itself  "infinite  after  its  kind."  Although  restricted  and  par- 
tial, like  the  view  of  a  mountain  from  a  single  point,  either  one 
of  the  attributes  conveys  a  distinct  and  clear  conception  of 
Substance.  An  object  may  be  white  and  at  the  same  time 
smooth  without  in  the  least  containing  contradictions.  In  the 
same  manner  an  infinite  object  may  be  supposed  to  contain  an 
infinity  of  infinite  attributes,  each  one  of  which  adequately, 
but  never  perfectly,  defines  the  object  itself. 

Mind  and  matter  are  the  two  attributes  of  Substance.  But 
a  question  will  naturally  arise  as  to  the  manner  in  which  they 
are  related,  especially  to  our  own  finite  thought.  Are  we  to 
interpret  the  attributes  as  really  existent  in  Substance,  just  as 
roundness  is  existent  in  a  circle  ?  or  else  are  we  to  regard  them 
as  simply  the  ways  in  which  the  concept  of  Substance  comes  to 
human  consciousness?  The  former  or  realistic  interpretation 
regards  the  attributes  as  truly  expressing  the  inner  nature  of 
Substance;  while  the  latter  or  idealistic  view  regards  them 
simply  as  media,  so  to  speak,  through  which  man  knows  of 
God.  This  is  a  distinction  which,  carries  us  back  to  the  realism 
and  conceptualism  of  the  Middle  Ages  and  forward  to  Leibnitz 
and  Kant. 

Among  the  first  definitions  of  the  "  Ethics"  Spinoza  describes 
attributes  as  "  that  which  the  intellect  perceives  of  Substance 
as  constituting  its  essence/7  29  And  the  whole  dispute  is  nar- 
rowed down  to  the  epistemological  question  does  "  the  intellect 
perceive"  an  aspect  of  the  true  nature  of  Substance?  One 

59 "  Per  attributum  intelligo  id,  quod  intellectus  de  substantia  per- 
cipit,  tamquam  ejusdem  essentiam  const! tuens." — Ethics,  Part  I., 
Def.  4. 


98  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

cannot  help  believing  that  the  recent  historians  of  philosophy 
have  made  more  of  this  ambiguity  than  Spinoza's  text  would 
warrant.  That  those  idealistically  inclined,  Hegel,  Erdmann, 
and  others,  have  been  prone  to  interpret  the  "  Ethics"  in  terms 
of  their  own  philosophy.  Spinoza  constantly  refers  to  the 
necessary  agreement  between  the  "idea"  and  the  "thing/3  so 
that  what  "the  intellect  perceives"  cannot  be  separated  from 
what  "  truly  constitutes." 

Modes. — In  the  thought  of  Spinoza  the  idea  of  Substance 
seems  farthest  removed  from  the  common  experience  of  man. 
The  two  attributes  of  Substance,  mind  and  matter,  seem  a 
little  nearer  our  ordinary  comprehension;  but  even  they  lack 
that  apparent  familiarity  which  we  associate  with  the  ideas  of 
practical  life.  The  term  mind  or  thought  is  at  least  abstract; 
it  is  too  general  to  convey  much  significance  to  one  who  wishes 
a  really  practical  explanation  of  the  world.  Likewise  matter, 
simple  as  the  term  may  appear,  is  capable  of  endless  modifica- 
tions and  interpretations.  We  can  therefore  well  understand 
the  feeling,  that  although  the  attributes  are  less  indefinite  than 
the  primal  Substance,  they  also  are  too  abstract  in  their  nature 
to  form  the  materials  of  our  ordinary  world  of  ideas  and  sense- 
impressions.  To  conform  to  this  justifiable  demand  Spinoza 
saw  the  necessity  for  carrying  his  deduction  one  step  farther 
and  recognized  a  term  for  the  various  modifications  and  sep- 
arate modifications  and  separate  manifestations  of  mind  and 
matter.  In  just  this  significance  Spinoza  uses  the  word  mode, 
another  term  borrowed  from  the  vocabulary  of  the  Schoolmen. 
As  the  attributes  were  the  distinct  and  differentiated  aspects 
of  Substance,  so  the  modes  are  the  still  more  individual  and 
less  abstract  manifestations  of  the  attributes. 

The  system  of  Spinoza  represents  in  the  history  of  modern 
philosophy  the  classic  example  of  psycho-physical  parallelism. 
The  distinctiveness  of  this  position  becomes  very  clear  in  con- 
nection with  the  theory  of  modes.  Every  separate  object  con- 
stitutes a  mode  of  the  attribute  of  extension,  every  idea  a  mode 


BENEDICT   DE   SPINOZA.  99 

of  thought.  But,  although  ideas  may  be  formed  of  objects, 
and  objects  are  the  necessary  points  of  reference  for  ideas,  the 
two  systems  of  modes  are  absolutely  distinct  from  one  another; 
each  may  be  conceived  to  possess  its  own  peculiar  characters 
and  laws.  Yet,  notwithstanding  this  complete  independency  in 
regard  to  any  causal  interferences,  there  is  a  perfect  parallelism 
between  the  elements  of  the  two  series,  term  for  term,  mode 
for  mode.  This  is  explained  by  a  very  interesting  proposition 
in  the  second  part  of  the  "  Ethics/'  dealing  with  the  nature 
and  origin  of  mind.  "The  order  and  connection  of  ideas  is 
the  same  as  the  order  and  connection  of  things."  30  This  propo- 
sition is  also  important  in  connection  with  the  controversy 
concerning  the  realistic  or  idealistic  interpretation  of  attribute. 
It  is  remarkable  evidence  in  support  of  the  former  hypothesis, 
for  it  seems  to  show  that  Spinoza  recognized  no  difference  in 
absolute  nature  between  "what  the  intellect  perceives"  and 
what  truly  is. 

In  this  doctrine  of  modes  is  developed  more  forcibly  the 
abstract  and  fundamental  character  of  Spinoza's  lonely  Sub- 
stance. In  its  majestic  "oneness"  Substance  is  determined 
only  by  itself.  It  is  self -caused,  because  the  source  of  its  being 
lies  within  its  own  nature.  In  direct  contrast  to  the  self- 
determined  existence  of  Substance  stand  the  various  modes, 
every  one  of  which  depends  on  a  cause  beyond  itself.  Each 
finite  mode  arises  out  of  and  must  be  conceived  in  connection 
with  other  similar  finite  modes,  the  whole  causal  series  of  which 
presupposes  and  is  implicitly  contained  in  the  infinite  mode 
of  the  intellect.  And  likewise  this  latter  demands  the  existence 
ofThe  attribute  of  thought,  infinite  after  its  own  kind,  which 
in  its  turn  finds  its  reality  only  in  Substance  itself.  Each 
thought,  each  volition,  and  each  object  is  intelligible  only  if 
conceived  in  the  Absolute. 

30 "  Ordo  et  connexio  idearum  idem  est,  ac  ordo  et  connexio  rerum." 
—Ethics,  Part  II.,  Prop.  1, 


100  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 


EPISTEMOLOGY. 

One  must  consider  that  the  distinction  between  metaphysics 
and  epistemology  has  been  recognized  for  only  a  short  time, 
and  yet  notwithstanding  this  fact  that  the  difference  was  un- 
known at  the  time  of  Spinoza,  the  definiteness  of  his  geomet- 
rical method  enabled  him  to  observe  more  clearly  than  any 
other  writer  of  that  period  the  separation  between  the  theory 
of  reality  and  the  theory  of  knowledge.  The  sharp  line  of  de- 
marcation between  objects  and  ideas,  modes  of  extension  and 
modes  of  thought,  required  some  definite  theory  of  the  relation 
between  the  two  series  other  than  the  proposition  that  the 
order  and  connection  of  the  two  was  parallel.  The  human 
mind  consists  of  nothing  but  ideas, — modes  of  thought;  it  is 
therefore  the  general  expression  for  the  power  of  ideation.  The 
material  object  which  corresponds  to  tUcf  human  mind,  for 
every  form  of  idea  must  refer  to  an  object,  is  the  human  body ; 
it  is  a  very  complex  mode  of  extension,  "  consisting  of  many 
composite  parts."  31  Mind  and  body  are  aspects  of  one  and  the 
same  reality,  the  antithesis  of  which  arises  from  a  difference 
of  stand-point. 

In  his  treatment  of  knowledge  itself  Spinoza  reminds  one 
of  the  fourfold  classification  of  the  sources  and  kinds  of  knowl- 
edge earlier  found  in  the  thought  of  Nicolas  of  Cusa.  With 
Spinoza  the  highest  type  of  knowledge  is  concerned  with  the 
essence  (essentia), — or  fundamental  nature  of  the  object.  In 
an  earlier  fragment  on  the  "  Improvement  of  the  Intellect"  32 
Spinoza  seems  to  believe  this  purest  kind  of  knowledge  is  at- 
tainable without  a  direct  reference  to  the  being  of  God,  provided 
only  we  completely  understand  the  fundamental  nature  of  the 
thing, — as,  for  example,  "  By  this  kind  of  knowledge  we  know 
two  and  three  to  be  five,  and  if  there  are  given  two  lines  parallel 


81  Ethics,  Part  II.,  Postulate  1. 

22  Tractatus  de  Intellectus  Emendatione. 


BENEDICT   DE  SPINOZA.  101 

to  a  third,  they  are  parallel  to  each  other."  In  the  " Ethics" 
however,  it  is  expressly  defined  as  a  deduction-  from  "  an  -ade- 
quate idea  of  the  formal  essence  of  certain  'attributes  of* -God 
to  an  adequate  knowledge  of  the  essence  vof  'thhrgs.—38  Thh 
highest  kind  of  knowledge,  perfect  as  it  i's  andv  Mmfct  synony- 
mous with  the  intuition  of  the  Mystics,  can  be  employed  only 
in  regard  to-  a  very  few  objects.  The  great  mass  of  the  true 
ideas  belong  to  a  type  of  knowledge  obtained  from  observing 
the  interrelation  of  things,  by  advancing  from  a  knowledge  of 
one  thing  to  the  knowledge  of  another, — from  a  true  knowledge 
of  light  one  may  deduce  the  true  conclusion  that  the  sun  is 
larger  than  it  appears.  These  two  former  kinds  of  knowledge 
furnish  the  ground  by  which  we  may  distinguish  the  true  from 
the  false,  but  they  by  no  means  exhaust  the  possible  sources  of 
knowledge.  The  imagination  or  unfounded  opinion  supplies  us 
with  a  considerable  portion  of  the  elements  of  our  intellectual 
activity.  It  falsely  connects  two  ideas  which  should  be  sun- 
dered, or  it  allows  us  to  consider  as  true  the  confused  memory 
images  or  fanciful  word  symbols.  Even  below  the  confused 
images  there  is  the  lowest  kind  of  knowledge^  derived  from 
vagugjixperience.  The  senses  present  us  a  disorderly  array  of 
mutilated  expressions  which  in  nowise  resemble  the  true  nature 
of  the  objects  to  which  they  correspond.  To  this  lowest  type 
of  knowledge  belong  the  ideas  which  the  mind  forms .  of  the 
emotions  of  its  body;  they  are  always  felt  but  never  intellec- 
tually perceived.  Even  the  idea  of  the  body  itself  is  known 
only  through  the  obscurity  of  vague  knowledge,  since  the  pres- 
ence of  its  sensations  is  only  indirectly  given  through  confused 
emotions. 

ETHICS. 

Thus  far  the  philosophy  of  Spinoza  appears  to  be  little  else 
than  a  monistic  metaphysics,  an  absolute  pantheism  in  which 
there  is  no  place  for  man.  Although  the  history  of  modern 

88  Ethics,  Part  IT.,  Prop.  40,  Scholium  2. 


102  HISTORY   OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

philosophy  considers  Spinoza's  metaphysical  basis  as  the  im- 
portant part  of  his  system,  yet  in  his  own  mind  he  regarded 
metaphysics  as  merely  the  ground  for  the  interpretation  of  the 
relation  ;berftw£en  man  and  nature.  In  the  accomplishment  of 
this  lie  has  recourse 'to  both  a  mechanical  psychology  and  a 
Stoical  estimation  of  human  character.  The  former  led  him 
to  reduce  the  more  complex  feelings  and  emotions  to  the  sim- 
plest elements  of  animal  passion ;  the  latter  led  him  to  find  the 
dignity  of  life,  the  real  value  of  these  emotions,  in  a  lofty 
contemplation  of  nature.  It  was  a  strange  yet  impressive  har- 
mony of  mechanism  and  reason,  of  empirical  psychology  and 
rational  naturalism. 

Psychology  of  Ethics. — Owing  to  their  subsistence  in  the 
attribute  of  mind  the  infinite  modes  of  will  and  intellect  are 
to  be  regarded  from  the  metaphysical  stand-point  as  one  and 
the  same.  But  when  looked  upon  from  the  stand-point  of 
human  activity,  we  must  recognize  the  primacy  of  the  volitional 
impulse.  The  desire  for  the  preservation  of  life,  Spinoza,  like 
Hobbes  and  the  later  materialists,  places  as  the  real  basis  of 
the  psychology  of  the  feelings.  "Happiness  consists  in  a 
man's  ability*  to  preserve  his  own  being."  34  Upon  this  funda- 
mental presupposition  he  seeks  to  establish  the  psychological 
side  of  his  theory  of  ethics.  When  this  desire  for  its  own 
being,  the  universal  property  of  all  existence,  is  expressed 
through  the  conscious  reason  of  man,  we  have  will  activity. 
This  gives  rise  to  the  emotions  of  pleasure,  when  the  activity 
of  the  will  causes  a  transition  from  a  less  to  a  more  perfect 
state  of  organic  life ;  to  those  of  pain,  when  the  movement  is  in 
the  opposite  direction.  The  criterion  for  the  determination  of 
the  pleasurable  or  painful  rests  upon  certain  more  or  less  tran- 
sient subjective  ideals,  created  by  each  person  from  the  indi- 
viduality of  his  own  character.  Most  prominent  among  the 

84 "  .  .  .  et  f  elicitatem  in  eo  consistere,  quod  homo  suum  esse  con- 
servare  protest." — Ethics,  Part  IV.,  Prof.  18,  Scholium. 


BENEDICT   DE   SPINOZA.  103 

forces  which  Spinoza  believes  to  contribute  towards  the  preser- 
vation of  individual  man  are  the  existence  and  the  welfare  of 
one's  fellow-men.  In  this  connection  the  conception  of 
Spinoza's  original  motive  of  self-preservation  becomes  trans- 
formed into  a  higher  recognition  of  the  brotherhood  of  all 
mankind,  giving  rise  to  the  virtue  of  generosity.  "  Minds  are 
not  conquered  by  force  but  by  love  and  generosity."  35 

Naturalism  of  Ethics. — Characteristic  of  the  breadth  of 
Spinoza's  philosophy  is  another  element  which  enters  into  his 
ethical  thought.  Besides  the  empirical  psychology  of  feeling, 
which  starts  with  the  animal  emotion  of  egoism  and  developed 
through  reason  into  the  virtue  of  altruism,  Spinoza  emphasizes 
the  subsistence  of  all  feelings,  emotions,  and  virtues  in  Nature. 
It  is  a  virtue  to  see  one's  own  happiness  in  the  happiness  of 
mankind,  it  is  noble  to  strive  for  the  higher  ideals  of  others; 
but  it  is  the  highest  virtue  to  recognize  the  real  unity  that 
lies  at  the  base  of  human  frailty  and  natural  law.  Just  as 
true  virtue  recognizes  the  community  of  the  whole  human 
species,  it  is  virtue  of  a  higher  kind  to  connect  mankind  with 
God.  This  noblest  virtue  is  the  intellectual  contemplation  of 
Nature, — "  amor  Dei  intellectualis"  36 — springing  from  the 
highest  kind  of  knowledge  and  eternal  in  its  essence,  and  which 
Spinoza  regards  more  as  a  passive  attitude  of  mind  than  as  a 
specific  formulation  of  the  moral  law.  To  one  who  has  at- 
tained this  perfect  intellectual  peace,  all  the  conflict  of  the 
external  world,  all  the  sin  and  evil  of  man,  becomes  the  mani- 
festation of  the  eternal  laws  of  God.  Human  weakness  is 
prone  to  recognize  such  emotions  as  sympathy,  pity,  remorse, 
or  hope,  but  they  have  no  place  in  the  intellectual  contempla- 
tion of  nature.  There  is  no  evil  or  good,  no  love  or  hatred, 
beauty  or  ugliness,  no  virtue  or  sin  in  the  world  as  it  is  in 


85 "  Animi  tamen  non  armis,  sed  Amore  et  Generositate  vincuntur.' 
—Ethics,  Part  IV.,  Appendix  11. 
39  Ethics,  Part  V.,  Prop.  33. 


104  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

itself,  in  God;  it  is  the  finitude  and  partiality  of  the  human 
mind  which  creates  these  emotions  from  its  own  contorted 
consciousness.  Owing  to  a  false  assumption  of  power,  a  pride 
in  his  finite  judgment,  man  is  wont  to  interpret  nature  after 
his  own  liking.  He  attributes  purposes  or  final  causes  to 
impersonal  nature;  he  even  explains  the  will  of  nature  by 
elaborate  theories  of  his  own.  From  a  similar  conceit  man 
believes  himself  capable  of  making  moral  and  aesthetical  judg- 
ments, forgetting  that  goodness  or  beauty,  as  well  as  purpose, 
have  no  real  existence  except  in  the  imagination. 

The  God  or  Nature  of  Spinoza,  although  first  appearing  in 
a  metaphysical  setting,  now  becomes  the  direct  object  of  the 
ethical  consciousness.  But  at  the  same  time  that  he  emphasizes 
the  ideal  of  a  colorless  Nature  as  the  object  of  the  highest 
virtue,  he  transforms  virtue  from  the  field  of  the  will  to  that 
of  the  intellect.  Spinoza  may  be  easily  associated  in  this  regard 
with  the  Greek,  Socrates,  whose  ethical  aphorism  "Virtue  is 
knowledge"  is  equally  applicable  to  the  seventeenth-century 
Jew.  Morality,  then,  according  to  its  highest  ideal  is  a  product 
of  the  intellect  rather  than  of  the  emotions.  "  Blessedness  is 
not  the  reward  of  virtue,  but  is  virtue  itself/'  37  We  may  will 
to  behold  the  perfection  of  a  purely  natural  God,  devoid  of  all 
anthropopathic  attributes,  but  the  appreciation  of  such  a  God 
is  an  act  of  reason  alone.  It  is  an  under-emphasis  on  the 
meaning  of  the  "  intellectual  contemplation  of  God"  that  leads 
many  to  regard  Spinoza's  monism  as  a  religion. 

NATURALISTIC  FATALISM. 

Notwithstanding  his  high  estimation  of  human  character, 
Spinoza  did  not  fail  to  draw  the  conclusion  which  his  intellec- 
tual naturalism  demanded.  If  nature  constitutes  the  essence 
of  reality,  then  the  irrevocable  laws  of  nature  must  be  applic- 


"  "  Beatitude  non  est  virtutis  prsemium,  sed  ipsa  virtus."  —  Ethics, 
Part  V.,  Prop.  42. 


BENEDICT   DE   SPINOZA.  105 

able  to  all  the  finite  modes  of  nature.  In  other  words,  Spinoza's 
monism  in  its  treatment  of  man  afforded  no  place  for  freedom. 
Just  as  the  stone  obeys  the  eternal  laws  of  the  attribute  of 
matter,  so  also  the  human  will  obeys  the  equally  irresistible 
laws  of  mind.  It  is  true  the  finite  intellect  of  man  believes 
itself  to  be  free,  because  memory  and  limited  knowledge  are 
unable  to  determine  the  direct  causes  of  action.  <  Should  we 
know,  however,  every  law  of  nature,  then  the  forces  which 
control  human  activity  would  become  known  and  recognized 
as  expressions  of  the  divine  thought  of  Substance.  However 
stern  and  relentless  this  naturalistic  fatalism  may  appear,  its 
apparent  horror  was  altogether  alleviated  in  Spinoza's  own 
mind  by  the  lofty  ideal  of  "  the  intellectual  contemplation  of 
God.",2Jt  was  a  favorite  theme  among  the  Schoolmen  to  recon- 
cile human  responsibility  and  Divine  omnipotence  by  suggest- 
ing that  man  freely  chose  the  eternal  will  of  God.  In  a 
similar  manner  Spinoza  feels  himself  elevating  the  dignity  of 
man  by  emphasizing  his  subsistence  in  nature.  The  fatalism 
of  Spinoza  lies  at  the  very  root  of  his  system.  It  springs  from 
his  desire  to  uplift  nature  to  a  place  far  higher  than  the  ob- 
jective existence  attributed  to  it  by  physical  science. 
nature  is  made  to  include  man,  then  natural  law  becomes 
human  law  and  the  activities  of  Infinite  Nature  are  reflected  in 
every  act  of  finite  man.  By  his  reality  in  nature,  man  becomes 
a  significant  part  in  a  vast  process  and  the  individual  expres- 
sion of  infinite  law  and  mind.  Spinoza  exalts  nature  above 
man,  but  in  so  doing  he  emphasizes  their  ultimate  harmony. 

PHILOSOPHICAL  IMPORTANCE. 

In  the  philosophical  system  of  Spinoza  the  deductive  ration- 
alism of  the  time  reaches  its  fullest  development.  It  is  the 
most  perfect  monism  which  has  been  yet  established  on  a 
realistic  basis.  Substance  is  something  real,  appreciable,  defi- 
nite ;  it  is  not  a  principle  or  an  idea,  like  the  "  Pre-established 
Harmony"  of  Leibnitz  or  the  "  Absolute"  of  subsequent  meta- 


106  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

physics,  but  rather  the  objectively  real  source  of  all  being.  In 
his  initial  conception  of  Substance  Spinoza  removes  himself 
altogether  from  experience.  He  realizes  this  error  and  en- 
deavors to  re-establish  himself  in  the  world  of  fact  by  his  theory 
of  modes.  But  we  seek  in  vain  for  an  adequate  explanation 
of  the  transition.  The  early  Schoolmen  were  wont  to  discuss 
the  problem  of  "Why  did  God  become  man?"  ("Cur  Deus 
homo?")  and  we  too  inquire  of  Spinoza  in  what  manner  does 
Substance  become  modes.  There  is  seemingly  a  need  for  some 
kind  of  spiritualistic  unity  which  shall  afford  a  basis  for  the 
existence  of  plurality  in  unity.  An  attempt  to  supply  such  a 
ground  is  illustrated  by  the  "  Pre-established  Harmony"  of  the 
third  important  exponent  of  rationalism,  Leibnitz. 

GOTTFRIED    WILHELM   LEIBNITZ. 

Among  the  persons  who  frequently  wrote  to  Spinoza,  and 
to  whom  the  latter  confided  his  "Ethics"  was  a  young  man 
who  was  introduced  to  him  as  "being  free  from  the  usual 
theological  prejudices."  This  young  man  was  Leibnitz,  the 
successor  of  Spinoza  in  his  rationalism,  but  his  opposite  in 
type  of  mind  and  in  philosophical  stand-point. 

LIFE. 

Leibnitz  was  born  in  1646,  the  son  of  a  Professor  of  Moral 
Philosophy  in  the  University  of  Leipzig.  His  father  died 
when  he  was  very  young,  but  left  a  large  library  to  which  the 
lad  had  free  access.  From  his  early  reading  Leibnitz  acquired 
a  considerable  knowledge  of  physics,  scholastic  philosophy,  and 
various  foreign  languages.  At  fifteen  years  of  age  he  entered 
the  University  of  his  native  city,  but  took  his  final  degree  of 
Doctor  of  Laws  at  the  smaller  University  of  Altdorf.  From 
that  time  to  an  advanced  age  the  attention  and  interest  of 
Leibnitz  was  distributed  throughout  every  possible  field  of 
scientific,  philosophical,  and  legal  inquiry,  in  all  of  which  he 
met  with  distinguished  success.  He  was  first  associated  with 


GOTTFRIED   WILHELM   LEIBNITZ.  107 

the  Elector  of  Mayence  in  the  systematization  of  the  laws,  and 
later  went  on  an  embassy  to  Paris,  with  the  object  of  diverting 
the  attention  of  Louis  XIV.  towards  the  conquest  of  Egypt. 

At  the  French  capital  he  became  associated  with  some  of 
the  most  remarkable  men  of  the  time,  especially  those  inter- 
ested in  mathematical  physics.  Through  the  suggestion  of  a 
friend  he  made  an  investigation  into  the  Cartesian  doctrine  of 
God,  and  began  to  feel  the  need  of  a  reconciliation  between 
the  mechanical  universe  of  modern  science  and  the  demand  for 
a  purposive  Author  of  Nature. 

On  his  return  journey  from  Paris  he  paid  several  visits  to 
Spinoza,  then  residing  at  The  Hague.  Undoubtedly  the  later 
philosophy  of  Leibnitz  was  somewhat  influenced  by  his  personal 
intercourse  with  Spinoza,  especially  as  the  latter  permitted  him 
to  read  the  "Ethics;"  but  too  much  stress  must  not  be  laid 
upon  indirect  testimony  alone.  Although  their  general  inter- 
ests were  parallel  and  the  rationalistic  tendency  was  as  promi- 
nent in  one  as  in  the  other,  yet  it  is  doubtful  if  the  difference 
in  their  temperaments  and  stand-points  admitted  of  any  appre- 
ciation of  each  other's  philosophy.  Soon  after  his  return  from 
Paris,  the  Duke  of  Hanover  appointed  Leibnitz  to  the  office 
of  Councillor  and  Librarian,  a  post  which  he  held  for  many 
years.  His  death  occurred  in  1716. 

In  public  life  and  in  letters  Leibnitz  achieved  high  dis- 
tinction on  account  of  his  breadth  of  learning  and  the  original 
trend  of  his  mind.  He  was  the  founder  of  the  Berlin  Academy 
of  Science,  and  was  elected  its  first  President,  an  office  he  held 
for  life.  He  was  honored  by  several  of  the  German  States, 
by  Austria  and  Kussia.  In  1676  he  announced  the  discovery  of 
the  Differential  Calculus,  which  has  revolutionized  pure  and 
applied  mathematics.  The  honor  of  this  achievement,  however, 
is  justly  divided  with  the  Englishman  Newton,  who  antici- 
pated the  work  of  Leibnitz  by  his  Calculus  of  Fluxions. 

During  his  early  life  Leibnitz  wrote  various  treatises  on 
jurisprudence,  and  also  a  small  work  on  the  logical  method  of 


108  HISTORY   OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

Raymond  Lully.  During  his  latter  life,  even  after  his  philoso- 
phy was  definitely  crystallized  in  his  own  mind,  Leibnitz  found 
himself  too  much  occupied  with  other  things  to  give  definite 
form  to  his  thought.  His  literary  remains  form  at  best  a 
patchwork,  which,  had  he  possessed  a  greater  power  of  concen- 
tration, he  might  have  welded  into  a  philosophical  system  of 
universal  power  and  scope.  The  three  works  on  which  his 
chief  speculative  merit  rests  are,  the  "New  Essay  upon  the 
Human  Understanding"  "  The  Theodicy,  and  the  " Monadol- 
ogy"  The  "New  Essay"  was  prepared  as  a  refutation  to 
Locke,  although  it  was  not  published  until  fifty  years  after 
the  death  of  Leibnitz.  The  ""  Theodicy"  was  directed  against 
a  mild  scepticism  then  prevalent  in  France  and  Germany.  The 
work  endeavored  to  harmonize — for  Leibnitz  was  always  har- 
monizing— the  reason  of  God  and  the  existence  of  evil.  It 
Advocated  that  freedom  and  the  possibility  of  evil  contribute 
to  the  absolute  perfection  of  God.  The  "  Monadology"  was  a 
brief  analysis  of  his  doctrine  of  the  force  atom  and  a  philo- 
sophical justification  of  realistic  pluralism.  This  latter  is  the 
doctrine  of  metaphysics  which  advances  the  belief  that  at  the 
very  foundation  of  the  universe  there  are  certain  simple  ele- 
ments, absolutely  real  in  themselves.  The  atomism  of  the 
Greeks  is  an  excellent  example  of  such  a  view,  as  well  as  the 
older  interpretations  of  the  atomic  theory  in  physics. 

METAPHYSICS. 

Spinoza  and  Leibnitz. — In  a  foregoing  paragraph  we  have 
stated  that  Spinoza  was  the  opposite  in  almost  every  respect  to 
Leibnitz.  In  character  the  former  was  simple  and  unpreten- 
tious, reserved  in  speech,  and  retired  in  manner  of  life, — little 
influenced  by  what  the  world  calls  honor  and  ambition.  His 
mind  was  more  constructive  than  original,  more  thorough  and 
systematic  than  quick  and  powerful.  In  all  these  respects 
Leibnitz  was  the  opposite.  His  life  was  full  of  variety,  his 
character  frank,  earnest,  and  easily  swayed  by  passing  ambi- 


GOTTFRIED   WILHELM   LEIBNITZ.  109 

tions.  His  mind  was  far  more  original  in  type  than  that  of 
Spinoza,  but  decidedly  lacked  the  concentrativeness  of  the 
latter.  One  is  the  personification  of  passivity,  the  other  of 
activity.  This  contrast  penetrates  to  the  very  roots  of  their 
respective  philosophical  positions.  The  only  similarity  lies  in 
the  general  trend  of  their  rationalistic  epistemology,  for  each 
finds  in  reason  the  ultimate  criterion  of  truth.  With  Spinoza 
Substance,  Nature,  or  God  was  completely  defined  by  "  self- 
ejdstence."  This  existence  was  purely  a  passive  state^com^ 
pletely  self-determined  in  the  sense  that  its  reality  was  inde- 
pendent of  all  descriptive  definition.  Leibnitz  defined  the 
primal  Substance  as  activity  instead  of  passivity.  Substance, 
to  him,  was  ultimately  real,  not  because  it  was  self-determined, 
but  because  it  strove  to  be  something  other  than  what  it  was. 
Instead  of  starting  with  a  world  of  absolute  rest,  a  Universal 
of  all  universals,  Leibnitz  chose  rather  to  construct  his  universe 
from  elements  whose  only  positive  attributes  are  restlessness 
and  distinctive  individuality.  With  this  demand  in  mind  lie 
saw  only  force  and  activity,  transition  and  evolution,  where 
Spinoza  had  seen  the  opposite.  The  spirit  of  the  philosophy  of 
Leibnitz  carries  us  back  to  Heraclitus,  Democritus,  and  Lucre- 
tius ;  and  forward  to  the  vortex  rings,  the  force  function^,  and 
energetics  of  modern  physics. 

Definition  of  Monad. — The  active  Substance  of  Leibnitz 
did  not  allow  of  an  undifferentiated  monism.  Activity  pre- 
supposes a  duality  of  some  kind,  and  in  its  ultimate  analysis 
seems  to  evade  all  attempts  at  reduction  to  a  single  element. 
The  organic  unity  of  Spinoza's  system  demanded  an  undiffer- 
entiated  Unit  as  the  logical  genesis  of  all  forms  of  mind  and 
matter.  Leibnitz,  on  the  contrary,  is  required  by  his  funda- 
mental definition  of  Substance  to  develop  his  world  from  origi- 
nal atoms  of  activity  or  force.  Everything  is  actuated  into 
being  by  the  incessant  reality  of  force;  action  and  reaction 
was  the  first  law  of  the  Universe.  These  atomic  forces,  or 
monads,  as  they  were  technically  called,  correspond  in  their 


110  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

variety  to  the  modes  of  Spinoza.  Only  the  two  concepts  differ 
in  that  the  monads  may  be  considered  self-sufficient  and  ele- 
mentary, while  the  modes  derive  their  reality  from  the  deeper 
nature  of  Substance.  Briefly  denned,  the  monads  are  the 
simple,  indestructible,  indivisible  parts  of  the  universe. 
"  These  monads  are  the  true  atoms  of  nature, — that  is,  the 
elements  of  things."  38  The  objects  of  sense  are  really  com- 
pounds or  aggregations  of  these  simple  elements.  Just  as 
large  quantities  of  the  invisible  impurities  of  the  atmosphere 
are  sufficient  to  become  appreciable  by  obscuring  the  landscape, 
so  the  invisible  monads  are  capable  of  congealing  into  tangible 
objects  of  sense.  And  further,  the  monads  are  themselves 
unaffected  by  the  accidents  of  time  and  space, — they  arise 
through  a  creative  act  of  God,  and  can  be  annihilated  only  by 
His  will. 

Description  of  Monads. — Beyond  the  mere  definition,  how- 
ever, a  difficulty  presents  itself.  A  monad  cannot  be  conceived 
as  a  physical  atom,  for  this  would  be  a  purely  material  object 
capable  of  still  further  division;  and  if  capable  of  division,  it 
could  not  be  regarded  as  a  final  element.  Nor,  on  the  other 
hand,  could  one  define  the  monad  in  mathematical  terms,  for 
by  definition  the  geometrical  point  is  purely  conceptual;  no 
summation  of  mathematical  points  could  give  us  the  idea  of 
space.  The  solution  of  this  dilemma  is  characteristic  of  the 
harmonizing  spirit  of  Leibnitz.  We  are  told  that  the  monad 
is  not  exactly  a  physical  unit,  nor  is  it  a  mathematical  point; 
yet  it  partakes  of  the  nature  of  each.  The  pure  force  monad 
has  the  space-filling  quality  of  the  physical  atom,  but  at  the 
same  time  the  indivisibility  of  the  mathematical  point !  From 
this  premise  it  may  be  regarded  as  the  constituent  of  the 
objects  of  sense  at  the  same  time  that  one  conceives  it  to  be  the 
indivisible  atom  of  the  universe. 


38 ".  .  .  ces  Monades  sout  les  v6ritables  atomes  de  la  nature  et  en 
un  mot  les  elements  des  choses." — Monadology,  Section  3. 


GOTTFRIED   WILHELM   LEIBNITZ.  Ill 

The  World  of  Monads. — Beyond  this  bare  presupposition 
of  an  indeterminate  number  of  realistic  monads,  Leibnitz  is 
confronted  with  two  distinct  problems.  It  will  be  remembered 
that  one  of  the  most  significant  difficulties  in  Spinoza's  monism 
was  concerned  with  the  relation  between  Substance  and  its 
finite  modes.  We  were  able  to  understand  much  that  was  said 
in  this  important  connection,  yet  found  difficulty  with  the 
question :  Why  does  Substance  show  itself  in  just  these  forms  ? 
We  naturally  inquire  if  there  is  not  some  deep-seated  law 
which  permeates  the  full  extent  of  nature,  that  explains  its 
variety  and  finite  forms  by  reference  to  some  conceptual  prin- 
ciple of  unity.  To  both  of  these  problems,  the  variety  of  the 
world  and  the  law  of  its  unity,  Leibnitz  offers  the  hypothesis 
of  the  monads  with  their  ideal  harmony. 

THE  SERIAL  ORDER  OF  THE  MONADS. — For  convenience  of  ex- 
position let  us  first  inquire  into  the  former  problem,  the  source 
of  the  world's  variety.  Leibnitz  recognized  activity  in  a  cer- 
tain direction  to  be  the  essential  of  force.  Universal  striving, 
cause  and  effect,  action  and  reaction,  reign  throughout  the 
world  of  the  monads.  In  all  this  incessant  striving  of  monads 
new  conditions  arise  which  are,  from  the  nature  of  their  strug- 
gles, more  or  less  perfect  than  the  preceding  states.  There  will 
thus  develop  a  long  series  of  monads,  the  position  of  each  being 
determined  by  the  degree  of  its  relative  perfection.  At  the 
summit  of  this  series  stands  "  the  Monad  of  monads"  which 
occupies  the  position  of  God  in  the  system  of  Leibnitz.  Below 
God  are  all  grades  of  monads  extending  from  the  purely  mate- 
rial or  formless  up  to  the  highly  spiritual,  such  as  the  human 
soul.  Every  sensible  object,  as  a  chair  or  a  stone,  is  a  vast 
coalition  of  monads,  each  of  which  has  its  unique  place  in  the 
scale  of  relative  perfection.  The  individuality  of  each  object, 
however,  is  defined  by  its  formal  or  soul-monad.  Thus,  for 
example,  a  chair  consists  of  wood-,  iron-,  paint-,  and  rattan- 
monads,  but  dominating  all  and  giving  form  and  character  to 
the  assembly  is  the  special  chair-monad.  In  a  similar  manner 


112  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

each  individual  man  is  composed  of  the  immortal  soul-monad, 
acting  in  conjunction  with  a  vast  organized  assembly  of  cor- 
poreal monads,  together  forming  the  body. 

THE  "  PRE-ESTABLISHED  HARMONY"  OF  THE  MONADS. — In 
his  solution  to  the  problem  of  the  general  law  which  controls 
the  activity  of  the  monads,  Leibnitz  approaches  more  nearly  to 
the  idealism  of  the  following  century.  Starting  with  the  real- 
istic assumption  of  a  pluralism,  he  cannot  have  recourse  to  a 
substantive  unity,  like  that  employed  by  Spinoza.  On  the  con- 
trary, every  monad  is  absolutely  distinct  in  itself  and  possesses 
"  no  windows  to  look  out  of."  Any  principle  of  unity,  therefore, 
that  controls  the  monads  must  be  distinctly  spiritual,  ideal- 
istic, teleological,  or  purposive,  whichever  of  these  terms  is 
best  suited  to  express  the  opposite  of  objectivity.  "  The  natural 
\  changes  in  the  monads  arise  from  an  internal  principle,  since 
•J  an  external  one  could  not  influence  their  interior."  39  And 
again,  "  The  influence  of  the  monads  upon  one  another  is 
purely  ideal/'  40  The  importance  of  these  passages  cannot  be 
estimated  too  highly,  for  they  indicate  the  most  pronounced 
advance  of  Leibnitz  over  his  predecessors,  that  of  conceptual 
unity  of  Nature.  This  element  of  his  philosophy  places  it  in 
sharp»contrast  to  the  naturalism  of  Spinoza  and  Hobbes,  while 
it  unites  him  closely  with  Kant  and  his  idealistic  followers. 
To  supply  this  demand  for  an  ideal  unity  of  nature,  Leibnitz 
introduced  us  to  his  doctrine  of  "Pre-established  Harmony/' 
Each  monad  follows  its  own  individual  course  of  activity,  abso- 
lutely oblivious  of  what  occurs  about  it;  but  from  the  perfect 
harmony  of  the  whole  system  the  impulse  of  the  one  will  be 
the  law  of  the  whole.  Each  monad  has  its  own  individual 
activity,  simple  and  imperishable,  but  yet  it  reflects  in  its  own 

39 " .  .  .  que  les  changements  naturels  des  Monades  viennent  d'un 
principe  interne;  puisqu'une  cause  externe  ne  saurait  influer  dans 
son  inter ieur." — Monadology,  Section  11. 

40 "  Mais  dans  les  substances  simples,  ce  n'est  qu'une  influence  id6ale 
d'une  monade  sur  1'autre." — Monadology,  Section  51. 


GOTTFRIED   WILHELM   LEIBNITZ.  113 

peculiar  way,  the  whole  organic  structure  of  the  Universe. 
This  is  the  conceptual  principle  upon  which  Leibnitz  believes 
himself  able  to  assert  the  doctrine  of  "  Pre-established  Har- 
mony" as  the  universal  law  of  the  monads.  Every  monad  acts 
according  to  its  own  life,  but  on  account  of  its  position  in  the 
organic  structure  of  the  Universe,  it  acts  in  harmony  with 
every  other  monad. 

Human  Freedom. — This  theory  of  "  Pre-established  Har- 
mony" places  the  freedom  of  man  in  an  altogether  original 
light.  As  the  soul  is  an  imperishable  and  unconditioned  monad, 
it  obeys  no  other  law  than  its  own.  But  nevertheless  it  belongs 
to  the  organic  structure  of  nature,  and  in  that  sense  obeys  the 
ultimate  law  of  the  Universe.  The  soul  is  free  to  do  as  it 
would,  but  yet  it  freely  chooses  what  is  required  by  the  law  of 
"Pre-established  Harmony."  The  soul  freely  chooses  law. 
This  skilful  evasion  of  the  Scylla  and  Charybdis  of  the  free- 
will controversy  is  characteristic  of  the  harmonizing  spirit  of 
Leibnitz.  It  is  in  spirit  similar  to  the  teachings  of  Thomas 
Aquinas  in  the  thirteenth  century :  the  human  will  necessarily 
chooses  the  good,  the  will  of  God. 

The  Importance  of  God. — With  Leibnitz  this  principle  of 
e<  Pre-established  Harmony"  also  supplies  "  a  new  proof  for 
the  existence  of  God,  one  of  unusual  clearness."  41  The  term 
"  Pre-established,"  when  applied  to  the  world,  implies  the 
Author  of  the  universe,  for  universal  harmony  could  arise  only 
from" "a  creative  and  rational  Being.  "  The  harmony  of  so 
many  substances  influenced  by  each  other  could  only  come 
from  a  .general  cause,  upon  which  they  all  depend,  and  that 
must  possess  infinite  power  and  wisdom  in  order  to  establish 
this  universal  harmony."  42  God  created  the  monads,  and  Him- 
self impressed  upon  them  their  deepest  law  of  "  Pre-established 
Harmony."  Leibnitz  further  unites  "line  two  concepts  of  God 


41  New  System  of  Nature,  Section  16. 
"Principles  of  Life,  1705. 
8 


114  HISTORY   OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

and  "  Pre-established  Harmony"  by  regarding  the  latter  as  the 
constant  expression  of  God's  will.  For  God,  the  "  Monad  of 
monads/'  occupies  the  highest  possible  position  in  the  scale  of 
being;  He  is  the  fy2£e<£J[deaL  And  it  is  the  constant  and 
incessant  desire  of  all  the  less  perfect  monads  to  rise  to  the 
Supreme  Perfection  of  God.  Although  in  harmony  with  one 
another,  every  monad  struggles  forward  to  some  higher  state. 
Evolution  towards  God  is  the  single  impulse  which  permeates 
the  entire  fabric  of  nature. 

Optimism. — -Owing  to  the  fact  that  there  can  be  but  one 
God,  every  other  monad  necessarily  possesses  a  certain  amount 
of  imperfection  or  evil,  dependent  on  the  relative  distance  from 
the  "  Monad  of  monads."  In  a  similar  manner  Leibnitz  ex- 
plains away  all  forms  of  evil,  as  the  consequence  of  the  wisdom 
of  God,  suggesting  at  the  same  time  that  we  live  in  the  best 
of  possible  worlds.  It  is  true  that  we  observe  evil  in  the  world, 
but  it  is  only  here  through  the  consent  of  God,  for  by  evil  is 
He  best  able  to  work  out  the  salvation  of  mankind.  Evil  often 
accompanies  and  makes  possible  a  greater  good,  as  "  a  general 
in  the  army  will  prefer  great  victory  and  slight  wounds  to 
neither."  43 

SCOPE  OF  THE  SYSTEM. 

In  its  broader  meaning  and  with  special  reference  to  the 
original  philosophy  of  Leibnitz,  the  principle  of  "  Pre-estab- 
lished Harmony"  was  supposed  to  control  the  relations  among 
all  the  monads.  The  special  relation  between  mind  and  matter, 
the  old  problem  of  Cartesianism,  was  thus  but  a  single  example 
of  the  operation  of  a  universal  principle.  The  importance  of 
this  single  instance  of  the  broader  law  has  led  the  historians  of 
philosophy — following  the  lead  of  Wolff,  a  disciple  of  Leibnitz 
— to  regard  the  operation  of  the  principle  of  "  Pre-established 
Harmony"  to  be  of  importance  only  to  the  single  case  of  body 
and  soul.  This  popular  misinterpretation  brings  into  the  fore- 

43  Abridgment  Theodicy,  1. 


THE   RATIONALISTS  AS   A  WHOLE.  115 

ground  the  Cartesian  problem  of  the  relation  of  mind  and 
matter,  but  at  the  same  time  it  modifies  the  value  of  the  Leib- 
nitzian  Realism.  The  ingenuity,  originality,  and  power  of 
reconciling  the  irreconcilable  cannot  but  impress  the  reader  of 
Leibnitz.  His  scattered  thoughts  are  all  brilliant,  keen,  and 
searching,  but  disconnected  and  often  contradictory.  In  origi- 
nality he  has  been  compared  with  Aristotle  and  in  analytical 
keenness  to  Kant,  but  his  utter  lack  of  systematic  expression 
gives  to  him  a  position  in  philosophy  far  inferior  to  either. 

THE   RATIONALISTS   AS   A   WHOLE. 

THEIR  PROBLEM. 

Before  we  turn  our  attention  towards  the  British  philoso- 
phers, who  look  upon  reality  from  an  altogether  different  stand- 
point, it  may  be  well  to  take  a  brief  retrospect  of  the  whole 
rationalistic  school.  At  the  beginning  of  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury the  learned  world  was  concerned  with  the  reconciliation 
of  a  new  science  to  the  traditions  of  philosophy  and  religion. 
The  former  pointed  to  a  mechanical  universe  in  which  both 
God  and  man  were  subordinated  to  natural  law,  while  the 
more  conservative  thought  still  held  to  the  God  of  Moses  and 
the  Christian  estimation  of  man.  Various  were  the  attempts 
to  deal  with  this  reconciliation  and  various  were  the  results 
obtained.  Should  one  over-emphasize  natural  law  he  would 
evolve  the  Universe  of  the  materialist  with  its  countless  human 
machines ;  and  if,  on  the  contrary,  natural  law  were  forgotten, 
religion  would  become  transformed  into  a  mysticism  or  even 
a  fanaticism. 

Various  Solutions  of  the  Problem. — <5V"ith  the  Cartesian 
metaphysics  a  new  instrument  was  discovered  which  could  be 
very  readily  employed  in  effecting  a  proper  balance  between 
law  and  God.  This  instrument  was  none  other  than  a  rigid 
examination  of  the  meaning  of  existence  as  founded  on  the 
reality  of  the  self.  Instead  of  attempting  the  reconciliation 


116  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

just  alluded  to,  Descartes  stated  the  new  problem  of  self- 
certitude  and  turned  the  inquiry  towards  the  relation  between 
this  self  and  the  external.  But  this  solution  of  the  new  prob- 
lem by  Descartes,  with  its  reliance  on  the  self-evident,  was  by 
no  means  sufficient  to  prevent  any  future  advance.  The  mere 
existence  of  the  self,  however  assured  it  may  be,  is  insufficient 
to  determine  the  relation  of  this  self  to  a  possible  world  beyond 
/  it.  The  central  problem  of  the  Cartesian  theory  becomes  the 
discovery  of  the  relation  between  mind  and  matter. 

Eeceiving  from  the  hands  of  their  master  the  mere  state- 
ment of  the  problem,  the  later  Cartesians  developed  the  doc- 
:  trine  of  "  Occasional  Cause."  They  conceived  God  to  be  the 
;  mediator  between  the  impulses  of  mind  and  the  laws  of  matter. 
Spinoza,  looking  at  the  same  problem  from  a  monistic  stand- 
point, considered  it  necessary  to  subsume  mind  and  matter 
under  the  unity  of  substance,  in  order  to  make  possible  their 
mutual  relation.  And  Leibnitz,  approaching  the  problem  from 
an  opposite  direction,  considered  the  spiritual  unity  of  "  Pre- 
.established  Harmony"  to  be  the  only  ground  for  the  separate 
reality  of  self  and  the  not-self.  • 

Example  of  the  Clocks. — Perhaps  the  clearest  appreciation 
of  the  similarity  and  difference  of  the  three  rationalistic  solu- 
tions of  the  relation  between  mind  and  matter  is  expressed 
in  several  letters  written  by  Leibnitz,  although  the  illustration 
was  suggested  by  earlier  Cartesians.  He  considers  two  clocks 
which  run  in  perfect  unison  as  a  suggestive  illustration  of  the 
parallelism  of  mind  and  matter.  The  agreement  of  these  two 
timepieces  may  result  from  one  of  three  causes.  In  the  first 
instance  we  may  presuppose  a  skilled  workman  who  constantly 
keeps  the  two  clocks  in  accord  with  one  another.  The  workman 
corresponds  to  God  in  the  Occasionalistic  hypothesis.  As  a 
second  explanation  it  is  possible  to  believe  that  the  two  clocks 
are  not  really  separated  but  connected  by  some  hidden  bond, 
such  as  sympathy  of  vibration.  This  illustrates  the  Imma- 
nent God  of  Spinoza,  in  whom  both  mind  and  matter  sub- 


THE   RATIONALISTS  AS  A  WHOLE.  117 

sist.  And  thirdly,  there  is  the  possibility  that  the  two  clocks 
"have  been  constructed  with  so  much  art  and  accuracy  as  to 
assure  their  future  harmony."  This  last  explanation  well  illus- 
trates the  theory  of  "  Pre-established  Harmony"  made  promi- 
nent in  Leibnitz's  own  philosophy. 

Its  Deeper  Meaning. — In  their  metaphysics  each  branch  of 
the  rationalistic  school  represents  a  distinct  phase  of  the  central 
inquiry  of  speculative  philosophy, — the  possibility  of  both  unity 
and  variety.  The  deeper  meaning  of  the  old  problem  of  mind 
and  matter  was  not  distinctly  understood  by  Descartes  and  his 
immediate  followers.  For  this  reason  we  have  God  denned  by 
means  of  antithetical  attributes.  The  God  of  Malebranche  and 
Geulincx  supplies  the  ultimate  and  passive  connection  between 
mind  and  matter;  and  at  the  same  time  He  personified  con- 
stant activity,  in  so  far  as  the  relation  between  soul  and  body 
was  interpreted  dynamically.  In  this  twofold  position  of  pas- 
sive Unity  and  active  Mediator,  the  Deity  of  the  Cartesians 
exhibits  a  distinct  contradiction.  While  by  original  conception 
the  Cartesians  have  interpreted  Descartes  according  to  a  more 
consistent  monism,  they  are  compelled,  nevertheless,  to  sacri- 
fice this  unity  to  a  deeper  plurality  as  soon  as  they  attempt  to 
apply  it  to  the  world.  They  sought  to  harmonize  activity  and 
passivity,  without  establishing  a  sufficient  ground. 

Following  directly  upon  the  failure  of  the  Cartesians  to 
discover  a  real  unity  beneath  the  variety  of  the  world,  we  meet 
with  the  two  opposing  solutions  of  Spinoza  and  Leibnitz.  The 
meaning  and  importance  of  the  contrast  between  these  two  is 
of  extreme  moment.  The  Substance  of  Spinoza  possessed  an 
absolute  reality,  it  comprehended  in  its  definition  all  that  was 
real;  consistency  required  that  the  modes  should  be  made 
dependent  and  that  their  reality  should  arise  only  in  their 
relations  to  Substance.  Leibnitz,  on  the  contrary,  gave  to  the 
multitude  of  monads  an  individual  existence  as  real  as  the 
Spinozistic  Substance  and  transformed  this  apparent  pluralism 
into  a  monism  by  the  universal  principle  of  "  Pre-established 


118  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

Harmony."  The  Cartesians  were  at  a  loss  to  reconcile  pas- 
sivity and  activity  in  the  Godhead;  Spinoza  emphasized  the 
former  and  evolved  a  realistic  unity,  requiring  an  idealistic 
variety.  Leibnitz  started  with  a  realistic  variety  and  was  com- 
pelled to  posulate  the  idealistic  unity. 


CHAPTEE    IV. 
LOCKE  AND  HIS  INFLUENCE. 

RATIONALISM  AND  EMPIRICISM  CONTRASTED. 

CONTEMPORANEOUS  with  the  history  of  Continental  Ration- 
alism, the  English  philosophy  of  science  developed  its  reliance 
on  the  given  facts  of  experience.  We  have  met  striking  exam- 
ples of  the  empirical  and  metaphysical  sides  of  this  attitude 
of  mind  in  earlier  writers,  such  as  Bacon  and  Hobbes. 
Although  nearly  all  of  the  thinkers  of  the  Continent  were  more 
or  less  influenced  by  the  new  ideas  which  directly  sprung  from 
the  impetus  given  to  philosophy  by  Descartes,  the  Englishmen 
remained  apart  from  the  general  current.  They  set  for  them- 
selves other  problems,  for  the  solution  of  which  the  rational- 
istic formulae  were  of  little  avail;  and  even  when  the  same 
questions  were  investigated  by  both  schools,  the  difference  of 
stand-point  rendered  the  results  obtained  by  one  of  little  value 
to  the  other. 

The  important  and  perhaps  only  thread  that  unites  the 
philosophical  systems  of  the  Cartesians,  Spinoza,  and  Leibnitz 
is  their  rationalistic  foundation.  The  single  bond  that  gives 
a  unity  to  the  whole  extent  of  British  thought  is  the  constant 
and  final  reference  to  the  test  of  experience.  Historians  of 
philosophy  have  been  accustomed  to  regard  the  antithesis 
between  the  Rationalists  and  the  English  Empiricists  as  one 
of  extreme  importance,  for  it  well  illustrates  the  differences 
which  may  arise  from  a  fundamental  distinction  in  the  episte- 
mological  stand-point.  From  their  emphasis  on  the  reason  the 
Rationalists  developed  the  metaphysical  and  logical  side  of 
philosophy;  and  on  their  emphasis  of  the  value  of  experience 
the  English  thinkers  laid  the  foundation  of  a  scientific  psy- 
chology. And  when  the  two  currents  of  thought  united  in  the 

119 


120  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

genius  of  Kant,  each  contributed  its  own  necessary  element 
towards  the  realization  of  a  broad  and  symmetrical  philosophy. 
Narrowness  of  Early  Empiricism. — The  influence  of 
Hobbes  was  negative  rather  than  positive;  it  served  to  stimu- 
late and  antagonize,  but  failed  to  excite  the  interest  of  any 
who  might  have  been  capable  of  developing  more  fully  the 
suggestions  of  his  significant  but  rather  crude  materialism. 
When  similar  doctrines  eventually  sprung  up  all  over  Europe, 
they  could  be  traced  only  indirectly  to  Hobbes.  He  wrote  at 
a  time  when  the  attention  of  the  English  people  was  turned 
towards  political  changes  and  had  little  time  or  inclination  to 
analyze  and  estimate  a  new  system  of  metaphysics.  Eeligious 
principles  were  in  the  ascendency,  and  any  philosophy  that 
conflicted  with  the  dogmas  of  religion  as  a  whole  could  expect 
little  sympathy  from  either  Protestant  or  Catholic.  If  any 
philosophy  was  to  seriously  effect  the  trend  of  national  thought 
it  could  not  altogether  disregard  ancient  traditions,  nor,  on  the 
other  hand,  could  it  spring  from  distinctly  religious  motives. 
The  materialism  of  Hobbes  faded  away  because  it  tended 
towards  the  former  extreme.  On  the  contrary,  the  voluminous 
tracts  which  had  their  origin  in  the  religious  ferment  of  the 
seventeenth  century  also  failed  to  occasion  more  than  a  momen- 
tary interest.  The  middle  course,  free  from  the  narrowness 
of  either  extreme,  was  followed  by  John  Locke,  the  most  in- 
fluential of  the  English  Empiricists. 

JOHN  LOCKE. 
LIFE. 

It  was  a  coincidence  that  Locke,  the  broadest  of  English 
Empiricists,  was  born  in  the  same  year  as  Spinoza.  The  stand- 
points of  the  two  men  are  absolutely  different;  yet  there  are 
many  points  of  resemblance  in  their  philosophical  systems 
which  the  contrast  in  outward  form  seems  to  obscure. 

Youth. — John  Locke  was  born  on  August  29,  1632,  in 
Wrington,  a  small  village  in  the  north  of  Somersetshire.  His 


JOHN   LOCKE.  121 

father  was  a  practising  country  attorney,  from  whom  "he 
probably  derived,  if  not  his  earliest  instruction,  at  least  some 
of  his  earliest  influences  and  some  of  his  most  sterling  charac- 
teristics." 1 

Mr.  Fox-Browne,  in  his  Life  of  Locke,  quotes  a  letter  from 
Lady  Masham,  in  which  she  says,  "  From  Mr.  Locke  I  have 
often  heard  of  his  father,  that  he  was  a  man  of  parts.  Mr. 
Locke  never  mentioned  him  but  with  great  respect  and  affec- 
tion. His  father  used  a  conduct  towards  him  when  young  that 
he  often  spoke  of  afterwards  with  great  approbation.  It  was 
the  being  severe  to  him  by  keeping  him  in  much  awe  and  at  a 
distance  when  he  was  a  boy,  but  relaxing,  still  by  degrees,  of 
that  severity  as  he  grew  up  to  be  a  man,  till,  he  being  become 
capable  of  it,  he  lived  perfectly  with  him  as  a  friend." 

The  young  empiricist  spent  six  years  at  Westminster  School, 
where  he  developed  a  dislike  for  the  study  of  the  Greek  and 
Latin  classics.  At  twenty  years  of  age  he  entered  Christ 
Church,  Oxford,  where  the  course  of  study  convinced  him  of 
the  futility  of  the  scholastic  method  of  education.  This  is 
often  given  as  the  reason  why  he  failed  to  attain  any  promi- 
nence in  his  studies,  choosing  rather  to  develop  himself  by  an 
extensive  course  of  private  reading.  It  is  said  that  the  works 
of  Descartes  first  drew  his  attention  to  philosophy,  although 
he  never  evinced  very  much  sympathy  with  the  more  specu- 
lative parts  of  Cartesianism.  He  regularly  took  the  degrees 
of  Bachelor  and  Master  of  Arts,  and  in  1660  was  appointed 
Greek  lecturer  at  Christ  Church. 

Political  Career. — The  English  government  desired  to  es- 
tablish an  alliance  with  the  Elector  of  Brandenburg.  For  this 
purpose  Sir  Walter  Vane  was  sent  to  Cleves,  the  capital  of 
Brandenburg,  at  the  head  of  an  embassy  in  which  Locke  was 
appointed  secretary.  This  embassy  accomplished  nothing,  and 
returned  to  England  after  an  absence  of  three  months.  Locke 

*Life  of  Locke,  by  Thomas  Fowler. 


122  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

soon  after  settled  down  again  at  Oxford,  and  devoted  himself 
seriously  to  the  study  of  medicine,  the  profession  which  he 
decided  to  adopt.  About  1666  he  made  the  acquaintance  of 
Lord  Shaftesbury,  then  Lord  Ashley,  with  whom  he  remained 
in  close  intimacy  during  the  rest  of  Shaftesbury's  life.  He 
acted  as  physician  and  trusted  friend  to  the  Ashley  family. 
He  also  became  tutor  to  Shaftesbury's  only  son,  Anthony,  and 
was  finally  entrusted  with  the  delicate  task  of  selecting  a  wife 
for  his  young  pupil.  As  a  result  of  Locke's  inquiries  the 
young  Anthony  was  married  to  a  daughter  of  the  Earl  of  Rut- 
land, to  whom  was  born  Anthony,  third  Earl  of  Shaftesbury 
and  author  of  the  "  Characteristics/'  a  name  well  known  in 
the  history  of  English  ethics.  Locke  assisted  Ashley  and  the 
other  seven  "lords  proprietors"  in  the  drafting  of  a  constitu- 
tion for  the  colony  of  Carolina.  It  is  not  known  just  what 
part  Locke  had  in  the  preparation  of  these  articles,  but  it 
is  almost  certain  that  he  is  accountable  for  the  section  relative 
to  religious  freedom.  In  1672  Shaftesbury  became  Lord  High 
Chancellor  of  England  and  Locke  was  made  Secretary  of  Pre- 
sentations. During  the  following  year  his  patron  was  removed 
from  office,  an  event  which  caused  Locke  to  lose  the  Secretary- 
ship. Shortly  after  this  circumstance  Shaftesbury,  who  in  the 
meantime  had  been  raised  to  another  position  of  political  im- 
portance, was  compelled  to  flee  to  Holland,  owing  to  a  connec- 
tion with  an  unsuccessful  revolution  against  Charles.  Locke 
followed  the  fortunes  of  his  old  friend,  and  accordingly  he 
went  to  Holland  in  1683.  Here  he  remained  until  1689,  when 
the  new  political  conditions  rendered  his  return  to  England 
admissible.  William  of  Orange  offered  him  several  foreign 
positions  of  importance,  but  his  enfeebled  health  prevented 
their  acceptance. 

Declining  Years. — His  declining  years  were  spent  at  Gates, 
the  seat  of  Sir  Francis  Masham.  The  wife  of  Sir  Francis 
was  the  daughter  of  Ralph  Cudworth,  perhaps,  of  all  the  Eng- 
lish thinkers,  the  one  least  in  sympathy  with  the  philosophy 


JOHN   LOCKE.  123 

of  Locke.  In  the  genial  society  and  stanch  friendship  of  the 
Masham  family  Locke  had  the  opportunity  and  leisure  to  enjoy 
his  tastes.  He  was  constantly  surrounded  by  men  of  promi- 
nence in  politics  and  science,  among  whom  were  Boyle  and 
Newton.  Weekly  meetings  held  at  the  house  of  Lord  Pem- 
broke for  the  express  purpose  of  discussing  matters  of  scien- 
tific moment  were  a  source  of  constant  pleasure  to  Locke. 
Here  all  the  company  felt  at  liberty  to  express  their  unbiased 
views  on  whatever  topic  they  saw  fit.  "  These  conversations, 
'  undisturbed  by  such  as  could  not  bear  a  part  in  the  best  enter- 
tainment of  rational  minds,  free  discourse  concerning  useful 
truths/  were  a  source  of  great  enjoyment  to  Locke."  2  During 
the  last  few  years  of  his  life  he  interested  himself  in  various 
political  undertakings,  notably  in  the  opposition  to  the  depre- 
ciation of  the  currency,  and  again  in  behalf  of  the  English 
woollen  trade.  Unfortunately,  he  was  not  spared  the  unpleas- 
antness of  religious  controversy,  for  Stillingfleet,  Bishop  of 
Worcester,  provoked  an  extended  correspondence  regarding  the 
dogma  of  the  trinity.  On  October  28,  1704,  Locke  died,  having 
been  in  very  feeble  health  during  the  last  few  years  of  his  life. 
Literary  Labors. — Although  Locke  wrote  a  number  of  arti- 
cles on  various  scientific,  literary,  and  political  subjects  his 
importance  in  the  history  of  philosophy  rests  almost  entirely 
on  "An  Essay  concerning  Human  Understanding."  In  the 
epistle  to  the  reader,  prefixed  to  this  work,  Locke  gives  the 
following  account  of  its  origin:  "Were  it  fit  to  trouble  thee 
with  the  history  of  this  essay,  I  should  tell  thee,  that  five  or 
six  friends  meeting  at  my  chamber,  and  discoursing  on  a  sub- 
ject very  remote  from  this,  found  themselves  quickly  at  a 
stand,  by  the  difficulties  that  rose  on  every  side.  After  we  had 
awhile  puzzled  ourselves,  without  coming  any  nearer  a  resolu- 
tion of  those  doubts  which  perplexed  us,  it  came  into  my 
thoughts  that  we  took  a  wrong  course,  and  that  before  we  set 

2  Fowler's  Life  of  Locke. 


124  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

ourselves  upon  inquiries  of  that  nature,  it  was  necessary  to 
examine  our  own  abilities,  and  see  what  objects  our  under- 
standings were,  or  were  not,  fitted  to  deal  with.  This  I  pro- 
posed to  the  company,  who  all  readily  assented ;  and  thereupon 
it  was  agreed  that  this  should  be  our  first  inquiry."  3  This 
"  meeting,"  to  which  Locke  above  refers,  took  place  about  1671, 
but  the  "Essay"  itself  was  not  published  until  1690,  three 
years  after  the  appearance  of  Newton's  "  Principia"  These 
two  works  make  the  closing  years  of  the  seventeenth  century 
illustrious  in  the  history  of  intellectual  progress.  Locke's 
"Essay"  has  exerted  a  far  greater  influence  than  any  other 
English  philosophical  work;  and  the  "Principia"  written  by 
Locke's  friend,  has  established  the  foundations  of  modern 
mathematics  and  physics.  In  the  case  of  Locke  we  meet  with 
a  man  who  published  practically  nothing  during  his  early  life, 
but  after  finishing  and  publishing  his  "Essay"  he  seems  to 
have  acquired  a  certain  degree  of  self-reliance,  and  thereafter 
produced  works  on  almost  every  conceivable  topic.  The  publi- 
cation of  all  his  writings  is  confined  to  a  period  comprising  the 
last  fifteen  years  of  his  life,  during  which  the  comparative 
quiet  of  politics  allowed  him  ample  time  for  literary  labor. 
The  "Essay  concerning  Human  Understanding"  is  the  first 
of  a  long  series  of  English  works  on  introspective  psychology. 
The  philosophy  of  Locke  is  remarkable  above  all  else  for  an 
acuteness  of  observation  or  "  common  sense,"  as  it  has  been 
called.  Seldom  does  he  approach  the  subtility  or  profundity 
of  the  Continental  philosophers,  but  far  exceeds  them  all  in 
the  acuteness  of  psychological  analysis,  portions  of  Spinoza's 
"  Efhics"  alone  excepted.  His  works  are  all  intelligible  to  the 
ordinary  mind  and  are  altogether  devoid  of  any  arrogance  of 
bearing  or  of  expression.  The  clearness  and  freshness  of  treat- 
ment which  characterizes  all  his  writings  served  to  initiate  a 
wide-spread  interest  in  speculative  problems.  Yet  he  is  strictly 

8  Epistle  to  the  Reader,  Locke's  Works. 


JOHN   LOCKE.  125 

a  psychologist  and  epistemologist,  but  wrote  at  a  period  when 
the  limits  of  the  various  fields  of  philosophy  were  unrecognized. 
The  description  of  inner  experience  is  certainly  an  important 
element  in  truth,  and  Locke's  empiric  stand-point  turned  the 
course  of  philosophical  inquiries  into  new  and  fertile  fields. 

OBJECT  OF  LOCKE'S  PHILOSOPHY. 

Two  distinct  motives  seem  to  have  stimulated  the  production 
of  Locke's  "  Essay."  On  the  one  hand  there  was  a  practical 
demand,  in  answer  to  which  he  endeavored  to  account  for  the 
extent  and  limitation  of  human  knowledge.  Should  he  dis- 
cover "the  utmost  extent  of  its  tether,"  as  he  hoped;  he  felt 
that  it  would  furnish  some  ground  whereby  we  could  distin- 
guish between  the  possible  and  the  impossible.  This  desire  to 
define  the  limits  of  human  inquiry  was  closely  connected  with 
another  motive  which  had  considerable  influence  on  the  pro- 
duction of  the  "Essay."  Locke  favored  the  "Low  Church" 
party  of  England  against  a  twofold  opposition.  On  the  one 
side  was  the  "  High  Church,"  as  represented  by  such  men  as 
Stillingfleet  and  Lord,  and  on  the  other  the  atheistic  tendencies 
of  Hobbes  and  the  free-thinkers.  While  wishing  to  limit  the 
unsubstantiated  speculations  of  both  the  uncritical  clergy  and 
the  Continental  Kationalists,  he  sought  also  to  show  that  the 
human  understanding  cannot  exist  without  the  idea  of  God. 
The  discovery  of  the  limits  of  human  knowledge  and  the 
development  of  a  rational  conception  of  God  were  the  under- 
lying motives  in  the  philosophy  of  Locke. 

THE  SOURCE  OF  OUR  KNOWLEDGE. 

In  order  to  discover  the  limits  of  human  knowledge,  or  even 
to  discuss  knowledge  itself,  Locke  considers  it  necessary  to 
understand  the  source  of  all  our  ideas.  He  recognizes  but  two 
alternatives :  the  ideas  may  be  imprinted  upon  the  mind  from 
without,  or  else  they  may  arise  coincident  with  the  very  nature 
of  the  mind  itself. 


126  HISTORY   OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

Opposition  to  Innate  Ideas. — The  first  part  of  the 
"Essay"  is  concerned  with  the  refutation  of  the  latter  alter- 
native, thus  preparing  the  ground  for  a  more  ready  acceptance 
of  the  universality  of  the  former.  To  prove  that  there  is 
nothing  innate  in  the  mind,  he  observes  that  the  most  ele- 
mentary facts  of  knowledge,  those  which  most  readily  suggest 
common  assent,  are  either  the  fundamental  laws  of  thought  or 
the  principles  of  morality.  The  former  cannot  be  innate,  for 
they  are  consciously  recognized  only  in  a  comparatively  late 
period  of  one's  life.  A  child  is  aware  that  salt  is  not  sugar 
long  before  it  is  conscious  of  the  fundamental  law  of  thought 
that  "  a  thing  cannot  both  be  and  not  be."  From  similar  ob- 
servations Locke  finds  that  the  primary  principles  of  morality 
are  not  innate,  for  he  conceives  that  the  moral  commandments 
vary  with  the  race  and  the  individual;  they  are  the  imprints 
of  environments,  and  not  the  inborn  laws  of  God.  A  distinct 
code  of  morals  is  firmly  impressed  on  the  minds  of  all  children 
according  to  the  example  of  their  immediate  surroundings; 
and  when  the  child  later  reflects  on  these  principles,  they 
appear  to  have  been  present  from  birth. 

True  Source  of  Our  Ideas. — After  having,  to  his  own  sat- 
isfaction, disposed  of;  the  possibility  of  innate  ideas,  Locke 
believes  himself  able  to  declare  that  experience  is  the  only 
source  of  our  knowledge.  "  Our  observation  employed  either 
about  external  sensible  objects  or  about  the  internal  operations 
of  our  minds,  perceived  and  reflected  on  by  ourselves,  is  that 
which  supplies  our  understandings  with  all  the  materials  of 
thinking."  4  From  an  historical  point  of  view  the  ideas  arising 
from  mere  sensation  come  first,  while  those  proceeding  from 
reflection  are  later,  because  they  need  more  careful  attention 
than  the  former.  The  mind  is  supposed  to  be  at  first  like  a 
blank  sheet  of  white  paper,  upon  which  is  written  the  sensuous 
impressions  of  the  external  world.  These  impressions  are  fur- 
Locke's  Essay,  Book  II.,  Chapter  i.,  Sec.  2. 


f    UNIVERSITY    1 
JOHN  fcOCKE.  127 

ther  reshaped  by  the  reason  into  the  more  complex  and  abstract 
ideas  of  the  thinking  process. 

Epistemological  Foundation. — The  older  historians  of 
philosophy  have  been  accustomed  to  place  Locke  among  the 
empiricists,  and  the  general  attitude  of  much  that  he  has 
written  seems  to  warrant  such  a  view.  But  on  the  other  hand 
the  dual  source  of  our  knowledge  in  sensation  and  reflection 
seems  to  demand  a  little  hesitancy.  And  still  more  doubtful 
of  Locke's  empiricism  does  one  become  when  it  is  observed 
that  the  "operation  of  the  mind"  or  reason  occupies  a  very 
important  place.  True  empiricism,  in  its  logical  consequence, 
is  sensationalism,  a  doctrine  which  we  meet  in  Condillac,  a 
French  disciple  of  Locke.  But  Locke  himself  was  not  dis- 
tinctly aware  of  his  epistemological  position,  although  he  well 
represents  the  empirical  tendencies  of  his  race.  While  empha- 
sizing sensation  as  the  material  source  of  our  ideas,  he  gives  to 
the  reason  as  high  and  as  important  a  position  as  it  occupies 
in  the  system  of  any  rationalist.  Undoubtedly  the  empirical 
school  took  its  rise  from  the  impetus  which  Locke  gave  to 
philosophy,  yet  its  founder  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  strict 
empiricist. 

THE  NATURE  OF  OUR  IDEAS. 

Division  of  Ideas. — SIMPLE  IDEAS. — With  the  general 
source  of  our  knowledge  clearly  before  him,  Locke  proceeds  to 
divide  the  ideas  into  the  simple  and  the  complex,  the  former 
representing  the  primary  elements  of  the  latter.5  To  the 
former  group  he  attributes  four  distinct  classes :  those  simple 
ideas  which  are  acquired  through  a  single  sense,  those  from 
many  senses,  those  from  reflection  alone,  and,  finally,  those 
simple  ideas  which  have  their  source  in  both  sensation  and 
reflection.  As  an  example  of  a  simple  idea  of  a  single  sense 
may  be  mentioned  color,  sound,  or  heat.  The  ideas  of  "will- 

s  For  further  exposition,  see  the  opening  chapters  of  the  second  book 
of  Locke's  Essay. 


128  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

ing"  and  "  thinking,"  which  correspond  to  the  "  infinite  modes" 
of  Spinoza,  are  regarded  by  Locke  as  simple  ideas  derived 
from  reflection  alone.  While  pleasure,  existence,  or  unity  are 
examples  of  simple  ideas  derived  from  both  sensation  and 
reflection. 

COMPLEX  IDEAS. — The  simple  ideas  are  the  original  atoms 
out  of  which  the  mind  constructs  an  almost  endless  variety  of 
complex  ideas.  In  this  transition  from  the  simple  to  the  com- 
plex, Locke  mentions  six  psychological  processes  or  operations 
which  the  mind  employs.  And  it  is  this  emphasis  on  the  re- 
arranging and  remoulding  of  our  ideas  which  warrants  the 
rationalistic  interpretation  of  Locke  earlier  mentioned.  While 
in  the  reception  of  the  simple  ideas  we  may  fail  to  perceive 
any  direct  activity  of  the  mind  itself,  yet  when  Locke  proceeds 
to  the  treatment  of  the  complex  ideas  one  is  made  to  feel  that 
the  mind  is  no  longer  a  passive  participant  in  the  thinking 
process,  but  rather  an  active  and  indispensable  agent.  The 
first  of  these  psychological  activities  by  which  the  mind  trans- 
forms the  simple  ideas  into  the  complex  is  perception.  This 
faculty  was  regarded  by  Locke  as  the  distinguishing  trait  of 
the  animal  kingdom,  and  is  best  defined  as  the  conscious  recog- 
nition of  the  simple  idea.  Beyond  the  mere  perception,  the 
mind  is  able  to  compare  its  various  ideas,  either  by  directly 
contemplating  them  together  or  else  by  the  retention  in  the 
memory  of  previous  impressions.  In  this  act  of  comparison 
it  is  necessary  for  the  mind  to  clearly  discern  both  the  super- 
ficial and  the  subtile  distinctions  between  its  various  ideas. 
And  it  is  the  development  of  this  faculty  of  discernment  which 
makes  possible  clearness  and  accuracy  of  thought.  The  fifth 
faculty  of  the  mind  to  which  Locke  draws  our  attention  is  the 
compounding  or  uniting  of  the  simpler  mental  states  into  the 
more  complex  ones.  The  last  and  by  far  the  most  highly 
evolved  process  of  the  mind  is  that  of  abstraction.  This  is  the 
ability  to  form  general  concepts  by  the  observation  of  numerous 
particular  cases.  By  this  process  of  abstraction  one  is  able  to 


JOHN  LOCKE.  129 

define  a  common  characteristic,  present  in  all  members  of  a 
class,  and  to  distinguish  the  class  by  this  common  quality. 
Thus  we  are  able  to  abstract  from  many  objects,  such  as  chalk, 
snow,  and  milk,  a  common  color  which  we  call  whiteness ;  and 
we  define  as  a  class  all  objects  to  which  this  general  idea  is 
capable  of  application.  Locke  thought  that  he  had  discovered 
in  the  power  of  abstraction  a  means  for  determining  the  rela- 
tive capacity  of  the  intellect.  Brutes  were  totally  devoid  of 
this  faculty,  while  it  is  barely  visible  in  idiots,  savages,  and 
children.  Whether  any  one  does  possess  this  power  has  been 
doubted,  and  the  question  will  be  more  fully  considered  in  the 
study  of  Berkeley  and  Hume.  At  least  modern  anthropology 
seems  to  countenance  Locke's  theory,  as  far  as  abstract  names 
are  concerned.  The  inhabitants  of  Tierra  del  Fuego,  one  of 
the  five  lowest  of  natural  races,  are  said  to  possess  a  language 
so  lacking  in  general  terms  that  thirty  thousand  separate  words 
are  required,  and  the  people  are  incapable  of  counting  beyond 
three. 

DIVISION  OF  COMPLEX  IDEAS. — In  the  foregoing  exposition 
it  is  observable  that  Locke  is  chiefly  concerned  with  intro- 
spective psychology.  He  approaches  the  problems  of  his  philos- 
ophy by  inquiring  into  the  genetic  source  of  the  states  of  the 
mind,  by  asking  what  we  observe  to  be  true  rather  than  what 
must  or  ought  to  be  true.  But  once  his  primary  analysis  of 
the  mind  was  firmly  established,  Locke  felt  it  necessary  for 
him  to  consider  more  speculative  issues.  He  divided  all  com- 
plex ideas,  of  whatever  origin  or  character,  into  three  distinct 
groups.  The  most  fundamental,  from  a  metaphysical  stand- 
point, was  the  group  of  substances  which  comprehends  all  com- 
plex ideas  referrible  to  "  distinct  particular  things  subsisting 
by  themselves,  in  which  the  supposed  or  confused  idea  of 
Substance,  such  as  it  is,  is  always  the  first  and  chief."  *  As  an 
example  of  a  substance  take  the  metal  lead.  This  includes  in 

•  Locke  s  Essay,  Book  II.,  Chapter  xii. 
9 


130  HISTORY   OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

a  single  complex  idea  many  simple  ideas, — as  color,  weight, 
hardness,  and  fusibility, — combined  with  the  concept  of  a  tan- 
gible objective  something  or  substance.  The  second  division 
or  group  of  complex  ideas  was  called  modes.  This  was  in- 
tended to  include  all  those  ideas  which  refer  to  states  of 
"  affections"  of  the  more  fundamental  substances.  Thus  such 
ideas  as  are  conveyed  by  the  words  gratitude,  wonder,  hatred 
are  not  completely  intelligible  in  themselves,  but  require  the 
logical  premise  of  some  substance, — such  as  a  man  or  a  child. 
And  still  again  there  are  classes  of  complex  ideas  which  are 
called  relations  and  arise  from  the  comparison  of  several  ideas. 
All  complex  ideas  of  relation  are  derived  from  the  comparison 
of  other  ideas.  They  are  generally  brief  methods  of  explaining 
comparison. 

Substance. — In  the  foregoing  definitions  one  can  clearly 
perceive  the  difference  of  meaning  which  the  English  mind 
attributes  to  terms  already  used  in  the  more  speculative  sys- 
tems of  the  Continent.  To  the  Eationalists,  as  well  as  to 
Locke  himself,  Substance  meant  the  metaphysical  premise  upon 
which  a  philosophy  of  the  external  world  must  ultimately  rest ; 
that  which  is  absolutely  real  in  itself.  The  speculative  trend 
of  the  Cartesians  led  them  to  connect  this  primal  reality  with 
God,  Nature,  or  activity ;  the  simple  "  common  sense"  of 
Locke  led  him  to  interpret  Substance  as  the  separate  objects 
of  a  material,  external  world  of  sense.  This  fundamental  dif- 
ference in  the  use  of  a  single  term  well  illustrates  the  distinc- 
tion between  the  two  attributes  of  thought.  The  followers  of 
Descartes  sought  a  unity  beyond  the  apprehension  of  the 
human  mind,  and  from  the  hypothetical  character  of  its  defini- 
tion they  were  able  to  regard  it  as  the  logical  essence  of  the 
Universe.  Locke,  on  the  contrary,  founded  the  base  of  his 
metaphysics  on  what  is  looked  upon  as  real  by  all, — the  objects 
of  sense.  But  when  he  came  to  define  Substance  more  defi- 
nitely, he  found  himself  at  a  loss  for  adequate  expression.  He 
employed  the  term  very  much  in  the  scholastic  sense  of  a 


JOHN   LOCKE.  131 

"  central  something"  which  upholds  the  various  attributes  or 
qualities, — "  the  supposed  but  unknown  support  of  those  quali- 
ties we  find  existing,  which  we  imagine  cannot  subsist,  (  sine 
re  substante/  without  something  to  support  them."  7  This 
doctrine  of  Substance  is  a  much  more  important  element  in  the 
system  of  Locke  than  might  appear  at  first  sight.  Not  only 
does  it  exhibit  the  contrast  between  his  own  position  and  that 
of  the  Continental  thinkers,  as  well  as  suggesting  a  distinct 
problem  for  Berkeley  and  Hume,  but  it  also  supplies  a  ground 
for  Locke's  whole  attitude  towards  the  limits  of  scientific 
inquiry.  The  contrast  which  he  makes  between  Substance  and 
the  perceivable  qualities  which  inhere  in  it,  is  a  contrast  which 
separates  the  absolutely  real  world — an  understanding  of  which 
would  require  a  knowledge  of  this  unknowable  substance — and 
the  world  of  scientific  phenomena  presented  to  us  by  the  senses 
and  intelligibly  through  experiment. 

Primary  and  Secondary  Qualities. — In  this  connection 
Locke  is  careful  to  distinguish  between  primary  and  secondary 
qualities.  The  former  produces  the  ideas  of  extension,  solidity, 
or  figure;  ideas  which  are  empirically  real  in  the  object, — that 
is,  independent  of  human  apprehension.  The  secondary  quali- 
ties, on t  the  other  hand,  such  as  the  colors,  tastes,  or  sounds, 
are  to  be  distinguished  from  the  primary  in  that  they  are 
directly  dependent  on  the  senses  and  possess  no  real  existence 
in  the  object  itself.  This  distinction  between  primary  and 
secondary  qualities  is  closely  connected  with  Locke's  doctrine 
of  Substance  and  is  of  great  importance  in  subsequent  British 
thought.  It  forms  the  central  distinction  between  Locke  on 
the  one  side  and  Berkeley  and  Hume  on  the  other. 

Modes. — In  his  treatment  of  modes  Locke  feels  more  con- 
fidence in  himself  than  he  shows  in  the  exposition  of  his  un- 
known substance.  For  convenience  he  divides  all  modes  into 
the  simple  and  the  mixed,  according  to  the  complexity  of  the 

7  Locke's  Essay,  Book  II.,  Chapter  xxiii.,  Sec.  2. 


.  \ 
1  1 
'  ' 


132  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

ideas  from  which  they  spring.  The  ideas  of  space  and  time  are 
the  more  important  simple  modes,  and  both  take  their  origin 
from  rejection.  The  modal  concept  of  space  results  from  a 
reflection  on  the  objects  of  sight  and  touch;  tinie  upon  the 
succession  of  our__ideas.  We  construct  the  concepts  of  an 
infinite  space  and  an  infinite  time,  by  observing  that  a  single 
portion  of  either  really  requires  its  own  limitlessness.  As 
examples  of  mixed  or  more  complex  modes  Locke  instances  the 
ideas  implied  by  obligation,  drunkenness,  falsehood  :  "  they  are 
not  looked  upon  to  be  characteristical  of  any  real  beings  that 
have  a  steady  existence,  but  scattered  and  independent  ideas 
put  together  by  the  mind."  8 

Relation  of  Personal  Identity.  —  The  third  and  last  group 
of  complex  ideas  arise  from  the  relations  between  the  various 
states  of  mind.  These  are  almost  innumerable  in  kind  and 
character,  one  of  the  most  interesting  of  which  is  that  of  iden- 
tity. Locke  meets  the  old  problem  of  what  constitutes  personal 
identity  or  sameness  of  a  human  being  by  the  simple  criterion 
of  consciousness.  The  personality  of  a  man  is  the  same  so  long 
as  the  consciousness  of  past  states  of  thought  and  action  remain 
unaltered,  but  the  continuation  of  the  same  body  does  not  make 
the  same  person  unless  there  is  a  continuity  of  consciousness. 

KNOWLEDGE. 

After  having  treated  of  the  various  elements  which  enter 
into  our  thought,  Locke  in  the  fourth  book  of  his  "Essay" 
considers  himself  ready  to  deal  with  the  problem  of  knowledge 
itself.  He  formally  defines  knowledge  as  "the  perception  of 
the  connection  and  agreement,  or  disagreement  and  repug- 
nancy  of  any  of  our  ideas,"  9  and  describes  three  distinct  grades 
or  degrees.  We  have  immediate  or  intuitive  knowledge  of  the 
existence  of  the  self  ;  demonstrative  knowledge  of  the  existence 

8  Locke's  Essay,  Book  II.,  Chapter  xxii.,  Sec.  1. 
•Ibid.,  Book  IV.,  Chapter  i.,  Sec.  2. 


JOHN  LOCKE.  133 

of  God ;  and,  finally,  a  sensitive  knowledge  of  the  existence  of 
all  other  objective  things.  As  regards  our  belief  in  the  exist- 
ence of  the  self,  Locke  follows  the  "  cogito  ergo  sum"  of  Des- 
cartes, but  is  inclined  to  feel  little  confidence  in  the  ontological 
proof  of  God.  In  its  stead  Locke  substitutes  the  proof  from 
firstcause,  generally  known  as  the  cosmological.  The  exist- 
ence of  the  individual  self,  of  which  we  have  intuitive  cer- 
tainty, when  analyzed  really  requires  the  existence  of  something 
beyond;  this  in  its  turn  demands  something  further,  and  so 
on  to  the  necessary  existence  of  a  First- Cause.  The  present 
reality  of  the  self  therefore  requires  the  omniscient  and  eternal 
Being  of  God  as  its  ultimate  cause. 

Limits  of  Knowledge. — Two  motives,  we  earlier  observed, 
were  prominent  in  Locke's  mind  during  the  production  of  his 
"Essay."  By  this  causal  proof  for  the  existence  of  God  he 
felt  himself  able  to  oppose  any  atheistic  tendencies  which  might 
emanate  from  the  Hobbesian  metaphysics,  but  there  still  re- 
mained the  desire  to  define  the  limits  and  capabilities  of  the 
human  intellect.  From  his  empirical  presuppositions  Locke 
felt  sure  that  our  ideas  are  necessarily  resjricied  to  .,the.  posgeiL 
and  scope  of  the  senses;  while  he  further  observed  that  our 
knowledge,  which  can  only  arise  from  the  limited  perceptions 
of  a  few  ideas^has  even  a  rnpre  restricted  fieid  than  the  sense- 
perceptions  themselves.  The  position  of  Locke  in  this  regard 
is  quite  remarkable.  At  the  same  time  that  he  restricts  our 
knowledge  to  a  range  even  narrower  than  the  senses,  he  is  care- 
ful to  point  out  that  the  existence  of  God  is  quite  as  infallible 
as  the  demonstrable  principles  of  mathematics,  and  that  "  the 
bare  testimony  of  Revelation  is  the  highest  certainty." 10 
Locke  here  takes  a  stand  which  is  in  marked  contrast  to  the 
position  later  developed  by  Kant  in  his  "  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason" 

Science. — The  pursuit  of  scientific  inquiry  is  ultimately 

10  Locke's  Essay,  Book  IV.,  Chapter  xvi.,  Sec.  14. 


134  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

limited  to  the  ideas  obtained  from  the  senses.  But  even  this 
range  cannot  give  us  incontestable  scientific  knowledge.  There 
are  two  types  of  condition  which  limit  the  discovery  of  abso- 
lute knowledge,  the  one  due  to  the  unknowable  character  of 
substance,  the  other  to  the  limits_of  the  human  intellect.  By 
no  means  whatsoever  can  the  mind  penetrate  to  the  absolute 
understanding  of  substance,  the  real  essence  of  things  behind 
the  field  of  sense-impression.  The  true  and  incontestable  pro- 
cesses of  nature,  which  neither  the  sense  can  appreciate  or  the 
reason  comprehend,  are  forever  hidden  from  our  inquiry.  It  is 
true  that  the  knowledge  of  the  sequence  of  events,  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  qualities  and  accidents  of  substance,  lead  us  to  a 
belief  in  the  high  probability  of  the  truth  of  our  observation, 
but  an  absolute  certainty  of  the  laws  of  nature  could  arise  only 
from  a  perfect  knowledge  of  substance. 

The  second  restriction  to  the  pursuit  of  scientific  knowledge 
is  concerned  with  the  imperfections  of  sense  and  reason. 
Truth  consists  in  the  correct  union  of  ideas,  according  to  their 
agreement  with  things.  But  this  test  is  very  limited  in  its 
application.  Owing  to  the  paucity  of  clear  and  distinct  ideas 
of  spirit  we  can  have  no  .true  scientific  knowledge  of  spiritual 
things,  and  from  the  lack  of  knowledge  of  atoms  we  can  have 
no  perfect  knowledge  of  bodies,  since  we  cannot  know  the 
nature  of  their  finest  parts.  And,  furthermore,  when  we  come 
to  the  imperfection  of  our  reason  we  find  other  difficulties. 
The  syllogism  of  logic  often  leads  to  error,  while  all  processes 
of  reasoning  abound  in  false  assumptions  and  undefined 
terms. 

ETHICS. 

Basis  of  Morality. — Before  closing  this  account  of  a  few 
of  the  important  and  influential  doctrines  of  Locke  it  may  be 
well  to  refer  briefly  to  his  attitude  towards  some  of  the  contro- 
verted questions  of  ethics.  He  regards  the  relation  between 
God  and  man  as  the  basis  for  the  principles  of  morality;  the 
moral  law  as  the  expression  of  His  divine  will.  At  the  same 


JOHN   LOCKE.  135 

time  Locke  believes  that  these  basal  principles,  such  as  justice 
or  benevolence,  are  capable  of  demonstration,11  and  looks  to  the 
future  to  establish  them  with  the  same  certainty  as  is  attached 
to  the  theorems  of  Euclid.  His  advocacy  of  the  objectivity  of 
the  ethical  principles  is  countenanced  by  his  doctrine  of  moral 
control. 

Theory  of  the  Will. — The  idea  of  power,  which  we  obtain 
from  observing  the  various  changes  in  our  own  consciousness, — 
especially  the  flow  of  thought, — served  to  supply  Locke  with  a 
ground  for  his  theory  of  the  will.  He  is  very  careful  at  this 
point  to  avoid  a  confusion  of  terms, — a  merit  which  is  not  uni- 
versal among  writers  on  this  subject.  Liberty  is  as  little  ap- 
plicable to  the  will  as  squareness  is  to  virtue;  it  is  simply  the 
power  to  follow  one's  own  mental  preference  and  is  opposed  to 
external  restraint.  Thus  we  arc  not  at  liberty  "to  lay  by 
the  idea  of  pain,"  nor  is  the  prisoner  at  liberty  to  escape.  The 
will,  on  the  contrary,  is  another  power  of  having  a  preference, 
and  its  nature  is  in  no  wise  affected  by  the  liberty  to  realize 
this  preference  in  the  external  world.  The  deepest  spring  of 
action  is,  in  Locke's  mind,  the  desire  for  happiness.  It  is  the 
universal  and  primary  sanction  that  ultimately  shapes  the 
course  of  the  will.  This  constant  desire  for  happiness  results 
in  a  certain  uneasiness  or  discontent  with  the  present  surround- 
ings; and  this  in  turn  stimulates  the  judgment  of  the  mind 
to  decide  upon  some  action.  The  decisions  of  the  judgment 
with  regard  to  a  pleasurable  action  are  the  final  motives  which 
definitely  determine  the  will.  This  view  of  the  volition  is 
accepted  by  practically  all  the  later  English  thinkers  and 
bears  a  close  resemblance  to  the  naturalistic  determination  of 
Spinoza. 

LOCKE'S  INFLUENCE. 

Comparison  with  Leibnitz. — In  the  philosophy  of  Locke 
one  feels  the  presence  of  a  mind  of  the  first  order,  with  a  dis- 

11  Locke's  Essay,  Book  IV.,  Chapter  iii.,  Sec.  18. 


136  HISTORY   OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

tinct  power  of  introspective  analysis.  In  comparison  with  Leib- 
nitz we  observe  a  sharp  distinction  in  mental  force.  Both  pos- 
sessed intellects  of  the  first  order,  but  totally  different  in  char- 
acter. Leibnitz  was  quick,  energetic,  strikingly  original,  and 
often  superficial;  Locke  was  slow,  tenacious  of  purpose,  ana- 
lytical, but  not  remarkably  original.  If  Locke  had  written  at 
a  more  recent  date  he  would  be  regarded  chiefly  as  an  episte- 
mologist  and  psychologist.  His  method  aims  to  describe  rather 
than  explain,  to  analyze  rather  than  synthesize.  Even  when 
he  approaches  more  profound  questions  of  metaphysics  the 
same  reliance  on  inner  experience  is  observable.  In  the  causal 
demonstration  of  God's  existence  he  utterly  fails  to  reach  the 
standards  of  logical  power  already  attained  by  the  Schoolmen 
and  the  Continental  philosophers.  His  influence,  however, 
came  at  the  time  it  was  most  needed,  and  served  to  show  the 
necessity  for  an  introspective  element  in  all  philosophy. 

Extent  of  Influence. — This  influence  of  Locke's  stand-point 
and  method,  truly  one  of  the  prime  factors  of  modern  phi- 
losophy, extended  all  over  the  learned  world.  It  occasioned 
a  long  and  systematic  refutation  on  the  part  of  Leibnitz  and 
involved  its  author  in  controversies  with  the  High-Church- 
men and  the  "  Free-thinkers."  On  its  positive  side  Locke's 
philosophy  served  to  excite  no  less  than  four  separate  and  dis- 
tinctly original  tendencies.  These  sprung  from  certain  funda- 
mental conceptions  developed  in  the  "Essay'9  each  of  which^ 
like  the  imperfect  Socratic  schools  of  Greece,  laid  stress  on 
but  a  single  aspect  of  the  master's  thought.  By  far  the  most 
profound  of  these  tendencies,  and  the  one  which  forms  the 
logical  completion  of  Locke's  work,  is  traceable  in  Berkeley 
and  Hume.  It  emphasizes  the  subjective  side  of  Locke's 
empirico-rationalism.  It  narrows  the  epistemological  dualism 
of  sensation  and  reflection  to  the  mere  reception  of  ideas,  and 
avoids  the  inconsistency  of  substance  and  primary  qualities. 
Directly  opposite  to  the  school  of  Berkeley  and  Hume  was  the 
pure  empiricism,  or  sensationalism,  which  found  a  welcome  in 


FRENCH   SENSATIONALISM.  137 

France.  This  discarded  the  reflective  element  in  knowledge 
and  sought  to  prove  that  organs  of  sense  supplied  the  only  and 
sufficient  approach  to  truth. 

Besides  these  two  tendencies  which  are  concerned  with 
Locke's  epistemology  we  can  trace  a  religious  and  an  ethical 
movement  due  to  the  further  growth  of  the  empirical  principles 
and  likewise  to  the  subsequent  reaction  against  them.  The 
former  sought  to  develop  a  natural  as  opposed  to  a  revealed 
religion,  placing  its  reliance  on  the  belief  that  the  existence  of 
God  was  capable  of  a  rational  demonstration.  The  ethical 
influence  of  Locke  was  rather  indecisive  in  character  and 
somewhat  difficult  to  trace.  It  appeared  most  clearly  in  the 
general  demand  for  a  rational  ground  of  morality, — the  ten- 
dency to  develop  the  concept  of  goodness  from  experience  and 
reason  rather  than  from  religious  emotions.  Owing  to  the  ex- 
treme importance  of  Berkeley  and  Hume,  we  shall  leave  the 
development  of  their  relations  to  Locke  until  the  following 
chapter ;  but  the  sensationalistic,  the  religious,  and  the  ethical 
tendencies  may  be  advantageously  considered  here. 

FRENCH   SENSATIONALISM. 

The  variety  and  many-sidedness  of  the  Lockeian  philosophy 
was  the  source  of  a  most  exacting  sensationalism  and  mate- 
rialism. It  had  its  centre  of  activity  in  France,  where  the 
whole  eighteenth  century  is  characterized  by  a  revolt  against 
religious  traditions.  Montesquieu  and  Voltaire  are  generally 
accredited  with  the  introduction  of  English  philosophy  among 
the  French.  Their  importance  lies  more  in  popularizing  the 
empiric  philosophy  than  in  the  development  of  anything  new. 
The  reputation  of  Montesquieu  rests  chiefly  upon  his  achieve- 
ments in  political  science  rather  than  in  speculative  philosophy. 
His  classic  work,  "  The  Spirit  of  the  Laws'' 12  contains  a  favor- 
able estimation  of  Locke's  interpretation  of  the  English  con- 

"L'Esprit  des  Lois. 


138  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

stitution.  Voltaire,  equally  well  known  in  general  literature, 
opposed  the  optimistic  teleology  of  Leibnitz  and  sought  to  in- 
troduce to  his  countrymen  the  naturalism  of  Locke  and 
Newton. 

By  far  the  most  profound  of  the  French  sensationalists  was 
Etienne  Bonnot  de  Condillac.  He  was  born  in  1715,  lived  the 
peaceful  and  unassuming  life  of  a  student  and  thinker,  and 
died  in  1780.  Although  he  was  Abbot  of  Mureaux  and  some- 
time tutor  to  the  grandson  of  Louis  XV.,  his  philosophy  is 
remarkably  free  from  sectarianism.  In  his  attempt  to  estab- 
lish an  uncompromising  sensationalism  by  the  inductive 
method,  Condillac  admits  a  thorough  empiricism  in  his  general 
attitude  towards  the  source  of  our  ideas.  While  Locke  proves 
to  his  own  satisfaction  that  knowledge  originates  from  sensa- 
tion and  reflection  by  precluding  all  other  possibilities,  Condil- 
lac believes  that  he  is  able  to  definitely  trace  all  our  ideas  to 
sensation  alone.  His  method  for  accomplishing  this  result  is 
unique  and  interesting.  Starting  with  a  statue  which  is  en- 
dowed only  with  the  sense  of  smell,13  Condillac  imagines  va- 
rious odors  presented  to  it,  each  of  which  leaves  a  faint  mem- 
ory image.  By  mere  passive  attention  to  these  memory  images 
and  the  recognition  of  sameness  and  identity,  there  arises  the 
power  of  reflection,  the  reason,  and  the  will.  And  further, 
should  the  other  four  senses  be  added  to  that  of  smell,  one  after 
the  other,  the  statue  would  gradually  acquire  all  the  psychic 
processes  which  we  associate  with  the  human  mind.  On  the 
same  grounds  Condillac  believes  the  self-conscious  and  per- 
sonal identity  of  the  subject  to  consist  in  the  mass  of  sensory 
impressions  united  by  the  memory. 

Materialism. — In  the  strict  sense  of  the  word  Condillac  was 
not  a  materialist,  for  his  sensations  are  mere  subjective  states 


18 "  Les  connoissance  de  notre  statue  borages  au  sens  de  1'odorat,  ne 
peuvent  s'Stendre  qu'  a  des  odeurs." — Traits  des  Sensations,  Part  I., 
Chapter  i. 


FRENCH   SENSATIONALISM.  139 

and  give  us  no  ground  for  a  belief  in  the  absolute  reality  of  the 
material  world.  But  the  transition  from  a  pure  sensationalism 
to  pure  materialism  is  by  no  means  difficult.  It  has  been  ob- 
served that  a  sensationalistic  epistemology  always  accompanies 
a  materialistic  metaphysic;  so  that  Condillac  readily  found 
disciples  who  did  not  hesitate  to  combine  the  two  stand-points. 
To  mention  all  the  French  materialists  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury would  be  a  difficult  task.  Certain  among  them,  notably 
Diderot,  La  Mettrie,  D'Holbach,  and  Cabanis,  developed  the 
most  perfect  materialism  that  the  history  of  philosophy  has 
ever  seen. 

Denis  Diderot { the  first  notable  name  among  the  French  ma- 
terialist^, was  educated  under  church  influences,  but  the  study 
of  the  English  empiricists  gradually  turned  his  mind  to  a 
materialism  in  which  God  was  only  a  name  without  definite 
place.  The  name  of  Diderot  is  universally  associated  with  the 
French  Encyclopaedia  14  of  which  he  was  the  editor-in-chief. 
This  work  was  published  in  twenty-eight  volumes  during  the 
years  following  1750.  It  had  as  its  covert  intention  the  under- 
mining of  traditional  authority  by  the  sceptical  question, 
"  Que  sais  je  ?"  It  answered  this  inquiry  by  exhibiting  the  un- 
certainty and  limited  range  of  the  achievements  which  the 
human  intellect  had  thus  far  accomplished.  But  the  barrier 
between  scepticism  and  materialistic  atheism  is  very  easily  trav- 
ersed, and  the  step  had  already  been  taken  by  the  French 
physician,  Julien  Offray  de  la  Jtfe^rjp* 

He  was  born  in  1709,  and  early  obtained  considerable  promi- 
nence as  a  physician,  but  was  expelled  from  France  and  Hol- 
land on  account  of  atheistic  writings.  He  found  a  protector  in 
the  person  of  Frederick  the  Great,  of  Prussia,  at  whose  court  he 
died  in  1751. 

La  Mettrie  remarks  in  the  preliminary  observations  to  his 
"  (Euvres  Philosoptyques"  that  he  "  does  not  pretend  to  favor 

14  Encyclop6die-Dictionnaire  Kaissonng. 


140  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

atheism,  but  only  examine  it  as  a  disinterested  physician/'  but 
nevertheless  he  suggests  at  the  same  time  that  a  society  com- 
posed of  atheists  would  be  more  successful  than  one  in  which 
the  recognized  laws  of  morality  were  superimposed  on  religious 
fanaticism.  A  classic  work  of  La  Mettrie,  "  The  Man- 
Machine"  15  attempts  to  prove  that  all  the  characteristics  which 
we  associate  with  mental  processes,  the  ideals  of  religion, 
beauty,  and  justice,  result  from  the  peculiar  conditions  of  the 
structure  of  the  human  organism,  and  are  referable  in  all  cases 
to  move^e^tswithin  tjierj^ervoussjstejn.  It  is  only  the  physi- 
cian who  is  the  philosopher,  because  he  alone  understands  the 
structure  and  laws  of  this  very  complicated  piece  of  mechanism, 
and  these  laws,  when  thoroughly  understood,  will  be  able  to 
explain  every  characteristic  of  man.  The  physical  state  of 
sleep  or  the  presence  of  opium  is  able  to  change  entirely  the 
mental  life, — "  a  sleeping  soldier  is  oblivious  of  the  bomb  that 
is  ready  to  tear  him  to  pieces."  The  diet  of  men  affects  their 
mental  processes, — rare  meat  makes  a  race  fierce  and  indocile; 
rage,  moral  degeneracy,  and  madness  are  the  immediate  effects 
of  hunger.  And  since  the  organic  functions  comprise  the  en- 
tire being  of  man,  the  purpose  of  life  is  the  gratification  of 
those  pleasures  which  arise  from  bodily  activities.  The  pleas- 
ures of  the  mind,  however,  because  they  are  more  permanent 
and  less  restricted,  are  superior  to  the  sensuous  pleasures. 

The  fact  that  man  like  other  natural  formations  is  a  function 
of  matter  and  its  laws  was  further  reinforced  by  observations 
among  the  lower  animals.  We  are  able  to  find  very  little  differ- 
ence except  in  complexity  of  structure  between  the  brain  of  man 
and  the  brain  of  the  monkey.  La  Mettrie  even  advances  the 
supposition  that  a  monkey  could  be  so  trained  as  to  become 
a  "  perfect  man,  a  little  polite  fellow,  with  as  many  parts  and 
members  as  ourselves,  able  to  think  and  profit  by  his  educa- 
tion." This  materialist  praises  Descartes  for  interpreting  the 

"  L'Homme  Machine. 


FRENCH   SENSATIONALISM.  141 

brute  as  an  automaton,  since  this  is  the  first  step  towards  the 
recognition  of  universal  mechanism  throughout  the  whole  or- 
ganic world ;  "  that  man  is  a  machine  and  that  there  is  in  the 
universe  only  a  single  substance  differently  modified."  : 

D'Holpjfacfi,  in  his  classic  work  on  the  "  System  of  Nature" 
("  Systeme  de  la  Nature"),  endeavors  to  show  that  the  valuable 
moral  ideals  are  supported  by  materialism,  although  the  exist- 
ence of  God,  the  soul,  and  the  possibility  of  human  immortality 
cannot  be  recognized.    D'Holbach  believes  that  the  happiness  ^ 
derived  from  helping  mankind  is  greater  than  would  be  realized/ 
from  the  reward  of  Heaven. 

Pierre  J^^Cab^is,  a  prominent  physician  of  the  French 
revoIutTonary  period,  was  the  last  and  perhaps  the  most  in- 
fluential of  the  eighteenth-century  materialists.  He  defined  the 
psychical  processes  as  simply  the  phenomena  of  the  nervous 
system,  stimulated  by  the  sensuous  impressions  from  the  real 
physical  world.  "Vivre,  c'est  sentir."  To  live  is  to  sense.17 
He  describes  the  various  emotions  and  mental  states  as  the 
direct  product  of  nervous  activities  arising  from  mechanical 
and  chemical  changes.  Influencing  the  formation  of  ideas  and 
moral  affections  there  are  six  primary  conditions, — age,  sex, 
temperament,  disease,  habit,  and  climate.17  Controlled  by  the 
same  physiological  laws,  thought  emanates  from  the  brain  in 
the  same  manner  that  bile  is  secreted  by  the  liver. 

Stand-point  of  Materialism. — As  a  whole  the  materialists 
stand  for  a  perfectly  definite  attitude  of  mind.  They  are  im- 
pressed with  the  universal  mechanism  to  be  observed  wherever 
they  conduct  their  scientific  studies,  and  can  discover  no  suf- 
ficient reason  to  prevent  the  application  of  mechanical  laws  to 
human  values.  They  are  monists  in  the  strictest  sense  of  the 
word, — matter  with  its  motion  is  the  primordial  Substance,  the 


16 "  Que  1'Homme  est  une  Machine ;   &  qu'il  n'y  a  dans  tout  PUnivers 
qu'une  seule  substance  diversement  modifiee." — L'Homme  Machine. 
17 "  Rapports  du  Physique  et  du  Moral  de  1'Homme." 


142  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

self -existent  and  eternally  immutable.  In  the  earlier  instance 
of  Hobbes  materialism  was  just  emerging  from  its  scholastic 
background,  Substance  still  retained  its  early  significance  of  a 
metaphysical  substratum,  while  matter  was  its  physical  repre- 
sentation. But  the  French  materialists  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury had  withdrawn  from  all  traditions  which  could  in  any  wise 
modify  the  extent  of  their  position.  Imbued  with  the  scien- 
tific enthusiasm  which  was  developing  about  them,  they  sought 
to  go  even  to  the  utmost  limits  of  possible  science  and  define 
a  speculative  structure  in  accordance  with  which  experimental 
science  might  some  time  accomplish  its  ideal,  the  reduction  of 
life  to  mechanical  terms.  In  its  deeper  meaning  their  phi- 
losophy teaches  that  the  science  of  mind  is  somehow  a  part  of 
the  whole  science  of  nature,  a  conclusion  with  which  all  schools 
of  monism  are  in  agreement. 

THE  DEISTS. 

The  second  philosophical  movement  which  arose  from  the 
influence  of  Locke  has  been  called  English  Deism.  No  exact 
and  definite  characterization  of  this  tendency  of  thought  is 
possible;  those  men  who  are  generally  associated  with  it  seem 
devoid  of  any  striking  similarity  in  the  result  of  their  reflec- 
tions. It  is  more  a  religi^us^attitude  than  a  metaphysical 
qfifoonl-  more  a  synthesiscJ  faith  and  reason  than  an  analysis 
of  either.  In  general  English  Deism  is  a  sort  of  philosophical 
religion, — a  pantheism  personified.  Locke  had  taught  that  the 
existence  of  God  was  the  necessary  presupposition  following 
directly  from  the  existence  of  the  self.  If  this  stand-point  is 
granted,  then  reason  has  successfully  invaded  the  field  of  re- 
vealed religion;  a  dogma  of  faith  has  been  approved  by  the 
laws  of  the  intellect.  Once  this  signal  step  is  taken,  all  re- 
ligion and  Christianity  must  be  subjected  to  reason,  a  task 
which  the  Deists  attempted  with  all  the  hope  of  success.  In 
brief,  Deism  appears  as  the  advocate  of  natural  religion.  It 
exhorts  men  to  see  God  in  all  natural  processes,  and  to  recognize 


J 

LOCKE'S   INFLUENCE  ON   ETHICS.  143 

His  voice  in  the  conscience.  In  connection  with  this  move- 
ment two  names  are  worthy  of  mention,  Toland.  anjiiChut&. 

John  Toland  was  born  in  1670  and  was  educated  as  an  Irish 
Catholic  "  in  the  grossest  superstition  and  idolatry/' 18  In  his 
chief  work,  (f  Christianity  not  Mysterious"  which  appeared  six 
years  after  Locke's  "  Essay,"  Toland  endeavors  to  examine,  in 
the  light  of  reason,  the  various  tenets  of  simple  Christianity 
undefiled  by  ecclesiastical  interpretation.  In  the  process  of  this 
investigation  he  is  able  to  discover  nothing  which  contradicts 
the  reason,  nor  which  is  mysterious  or  occult ;  and  although  it 
contains  many  things  that  our  narrow  intellects  cannot  ade- 
quately grasp,  there  is  nothing  in  the  religion  of  Christ  which 
absolutely  contradicts  the  laws  of  human  thought. 

The  moral  side  of  Deism  is  brought  into  the  foreground  by 
the  teachings  of  a  very  interesting  character  named  Thomas 
Chubb,  a  poor  tallow-chandler.  Like  Jacob  Boehme,  he  sought 
to  interpret  Christianity  to  the  lowest  classes  of  society.  In  his 
teachings  Chubb  recognizes  the  reason  as  a  divine  gift,  by 
which  God  enables  man  to  worship  him  through  a  life  of  simple 
morality.  Love,  usefulness,  and  purity  are  the  only  means  to 
grace, — happiness  in  this  world  and  in  the  life  to  come. 

LOCKE'S   INFLUENCE   ON   ETHICS. 

The  simple  faith  of  Chubb,  exhorting  all  mankind  to  a  life 
of  rational  morality,  forms  a  fitting  transition  from  the  Deisti- 
cal  to  the  Ethical  influence  of  Locke.  The  French  thinkers 
have  always  exhibited  a  remarkable  power  of  logical  analysis, 
often  developing  into  materialism  and  scepticism;  the  Ger- 
mans have  evinced  an  aptitude  for  profound  and  subtile  meta- 
physics, for  originality  and  systematization.  But  to  the  British 
thinkers  belongs  the  credit  of  founding  and  developing  modern 
psychology  and  ethics.  The  "  English  moralists"  from  Hobbes 
to  Green  represent  a  movement  of  modern  thought  of  the  first 

18  Preface  to  "  Christianity  not  Mysterious." 


144  HISTORY  -OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

importance.     A  single  central  theme  runs  through  the  whole 
of  English  ethics,  —  the  discovery  of  the 


morality,  —  and  each  of  the  eignTe^th-celitury  moralists  con- 
tributes his  own  solution  to  this  problem.  The  mention  of 
three  names  will  be  sufficient  to  distinguish  the  general  char- 
acter of  these  writings  :  Clarke,  who  emphasized  the  reasonable- 
ness of  morality  ;  Shajtesbury  its  beauty  ;  and  Butler  its  origin 
in  the  conscience. 

Samuel  Clarke,  born  1675,  in  Norwich,  England,  and  edu- 
cated at  the  University  of  Cambridge,  supplements  Locke's 
belief  in  the  rational  foundations  of  morality  by  a  rationalistic 
metaphysic.  He  maintains  the  supposition  that  certain  neces- 
sary and  eternal  laws  control  the  relations  between  every  ele- 
ment of  the  world.  Each  thing  possesses  an  individuality  of 
its  own,  by  virtue  of  which  there  is  a  unique  relation  with 
every  other  thing.  In  some  cases  these  relations  express  a  cer- 
tain degree  of  adaptability  or  fitness  of  relation  between  things  ; 
while  again  they  indicate  an  heterogeneity  and  antipathy.  In 
Clarke's  method  of  proving  these  contentions  he  follows  the 
"more  geometrico"  of  Spinoza,  and  arrives  at  the  conclusion 
of  a  dynamic  world,  not  unlike  that  of  Leibnitz.  In  his  moral 
philosophy  Clarke  is  as  rationalistic  as  his  Continental  masters, 
only  he  emphasizes  Locke's  statement,  "Moral  principles  are 
capable  of  demonstration."  Goodness  is  the  expression  of  the 
fitting  and  appropriate  relations  between  things,  while  the  term 
evil  indicates  those  relations  of  the  opposite  type.  Clarke  ob- 
serves in  the  first  "Discourse  concerning  Natural  and  Revealed 
Religion/'  —  one  of  the  most  remarkable  portrayals  in  English 
of  a  rationalistic  ethics  and  theology,  —  "Also  that,  from  the 
different  Eelations  of  different  Persons  one  to  another,  there 
necessarily  arises  a  Fitness  or  Unfitness  of  certain  Manners  of 
Behavior  of  some  Persons  towards  others:  Is  as  manifest,  as 
that  the  Properties  which  flow  from  the  Essences  of  different 
mathematical  Figures,  have  different  Congruities  or  Incon- 
gruities between  themselves/'  Among  these  fitting  moral  rela- 


LOCKE'S   INFLUENCE   ON   ETHICS.  145 

tions  are  to  be  mentioned  the  worship  of  God,  the  exercise  of 
charity,  honesty,  and  mercy.    Virtue  COTusktsi^oj^ 
the  inf  allib^^ason,  the^t^^^S^ons  Eetwee^magia^d^his 
envifonment  ;  "  ana  j^thT^sCTvaJp.^^^''^^?  immutable  laws 


oTTirtueTs  to  be  found  the  only  true  happiness.  There  are, 
however,  many  men  who  are  too  weak  to  be  guided  by  the  rea- 
sonableness of  virtue  and  who  need  an  artificial  stimulus.  To 
this  latter  class  Clarke  regards  revelation  and  the  promise  of 
future  reward  to  be  of  especial  help.  In  recognizing  the  neces- 
sary existence  of  both  good  and  evil  relations  Clarke  mediates 
between  the  uncritical  optimism  of  the  last  quarter  of  the  seven- 
teenth century  —  Leibnitz  and  Shaftesbury  —  and  the  pessimistic 
tinge  to  be  found  at  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century,  — 
Swift  and  Mandeville  19  and  Voltaire. 

Perhaps  the  most  widely  read  of  the  English  moralists  was 
Anthony  Cooper,  third  Earl  of  Shaftesbury,  earlier  referred  to 
in  connecton  with  the  life  of  Locke.  He  differed  far  more 
with  Locke  than  did  Clarke,  and  lacked  the  speculative  ability 
of  the  latter.  In  fact  it  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  Shaftes- 
bury had  little  foundation  for  his  ethics,  a  circumstance  which 
by  no  means  benefited  the  latter.  Throughout  all  nature  he 
saw,  like  the  ancient  Stoics,  a  harmony  and  simplicity  of  law 
and  order,  which  led  him  to  interpret  the  Universe  in  terms  of 
beauty.  Man's  relation  to  this  natural  beauty  was  reflected  in 
the  "  moral  sense,"  a  faculty  of  the  mind  as  original  in  charac- 
ter as  the  reason  or  the  feeling.  The  operation  of  the  "  moral 
sense"  is  immediate  and  altogether  separable  from  the  decision 
of  the  intellect.  Through  the  demands  of  this  immediate  fac- 
ulty mankind  is  led  towards  benevolence  and  altruism.  Happi- 

19  "  So  vice  is  beneficial  found 

When  it's  by  Justice  lopt  and  bound."  — 

Grumbling  Hive,  or  Knaves  turn'd  Honest. 

Mandeville  contended  that  social  prosperity  and  racial  progress  are 
promoted  by  the  struggles  and  vices  of  the  individuals  rather  than  by 
the  exercise  or  Christian  virtues. 

10 


146  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

ness,  contentment,  and  prosperity  result  only  from  a  life  of  ser- 
vice to  others.  Shaftesbury  introduces  a  line  of  ethical  thought 
in  his  writings  which  runs  in  opposition  to  Hobbes,  Locke,  and 
Clarke;  it  shows  a  distinct  reaction  against  the  assurance  in 
reason  so  generally  prominent  in  the  opposite  empirical  school  of 
ethics.  All  these  intuitional  writers  seek  to  give  the  moral  law 
a  foundation  above  and  beyond  the  sense  or  the  reason,  either 
in  an  innate  faculty  of  the  soul  or  in  the  direct  voice  of  God. 
The  two  attitudes,  the  empirical  and  the  intuitional,  were 
somewhat  united  by  Bishop  Butler,  Dean  of  St.  Paul's.  On  the 
one  hand  he  admits  the  operation  of  a  certain  complex  moral 
faculty,  the  intuitional  sense;  while  on  the  other  hand  the 
exercise  of  the  conscience  is  possible  only  through  the  reason.  It 
will  be  observed  that  Shaftesbury  gives  us  no  analysis  of  the 
"moral  sense."  This  is  attempted  by  Joseph  Butler,  the 
author  of  "  The  Analogy  of  Religion,  Natural  and  Revealed, 
to  the  Constitution  and  Course  of  Nature/'  one  of  the  classical 
religious  works  of  English  thought.  Butler  finds  that  Nature 
acts  according  to  conceptual  processes,  which  find  a  correspond- 
ence in  the  moral  life  of  man.  Certain  activities  are  "appro- 
priate to  the  constitution  of  Nature,  and  likewise  certain 
actions  are  proper  according  to  the  characteristics  and  organiza- 
tion of  man.  But  just  as  there  is  a  reason  which  guides  our 
thoughts  towards  the  ends  of  truth,  so  also  there  is  a  conscience, 
the  observance  of  which  leads  men  to  virtue  and  happiness. 
This  conscience  is  the  source  of  moral  activity,  and  exerts  its 
authority  in  view  of  the  ends  best  adapted  to  the  progress  of 
mankind  and  the  purposes  of  God.  The  lowest  element  ob- 
servable in  the  conscience  is  concerned  with  the  lower  pas- 
sions, which  arouse  the  interests  of  self-love,  and  very  often 
moral  relations  towards  our  fellows.  Benevolence  is  a  higher 
stage  of  the  conscience,  while  in  its  complete  expression  Butler 
finds  both  an  intuitional  and  a  rational  significance;  the  for- 
mer is  the  foundation  of  morality,  while  the  latter  is  the  means 
of  its  expression. 


THE   EMPIRICAL  STAND-POINT.  147 

THE   EMPIRICAL  STAND-POINT. 

The  tendencies  of  empirical  thought,  first  consciously  for- 
mulated by  Bacon  and  Hobbes,  were  fully  developed  by  Locke 
and  his  immediate  followers.  The  points  wherein  the  English 
philosophy  of  this  period  differ  from  the  rationalistic  tenden- 
cies of  earlier  and  later  Continental  thought  are  very  difficult 
to  appreciate  in  other  than  the  most  general  terms.  The  dif- 
ference lies  more  in  stand-ppi^t.  than  jg jrwntppt^-  mnrp  in  the 
a ttjtude,  towards  thjjjEOjld  than  in  the  deeper  results  of  philo- 
sophical inquiry.  This  is  a  fact  which  is  quite  remarkable 
and  inclined  to  be  overlooked.  It  is  certainly  true  that  the 
outward  form,  the  language,  the  methods,  and  even  the  imme- 
diate conclusions  of  the  empirical  philosophy  stands  in  marked 
contrast  to  the  similar  characteristics  of  the  Continental  think- 
ers. Yet  this  notable  contrast  does  not  penetrate  to  the  central 
meaning  of  the  two  schools.  Beneath  the  form  of  expression, 
the  accidents  of  temperament  and  environment,  beneath  even 
the  conclusions  of  the  individual  man  himself,  there  is  discerni- 
ble a  similarity  in  the  deeper  values  of  life  and  the  world  which 
is  appreciable  only  in  terms  of  the  unity  of  human  thought. 
Specific  illustrations  of  this  abound.  Locke  accepted  the 
aphorism  of  self -existence  as  the  most  certain  of  all  knowledge, 
while  Descartes  on  the  other  hand  found  it  necessary  to  give 
certainty  to  the  facts  of  experience,  in  order  to  go  beyond  the 
abstractions  of  the  self  and  God ;  and  in  fact  when  stripped  of 
external  peculiarities  it  will  be  found  that  the  reason  and  ex- 
perience are  of  about  the  same  relative  importance  in  the  sys- 
tems of  the  founders  of  empiricism  and  rationalism.  Descartes, 
Spinoza,  and  Locke  are  equally  acute  in  their  psychological 
analysis  of  human  emotion,  and  with  each  the  demonstration 
of  moral  truths  is  the  foundation  for  ethics.  The  materialists 
are  monists ;  when  strictly  analyzed  their  "  matter"  differs  but 
little  from  Spinoza's  "  Substance."  Clarke  denounces  Spinoza 
as  an  atheist,  yet  he  observes  his  geometrical  method  and  estab- 


148  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

lishes  the  existence  and  attributes  of  God  by  the  same  rational- 
istic evidence  earlier  employed  in  the  "  Ethica"  Leibnitz  had 
his  correspondences  in  the  empirical  school;  a  metaphysical 
atomism  was  taught  by  many  scientists  of  the  times;  "Pre- 
established  Harmony"  often  appears  under  other  names  among 
the  Encyclopedists,  the  Deists,  and  the  earlier  English 
moralists. 

When  we  have  thus  discovered  a  fundamental  unity  between 
rationalist  and  empiricist  we  have  by  no  means  exhausted  the 
topic.  While  emphasizing  the  unity  of  thought  which  pervades 
the  whole  pre-Kantean  philosophy,  it  must  not  be  understood 
that  the  profound  difference  of  stand-point  between  rationalism 
and  empiricism  can  be  for  a  moment  neglected.  These  internal 
similarities  are  discovered  only  in  the  deeper  recesses  of  the 
various  systems  of  philosophy;  they  would  probably  have  been 
repudiated  by  the  philosophers  themselves.  As  a  matter  of 
considerable  consequence  empiricism  does  define  a  type  of 
thought  peculiarly  its  own,  but  its  individuality  consists  in  its 
attitude  towards  the  world,  its  method  of  approach  to  the  prob- 
lem of  philosophy  rather  than  in  its  ultimate  conclusions.  Em- 
piricism is  psychological,  it  is  metaphysical  only  so  far  as  it 
is  epistemological ;  rationalism  is  distinctly  metaphysical,  logi- 
cal, and  critical.  Eeduced  to  its  simplest  terms,  empiricism 
has  always  meant  nothing  else  than  a  thorough  reliance  on  the 
given  facts  of  experience,  on  the  psychological  data  of  the  men- 
tal image,  "  This  is  my  fact."  It  approaches  philosophy  with 
a  metaphysic  already  formed, — the  fact  has  a  reality  which 
cannot  be  further  analyzed, — and  proceeds  to  show  wherein 
many  facts  of  this  description  are  able  to  give  a  world  consistent 
with  itself  and  full  of  ethical  and  religious  values.  It  makes 
no  covert  assumptions  nor  does  it  struggle  to  give  the  facts  a 
mysterious  significance  unrepresented  in  their  bare  "given- 
ness."  It  is  advanced  by  philosophers  who  are  by  temperament 
active  and  eminently  practical,  generally  by  men  who  have 
attained  some  distinction  in  the  law  or  in  politics.  Empiricism 


THE   EMPIRICAL  STAND-POINT.  149 

does  not  disregard  the  reason  any  more  than  rationalism  can 
afford  to  disregard  experience.  Experience  and  reason  are 
equally  essential  to  both  methods,  the  former  is  always  the  con- 
tent and  starting-point,  the  latter  is  necessarily  the  form  or 
instrument.  The  distinction  of  schools  results  from  the  differ- 
ence of  approach.  Eationalism  compels  reason  to  prosecute  an 
examination  into  itself  before  considering  the  data  of  sense, 
whereas  empiricism  first  requires  the  reason  to  analyze  expe- 
rience. 


CHAPTEK   V. 

BERKELEY  AND    HUME. 

METAPHYSICAL  INFLUENCE  OF  LOCKE. 

IN  the  previous  chapter  it  was  our  purpose  to  review  briefly 
the  life  and  philosophy  of  John  Locke,  with  special  reference 
to  those  problems  of  marked  significance  to  the  history  of 
philosophy.  With  this  latter  point  in  mind  we  were  able  to 
discover  a  metaphysical,  an  epistemological,  a  religious,  and 
an  ethical  movement  traceable  directly  to  the  influence  of 
Locke.  By  brief  summaries  of  the  epistemological,  religious, 
and  ethical  movements  we  traced  the  reception  of  Locke's 
philosophy  in  French  Materialism,  English  Deism,  and  Eng- 
lish Ethics,  but  at  the  same  time  we  reserved  to  this  chapter 
a  consideration  of  his  influence  on  the  more  speculative  phases 
of  British  thought.  Berkeley  and  Hume  are  generally  asso- 
ciated with  the  metaphysical  development  of  Locke's  philoso- 
phy, although  in  reality  they  only  carry  his  dualistic  episte- 
mology  of  sensation  and  reflection  to  its  logical  conclusion. 

GEORGE  BERKELEY. 
LIFE. 

Youth. — George  Berkeley,  one  of  the  most  profound  think- 
ers of  the  English  race,  was  born  in  the  County  of  Kilkenny, 
Ireland,  on  March  12,  1685.  His  father  is  said  to  have  been 
of  English  descent,  while  his  mother  was  undoubtedly  Irish. 
Little  is  known  of  his  early  life  other  than  a  short  entry  in  his 
"  Commonplace  Book"  " I  was  distrustful  at  eight  years  old." 
At  eleven  years  of  age  he  entered  the  Kilkenny  school,  where 
Swift  had  previously  studied.  Four  years  later  we  find  him  at 
Trinity  College,  Dublin,  already  deeply  engaged  with  the  prob- 
lems of  reality.  At  this  period  of  his  life  Locke's  influence 
160 


GEORGE   BERKELEY.  151 

was  distinctly  felt  by  Berkeley,  and  he  read,  to  a  certain 
extent,  the  works  of  Descartes,  Malebranche,  Aristotle,  and 
perhaps  some  of  the  Schoolmen  and  the  Church  Fathers.  In 
Berkeley's  philosophical  diary  or  "Commonplace  Boole,"  contin- 
ued in  the  years  immediately  following  his  graduation,  are  found 
entries  which  indicate  the  character  of  his  reading  and  at  the 
same  time  mark  the  progress  of  his  own  conceptions.  Berke- 
ley continued  his  connection  with  the  University  after  taking 
the  Masters'  degree  and  prepared  at  this  time  two  short  works 
of  extreme  importance.  The  first  of  these,  "  An  Essay  towards 
a  New  Theory  of  Vision"  was  published  in  1709.  This  was 
followed  the  next  year  by  "  A  Treatise  concerning  the  Princi- 
ples of  Human  Knowledge"  The  former  leads  up  to  Berke- 
ley's own  metaphysic,  by  a  psychological  analysis  of  the  sense 
of  vision,  while  the  "Principles"  define  his  own  position  and 
explain  his  objections  to  Locke  and  the  materialists.  His 
complete  stand-point  is  more  fully  developed  in  later  dia- 
logues, but  in  these  two  essays,  written  when  Berkeley  was 
only  twenty-five  years  of  age,  one  observes  a  certain  freshness, 
vigor,  and  self-assertion  which  is  less  prominent  in  his  later 
writings. 

Travels. — About  two  years  after  the  publication  of  the 
"Principles"  Berkeley  removed  to  London  with  the  manu- 
script of  another  exposition  of  his  theory  of  the  world,  written 
in  the  form  of  a  dialogue.  Here  he  met  some  of  that  brilliant 
company  that  made  the  opening  years  of  the  eighteenth  century 
the  Augustan  age  in  English  literature, — Swift,  Pope,  Addi- 
son,  Steele,  Johnson,  Clarke,  Pembroke,  and  Collins.  In  the 
society  of  these  men,  Berkeley,  whose  personal  charm  won  him 
favor  in  every  direction,  spent  nearly  a  year.  It  is  interesting 
to  note  that  his  "idealistic  system  of  the  world"  excited  a 
wide-spread  interest.  Swift  writes,  "  That  Mr.  Berkeley  is  a 
very  ingenious  man,  and  a  great  philosopher,  and  I  have  men- 
tioned him  to  all  the  ministers,  and  have  given  them  some 
of  his  writings,  and  I  will  favor  him  as  much  as  I  can." 


152  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

Towards  the  close  of  1713  Berkeley  decided  to  accompany  Lord 
Peterborough  on  an  embassy  to  Sicily.  The  journey  gave  him 
the  opportunity  to  visit  France  and  Italy.  There  is  a  tradition 
extant  that  while  in  Paris  Berkeley  called  on  Father  Male- 
branche  in  his  cell  and  that  a  heated  discussion  which  arose 
during  the  interview  was  the  "occasional  cause"  of  the  aged 
Father's  death. 

Bermuda  College. — About  1721  Berkeley  conceived  the 
project  of  founding  a  college  in  the  Island  of  Bermuda  for 
the  education  of  savages,  and  where  he  might  prove  to  be  "  the 
mean  instrument  of  doing  great  good  to  mankind."  However 
hypothetical  and  impractical  such  a  scheme  might  appear,  the 
most  sincere  praise  is  due  to  Berkeley  for  his  energy  and  self- 
sacrifice.  At  a  time  when  the  "  South  Sea  Catastrophe"  was 
in  everybody's  mind,  the  fact  that  unaided,  except  by  his  own 
attractive  personality,  Berkeley  was  able  to  arouse  interest  on 
every  side,  obtain  private  subscriptions  amounting  to  five  thou- 
sand pounds,  to  which  Walpole  contributed,  with  an  almost 
unanimous  grant  of  twenty  thousand  pounds  from  Parliament, 
attests  more  than  words  to  his  self-denial,  earnestness,  and  sin- 
gle-heartedness. Late  in  1728  Berkeley  sailed  for  America,  and 
arrived  at  Newport,  Ehode  Island,  early  in  the  following  year. 
He  purchased  a  farm,  about  three  miles  from  the  town,  where 
he  built  a  large  house  in  the  prevailing  colonial  style.  Here  at 
"  Whitehall,"  as  he  called  his  home,  he  composed  the  longest  of 
his  philosophical  dialogues,  "  Alciphron,  or  the  Minute  Philoso- 
pher." Here  he  welcomed  Jonathan  Edwards, — one  of  the 
very  few  illustrious  names  which  America  has  added  to  the 
History  of  Philosophy, — together  with  many  missionaries  and 
professors  from  Harvard  and  Yale.  During  the  life  of  retire- 
ment at  Whitehall  his  fortunes  at  the  English  court  were  not 
altogether  prospering.  The  promised  grant  from  the  Crown 
had  not  been  paid,  and  Walpole  intimated  that  Berkeley  had 
better  come  home  and  not  wait  for  it.  Thus  was  quenched  the 
hopes  and  labors  of  many  years.  Fraser  fittingly  remarks,  in 


GEORGE   BERKELEY.  153 

his  Sketch  of  Berkeley's  life,  that  "  Of  all  who  have  ever  landed 
on  the  American  shore,  none  was  ever  moved  by  a  purer  and 
more  self-sacrificing  spirit.  America  still  acknowledges  that 
by  Berkeley's  visit  on  this  mission  it  has  been  invested  with 
the  halo  of  an  illustrious  name,  and  associated  with  religious 
devotion  to  a  magnificent  ideal,  even  if  it  was  sought  to  be 
realized  by  impractical  means."  * 

Last  Years. — After  Berkeley's  return  to  England  he  re- 
ceived the  appointment  to  the  Bishopric  of  Cloyne,  in  South 
Ireland,  a  position  which  he  held  until  the  last  years  of  his 
life.  Here,  in  a  secluded  corner  of  Ireland,  Berkeley  was 
occupied  with  the  various  needs  of  his  diocese,  with  literary 
work,  and  with  "Tar-water."  This  latter  was  a  preparation 
which  Berkeley,  with  his  accustomed  enthusiasm,  conceived  to 
be  the  cure  for  every  ailment.  The  news  of  this  remarkable 
discovery  the  good  Bishop  of  Cloyne  spread  far  and  near. 
"  Siris,  a  Chain  of  Philosophical  Reflexions  and  Inquiries  con- 
cerning the  Virtues  of  Tar-Water  and  Divers  other  Subjects 
Connected  Together  and  Arising  One  from  Another"  is  the 
title  of  a  work  prepared  during  this  period.  "  Divers  other 
subjects"  comprise  nearly  everything  in  heaven  and  earth,  and 
well  illustrates  the  breadth  of  Berkeley's  interests.  About  the 
middle  of  1752  he  moved  from  Cloyne  to  Oxford,  in  order  to 
be  near  his  son,  who  was  about  to  enter  the  University.  He 
writes  at  this  time  that  he  no  longer  felt  the  same  enthusiasm 
and  interest  in  things  that  characterized  his  earlier  years,  and 
that  he  was  becoming  very  infirm  in  health.  On  January  14, 
1753,  Berkeley  died,  having  been  at  Oxford  but  a  few  months. 

STAND-POINT. 

In  the  whole  range  of  British  thinkers  there  have  been  few 
who  have  exhibited  greater  breadth  of  mind  or  power  of  philo- 
sophical expression.  The  difficulty  with  his  metaphysics  arises, 

1  Berkeley's  Works,  edited  by  A.  C.  Fraser,  Vol.  I.  lix. 


154  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

not  from  narrowness  of  scope,  but  rather  from  over-concentra- 
tion. He  focused  his  mind  upon  a  single  aspect  of  truth,  and 
from  that  very  intensity  he  was  able  to  produce  a  lasting 
influence  on  Modern  Philosophy.  Had  he  been  unbiassed  by 
religious  motives  and  conceptions  he  might  have  anticipated 
more  fully  the  German  Transcendentalists  and  effected  a  wider 
and  deeper  impression  on  the  current  of  the  world's  thought. 

Epistemology. — Like  all  British  thinkers,  Berkeley  erects 
his  metaphysic  upon  a  perfectly  definite  epistemological  basis. 
In  such  a  light  he  is  a  strict  empiricist;  reality  is  reached 
through  the  senses,  for  they  are  the  only  means  which  we  pos- 
sess for  the  attainment  of  knowledge.  "But  whoever  reads 
my  book  with  attention,"  he  writes  in  a  letter,  "  will  see  that 
I  question  not  the  existence  of  anything  we  perceive  by  our 
senses."  Instead  of  following  Locke  in  his  division  of  the 
ultimate  origin  of  human  knowledge  into  sensation  and  reflec- 
tion, Berkeley  conceived  only  of  the  n  Hi  mate,  existence  of 
ideas  ^  from  sensation,  although  he  recognizes  the  less  vivid 
ideas  of  memory__and  imagination.,..  In  this  he  was  perfectly 
consistent  with  the  epistemological  demands  of  Locke,  only 
the  meaning  of  sense  and  sensation  was  subjected  to  an  alto- 
gether new  interpretation.  This  involved  a  new  metaphysical 
background,  which  constitutes  the  true  advance  from  Locke 
to  Berkeley. 

After  he  has  defined  the  source  of  our  ideas,  Berkeley  is  next 
concerned  with  their  jeality.  He  recognizes  that  the  deter- 
mination of  reality  requires  a  certain  principle  or  criterion 
which  shall  be  in  every  respect  authoritative.  In  discovering 
this  principle  we  have  the  transition  from  his  empirical  episte- 
mology  to  his  spiritualistic  metaphysics.  For  if  we  can  assert 
that  the  data  of  sense  is  the  only  source  of  knowledge,  then  the 
^jOWfT  of  perception  is  itself  the  absolute  criterion  of  knowl- 
edge. In  other  words,  Berkeley,  with  perfect  consistency, 
draws  the  conclusion  that  if  all  we  can  know  are  sense-percep- 
tions, they  themselves  comprise  all  that  can  be  regarded  as 


GEORGE   BERKELEY.  155 


real.2    This  wasjiis  initial  pmdplefcij^  ^absolute  criterion.,  jpf 

reality  and  the  metaphysical  foundation  of  his  philosophy. 

METAPHYSICS. 

Ideas.  —  We  may  now  remove  the  epistemological  staging      , 
which  enabled  us  to  discover  the  principle  "  esseffl  per  dpi''    /^»-c 
perception  constitutes^  existence,  and  consider  what  kind  of  a/ 
universe  is  presented  to  our  view.    The  world  of  mere  percep-     V 
tion  amounts  to  nothing  more  than  a  constant  and  uninter-      / 
mpted  ffaylitfl^jYfy(7j?    occurring  either  singly  or  in  groups. 
Thus  the  blueness  of  the  sky  is  an  idea  which  is  excited  by 
simply  looking  up,  and  if  the  mere  sensation  alone  is  observed, 
it  constitutes  a  single  disconnected  idea.    But  this  pure  imme- 
diacy of  blueness  is  seldom  attained.    Our  ideas  generally  come 
to  us  in  groups,  —  that  is,  the  color  idea  of  yellowness,  the 
touch  idea  of  smoothness,  the  odor  idea  of  fragrance,  and  the 
taste  idea  of  sweetness,  all  jnjji  iiifa^^ffi,jjBu,flW>  concept  of 
apple.     The  same  color  idea  may  occur  in  connection  with 
various  other  groups  of  ideas,  but  we  employ  the  term  "  apple" 
only  when  a  certain  definite  and  predictable  combination  of 
the  various  sense  ideas  is  before  us.    And  presently  we  shall 
see  that  this  unique  combination  of  sense  ideas  is  called  a 
"  thing"  and  can  be  given  juj  absolute  reality  beyond  the  per- 
c^mng^ubject,  ojSfy  as,  a^  matter  ^of  convenieiice. 

SUBJECTIVITY  OF  IDEAS  OF  DISTANCE.  —  Before  we  have  suf- 
ficient data  to  inquire  into  the  truth  of  the  belief  in  the  object- 
ive existence  of  the  "thing,"  it  is  necessary  to  know  the  real 
nature  of  these  ideas  of  which  it  seems  to  be  composed.  Per- 
haps the  most  vivid  class  of  ideas  are  those  which  we  receive 
through  the  sense  of  sight;  therefore,  before  extending  any 
theory  to  all  the  ideas,  it  may  be  well  to  begin  our  examination 
with  those  derived  from  sight  alone.  One  of  the  most  impres- 
sive features  of  a  landscape  is  the  apparent  unequal  distances 

a  "  Ease  $  percipi."  —  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  Sec.  3. 


156  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

of  the  various  objects  seen.  Berkeley,  in  his  "  Essay  towards  a 
New  Theory  of  Vision"  suMects  thi&  idea  of  distance  to  careful 
scrutmy,  and  reaches  the  conclusion  that  we  are  confronted 
with  one  of  two  attitudes.  Either , .the  distance  of  the  various 
objects  is  given jfoecjj^Jjy  the^yjpiiil  jmage,  or  else  it  is  in 
some  way  inferred  from  the  configurations  and^Lmngs.  This 
latter  alternative,  which  was" tfieone  advocated  by  Berkeley, 
may  appear  in  a  clearer  light  if  we  examine  the  relation 
between  sight  and  touch.  If  we  suppose  a  man  endowed  only 
with  the  'sense  of  sight,  he  would  believe  every  part  of  the  whole 
landscape  to  be  equally  distant  from  his  eye;  the  haze  about 
the  remote  hills,  instead  of  conveying  to  him  the  idea  of  dis- 
tance, would  simply  indicate  natural  conditions;  the  sheep 
at  the  farther  end  of  the  pasture  would  appear  to  him  as 
belonging  to  a  smaller  species  than  those  in  the  foreground. 
Now  let  this  same  man  be  given  the  power  of  touch  or  move- 
ment, and  he  would  soon  discover  that  the  blue  haze  indicated 
remoteness,  that  lines  receding  from  the  eye  appear  to  con- 
verge, and  that  the  smaller  sheep  are  more  distant,  but  are 
really  of  the  same  size  as  those  in  the  foreground.  He  would 
soon  learn  from  detailed  observation  to  interpret,  without  the 
necessity  of  touch  or  movement,  the  signs  and  appearances 
which  indicate  variations  in  distances.  From  this  analysis 
Berkeley  concludes  that  the  idea  of  distance  is  really  injerreji 
tythemmd  from  certain  appearances,  and  not  given  by  dirjct 
perception,  as  was  presumed  before  his  time. 

SIHBJECTIVITY  OF  ALL  OUR  IDEAS. — In  his  "New  Theory  of 
Vision''  Berkeley  had  proved  to  his  own  satisfaction  that  the 
third  dimension  of  space  was  an  idea  originating  in  the  mind ; 
that  the  mere  sight  of  converging  lines  contains  in  itself  no 
idea  of  distance.  This  was  only  the  first  step  towards  a  much 
broader  generalization  which  he  developed  the  following  year 
in  the  "  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge."  In  order  to  prove 
the  subjectivity^  or.,  spiritual  origin  of  all  our  ideas,  he  refers  \ 
back  to  Locke's  division  of  qualities  or  ideas  into  primary  and 


GEORGE   BERKELEY.  157 

secondary.  It  will  be  remembered  that  the  former  comprised 
solidity,  extension,  figure,  number,  and  motion, — qualities 
which  had  a  perfectly  valid  existence  in  the  external  world. 
The  secondary  qualities  included  all  the  direct  sense  ideas, 
such  as  color,  taste,  or  odor,  and  differed  from  the  former 
group  in  that  they  were  real  only  to  the  percipient  subject. 
Berkeley  is  in  perfect  agreement  with  the  latter  part  of  this 
analysis,  and  believes,  even  more  fervently  than  Locke,  that 
the  secondary  qualities  have  only  a  mental  existence ;  but  fails 
at  the  same  time  to  understand  why  the  same  is  not  likewise 
true  of  the  primary  qualities.  In  the  application  of  his  for-  @ 
mula  "  esse  is  percipi"  Berkeley  finds  it  impossible  to  perceive  j 
mere  dimension,  figure,  or  motion, — these  ideas  always  occur  \ 
in  connection  with  the  secondary  qualities.  Take  dimension, 
for  instance.  It  is  possible  for  a  very  small  insect  to  look 
upon  the  foot  of  a  mite  as  a  man  might  regard  a  mountain. 
Dimension  and  size  are  merely  relative ;  what  appears  to  be 
large  to  one  animal  will  be  small  to  another.  And  this  same 
relativity  is  also  true  with  regard  to  the  primary  quality  of 
number  for  the  same  object  "  is  one,  or  three,  or  thirty-six, 
according  as  the  mind  considers  it  with  reference  to  a  yard,  a 
foot,  or  an  inch."  3  From  a  similar  stand-point  all  primary 
ideas  must,  at  the  last  analysis,  be  looked  upon  as  meaningless, 
or  else  placed  with  the  secondary  as  subjective  relations  and 
products  of  some  mental  process,  either  human  or  divine.  i 

Matter. — Locke  found  it  rather  difficult  to  define  his  con-  A* 
ception  of  substance  or  mere  matter,  but  finally  led  us  to 
believe  that  it  referred  to  that  part  of  an  object  which  held  up 
or  supported  the  various  secondary  qualities  or  attributes. 
Beyond  simple  extension  Locke  found  it  impossible  to  give  to 
substance  any  positive  attribute,  preferring  to  rely  on  the 
universal  belief  that  some  material  substratum  supported  the 
qualities  of  sense.  This  inability  to  define  substance  was  made 

3  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  Part  I.,  Sec.   12. 


158  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

by  Berkeley  the  cardinal  objection  to  any  materialistic  meta- 
physics; for  so  soon  as  extension  and  all  other  qualities  are 
recognized  to  be  ideas,  real  only  for  a  perceiving  mind,  there 
no  longer  exists  any  need  for  the  presupposition  of  an  external, 
unknowable  substratum.  In  other  words,  the  old  idea  of  matter, 
which  we  inherit  from  the  mediaeval  schools,  is  a  contradictory 
concept;  it  is  said  to  exist,  yet  it  cannot  be  described;  it  is 
real,  yet  it  cannot  be  perceived.  This  contradiction  led  Berke- 
ley to  regard  the  concept  "matter"  as  nothing  more  than  a 
philosophical  illusion.4  And,  moreover,  the  epistemological 
theory,  at  that  time  by  no  means  uncommon,  that  the  subjective 
ideas  of  man  were  archetypes  of  real  objective  things  was 
unable,  in  his  estimation,  to  fortify  this  illusion.  For  this 
archetype  or  idea  can  originate  in  nothing  but  an  idea,  and 
hence  can  exist  only  in  the  mind.  In  brief,  then,  this  is 
Berkeley's  theory  of  the  world:  All  ideas  ttfajk,  come  into  our 
consciousnesfif  tbej^pjp  mid^Tm  mmplpY^  the_distinct  $pA 
the  indistinct,  have  theirsource  in  Spirit  or  mind,  ajifl  nn|.  in* 


hypothetical  matter.  Every  conscious  statej o|_mind  is  an  idea, 
and  as '.such .coasts  only  in and!  tErougfathe  percipient  subject. 
The  concept  of  matter,  as  it  is  used  to  indicate  a  world  object- 
ively valid  beyond  the  sense,  is  in  itself  unintelligible;  it  can 
be  defined  onlyjjjj;  negative  terjas _jjollectiyely  equjj[alent_to 
npj^ing. 

Abstract  Ideas. — In  order  to  reinforce  this  general  position 
Berkeley  thought  it  nccessaryjo_reiute_the  accredited  doctrine 
Locke  believed  that  the  mind  had  the  power 


to  regard,  as  a  single  quality,  that  dejnent^LL^grfifip^ioQ  which 
was  common  to  several  objects.    The  mind  could  abstract  from 

*  It  is  to  be  noted  that  a  similar  conception  of  the  external  world 
was  reached  by  Arthur  Collier,  rector  in  the  English  Church.  In  1713 
he  published  "  Clavis  Universalis  :  or,  a  new  Inquiry  after  Truth, 
being  a  Demonstration  of  the  Non-Existence,  or  Impossibility,  of  an 
External  World."  Jonathan  Edwards  also  approached  very  near  to 
the  Berkeleian  Idealism. 


GEORGE  BERKELEY.  159 

paper,  snow,  and  clouds  the  common  or  abstract  color  of  white- 
ness. This  theory  struck  at  the  very  heart  of  Berkeley's  initial 
principle,  "  esse  is  per dpi"  for  should  the  power  of  abstraction 
be  admitted,  then  there  would  exist  an  important  class  of  ideas 
which  could  not  be  directly  perceived.  Berkeley,  recognizing 
this,  contended  that  the  abstract  idea  of  white  cannot  be  per- 
ceived, because  it  is  neither  dull  or  vivid,  distinct  or  confused. 
The  general  idea  of  man  is  neither  like  Peter,  James,  or  John, 
nor  has  it  any  predictable  qualities.  Animal-in-general  is  un- 
intelligible to  us,  for  we  know  not  whether  it  has  "hair, 
feathers,  or  scales."  5  Every  time  we  think  of  whiteness,  in 
Berkeley's  own  opinion,  we  must  at  the  same  time  think  of  a 
certain  definite  white  object ;  the  term  "  man"  is  meaningless 
unless  it  calls  to  mind  a  certain  definite  person  with  predict- 
able qualities  capable  of  perception  Abstract  ideas  are  merely 
words  or  convenient  expressions  to  Berkeley;  like  material 
substance,  they  are  the  artifices  of  a  decadent  metaphysics. 

Duality  of  Idea  and  Spirit. — In  our  previous  statement  of 
Berkeley's  theory  of  ideas  no  account  was  given  of  what  was 
meant  by  mind  or  spirit.  To  transfer  the  origin  of  our  ideas 
from  one  unknowable  to  another  of  a  different  name  was  cer- 
tainly no  great  advance.  Berkeley  understood  this,  and  from 
the  very  outset  emphasized  a  realitj,  other  tha^Jhat  of  tha 
ideas. — the  higher  reality  of  S^^^f^^mindi^  The  essence  of 
the  distinction  between  idea  and  spirit  is  that  the  former  is 
passive  and  the  latter  active.  We  can  show  that  all  our  ideas 
— or  whatever  we  may  choose  to  call  them — are  inactive;  one 
idea  can  in  nowise  produce  an  effect  on  another,  neither  can 
it  come  or  go  at  will.  Thepassive  existence_flf  jhe^  ijfca&jgallv, 
shows  thflt  ^^y  §^,grffl{pj[py  fiojnp  Active  power  which  Berke- 
ley designates  bl^jh§_jiame_of^ ^J^utik" — the  cause  of  the 
umn^rrupted  flow  of  our  ideas,  their  regularity  and  apparent 
uniformity.  This  active  source  of  our  ideas  "must  therefore 

5  Introduction,  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  Sec.  9. 


160  HISTORY  OF   MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

be  a  substance;  but  it  has  been  shewn  that  there  is  no  corporeal 
or  material  substance:  it  remains  therefore  that  the  cause  of 
ideas  is  an  uncorporeal  active  substance  or  Spirit."6  We 
cannot  perceive  spirit,  since  spirit  is  the  source  of  the  power 
of  perception.  A  difficulty  is  at  once  apparent.  There  can  be 
no  idea  of  spirit,  and  ideas  are  the  only  elements  of  knowledge ; 
then  one  can  surely  infer  that  we  can  have  no  knowledge  of 
even  the  existence  of  spirit.  Berkeley  appreciated  this  dilemma 
after  the  publication  of  the  first  edition  of  the  "  Principles/' 
and  in  his  subsequent  works  is  to  be  found  a  new  doctrine  of 
notion.  We  can  have  a  notion — a  sort  of  reflective  mental 
state — of  a  Spirit,  but  no  idea.  But  still  further  we  may 
inquire  as  to  how  one  may  have  an  idea  of  a  notion.  A  ques- 
tion which  strikes  at  the  very  root  of  the  Berkeleian  Idealism. 

Kinds  of  Spirit. — The  mere  duality  of  idea  and  spirit  is  in 
itself  insufficient  to  explain  the  uniformity  and  apparent  pur- 
posiveness  of  the  sense  ideas;  it  was  necessary  to  define  the 
conception  of  God  as  the  ultimate  unity  of  the  world  of  ideas. 
God  is  the  source  of  the  true  and  scientific  ideas,  whereas  the 
less  powerful  spirits  of  individual  men  are  alone  responsible 
for  the  creations  of  the  imagination.  The  real,  the  burning 
idea  of  fire  is  impressed  upon  us  by  the  Spirit  of  God,  whereas 
the  fire  of  our  fancy  is  an  idea  which  the  human  spirit  pro- 
duces. We  are  able  to  discern  the  source  of  those  ideas  which 
come  from  God  by  their  superior  vividness,  strength,  and  asso- 
ciations; they  correspond  to  the  ideas  which  the  materialists 
attribute  to  the  objective  world. 

EELATION  BETWEEN  KINDS  OF  SPIRIT. — One  of  the  least  sat- 
isfactory points  of  Berkeley's  philosophy  is  the  ambiguity  which 
settles  about  the  relation  between  the  universal  Spirit  of  God 
and  the  individual  spirit  of  man.  Berkeley  was  educated  in 
the  faith  of  the  Church  of  England  and  his  later  life  was  spent 
in  its  service.  The  Christian  conception  of  God  was  therefore 

•  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  Part  I.,  Sec.  26. 


GEORGE  BERKELEY.  161 

very  firmly  fixed  in  his  mind,  and  he  could  hardly  be  expected 
to  recognize  any  philosophy  which  did  not  possess  a  religious 
background.  In  fact  one  of  the  results  which  he  hoped  his 
philosophy  might  accomplish  was  the  permanent  refutation  of 
atheism.  Had  Berkeley  drawn  the  logical  conclusion  from  his 
premises  he  would  have  developed  a  pure  pantheism  like 
Spinoza,  or  else  a  pure  idealism  like  that  of  India  or  late 
Germany.  The  Christian  dogmas  of  transcendency  and  human 
freedom  preclude  the  former  alternative,  while  a  pure  idealism 
which  should  recognize  only  the  infinite  evolution  of  an  Idea 
through  finite  forms  would  have  then  been  looked  upon  as 
atheism.  To  be  true  to  his  original  position  and  at  the  same 
time  avoid  either  of  these  extremes  was  a  task  difficult  indeed ; 
it  formed  the  philosophical  theme  of  "  Siris"  his  last  and  least 
homogeneous  work.  So  far  as  may  be  judged,  the  Spirit  of 
God  was  the  true  author,  not  only  of  the  ideas  of  direct  per- 
ception, but  also  of  the  less  powerful  spirits  of  man.  These 
latter  were  endowed  by  their  Divine  Author  with  the  passive 
ability  of  perception,  as  well  as  the  distinct  power  to  create 
by  their  own  free  will  the  ideas  of  the  imagination  and  the 
ideals  of  life. 

THEOLOGY. — As  Berkeley  grew  older  in  years  the  importance 
of  God  in  his  system  seemed  to  increase  in  his  estimation.  In 
his  earlier  writings  he  is  content  with  the  proof  that  the  passive 
ideas  must  have  a  source  beyond  themselves,  in  a  Power  which 
should  embody  universal  Wisdom,  Authority,  and  Spirituality. 
But  in  his  later  works  he  reaches  a  final  proof  for  God's  exist- 
ence based  directly  on  his  empirical  epistemology.  In  the 
fourth  dialogue  of  "  Alciphron"  after  having  shown  that  all 
the  perceptions  of  the  world  indicate  the  operations  of  a  Divine 
Mind,  Berkeley  concludes  that  we  have  the  same  authority  for 
the  belief  in  the  Divine  Being  as  we  have  for  the  existence  of 
our  fellow-men.  In  fact  every  idea  is  a  manifestation  or  sign 
of  the  highest  reality  of  God.  All  ideas  of  our  sight  compose 
a  "  visual  language"  by  means  of  which  God  speaks  to  man. 

11 


162  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

Much  akin  to  this  is  his  theory  of  natural  law,  already  briefly 
mentioned.  We  observe  that  the  idea  of  stone  is  always  con- 
nected with  the  idea  of  hardness,  that  heaviness  is  associated 
with  lead,  and  that  some  characteristic  noise  accompanies  every 
animal.  Instead  of  regarding  these  causal  relations  as  indi- 
cations of  a  material  background  to  the  stone,  lead,  or  animal, 
we  must  look  upon  them  as  the  expressions  of  God's  will. 
Those  unalterable  sequences,  which  we  call  "  necessary  connec- 
tion/' are  really  God's  thoughts  unfolding  the  laws  of  His 
omniscient  mind.  Law,  order,  science,  truth,  are  mere  expres- 
sions for  the  notion  of  God;  imagination,  error,  are  the  ideas 
created  by  the  spirit  of  man. 

ANSWERS  TO  OBJECTIONS. 

Absent  Objects. — A  theory  of  the  world  so  original  and 
brilliant  as  that  of  Berkeley's  empirical  idealism  would  nat- 
urally meet  with  many  objections.  This  fact  was  recognized 
by  Berkeley  himself,  who  made  every  exertion  to  avoid  any 
misunderstanding, — the  worst  of  all  objections.  A  very  ap- 
parent difficulty  might  arise  with  regard  to  absent  objects. 
Berkeley  does  not  assume  that  the  moon  ceases  to  exist  when 
nobody  happens  to  be  gazing  at  it,  or  that  there  is  continued 
annihilation  and  recreation  following  the  history  of  a  single 
percipient  subject.  On  the  contrary,  we  are  told  that  all  the 
real  ideas  of  the  so-called  external  world  are  being  constantly 
perceived  by  the  Divine  Spirit.  That  I,  the  individual  spirit, 
may  not  always  perceive  the  moon,  the  table,  or  the  chair,  but 
that  God  perceives  them  without  interruption.  It  is  He  who 
holds  these  ideas  in  constant  reality,  ready  at  any  time  to 
impress  them  on  the  finite  spirit. 

-A         Extension  and  Mind. — Another  and  more  subtle  objection 

might  be  advanced  on  the  ground  that  if  so-called  "  extension" 

can  exist  only  in  the  mind,  then  extension  is  itself  an  attribute 

of  mind.     In  reply  to  this,  Berkeley  carefully  distinguishes 

"between  the  idea  in  the  mind — that  is,  perceived  by  the 


GEORGE   BERKELEY.  163 

and  what  might  be  said  regarding  the  mind  itself.  Thus  it  is 
conceivable  for  a  vessel  to  contain  water,  and  at  the  same  time 
be  devoid  of  all  the  qualities  by  which  we  describe  water. 

Meaning  of  "  Matter." — Perhaps  the  hardest  to  convince, 
in  Berkeley's  estimation,  are  those  who  still  cling  to  the  reality 
of  matter  as  either  a  convenient  or  necessary  hypothesis.  To 
the  former,  who  regard  matter  as  a  convenient  form  of  expres- 
sion, he  advances  a  well-known  aphorism, — "  We  ought  to  think 
with  the  learned,  and  speak  with  the  vulgar."  7  Although  most 
of  us  are  convinced  of  the  movement  of  the  earth,  yet  we  speak 
of  the  rising  of  the  sun.  To  the  other  class,  who  regard  the 
objective  existence  of  matter  to  be  necessary,  he  is  by  no  means 
so  lenient.  If  we  demand  "matter"  for  science  we  do  not 
disturb  either  the  facts  or  laws  of  science  by  substituting  the 
will  of  God  for  an  unknowable  principle  of  causation  itself 
dependent  on  an  unknowable  substance.  If  we  demand  "  mat- 
ter" in  order  to  give  the  world  of  our  ideas  a  reality,  we  fail 
utterly  in  such  an  undertaking,  for  we  can  describe  it  only  by 
negative  terms  which  make  it  a  "  something5'  indistinguishable 
from  "  nothing." 

Few  thinkers  have  been  more  misinterpreted  in  their  real 
meaning  than  Berkeley,  and  few  have  struggled  so  valiantly  or 
so  well  to  avoid  misrepresentation.  Dr.  Johnson  is  said  to 
have  refuted  him  by  an  impetuous  stamp  on  the  earth,  and 
others  have  concurred  with  the  learned  lexicographer.  Even 
Kant,  in  his  famous  refutation  of  idealism,  is  inclined  to 
believe  that  Berkeley  regarded  the  objects  of  the  space  world 
to  be  possessed  of  only  an  imaginary  reality.8 

Whatever  criticism  of  Berkeley's  system  is  made,  one  cer- 
tainly cannot  suppose  that  he  meant  to  do  away  with  the  reality 


7  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  Sec.  51. 

8"Und  darum  auch  die  Dinge  im  Raum  fur  blosse  Einbildungen 
erklart." — Kant,  Pure  Reason,  Second  Ed.  (Refutation  of  Idealism), 
p.  274. 


164  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

of  our  world  of  sense  or  even  of  our  fancy;  no  thinker  has 
ever  lived  who  rested  his  metaphysic  more  explicitly  on  the 
world  of  sense-perception.  His  chief  aim  was  to  show  that  the 
indescribable  "matter"  of  the  materialists  was  a  fiction  unin- 
telligible and  in  itself  contradictory;  it  could  therefore  have 
no  value.  A  lasting  contribution  he  has  most  certainly  made 
to  the  progress  of  the  world's  thought  by  drawing  attention  to 
the  idealistic  or  universalistic  side  of  empiricism.  Berkeley 
represents  the  transition  from  Locke  to  Hume.  Locke  found 
a  reality  behind  the  senses  in  a  material  world,  Berkeley  found 
a  higher  reality  in  the  Spirit  of  God,  while  Hume  failed  to 
find  reality  in  either. 

DAVID   HUME. 

Hobbes  and  Locke  were  Englishmen  in  the  broadest  sense  of 
the  word,  Berkeley  and  Hume  were  such  only  in  name.  The  in- 
terests of  Berkeley,  his  hopes,  and  his  ambitions,  were  connected 
with  Protestant  Ireland.  The  life  and  character  of  Hume  are 
those  of  the  eighteenth-century  Scotchman.  Both,  however, 
evinced  striking  similarity  in  disposition,  character,  and  mental 
power.  Both  were  noted  for  their  generosity,  simplicity,  and 
dislike  of  ostentation.  Both  had  written  their  most  influential 
works  in  philosophy  before  the  age  of  twenty-five,  and  both 
forsook  philosophy  for  other  pursuits  in  later  life. 

LIFE. 

Early  Surroundings. — David  Hume  was  born  in  Edinburgh 
on  April  26,  1711.  His  father,  who  owned  a  small  estate  or 
farm  near  the  English  border,  died  when  David  was  but  a 
small  child.  Both  parents  were  of  sturdy  Scotch  families, 
such  as  make  up  the  small  gentry  of  the  Lowlands.  His  mother 
is  said  to  have  been  a  woman  of  singular  mental  acuteness, 
although  an  early  estimation  of  her  son  seems  not  to  indicate 
any  great  sympathy  with  the  brooding  and  perhaps  lazy  philos- 
opher. "  Our  Dayie's  a  fine,  good-natured  crater,  but  uncom- 


DAVID   HUME.  165 

mon  wake-minded."  9  Hume's  youth  was  spent  at  the  parental 
farm  of  Mnewells,  where  he  seems  to  have  devoted  himself  to 
the  study  of  the  ancient  and  modern  classics.  He  was  a  self- 
taught  man,  having  derived  little  help  from  schools  or  school- 
masters. When  about  seventeen  his  relatives  thought  the  pro- 
fession of  the  law  might  prove  a  practical  realization  of  his 
rather  useless  studies,  so  he  entered  upon  the  path  of  a  young 
advocate.  The  attempt  early  proved  to  be  a  failure,  and  for 
the  next  six  years  he  became  a  resident  at  Ninewells. 

Philosophical  Authorship. — About  this  period  Hume 
began  to  exhibit  a  decided  interest  in  philosophical  works,  espe- 
cially the  writings  of  the  Roman  moralists.  While  impressed 
with  their  brilliant  portrayal  of  virtue  and  honor,  he  observed 
a  lack  of  experiential  foundation,  especially  in  the  writings 
of  the  Stoic  philosophers.  At  the  age  of  twenty-three  he 
decided  to  travel  to  a  foreign  country  where  he  might  have 
the  opportunity  and  leisure  to  construct  a  theory  of  morals 
which  should  supply  the  deficiency  in  the  classic  systems  of 
ethics.  In  1736  we  find  him  at  La  Fleche,  in  France,  where  was 
located  the  Jesuit  College  made  famous  by  the  boyhood  of 
Descartes.  For  three  years  Hume  worked  on  his  philosophical 
labors  with  unabated  zeal  and  patience,  and,  finally,  when  he 
came  forth  from  his  self-imposed  retirement,  he  brought  with 
him  the  completed  manuscript  of  his  first  and  most  powerful 
work,  "A  Treatise  of  Human  Nature."  This  was  published 
during  the  first  part  of  1739  and  met  with  little  recognition 
or  criticism,  two  results  which  its  author  hoped  it  might  attain. 
Biographers  of  Hume  place  an  ambition  for  literary  fame,  "  a 
craving  for  notoriety  and  vulgar  success,"  as  Huxley  calls  it, 
as  one  of  the  prime  motives  of  his  life  and  character.  What- 
ever internal  evidence  may  exist  for  this  view,  Hume's  whole 
literary  career  seems  to  verify  it.  Instead  of  resting  satisfied 
with  what  he  had  achieved,  which  he  must  have  felt  would 

•Prof.  Huxley's  Life. 


166  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

ultimately  influence  the  development  of  human  speculation, 
Hume  peevishly  writes  that  his  first  work  "  fell  dead-born 
from  the  press  without  reaching  such  distinction  as  even  to 
excite  a  murmur  among  the  zealots."  10  Thoroughly  dissatis- 
fied with  the  reception  of  the  "  Treatise,"  Hume  sought  to 
gain  recognition  by  recasting  his  thoughts  into  more  popular 
form.  Accordingly  he  rewrote  the  first  book  of  his  former 
work,  entitled,  "  Of  the  Understanding/'  publishing  a  more 
polished  but  less  profound  exposition  of  its  main  tenets  under 
the  title  of  "An  Enquiry  concerning  Human  Understanding;" 
and  the  latter  portions  of  the  earlier  work,  which  dealt  with 
ethics,  as  "An  Enquiry  concerning  the  Principles  of  Morals" 

Essayist. — Hume  now  gradually  lost  his  youthful  interest 
in  philosophy  and  began  to  speculate  on  political  and  economic 
questions.  About  1740  he  made  the  acquaintance  of  Adam 
Smith,  who  later  wrote  ef  The  Wealth  of  Nations"  a  classic 
in  the  science  of  political  economy.  Smith  has  also  a  place  in 
English  ethics  from  the  authorship  of  a  theory  of  morals 
which  emphasized  the  element  of  sympathy.  This  is  a  stand- 
point not  very  far  from  that  of  Hume.  In  the  political  field 
Hume  exhibits  the  same  power  and  subtility  of  mind  which 
made  his  philosophy  the  culmination  of  British  thought.  In 
the  "Political  Essays"  published  in  1741,  may  be  noted  the 
early  beginning  of  the  modern  science  of  political  economy. 
Here  he  contends  that  there  may  be  discovered,  permeating  the 
laws  of  government  and  the  relations  of  men,  certain  causal 
sequences  of  almost  mathematical  certainty,  notwithstanding 
the  heterogeneity  of  the  motives  and  passions  of  mankind. 
An  assumption  not  unlike  this  lies  at  the  very  foundation  of 
all  economic  inquiry. 

Later  Life. — Soon  after  the  publication  of  the  "Essays" 
the  friends  of  Hume  endeavored,  without  success,  to  procure 
for  him  the  professorship  of  moral  philosophy  at  the  Univer- 

10  Hume's  My  Own  Life. 


DAVID   HUME.  167 

sity  of  Edinburgh.  His  writings  were  by  this  time  too  well 
known  to  admit  of  any  sympathy  from  among  the  Presbyterian 
Clergy.  The  charge  of  heresy  and  scepticism  was  advanced 
against  him, — not  without  foundation,  as  it  will  later  appear, — 
and  the  governing  council  filled  the  vacancy  by  "  a  safe 
nobody/'  as  Huxley  expresses  it.  A  few  years  later  he  began 
the  publication  of  his  "History  of  England"  as  a  result  of 
which  he  achieved  that  literary  fame  he  had  so  long  cherished 
as  the  dearest  wish  of  his  ambition. 

His  philosophical  speculations  produced  more  comment  on 
the  Continent  of  Europe  than  at  home.  His  writings  were 
considered  to  be  in  deep  sympathy  with  the  superficial  philoso- 
phy of  the  more  fashionable  circles  of  French  society.  To  the 
uncritical  reader  the  epistemology  and  religious  scepticism  of 
Hume  appeared  very  close  to  the  materialism  of  La  Mettrie 
and  D'Holbach.  A  visit  to  France  was  the  occasion  for  much 
attention  from  great  nobles  and  great  ladies,  who  treated  him, 
it  is  said,  much  like  a  newly-found  "  sensation."  It  was  at 
this  time  also  that  he  made  the  acquaintance  of  Rousseau, 
which  later  placed  the  generous  and  kind-hearted  Hume  in  a 
position  to  receive,  in  return  for  his  kindness,  the  lunatic 
malignity  of  the  passionate  and  half-crazed  Swiss. 

By  this  time  Hume  had  acquired  a  large  fortune,  amply  suffi- 
cient to  supply  his  needs  and  his  generosity.  He  had  built 
for  himself  a  house  on  one  of  the  newly-opened  streets  of  Edin- 
burgh, to  which  some  one  jokingly  gave  the  name  of  "  St. 
David's  Street,"  a  title  which  it  continues  to  bear.  Here 
Hume  entertained  the  most  accomplished  society  of  the  Scotch 
metropolis,  Adam  Smith,  Ferguson,  and  many  others  of  lesser 
note.  About  1775  his  health  began  to  fail, — "I  now  reckon 
upon  a  speedy  dissolution.  ...  I  consider,  besides,  that  a 
man  of  sixty-five,  by  dying,  cuts  off  only  a  few  years  of  infirmi- 
ties," " — and  on  the  25th  of  August  of  the  following  year, 

"Hume's  My  Own  Life. 


168  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

1776,  he  died.  He  met  death  with  the  same  cheerfulness  and 
resignation  which  had  been  his  temperamental  characteristic 
through  life;  and  even  a  full  understanding  of  approaching 
death  failed  to  bring  him  nearer  to  the  faith  of  his  fathers  or  ex- 
cite a  single  expressed  hope  in  the  immortality  of  the  soul.  Yet 
few  men  whose  lives  have  been  recorded  in  history  have  met 
'  death  with  greater  simplicity,  cheerfulness,  or  noble  fortitude. 
Whatever  we  may  believe  regarding  his  philosophy,  there  is 
certainly  unanimity  in  the  estimation  of  a  generous  and  noble 
life  consecrated  to  the  service  of  others  and  the  pursuit  of 
truth. 

STAND-POINT. 

The  interest  that  Hume  manifested  in  early  life  for  philoso- 
phy is  probably  traceable  to  the  reading  of  the  Roman  moral- 
ists. The  Hellenic-Roman  philosophy,  prominent  about  the 
beginning  of  the  Christian  era,  is  remarkable  for  its  emphasis 
on  man.  Rome  attained  its  prominence  in  the  ancient  world 
more  through  action  than  reflection.  The  explanation  of  man, 
his  power  and  his  passions,  interested  the  Latins  far  more 
than  theories  of  the  world  or  speculations  concerning  the  truth 
and  the  basis  of  knowledge.  The  Roman  philosophers  were  all 
moralists  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  word.  Hume  accepted  their 
stand-point,  but  he  was  [unwilling  to  recognize  any  system  of 
ethics  unless  it  could  be  ultimately  traced  to  the  world  of 
experience.  '•  In  this  he  followed  his  predecessors,  Bacon, 
Hobbes,  and  Locke.  He  therefore,  finds  himself  unable  to 
continue  his  progress  in  moral  philosophy  until  he  has  exam- 
ined the  nature  of  man,  upon  which  all  morality  rests.  His 
problem,  then,  is  the  examination  of  human  nature.  1 

Epistemology. — With  this  purpose  in  mind  Hume  first 
seeks  to  discover  the  origin  of  our  mental  states,  believing  with 
Locke  that  this  is  the  key  to  all  knowledge.  "  As  the  science 
of  man  is  the  only  solid  foundation  for  the  other  sciences,  so, 
the  only  solid  foundation  we  can  give  to  this  science  itself 


DAVID   HUME.  169 

must  be  laid  on  experience  and  observation."  12  He  therefore 
divides  all  the  perceptions  of  the  mind,  or  elements  of  knowl- 
edge, into  two  broad  classes,  Impressions  and  Ideas.  The 
former  correspond  to  the  sensations,  direct  perceptions,  and 
more  violent  passions,  all  of  which  come  to  the  mind  with  an 
irresistible  force.  The  ideas,  on  the  other  hand,  are  secondary  , 
in  character,  arising  rather  from  the  processes  of  thought;  \ 
they  may  be  directly  traced  to  the  impressions  for  their  origin, 
but  are  generally  more  complex  in  character  and  richer  in 
content.  Hume's  distinction  between  impressions  and  ideas 
is  like  that  between  immediately  present  feeling  and  derived 
or  secondary  reflection. 

METAPHYSICS. 

Previous  Meaning  of  "  Idea." — We  must  not  confuse  the 
meaning  of  the  word  "  idea"  as  employed  by  the  three  British 
philosophers.  With  Locke  it  indicated  "whatsoever  is  the 
object  of  the  understanding,  when  a  man  thinks."  13  To  him 
the  ideas  comprehended  the  perception  of  color,  sound,  as  well 
as  the  concepts  of  existence,  unity,  and  power;  it  was  the 
general  name  to  be  applied  to  almost  any  state  of  mind.  This 
appreciation  of  the  meaning  of  idea  was  also  followed  by 
Berkeley,  who  wrote  in  his  "  Commonplace  Book/'  "  By  idea 
I  mean  any  sensible  or  imaginable  thing."  Hume,  on  the  con- 
trary, sought  to  restore  the  term  to  what  he  considered  to  be 
its  original  significance.  Instead  of  defining  idea  in  such  a 
manner  that  it  included  all  perceptions  or  psychical  states,  he  \r 
restricted  its  application  to  thoughts  or  derivative  processes  r* 
of  the  mind.  His  use  of  the  term  was  therefore  much  more 
restricted  in  its  application  than  in  the  case  of  the  two  earlier 
thinkers.  Hume  wished  it  to  express  only  the  more  complex 
reflective  processes  of  mind,  possibly  a  significance  nearer  to 
conception  than  perception. 

11  Introduction,  Treatise  of  Human  Nature. 
"Locke's  Essay,  Book  I.,  Chapter  i.,  Sec.  8. 


170  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

Substance. — The  theory  of  general  ideas  advanced  by  Hume 
is  almost  the  same  as  that  of  Berkeley.  The  latter,  it  will  be 
remembered,  positively  denied  the  existence  in  the  mind  of 
any  such  abstract  concepts,  and  Hume  writes  "  that  all  general 
ideas  are  nothing  but  particular  ones  annexed  to  a  certain^ 
term  which  gives  them  a  more  extensive  significance  and  makes 
them  recall  on  occasion  other  individuals  which  are  similar  to 
them." 14  The  denial  on  the  part  of  Berkeley  of  any  real 
existence  in  the  mind  to  be  ascribed  to  abstract  ideas  was  fol- 
lowed by  the  denial  of  that  unknown  substance  behind  our 
ideas,  considered  so  important  by  Locke.  With  this  Hume 
was  also  in  agreement.  Substance  meant  to  him  a  certain 
group  of  qualities  or  simple  impressions  often  occurring 
together.  The  idea  of  substance,  if  considered  apart  from  this 
collection  of  qualities,  is  contradictory  in  its  nature.  No  one 
can  mention  any  properties  which  belong  to  mere  substance  as 
such,  since  it  is  believed  to  excite  no  color,  sound,  or  other 
sensation.  It  is  therefore  undefinable  and  of  no  value,  except 
as  the  expression  for  a  certain  specific  group  of  impressions. 

Association  of  Ideas. — According  to  Hume  the  reappear- 
ance in  the  mind  of  an  impression,  as  an  idea,  is  accomplished 
by  two  faculties, — the  memory  and  the  imagination.  The  for- 
mer reproduces  the  impressions  as  they  are  in  themselves, 
according  to  a  fixed  order  and  position;  the  latter  recon- 
structs them  into  ideas,  according  to  its  own  laws.  These  laws 
of  the  imagination,  or  rather  the  means  by  which  we  connect 
or  associate  our  ideas,  are  three  in  number.  It  is  possible  that 
ideas  may  be  connected  in  the  mind  by  more  resemblance. 
The  face  of  a  stranger  suggests  some  absent  friend,  a  clap 
of  thunder  may  bring  to  mind  the  report  of  artillery.  These 
connections  of  ideas  are  merely  those  of  superficial  similar- 
ity, they  point  to  no  real  connection  between  the  stranger 
and  the  friend,  or  the  thunder  and  the  artillery.  Another 

14  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  Vol.  I.,  Part  I.,  Sec.  7. 


DAVID   HUME.  171 

means  by  which  different  ideas  may  become  associated  or  united 
in  the  mind  arises  from  some  previously  noted.^^^m|£_  in 
space  or  time.  Thus  it  is  possible  that  the  idea  of  a  flower 
may  suggest  a  certain  book,  because  on  some  previous  occasion 
the  two  were  observed  side  by  side.  And,  finally,  Hume  men- 
tioned the  principle  of  causality  as  perhaps  the  relation  which 
produces  the  strongest  and  most  certain  association  of  ideas. 
The~idea  of  the  ruins  of  a  house  consumed  by  fire  would 
almost  invariably  arouse  the  idea  of  fire.  The  name  of  an 
author  will  suggest  his  best-known  work,  and  likewise  the  name 
of  a  book  will  suggest  its  writer. 

THE  PRINCIPLE  or  CAUSALITY. — Of  the  several  relations 
which  may  exist  among  the  ideas,  Hume  considers  this  con- 
nection of  cause  and  effect  to  be  especially  worthy  of  analysis. 
Before  his  time  the  connection  between  two  events  was  believed 
to  be  necessary,  if  one  could  infer  that  a  causal  relation  existed 
between  them.  Hobbes  had  taken  this  for  granted  and  had 
raised  the  principle  of  causality,  the  undeniable  relation  of 
necessity  which  controlled  all  mental  as  well  as  external  events, 
to  a  position  of  supreme  importance.  The  entire  world  was 
under  the  dominion  of  law, — this  was  the  _basis_oUus..  mate- 
rialism. Locke  also  had  accepted  a  rather  uncritical  attitudej^ 
towards  causality.  The  idea  of  cause  was  derived  from  that  / 
which  produced  something,  and  effect  from  that  which  was 
produced.  The  unknowable  substance,  in  which  all  the  quali- 
ties of  an  object  subsist,  served  as  the  unchangeable  connective 
between  the  cause  and  the  effect.  Locke's  belief  in  substance 
was  therefore  a  sufficient  basis  for  the  necessary  connection 
between  two  events.  Berkeley  interpreted  the  substratum  of 
our  ideas,  not  as  a  material  and  unknowable  substance,  but  as 
the  spiritual  Being  of  God.  And  even  Spirit  as  the  ultimate 
origin  of  our  ideas  could  well  serve  as  the  basis  for  the  neces- 
sary connection  between  natural  events.  It  was  this  that 
Berkeley  especially  emphasized  in  his  later  writings ;  God,  the 
eternal  Spirit,  gave  to  certain  of  our  more  vivid  ideas  that 


172  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

necessary  connection  which  leads  us  to  associate  them  with  the 
fixity  and  necessity  of  the  external  world. 

HUME'S  VIEW  OF  NECESSARY  CONNECTION. — Hume,  on  the 
other  hand,  finds  himself  at  a  loss  to  reconcile  his  thorough 
empiricism  with  the  prevalent  explanation  of  necessary  con- 
nection. He  could  neither  recognize  with  Locke  and  the  scien- 
tists of  his  time  the  existence  of  a  material  "  Substance,"  nor 
could  he  remain  satisfied  with  the  "  spirit"  of  Berkeley,  since 
both  views  premised  a  something  which  could  not  be  received 
by  the  mind  as  an  impression.  The  only  alternative  for  Hume 
as  a  consistent  empiricist  was  the  denial  of  the  recognized 
principle  of  necessary  connection.  One  impression  comes  to 
the  mind,  and  another,  of  a  different  character,  immediately 
follows  it.  The  ideas  excited  by  these  impressions  are  asso- 
ciated together  in  the  mind  by  contiguity  in  time.  On  some 
future  occasion  the  two  impressions  occur  in  the  same  tem- 
poral order,  and  the  association  by  contiguity  in  time  is  further 
strengthened.  And  likewise  it  is  observed  that  the  two  hnpres- 
sions  always,  within  the  limits  of  our  experience,  recur^n  £ms 
same  temporal  order,  never  one  without  the  other.  From  this 
observed  sequence  the  human  mind,  which  is  too  apt  always 
to  draw  its  conclusions  from  insufficient  data,  infers  that  there 
is  some  inner  unity  or  necessary  connection  between  the  two 
events.  This  inner  connection,  which  gives  the  element  of 
necessity  to  the  succession  of  cause  and  effect,  is  what  Hume^ 
denies.  All  we  know  is  the  impressions ;  these  suggest  no  idea 
of  internal  connection  beyond  the  mere  flux  in  consciousness; 
causality  is  merely  observed  sequence,  nothing  more. 

The  Basis  of  Science. — Hume's  interpretation  of  causality 
is  certainly  simple  on  the  surface,  but  yet  carries  with  it  conse- 
quences of  a  momentous  character.  There  is  no  real  connection 
between  the  impressions  of  sun-setting  and  darkness,  they  are 
merely  connected  by  customary  observation.  There  is  no  abso- 
lute and  infallible  reason  why  darkness  must  follow  the  setting 
of  the  sun,  only  from  the  association  of  ideas,  by  sequence  in 


DAVID   HUME.  173 

time,  throughout  unnumbered  centuries.  It  is  true  that  the 
probability  is  highly  in  its  favor,  but  high  probability  is  dis- 
tinctly different  from  true  knowledge.  The  observations  of 
man  since  time  immemorial  give  risejmly^to  a  high  probability, 
never  to  absolute  knowledge.  What  we  call  truth,  or  science,  or 
law,  is  nothing  but  a  sequence  of  those  ideas  the  past  observa- 
tion of  which  has  already  testified  to  the  high  probability  of 
their  future  re-occurrence.  Scientific  facts  are  the  epigram- 
matic statements  of  these  observed  sequences  among  our  ideas. 

The  Character  of  Hume's  Scepticism. — This  view  un- 
doubtedly has  a  sceptical  tinge,  but  it  is  far  from  the  classic 
forms  of  scepticism;  were  this  not  so,  Hume  would  have  no  , 
place  in  the  history  of  positive  philosophy.  Hume  is  positive  I 
in  so  far  as  he  regards  the  imprp^oj^  t.n  be  the  source  of  all  / 
our  ideas;  he  is  sceptical  in  so  far  as  he  refuses  to  admit  the/ 
validity  of  any  ideas  which  cannot  be  traced  to  experience.) 
Necessary  connection,  the  idea  of  God  or  human  immortality, 
are  concepts  which  have  no  firm  foundation  in  the  world  of 
impressions,  and  therefore  he  denies,  or  perhaps  seriously 
doubts,  their  reality  or  value.  We  cannot  but  admire  the 
logical  consistency  of  Hume,  who,  starting  with  a  firm  belief 
in  the  infallible  nature  of  his  empiricism,  constructs  his  whole 
philosophy  with  its  demands  foremost  in  his  mind.  Impres- 
sions as  such  exist, — that  is  his  positive  philosophy.  "  They 
are  the  successive  perceptions  only,  that  constitutes  the  mind; 
nor  have  we  the  most  distant  notion  of  the  place,  where 
these  scenes  are  represented,  or  the  materials  of  which  it  is 
compos'd."  15  We  cannot  know  if  the  objects  of  the  impres- 
sions are  real  in  themselves,  or  whether  the  propositions  of  the 
reason  are  true, — and  that  is  his  scepticism. 

The  Self  and  Personal  Identity. — The  empirico-sceptical 
attitude  of  Hume  is  still  further  emphasized  by  the  problem 
of  personal  identity.  Locke,  it  may  be  remembered,  founded 

15  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  Vol.  I.,  Part  IV.,  Sec.  6. 


174  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

the  continuity  of  selfhood  upon  mere  consciousness,  but  never- 
theless, as  a  true  Christian,  he  recognized  the  existence  of  the 
human  soul  and  likewise  its  immortality.  Berkeley  accepted 
the  continued  existence  of  the  human  spirit  as  the  necessary 
condition  for  the  flow  of  ideas  and  the  operations  of  the  mind. 
Hume,  in  his  analytical  attitude,  wished  to  inquire  into  the 
nature  of  this  soul^  or  self  before  he  would  consent  to  accept 
it  as  a  real  idea;  if  such  it  could  be  directly  traced  to  some 
impression.  Now,  the  self,  according  to  its  classic  definition, 
Hume  observes,  is  a  constant  throughout  life,  "  but  there  is  no 
impression  constant  and  invariable.  Pain  and  pleasure,  grief 
and  joy,  passions  and  sensations  succeed  each  other,  and  never 
all  exist  at  the  same  time.  It  cannot,  therefore,  be  from  any 
of  these  impressions,  or  from  any  other,  that  the  idea  of  self 
is  derived,  and  consequently  there  is  no  such  idea."  16  All  the 
perceptions  are  distinguishable  from  one  another  and  may  be 
regarded  apart  from  anything  necessary  to  support  them.  The 
"self"  is  perhaps  a  brief  term  to  express  the  succession  of 
conscious  states  of  the  mind,  but  apart  from  this  convenience 
it  has  no  meaning  whatsoever.  The  "  I"  is  simply  the  suc- 
cession of  impressions. 

It  is  merely  the  memory,  and  not  a  permanent  soul-sub- 
stance, which  is  able  to  refer  back  to  some  original  impression, 
now  awakened  in  the  mind  as  an  idea.  The  succession  of  im- 
pressions, which  can  be  called  an  "  I"  only  for  convenience,  is 
in  some  wise  grasped  by  the  faculty  of  the  memory,  which 
alone  gives  oneness  to  our  lives.  It  is  the  memory  which 
enables  us  to  recognize  our  ideals  and  which  guides  our  action 
according  to  rational  motives.  The  "  self/'  however,  which 
the  memory  seems  to  represent  to  us,  is  nothing  more  than  a 
reflection  of  the  original  impression;  it  is  empirical  in  its 
character  and  very  far  from  the  "  soul-substance"  referred  to 
in  the  older  theories  of  personal  identity.  In  brief,  the  self  or 

16  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  Vol.  I.,  Part  IV.,  Sec.  6. 


DAVID   HUME.  '\  175 


person  is  merely  a  sequence  of  impressions  and  ideas,  devoid 
of  any  fundamental  unity  and  related  only  through  the  empir- 
ical character  of  the  memory. 

ETHICS. 

The  moral  philosophy  which  Hume  endeavors  to  erect  upon 
his  epistemological  foundation  has  not  the  importance  in  the 
history  of  thought  which  is  conceded  to  his  metaphysics.  It 
stands  in  .  disagreement  with  that  of  Locke,  and  in  certain 
respects  not  far  from  the  positions  of  Shaftesbury  and  Hume's 
friend,  Adam  Smith.  Hume  is  distinctly  opposed  to  Locke's 
original  thesis,  "that  morality  is  capable  of  demonstration  as 
well  as  mathematics."  17  On  the  contrary,  he  believes  that  the 
moral  judgments  are  derived  from  a  certain  moral  sense  arising 
independent  of  the  reason.  The  values  of  good  and  evil  are 
perceived  or  felt  like  any  other  impression ;  they  are  empirical 
in  their  nature,  not  rational.  The  element  by  which  we  may 
distinguish  the  noble  from  the  bad  is  a  certain  feeling  of 
pleasure  or  satisfaction.  "'Hume  constantly  emphasizes  the  ele- 
mentary distinction  between  the  sentiments  of  pleasure  and 
pain;  it  lies  at  the  root  of  passion  and  action,  of  desire  and 
volition.  But  this  elementary  feeling  is  not  always  associated 
with  mere  bodily  enjoyment;  sometimes  it  shows  itself  as  a 
delicate  satisfaction  in  the  presence  of  the  beautiful  in  art  and 
the  moral  in  conduct.  Beauty  and  goodness  were  very  close  to 
one  another  in  Hume's  mind.  The  nature  of  man  involun- 
tarily approves  of  those  actions  which  give  rise  to  a  feeling  of 
pleasure.  We  are  drawn  towards  both  the  actor  and  the  act 
by  an  irresistible  bond  of  sympathy.  "  There  is  no  spectacle 
so  fair  and  beautiful  as  a  noble  and  generous  action;  nor  one 
that  gives  us  more  abhorrence  than  one  that  is  cruel  and 
treacherous."  18 

17  Locke's  Essay,  Book  IV.,  Chapter  xii.,  Sec.  8. 

18  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  Vol.  II.,  Part  I.,  Sec.  2. 


176  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

HUME'S  POSITION  IN  PHILOSOPHY. 

.      Hume's  importance  in  the  history  of  philosophy  lies  more 

in  his  relation  to  other  thinkers  than  in  the  extreme  originality 

j  of  his  attitude  towards  the  world.     He  sums  up,  so  to  speak, 

/  the  English  philosophy  of  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  cen- 

I  turies.    He  carries  the  empirical  epistemology  to  its  ultimate 

logical  implications  and  discards  every  fragment  of  knowledge 

which  is  not  countenanced  by  the  empirical  stand-point.    If,  on 

the  one  hand,  he  brings  to  a  culmination  the  history  of  British 

V  philosophy,  Hume  must  be  regarded  likewise  as  the  real  source 

of  that  critical  attitude  towards  the  world  characteristic  of 

later  German  speculation.    He  is  so  thoroughly  an  empiricist, 

so  representative  of  the  analytical  psychology  of  the  English 

type  of  mind,  that  he  really  initiates  a  movement  in  the 

opposite  direction. 

The  problem  which  lies  at  the  foundation  of  all  English 
philosophy  is  the  same  problem  that  Hume  considered  himself 
able  to  dispose  of  by  means  of  his  empirico-scepticism, — a  per- 
I  manent  and  philosophical  foundation  for  natural  science.  It 
was  this  same  problem  that  excited  Descartes,  stimulated  the 
speculation  of  the  early  Continental  scientists,  Kepler  and  Gas- 
sendi,  and  which  served  as  a  guide  to  the  analytic  methods  of 
Spinoza  and  Leibnitz.  But  to  the  English  thinkers  the  prob- 
lem of  science  appears  in  an  original  setting.  Instead  of  first 
determining  the  conditions  and  the  jnethods  by  which  science  is 
possible, — the  central  inquiry  of  Continental  thinkers  in  early 
as  well  as  recent  times, — the  English  philosophers  took  the 
empirical  stand-point  as  their  original  presupposition  and 
showed  that  any  other  point  of  view  was  radically  opposed  to 
the  fundamental  demands  of  science. 

This  method  of  presupposing  the  validity  of  all  experiential 
data  was  thoroughly  successful  and  sufficient  so  long  as  the 
regularity  of  these  experiences  could  be  interpreted  as  identical 
with  the  true  processes  of  that  nature  which  science  itself 


DAVID   HUME.  177 

sought  to  interpret.  So  long  as  the  empirical  presupposition 
gave  to  the  experiences  an  objectively  valid  basis,  the  English 
philosophy  of  experience  was  impregnable.  But  when  Hume, 
in  the  light  of  the  very  stand-point  which  made  his  question 
possible,  demanded  an  empirical  explanation  for  this  basis  of 
our  expediences,  he  removed  the  foundations  from  the  entire 
English  empirical  philosophy.  By  showing  that  the  causal 
relations  among  our  ideas  correspond  only  to  observed  se- 
quences, he  showed  as  well  that  a  science  resting  merely  on 
the~"5ow  of  experiences  is  in  reality  nojscience.  The  solution 
of  this  perplexity  was  the  problem  which  he  set  for  himself 
and  which  unsolved  was  passed  on  to  Kant. 

Although  Hume  represents  the  true  culmination  of  British 
thought,  the  central  current  of  modern  philosophy  passed  from 
him  away  from  the  English  to  the  Germans.  Yet  his  own 
countrymen  were  by  no  means  satisfied  with  the  position  that 
he  defined  for  them.  They  in  turn  sought  to  re-establish 
empiricism  in  its  original  self-reliance  unvitiated  by  the  scep- 
tical outcome.  Hume  was  followed  in  Scotland  by  a  long  line 
of  thinkers  whose  works  are  of  little  value  except  from  the 
stand-point  of  introspective  psychology.  The  founder  of  this 
movement  was  Thomas  Eeid,  author  of  "  An  Inquiry  into  the 
Human  Mind  on  the  Principles  of  Common  Sense."  Keid 
reduced  all  judgments  of  absolute  or  scientific  truth  to  a  cer- 
tain innate  faculty  of  the  mind,  which,  like  the  moral  or  aes- 
thetic sense,  operated  by  certain  infallible  principles  or  laws. 
He  therefore  replied  to  the  empirico-scepticism  of  Hume  by 
resting  the  facts  of  science  on  the  certainty  of  consciousness. 
And  in  thus  transferring  the  criterion  of  necessity  from  the 
objective  to  the  subjective  he  moves  towards  the  criticism  of 
the  true  successor  of  Hume, — Immanuel  Kant. 

The  most  original  of  the  so-called  "  Scotch  school"  was  Sir 
William  Hamilton.  The  earlier  members  of  this  school  had 
refuted,  in  their  own  mind,  the  sceptical  character  of  Hume's 
empiricism  by  defining  reality  in  terms  of  "  common  sense/' 

12 


178  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

Anything  is  real  which  is  determined  to  be  such  by  all  men 
at  all  times.  Hamilton,  however,  refused  to  rest  satisfied  with 
this  simple  solution  to  the  problem  of  reality,  and  he  brought 
German  criticism  to  the  aid  of  English  introspection. 
Knowledge  should  be  defined  as  a  system  of  relations  or  con- 
ditions. Nothing  is  known  to  consciousness,  except  in  terms 
of  relation;  every  fact  is  the  expression  of  some  relation. 
Knowledge,  as  the  expression  of  conditions,  has  two  extremes, 
both  of  which  are  beyond  the  power  of  the  human  intellect. 
On  the  one  hand  there  is  the  simple  immediate  relation,  the 
absolutely  conditioned  or  defined;  while  on  the  other  there 
is  the  absolutely  unconditioned, — complete  freedom  from  all 
determination.  Between  these  two  extremes  lie  the  common 
relations  of  fact  and  life. 


CHAPTEE   VI. 
IMMANTJEL    KANT. 

'   THE  Two  EPISTEMOLOGICAL  STAND-POINTS. 

THUS  far  we  have  perceived  two  separate  movements  domi- 
nating the  philosophical  speculation  of  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  centuries.  On  the  Continent,  Descartes  and  his  fol- 
lowers emphasized  above  all  else  the  rational  element  in  our 
knowledge,  while  the  British  thinkers,  influenced  by  the  scien- 
tific characteristics  of  their  nature,  developed  a  distinctly  em- 
pirical philosophy,  standing  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  more 
speculative  tendency  of  the  Continent. 

After  the  systematization  of  the  philosophy  of  Leibnitz  by 
his  disciples,  Wolff  and  Baumgarten,  there  is  noticeable  but 
little  progress  within  the  field  of  the  Eationalists.  Original 
investigation  is  Jacking,  beyond  an  uncritical  incorporation  of 
the  doctrines  of  others  within  their  own  orthodox  teachings, — 
a  way  of  philosophizing  often  called  Eclecticism.  This  recast- 
ing and  harmonizing  of  somewhat  contradictory  principles  into 
the  form  of  a  single  system  was  the  task  of  the  German  univer- 
sity professors  during  the  early  years  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury. Just  at  this  period,  however,  when  rationalism  was  con- 
fined to  a  formal  set  of  principles,  the  English  empiricism 
had  assumed  unlooked-for  importance.  From  the  sudden  im- 
petus given  to  philosophy  by  the  analytic  acuteness  of  Locke, 
the  empirical  idealism  of  Berkeley,  with  its  negative  outcome 
in  Hume,  the  influence  of  empiricism  became  strongly  felt 
throughout  all  Europe.  It  penetrated  to  the  remote  city  of 
Konigsberg,  near  the  eastern  border  of  Prussia,  where  it  ex- 
cited the  attention  of  a  poor  German  tutor.  And  it  is  the 
transformation  which  empiricism  received  at  his  hands  which 
forms  the  subject  of  this  chapter,  nationalism  gradually  de- 

179 


180  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

clined  during  the  eighteenth  century,  while  at  the  same  time 
the  influence  of  empiricism  steadily  increased.  It  was  natural, 
therefore,  that  some  attempt  should  be  made  to  unite  the  truer 
elements  of  each  and  resuscitate  the  dying  rationalism  by  the 
youthful  self-reliance  of  empiricism.  Owing  to  the  funda- 
mental difference  of  method  of  the  two  schools,  a  mere  amalga- 
mation of  parts  was  impossible;  only  by  a  new  and  original 
stand-point  could  the  distinctive  features  of  each  be  retained 
and  harmonized.  Such  a  stand-point  was  developed  by  Im- 
manuel  Kant,  the  father  of  contemporaneous  philosophy,  and 
perhaps  the  most  profound  thinker  of  the  modern  world. 

LIFE  AND  CHARACTER. 

Parentage. — Kant  was  born  on  April  22,  1724,  in  the  pro- 
vincial city  of  Konigsberg,  the  capital  of  East  Prussia.  His 
father,  a  saddler  by  trade,  was  of  Scotch  descent.  The  elder 
Kant  (spelled  Cant)  left  no  evidence  of  more  than  ordinary 
education  nor  any  indication  of  remarkable  intellectual  bril- 
liancy. He  was  extremely  poor,  even  for  his  time  and  sur- 
roundings, but  yet  was  always  referred  to  by  his  son  in  terms 
of  the  deepest  reverence,  particularly  for  his  honesty  and  thrift. 
The  mother  of  the  family  was  a  woman  of  an  extremely  pious 
and  sensitive  nature,  and  although  she  had  had  but  few  educa- 
tional privileges,  Kant  inherited  from  her  a  simple  apprecia- 
tion for  Nature  which  was  one  of  the  ruling  motives  of  his  life. 
From  her  little  Immanuel  learned  his  first  lessons  in  science, 
for  she  would  often  take  him  outside  the  city  and  tell  him 
what  she  knew  concerning  the  flowers  and  trees.  The  stern 
morality  and  sincere  piety  of  his  parents  were  perhaps  the 
most  notable  influences  of  his  younger  years.  Simple  morality 
remained  for  him,  throughout  his  whole  life,  an  ideal  superior 
in  value  to  the  speculative  truths  of  philosophy. 

Early  Life. — At  the  age  of  eight  he  was  sent  to  the  Gym- 
nasium, or  public  school,  of  his  native  city.  It  was  by  the  sug- 
gestion of  the  family  pastor,  Dr.  Schulz,  that  Kant  was 


IMMANUEL  KANT.  181 

allowed  this  privilege,  for  his  parents  had  eleven  children  and 
could  ill  afford  the  expense.  It  has  been  said  that  this  worthy 
man,  Schulz,  furnished  the  family  with  firewood  to  offset  the 
cost  of  ImmanuePs  schooling.  There  is  nothing  in  the  youth 
of  Kant  which  would  suggest  mental  ability  beyond  the  aver- 
age boy  of  his  age.  He  spent  almost  nine  years  in  the  Gym- 
nasium, devoting  his  attention  to  the  Latin  language,  and  is 
said  at  that  time  to  have  aspired  to  the  career  of  a  classical 
philologist. 

When  sixteen  years  old  he  entered  the  University  of  Konigs- 
berg.  Here  his  earlier  preference  for  Latin  was  lost  and  he 
displayed  a  constantly  growing  inclination  for  physics  and 
mathematics.  This  change  in  his  taste  was  caused  by  the 
professor  in  physical  sciences,  Kuntzen  by  name,,  a  man  of  rare 
ability  and  power,  who  seems  to  have  excited  a  feeling  of 
reverence  in  Kant.  While  a  student  at  the  university  a  dispute 
arose  between  those  who  were  inclined  to  interpret  Nature 
pantheistically  and  the  orthodox  Lutherans.  The  intolerance 
shown  by  the  latter  was  sufficient  to  turn  Kant's  designs  away 
from  the  ministry,  although  he  was  registered  under  the  theo- 
logical faculty.  Intolerance,  in  whatever  form  it  showed  itself, 
was  disagreeable  to  Kant,  and  these  impressions  of  formal 
religion  were  amply  sufficient  to  alienate  him  from  the  pietistic 
influences  of  his  early  surroundings.  Kant  separated  the 
moral  ideal  from  the  religious  emotions;  the  former  he  re- 
garded as  the  basis  of  life  itself,  but  there  have  been  few  who 
have  felt  to  a  less  extent  the  influence  of  a  religion  of  feeling. 
His  university  career  was  marked  by  severe  poverty.  He  de- 
rived some  income  from  teaching  the  less  studious  pupils,  but 
this  and  a  little  assistance  from  a  relative  was  hardly  sufficient 
for  his  meagre  support.  Self-denial  and  an  unconquerable  will 
were  the  fruits  of  these  early  years  of  struggle  and  penury. 
Poverty  and  physical  weakness  taught  him  the  power  of  the 
mind  over  the  body,  the  will  over  the  passions. 

First  Publication. — Kant  left  the  university  at  twenty  years 


182  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

of  age  and  published  his  first  book  about  two  years  later.  The 
subject  of  this  work  was  concerned  with  the  purely -physical 
interpretation  of  Leibnitz's  concept  of  force.  During  the 
whole  of  his  academic  course,  and  even  earlier  at  the  Gymna- 
sium, he  had  been  taught  by  disciples  of  the  Leibnitz-Wolffian 
philosophy.  Owing  to  its  rationalistic  foundation, — the  inter- 
pretation of  truth  in  terms  of  what  ought  to  be, — Kant  was 
led  to  call  this  whole  movement  the  dogmatic.  To  this  dog- 
matic way  of  thinking  Kant  was  deeply  attached  during  the 
first  thirty  years  of  his  life ;  and  this  publication,  which  treated 
of  kinetic  forces  in  a  mathematical  manner,  was  distinctly 
dogmatic — rationalistic — in  character. 

After  the  death  of  his  father,  which  occurred  in  1746,  Kant 
became  a  family  tutor.  This  occupation  lasted  for  nine  years, 
during  which  time  he  was  in  the  service  of  three  different 
families,  all  residing  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Konigsberg. 
In  this  period  of  his  life  the  purely  academic  learning  acquired 
during  his  earlier  years  was  polished  and  brightened  by  con- 
stant intercourse  with  persons  of  culture.  As  a  practical  tutor 
he  gained  what  was  of  inestimable  value  to  him  in  later  years, 
— the  power  of  clear  and  concise  expression.  The  duties  of 
these  positions  did  not  demand  all  his  attention,  and  he  found 
time  and  opportunity  for  the  study  of  his  favorite  subject, — 
astronomical  physics.  Besides  his  first  publication  already 
mentioned  he  prepared  an  essay  on  the  retardation  of  the  earth's 
motion  by  tidal  action.  From  a  rough  estimation  of  the  retard- 
ing effect  of  the  action  of  the  tides  on  the  east  coast  of  the 
whole  American  continent  Kant  inferred  that  the  length  of  the 
day  was  increasing  at  the  rate  of  a  little  less  than  a  second  in 
every  thousand  years. 

Theory  of  the  Heavens. — This  short  essay  on  the  relation 
between  the  moon's  attraction  and  the  earth's  diurnal  motion 
was  the  prelude  to  an  extended  treatise  which  appeared  anony- 
mously in  1755,  entitled  "  A  General  Natural  History  of  the 
Heavens;  or,  an  Essay  concerning  the  Consitution  and  Me- 


IMMANUEL   KANT.  183 

chanical  Origin  of  the  whole  Universe  considered  according 
to  the  Newtonian  Principles."  This  work,  which  alone  places 
Kant  in  the  first  rank  of  original  thinkers  of  the  modern 
world,  is  the  first  exposition  of  the  so-called  "Nebular  Hy- 
pothesis." The  discovery  of  this  cosmological  theory,  which 
marks  a  new  era  in  astronomy,  has  been  falsely  attributed  to 
the  Frenchman,  Laplace.  The  principal  work  of  the  latter, 
"  The  System  of  the  World"  1  did  not  appear  until  forty-one 
years  after  the  publication  of  Kant's  treatise.  In  it  there  is 
no  mention  of  Kant ;  but  it  is  highly  improbable  that  Laplace 
would  have  mentioned  this  anonymous  essay,  even  if  he  had 
seen  it. 

An  exposition  of  Kant's  discovery  would  properly  belong  to 
the  history  of  astronomy  rather  than  to  that  of  speculative 
thought,  but  the  importance  warrants  a  brief  summary  here. 
The  entire  extent  of  the  present  stellar  universe  is  supposed  to 
have  been  occupied  at  some  previous  time  by  minute  particles 
of  matter,  each  of  them  susceptible  to  the  laws  of  gravity. 
Gradually  as  the  particles  of  the  original  chaos  would  act  and 
react  against  one  another  there  would  arise  centres  of  rotation 
throughout  the  whole  mass,  in  a  manner  similar  to  the  rotation 
of  water  while  passing  rapidly  down  a  spout.  Our  own  sun, 
with  its  attendant  planets,  developed  from  a  single  system  of 
rotating  particles,  and  each  of  the  stars  and  visible  nebulae 
represent  other  rotating  systems  in  various  stages  of  evolution. 
As  regards  the  formation  of  the  planets,  Kant  supposes  a 
gradual  separation  of  the  revolving  particles  into  rings,  each 
ring  finally  concentrating  about  a  centre.  These  centres,  of 
which  the  earth  is  one,  would,  after  they  had  become  solid 
spheres,  still  retain  the  original  motion  of  rotation  about  a 
central  body  or  sun.  Kant  proceeds  at  length  to  explain  the 
various  astronomical  facts  by  means  of  his  theory,  showing  in 
what  manner  the  planets,  the  form  of  their  orbits,  and  their 

1  SystSme  du  Monde. 


184  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

satellites  are  all  phases  in  the  realization  of  the  law  of  stellar 
evolution. 

University  Career. — In  the  following  year  Kant  published 
a  work  on  physical  geography,  in  which  he  offered,  for  the  first 
time  it  is  said,  a  true  explanation  of  the  trade-winds.  This 
publication  came  out  immediately  after  his  appointment  as 
lecturer,  or  "  Privat-Docent,"  at  the  University  of  Konigsberg. 
This  position  allowed  him  to  deliver  lectures  on  whatever  sub- 
jects he  might  choose  and  to  collect  the  fees  from  the  students, 
but  it  carried  with  it  no  official  recognition  from  the  university. 
These  lectures  were  on  the  most  varied  subjects,  comprising 
mathematics,  physics,  physical  geography,  anthropology,  mili- 
tary science,  pedagogics,  natural  theology,  logic,  moral  phi- 
losophy, and  metaphysics.  In  each  of  these  subjects  his  name 
is  connected  with  some  contribution  to  the  progress  of  true 
knowledge.  By  the  discovery  of  the  nebular  hypothesis  his 
name  is  worthy  of  a  place  beside  that  of  Copernicus  and  New- 
ton; and  he  may  also  be  regarded  as  one  of  the  early  founders 
of  physical  geography  and  the  modern  science  of  anthropology. 
In  pure  metaphysics  the  name  of  Aristotle,  of  all  the  great 
thinkers  of  ancient  and  modern  times,  is  alone  worthy  of  a  place 
beside  that  of  Kant.  Such  an  estimation  is  not  the  result  of 
unmerited  enthusiasm,  but  rather  an  echo  of  what  the  world 
is  gradually  coming  to  realize  when  it  recognizes  the  extent  of 
his  influence  together  with  the  obligations  which  society  owes 
to  this  humble  thinker  of  remote  Konigsberg. 

The  Three  "  Critiques." — Thus  occupied  with  private  lec- 
tures Kant  continued  until  1770,  when  he  received  the  appoint- 
ment to  the  chair  of  logic  and  metaphysics  in  the  university  of 
his  native  city,  a  position  which  he  continued  to  hold  until  his 
death.  After  the  inauguration  as  professor,  Kant  devoted  him- 
self almost  exclusively  to  metaphysics.  The  spreading  influ- 
ence of  English  empiricism  had  already  shaken  his  early 
reliance  on  the  rationalistic  methods,  and  finally  the  sceptical 
tendency  of  Hume  had  disturbed  his  confidence  in  the  validity 


IMMANUEL  KANT.  185 

of  science.  Some  years  before,  he  had  conceived  the  funda- 
mental premises  of  a  philosophy  wherein  he  hoped  to  restore  the 
former  eminence  of  science,  and  in  his  inaugural  address  de- 
fended a  thesis  made  prominent  in  his  later  publications.  His 
greatest  work,  the  "  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,"  2  published  in 
1781,  is  the  result  of  fifteen  years  of  thought.  Kant  in  this 
first  "  Critique"  intended  to  treat  of  the  speculative  or  meta- 
physical capacity  of  man  and  to  define  the  limits  of  the  human 
mind  in  its  pursuit  of  mathematical,  scientific,  and  metaphysi- 
cal truth.  This  speculative  reason,  however,  is  by  no  means 
the  extent  of  intellectual  activity;  the  fields  of  moral  and 
aesthetic  judgments  form  a  very  considerable  part  of  our  mental 
range.  To  supply  an  estimation  of  these  Kant  found  it  neces- 
sary to  supplement  his  former  work  by  the  issue  in  1788  of 
his  "  Critique  of  Practical  Reason  " 3  and  in  1790  of  his 
"  Critique  of  Judgment/' 4  Kant's  reputation  as  a  meta- 
physician rests  almost  entirely  on  these  three  works,  for  in 
them  is  found  the  fundamental  elements,  if  not  the  complete 
exposition,  of  his  system,  called  the  Critical  Philosophy.  The 
"  Pure  Keason"  is  empirical  and  sceptical  in  character.  It  seeks 
to  establish  mathematical  and  physical  science  more  firmly, 
while  it  also  aims  to  show  the  inability  of  the  reason  to  deal 
with  the  deeper  problems  of  pure  metaphysics.  The  "  Practical 
Keason"  supplements  the  former  work  and  seeks  to  establish 
metaphysics  on  a  moral  rather  than  on  a  speculative  basis.  It 
shows  that  the  same  problems,  such  as  immortality,  human 
freedom,  and  God,  which  the  "  Pure  Keason"  found  itself 
unable  to  cope  with,  were  really  solved  by  our  faith  in  the 
ultimate  reality  of  duty  and  morality.  In  the  "  Critique  of 
Judgment"  Kant  applies  an  idealistic  interpretation  to  beauty, 
sublimity,  and  natural  purposes,  believing  such  to  result  from 


2  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft. 

8  Kritik  der  praktischen  Vernunft. 

*  Kritik  der  Urtheilskraft. 


186  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

mental  attitudes  rather  than  from  the  perception  of  qualities 
possessing  a  real  existence  in  the  external  world. 

Characteristics.— The  many  peculiarities  in  the  personality 
of  Kant  deserve  a  passing  remark,  but  hardly  warrant  such 
undue  emphasis  as  they  often  receive.  In  physique  he  was 
weak  and  undersized;  in  stature  scarcely  five  feet  in  height. 
A  narrow  chest,  feeble  lung  power,  and  sunken  cheeks  are 
certainly  indications  of  a  frail  body,  but  in  Kant's  case  they 
were  the  result  of  inherited  weakness  enhanced  by  years  of 
study.  During  the  latter  part  of  his  life,  when  his  feeble- 
ness and  infirmities  increased,  he  is  said  to  have  presented 
an  emaciated  and  even  deformed  appearance,  particularly 
noticeable  to  strangers.  Kant  was  well  aware  of  his  own  feeble- 
ness, and  with  this  in  mind  he  made  the  health  of  his  body 
a  special  study.  He  believed  that  a  healthy  and  happy  state  of 
mind  was  the  first  requirement  for  a  healthy  body,  and  that, 
within  limits,  the  intellect  controlled  the  condition  of  the  whole 
organization.  He  disliked  drugs  of  all  kinds  and  believed  that 
regularity  and  exercise,  pure  air  and  recreation  were  the  surest 
foundations  for  a  lengthened  life. 

The  regularity  of  his  conduct  has  been  the  source  of  surprise 
to  all  who  know  only  the  complicated  conditions  of  our  modern 
life.  He  rose  punctually  at  five  in  the  morning  and  partook 
of  tea ;  until  seven  o'clock  he  was  occupied  with  the  preparation 
of  his  lectures,  and  from  seven  until  nine  with  their  delivery. 
The  rest  of  the  morning  was  taken  up  in  writing  for  publica- 
tion or  in  the  correction  of  his  manuscript.  During  hours  of 
meditation  it  was  his  custom  to  fix  his  eye  upon  some  distant 
object,  in  order  that  he  might  more  readily  concentrate  his 
thoughts.  A  neighboring  tower  seemed  well  adapted  for  this 
purpose,  and  there  is  current  a  tradition  that  when  it  became 
obscured  by  some  intervening  trees  Kant  required  their  removal. 
Eegularly  at  one  o'clock  he  met  a  group  of  his  friends  at  the 
dinner-table,  preferring  never  to  dine  alone.  These  social 
gatherings  were  extremely  enjoyable  to  Kant.  Here  he  pur- 


IMMANUEL  KANT.  187 

posely  came  in  contact  with  men  of  the  most  varied  experience, 
— merchants,  professors,  clergymen,  and  students  were  among 
the  number.  The  subjects  of  conversation  were  never  of  a 
philosophical  character;  he  desired  rather  to  hear  of  travel, 
politics,  and  topics  of  daily  interest.  He  is  said  to  have  been 
a  "  brilliant  conversationalist"  and  interesting  to  all  who  had 
the  privilege  of  dining  with  him.  His  marvellous  memory, 
keen  insight,  wit,  and  mild  sarcasm  form  a  combination  which 
may  well  deserve  to  be  called  "  brilliant."  After  the  noonday 
meal  he  would  either  visit  at  the  house  of  some  friend  or  spend 
a  few  hours  in  the  reading  of  newspapers.  Regularly  at  the 
close  of  the  afternoon  he  would  take  a  walk.  For  this  purpose 
Kant  chose  each  day  the  same  locality  until  his  generosity 
towards  beggars  so  increased  their  number  that  he  was  obliged 
to  seek  exercise  elsewhere.  Returning  from  the  daily  walk, 
which  was  never  postponed  on  account  of  the  severest  weather, 
Kant  would  spend  the  evening  enjoying  some  light  reading. 
He  is  said  to  have  been  especially  fond  of  Johnson  and  Swift 
among  the  English,  and  Montaigne  and  Rousseau  among 
French  writers.  Promptly  at  ten  he  retired  for  the  night. 

Mental  Qualities. — Kant  was  pre-eminently  the  thinker 
rather  than  the  actor;  he  lived  in  an  intellectual  sphere  and 
not  in  the  world  of  practical  affairs.  Because  of  long  brooding 
over  problems  of  metaphysics  his  whole  attitude  towards  the 
world  became  cold  and  reserved,  evincing  few  traces  of  warmth 
or  emotional  sympathy.  Although  he  looked  with  favor  upon 
the  American  and  French  revolutions  and  on  the  cause  of  politi- 
cal freedom  among  all  classes,  it  was  a  sympathy  born  of  the 
intellect  and  not  of  the  heart.  The  laws  of  human  progress 
required  an  increasing  respect  towards  the  dignity  of  man,  and 
Kant  beheld  in  political  liberty  a  single  phase  of  human  free- 
dom. He  had  an  especial  dislike  for  music,  believing  it  to  be 
a  waste  of  time  and  energy, — well  enough  perhaps  for  women 
who  had  nothing  else  with  which  to  occupy  their  attention,  but 
not  worthy  of  consideration  by  the  man  of  serious  mind.  Of 


188  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

the  other  aesthetic  arts,  poetry  alone  appealed  to  him,  and 
among  the  poets  Lucretius,  Horace,  and  Pope  were  his  favorites. 
Eloquence  was  the  object  of  special  aversion  to  him,  and  he  is 
said  to  have  often  declared  that  oratory  attains  its  object 
through  vain  deceit.  It  is  almost  needless  to  say  that  Kant 
never  married;  he  was  too  much  the  philosopher  to  subject  his 
independence  to  his  passions.  He  entertained  no  very  high 
regard  for  women  in  general,  and  believed  marriage  of  advan- 
tage only  for  rational  ends,  such  as  position  or  wealth. 

With  reference  to  religion  Kant  is  the  same  critical  phi- 
losopher. He  regarded  Christ  as  simply  a  personified  Idea  of 
Goodness  which  "reason  presents  to  us  for  imitation/'  But 
beyond  this  religion  of  reason  Kant  had  little  sympathy  with 
formal  Christianity.  He  avoided  all  attendance  at  church  and 
"  spoke  contemptuously  of  all  acts  of  worship."  Yet  there 
have  been  few  men  in  modern  times  who  have  had  a  more 
lasting  influence  on  the  deeper  phases  of  Christianity  or  have 
contributed  more  towards  a  rational  theology.  Perhaps  the 
deepest  and  firmest  element  in  Kant's  character  was  his  rever- 
ence for  simple  morality.  From  his  earliest  boyhood  he  had 
respected  the  moral  conscience  above  all  else,  and  sought  in  later 
life  to  raise  it  to  a  position  higher  than  that  of  the  speculative 
reason. 

To  say  that  Kant  was  free  from  all  emotions  is  certainly  an 
exaggeration.  He  was  often  dogmatic  in  the  expression  of  his 
views,  disliked  contradiction  under  all  circumstances,  and 
evinced  unmistakable  signs  of  anger  when  his  old  servant, 
Lampe,  disobeyed  his  orders.  Although  modest  in  the  estima- 
tion of  his  own  worth,  he  was  not  always  just  towards  those 
who  were  opposed  to  the  Critical  Philosophy.  Long  reflection 
made  it  difficult  for  him  to  appreciate  the  opinions  of  others, 
especially  when  they  could  not  readily  find  a  place  in  his  own 
thought. 

Death. — Towards  the  close  of  the  century  Kant's  former 
powers  began  to  fail.  He  no  longer  experienced  the  same  pleas- 


IMMANUEL   KANT.  189 

lire  in  the  conversations  of  his  friends  or  the  same  interest  in 
contemporary  affairs.  His  writings  became  less  coherent  and 
concise  and  at  the  same  time  more  dogmatic  in  tone.  Finally, 
towards  the  end  of  the  year  1803,  it  was  evident  that  he  could 
not  live  much  longer,  and  on  February  12,  1804,  he  breathed  his 
last.  When  the  news  of  his  death  spread  over  Konigsberg,  a 
soldier  pointed  to  a  small  cloud  in  the  zenith,  and  said,  "  Be- 
hold, that  is  Kant's  soul  flying  heavenward."  Thus  died  one  of 
the  profoundest  and  noblest  men  who  has  ever  lived. 

PROBLEMS  or  THE  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY. 

In  the  exposition  of  Kant's  philosophical  system  one  meets 
with  two  difficulties, — its  minuteness  and  its  scope.  Between 
this  Scylla  and  Charybdis  the  expounder  of  Kant  must  steer 
his  course.  As  regards  its  scope,  it  must  te  remembered  that 
Kant  endeavored  to  bring  all  branches  of  knowledge  within 
the  field  of  the  Critical  Philosophy  and  subject  them  to  its  prin- 
ciples. To  accomplish  this  undertaking  he  had  recourse  to  a 
minuteness  and  detail  altogether  inappreciable,  except  in  the 
writings  of  the  philosopher  himself.  As  a  thinker  he  is  gen- 
erally regarded  as  the  typical  German  metaphysician,  subtle 
but  unintelligible,  except  after  years  of  study.  The  style  in 
which  he  wrote  is  often  obscure  and  not  infrequently  lends 
itself  to  several  interpretations. 

Three  Factors. — In  the  philosophy  of  Kant,  considered  as 
a  whole,  there  are  three  factors  which  give  it  distinctness  of 
form, — rationalism,  empiricism,  and  morality.  During  the 
earlier  years  of  philosophical  study  and  reflection  Kant  was 
under  the  influence  of  the  Leibnitz- Wolffian  school.  He  dis- 
played little  originality  in  metaphysics  and  evinced  a  decided 
disposition  to  follow  the  current  of  the  prevalent  university 
philosophy.  Later,  however,  he  met  the  English  empiricists, 
who  impressed  him  with  the  inadequacy  of  the  rationalistic 
stand-point  and  the  necessity  of  meeting  the  issues  of  a  sceptical 
empiricism.  Hume's  treatment  of  Causality  particularly  trou- 


190  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

bled  him.  He  felt  the  cogency  of  its  position,  and  yet  was 
unwilling  to  accept  it,  since  it  seemed  to  undermine  the  possi- 
bility of  any  science  whatever.  If  the  principle  of  causalty  was 
merely  observed  sequence,  then  the  laws  and  truths  of  science 
have  no  value.  To  reconcile  Leibnitz  and  Hume  was  the  im- 
mediate purpose  of  the  Kantian  philosophy;  but  this  recon- 
ciliation was  by  no  means  the  only  end  in  view.  Kant  had  long 
felt  that  morality  was  superior  to  the  syllogism  of  logic  that 
the  practical  reason  could  approach  nearer  to  ultimate  reality 
than  the  speculative  reason.  With  this  in  view  the  whole 
Critical  Philosophy  culminated  in  the  proof  of  God's  existence 
deduced  from  the  eternal  reality  of  the  moral  law.  His  early 
writings  defined  a  new  empirico-rationalism,  through  which 
Kant  was  able  to  reassert  the  validity  of  science;  the  later 
works  carried  this  same  stand-point  beyond  the  physical  world 
into  the  range  of  moral  ideals. 

The  Motive. — Kant  set  before  himself  the  problem  of 
human  knowledge,  and  the  peculiar  solution  which  he  offered 
is  known  as  the  "  Critical  Philosophy."  This  aims  to  criticise^ 
the  data  of  experience  and  at  the  same  time  to  define  the  laws 
necessarily  implied  in  the  apprehension  of  experience,  the 
origin  of  these  laws,  their  nature,  and  their  limits.  This  ex- 
amination, however,  of  the  presuppositions  of  science  and  the 
validity  of  empirical  knowledge  was  subordinate  to  Kant's 
especial  task  of  raising  the  authority  of  the  moral  conscious- 
ness above  that  of  the  reason.  Thus,  there  appears  to  be  two 
distinct,  although  in  the  end  identical,  aspects  of  the  Kantian 
system, — the  criticism  of  the  sense-impression  and  the  proper 
estimation  of  the  moral  consciousness;  the  former  is  made 
prominent  by  the  "  Critique  of  Pure  Reason"  alone,  while  the 
latter  is  in  evidence  when  one  considers  this  work  in  connection 
with  the  "  Critique  of  Practical  Reason" 

Kantian  Terminology. — At  the  time  when  Kant  wrote,  the 
meaning  of  philosophical  terms  was  much  less  firmly  fixed  than 
at  present.  Especially  was  this  true  in  Germany,  where  Wolff 


IMMANUEL   KANT.  191 

and  Baumgarten,  but  a  few  years  before,  had  distinctly  defined 
for  the  first  time  the  use  of  the  German  language  in  technical 
philosophy.  The  original  stand-point  of  Kant's  system,  to- 
gether with  the  paucity  of  philosophical  terms,  made  it  neces- 
sary for  him  to  define  new  meanings  and  attach  to  them  new 
words.  This  makes  the  terminology  of  the  Critical  Phi- 
losophy a  study  in  itself  and  renders  its  translation  into  popular 
language  a  difficult  and  precarious  task.  The  understanding 
of  Kant's  system  demands  an  acquaintance  with  a  few  at  least 
of  these  terms,  especially  as  they  are  now  in  use  in  general 
philosophical  literature. 

THE  "CRITIQUE  OF  PURE  REASON." 

The  Logical  Judgments  of  Science. — It  was  earlier  re- 
marked that  the  problem  of  the  "  Critique  of  Pure  Reason" 
was  chiefly  concerned  with  the  foundations  of  science.  With 
this  inquiry  before  him  Kant  considered  it  necessary  to  define 
with  considerable  care  the  methods  of  reasoning  employed  in 
mathematics  and  science,  and  also  the  general  type  of  logical 
judgment  indicated  by  scientific  statements.  It  is  an  ancient 
conception  in  logic  whic^  distinguishes  between  those  thoughts 
or  judgments  which  really  join  two  separate  facts  or  concep- 
tions and  those  other  word  statements  which  merely  repeat 
the  same  idea,  as  A  =  A.  The  former  class  Kant  called  "  syn- 
thetic" because  they  indicate  a  synthesis  or  progress  of  ideas; 
whereas  the  latter  class,  which  are  mere  redundant  expressions, 
were  called  by  him  "  analytic."  Thus  the  judgment  "  that  leaf 
is  large"  is  a  synthetic  expression,  for  the  two  distinct  and 
unrelated  ideas  "  leaf"  and  "  largeness"  are  united  in  a  single 
statement.  But  when  we  say  "the  leaf  is  a  leaf,"  it  is  quite 
obvious  that  no  progress  of  thought  had  been  made,  and 
the  statement  is  a  useless  redundancy, — and  is  therefore 
"  analytic." 

Still  again,  Kant  lays  special  stress  upon  a  distinction  be- 
tween judgments  which  depend  on  their  apparent  necessity 


192  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

and  universality.  Thus  it  would  be  agreed  that  the  statement 
"boats  float  "on  the  water"  is  universal  and  carries  with  it  a 
sort  of  implicit  necessity  which  receives  the  assent  of  everybody. 
But  if  one  said  "  this  boat  is  white,"  the  statement  has  little  or 
no  meaning  until  the  special  boat  referred  to  is  made  known; 
for  some  boats  are  white  and  some  are  not.  It  is  therefore 
possible  to  distinguish  among  judgments  two  broad  classes. 
One  may  be  said  to  include  all  those  propositions  which  are 
universally  valid  so  far  as  human  thought  and  experience  are 
concerned, — such,  for  example,  as  "boats  float  on  the  water," 
"two  plus  two  make  four,"  "barium  sulphate  is  practically 
insoluble  in  water,"  or  the  law  of  gravity.  These  are  called  by 
Kant  " a  priori"  in  so  far  as  they  seem  to  be  based  on  a  sort 
of  implicit  necessity.  In  contradistinction  to  these  judgments 
of  universally  valid  facts  there  is  a  second  class,  which  in- 
cludes the  simple  descriptive  statements  of  but  a  single  experi- 
ence,— "  this  boat  is  white,"  "  that  man  is  tall,"  or  "  that  salt 
is  deliquescent."  These,  it  will  be  observed,  are  not  scientific 
or  true  facts  until  the  boat,  the  man,  or  the  salt  is  directly  indi- 
cated by  some  description;  the  statements  are  true  only  for  a 
limited  portion  of  the  extent  of  human  experience;  whereas 
the  a  priori  judgments  of  the  former  class  may  be  re- 
garded as  true  throughout  the  whole  length  and  breadth  of 
our  possible  experience.  This  second  class  of  statements 
whose  truth  is  limited  to  a  single  observation  Kant  calls  "a 
posteriori" 

The  Value  of  Synthetic  Judgments. — And,  furthermore, 
it  is  readily  seen  from  the  foregoing  analysis  that  it  is  pos- 
sible to  divide  all  judgments  into  four  subclasses  by  first 
classifying  them  into  synthetic  and  analytic  and  then  dividing 
each  of  these  groups  in  its  turn  into  a  priori  and  a  pos- 
teriori judgments.  Of  these  four  classes,  however,  the  two 
comprising  the  analytic  statements  are  of  little  or  no  conse- 
quence, since  they  are  mere  redundant  expressions.  The  syn- 
thetic judgments  a  priori  and  a  posteriori,  on  the  contrary, 


IMMANUEL   KANT.  193 

are  of  great  value,  because  it  is  by  their  means  that  we  can 
attain  to  scientific  knowledge.  But  a  synthetic  judgment  is 
one  that  connects  two  ideas  of  a  distinctly  different  char- 
acter in  such  a  manner  that  we  regard  the  relation  as  true. 
There  is  therefore  a  kind  of  mystery  connected  with  these  syn- 
thetic judgments,  for  they  are  able  to  express  true  relations 
between  apparently  disconnected  and  heterogeneous  ideas.  In 
the  case  of  the  class  of  synthetic  judgments  a  posteriori  we 
have  direct  experience  to  appeal  to  in  establishing  this  relation 
of  truth.  When  I  make  the  synthetic  a  posteriori  judgment 
"  this  boat  is  white"  I  connect  the  different  ideas  of  "  boat"  and 
"  whiteness"  by  means  of  the  sensations  of  sight  and  touch. 
But  these  sensations  of  sight  and  touch  cannot  penetrate  beyond 
the  boat  directly  before  me  to  all  boats  of  possible  experience, 
hence  the  judgment  is  valid  only  with  reference  to  \  certain 
definite  circumstance.  From  this  example  it  is  readily  seen 
that  in  the  case  of  synthetic  judgments  a  posteriori  we  have 
the  ground  for  the  assurance  of  their  truths  directly  derived 
from  the  certainty  of  sense-impression,  but  for  that  very  reason 
the  assurance  is  restricted  to  the  momentary  experience  be- 
fore us. 

Synthetic  Judgments  a  priori. — When,  in  the  second  place, 
we  inquire  regarding  the  basis  of  our  certainty  in  the  synthetic 
judgments  a  priori  we  approach  a  question  much  more  difficult 
to  answer.  For  when  we  say  "  boats  float  on  the  water"  we 
assert  that  at  any  time  or  in  any  place  we  shall  find  this  state- 
ment true,  although  our  own  restricted  experience  allows  us  to 
examine  but  a  small  number  of  all  the  boats  that  ever  were  or 
ever  will  be  built  and  only  a  small  portion  of  all  the  water  that 
exists.  Yet,  notwithstanding  this  restriction,  we  feel  able  to 
assert  as  a  fact  of  scientific  knowledge  that  this  statement  is 
necessarily  and  universally  true.  In  the  case  of  synthetic 
judgments  a  posteriori  we  had  direct  experience  to  rely  upon, 
but  with  a  priori  judgments  this  is  entirely  lacking.  What, 
then,  is  their  ground  of  truth  and  assurance?  Or  in  Kant's 

13 


194  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

wording,  How  are  synthetic  judgments  a  priori  possible?6 
This  is  the  immediate  problem  of  the  ff  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason/'  through  the  answer  to  which  he  hopes  to  reconcile 
empiricism  and  rationalism  and  thereby  permanently  relieve 
science  from  scepticism. 

The  knowledge  within  the  fields  of  mathematics,  natural 
science,  and  metaphysics  consists  of  synthetic  judgments  a  pri- 
ori,, and  the  field  of  these  judgments  is  co-extensive  with  the 
limits  of  possible  knowledge.  With  this  in  mind  Kant  recog- 
nized that  if  he  should  determine  the  extent  of  the  possibility 
of  the  synthetic  judgments  a  priori  he  would  have  really  deter- 
mined the  extent  of  the  possible  knowledge  of  man.  Kant's 
new  problem  of  the  ff  Critique  of  Pure  Reason"  is  in  truth, 
nothing  else  than  the  old  problem  of  Aristotle,  Nicolas  of  Cusa, 
Locke,  and  Hume,  —  the  limits  of  human  knowledge. 

The  Three  Faculties  of  the  Mind.  —  In  order  to  deal  with 
this  problem  of  the  possibility  of  synthetic  judgments  a  priori 
it  was  necessary  to  consider  the  various  circumstances  under 
which  they  could  arise.  For  it  would  seem  quite  obvious  that 
the  same  solution  to  the  problem  could  not  be  applied  to  those 
very  complex  processes  of  thought  which  might  be  found  suffi- 
cient in  cases  where  the  mind  only  made  simple  judgments  of 
apprehension.  The  differences  in  the  complexity  of  the  various 
mental  activities  would  render  a  single  solution  to  the  problem 
inadmissible.  In  brief,  it  was  necessary  to  divide  the  mind  into 
its  different  regions  of  activity  and  then  search  for  the  ground 
of  the  possibility  of  synthetic  judgments  a  priori  within  each 
field.  In  order  to  accomplish  this  the  ff  Critique  of  Pure  Rea- 
son" is  divided  into  three  distinct  parts,  each  of  which  relates  to 
a  special  aspect  of  the  mind.  At  first  Kant  is  concerned  with 
the  reception  of  our  knowledge,  —  that  is,  the  mere  intuitioji 
and  tfllvnlfl.f.irm  nf  t.hft  fp*fo  flf  ftYpftriftnf.ftj  an  operation  of  the 


B"Wie  sind  synthetische  Urteile  &  priori  moglich?"—  Kritik  der 
reinen  Vernunf  t,  Second  Edition,  p.  19. 


IMMANUEL  KANT.  195 

mind  which  is  accomplished  by  the  function  or  faculty  of 
sensibility.6  But,  besides  this  mere  reception,  the  experiences 
of  sense  and  imagination  must  be  arranged  and  systematized  in 
order  to  be  of  use  in  the  processes  of  thought.  For  this  purpose 
Kant  suggests  a  second  faculty,  that  of  the  understanding,7 
which  analyzes  and  arranges  the  data  presented  to  it  by  the 
sensibility.  Beyond  this  power  of  arrangement  of  the  under- 
standing there  is  still  another  faculty  of  the  mind,  the  reason,8 
which  attempts  to  carry  the  facts  of  sense  beyond  their  legiti- 
mate limits  and  into  the  field  of  abstract  metaphysical  construc- 
tions. The  term  faculty  does  not  imply  that  there  are  three 
unrelated  regions  of  the  mind,  each  one  of  which  operates  by 
independent  laws.  On  the  contrary,  Kant  insists  that  the  mind 
is  a  unity  in  itself  and  that  these  so-called  faculties  are  only 
the  different  aspects,  functions,  or  modes  of  its  operation. 

The  "  Thing-in-itself."— -With  this  threefold  classification 
of  our  mental  activities  clearly  defined,  the  further  treatment 
of  the  original  problem  regarding  synthetic  judgments  a  priori 
would  quite  naturally  take  the  form  of  what  we  might  call  a 
natural  history  of  the  ordinary  processes  of  knowledge.  This 
would  take  the  form  of  an  account  of  How  we  obtain  knowledge, 
it  would  attempt  to  trace  each  step  of  the  mind  through  the 
three  faculties  from  the  single  sense-perceptions  to  the  formula- 
tion of  the  highly  abstract  conceptions  of  metaphysics.  Such  an 
historical  sketch  would  point  out  the  general  nature  of  each  men- 
tal process  and  describe  the  conditions  under  which  it  occurred. 
While  tracing  the  natural  history  of  our  mental  processes 
we  shall  later  discover  that  Kant  is  a  rationalistic-idealist  in  so 
far  as  he  recognizes  that  the  mind  and  not  the  outside  world 
is  responsible  for  the  universality  and  necessity  of  all  true 
judgments  of  knowledge,  an  empiricist  in  so  far  as  he  recognizes 
that  the  elements  of  these  judgments  are  ultimately  derived 
from  sense-impressions.  In  order,  however,  for  any  idealism  to 

6  ShuHcbkeit.  7  Verstand.  8  Vermmft. 


196  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

reconcile  itself  with  the  hard  stubbornness  or  the  given  quality 
of  our  world  of  fact,  it  has  always  felt  the  necessity  of  some 
purely  objective,  external,  or  non-idealistic  element.  Thus 
Berkeley,  influenced  by  religious  motives,  defined  God  as  the 
ultimate  source  of  our  true  ideas, — or  synthetic  judgments 
a  priori,  as  the  critical  mind  of  Kant  would  have  called  the  God- 
given  ideas  of  Berkeley.  And  in  the  same  manner  Kant  found 
it  necessary  to  trace  our  knowledge  back  to  some  external  source, 
only  his  clear  insight  found  it  difficult  to  explain  the  partially 
comprehensible  facts  of  knowledge  by  the  incomprehensible 
nature  of  God.  On  the  contrary,  he  sought  the  simplest  and 
perhaps  least  objectionable  realistic  basis  for  any  idealism,  the 
mere  unqualified  existence  of  a  something  existing  outside  of 
space  and  time  and  beyond  our  exact  knowledge,  but  a  some- 
thing which  might  serve  as  the  logical  background  for  our 
world  of  experience.  This  unknowable  substratum  of  sensation 
Kant  called  the  "  thing-in-itself  (Ding-an-sich).  It  must  not 
be  confused  with  the  "  substance"  of  Locke  and  the  Scholastics, 
for  the  "  thing-in-itself "  is  a  spaceless,  timeless,  and  causeless 
entity,  the  conception  of  which  is  entirely  original  with  Kant. 
It  is,  even  in  his  case,  ultimately  traceable  to  an  inference  from 
experience,  for  he  sympathizes  above  all  else  with  the  empirical 
stand-point.  "  As  regards  temporal  antecedence,"  Kant  says, 
in  the  introduction  to  the  second  edition  of  the  "  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason/'  "  there  is  no  knowledge  within  our  mind  which 
was  not  first  in  experience."  He  thus  begins  with  apparently 
the  same  empirical  presupposition  as  Locke,  only  Kant  recog- 
nizes in  experience  something"  deeper  than  its  mere  givenness. 
This  he  finds  in  the  logical  reality  of  the  "thing-in-itself"  a 
non-sensuous  but  real  something,  which  somehow  underlies  our 
apprehension  of  the  outsidje* world.  This  strange  "thing-in- 
itself"  is  the  basis  or  original  starting-point  for  our  natural 
history  of  the  mental  processes.  The  only  conception  we  can 
possibly  form  of  it — and  even  this  meagre  conception  refers 
only  to  its  existence  and  not  to  any  qualities  it  might  possess — 


IMMANUEL  KANT.  197 

may  be  obtained  by  abstracting  from  some  object  all  its  spacial 
or  temporal  characteristics,  and  the  mere  "  skeleton"  which 
remains  is  some  approach  to  Kant's  "  thing-in-itselJ."  Its 
nature  will  perhaps  become  somewhat  clearer  if  we  proceed  to 
trace  the  conditions  under  which  it  may  affect  the  mind. 

The  Sensibility. — ITS  FORMS  OF  APPREHENSION. — The  im- 
pression from  the  outside  unknowable  "  thing-in-itself"  comes 
first,  to  the  mind  as  a  mere  stimulus  which,  owing  to  its  space- 
less and  timeless  character,  altogether  evades  consciousness.  It 
is  Kant's  original  interpretation  of  the  knowing  process  that 
this  external  stimulus  to  experience  is  received  by  the  mind 
according  to  its  own  laws  of  perception.  It  is  the  faculty  of 
sensibility  which  first  reacts  on  the  "  thing-in-itself,"  and  in 
so  doing  impresses  upon  it  the  conditional  elements  of  space 
and  time.  They  are  the  universal  qualities  of  every  experience, 
the  peculiar  and  distinctive  tools  or  instruments  which  the 
faculty  of  sensibility  employs  in  the  perception  of  the  unknow- 
able "  thing-in-itself."  In  other  words,  space  and  time  are  the 
instrumental  conditions  or  formula?  of  procedure  and  tabula- 
tion by  which  the  mind  perceives  the  external  source  of  its 
ideas.  They  are  not,  as  wrong  interpretations  of  Kant  would 
seem  to  imply,  the  arbitrary  creations  of  the  sensibility  which 
are  somehow  made  and  then  objectified  in  order  to  deceive  the 
mind,  but,  on  the  contrary,  they  are  the  necessary  conditions 
or  methods  without  which  the  mind  could  not  react  on  the  real 
external  world ;  from  a  similar  stand-point  one  might  consider 
warm  temperature  to  be  one  of  the  necessary  conditions  without 
which  life  could  not  continue,  or  feet,  to  use  a  simple  illustra- 
tion, the  necessary  condition  for  animal  locomotion.  Just  as  a 
man  who  has  always  worn  red  spectacles  would  perceive  the 
external  world  in  terms  of  redness,  or  the  person  under  the  in- 
fluence of  opium  would  look  at  the  world  through  the  veil 
which  this  drug  impresses  upon  the  mind,  so  space  and  time 
are  the  universal  media  by  which  the  human  intellect  appre- 
hends its  experiences. 


198  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

THE  "  PHENOMENON." — Should  one  wake  up  in  the  morn- 
ing and  find  that  everything  experienced  had  a  red  color  and 
that  nothing  could  be  conceived  except  as  veiled  in  this  redness 
it  is  by  no  means  improbable  that  the  conclusion  would  be 
drawn  that  the  redness  was  a  result  of  some  peculiarity  of  the 
mind.  From  a  similar  stand-point  Kant,  finding  that  space  and 
time  are  the  universally  necessary  elements  of  all  experience, 
failed  to  account  for  them  in  any  other  way  than  as  subjectiie 
forms  of  apprehension.  By  so  doing  he  ceased  to  regard  our 
sensuous  experiences  as  the  ultimately  simple  (after  Locke  and 
Hume),  but  rather  as  the  secondary  constituents  of  knowledge. 
The  term  "  appearance"  (object  of  sense-perception),9  and  later 
the  word  "  phenomenon/'  was  employed  by  Kant  to  denote  those 
constituent  elements  of  our  knowledge  which  result  from  the 
action  of  the  subjective  forms  of  space  and  time  on  the  un- 
knowable "  thing-in-itself ."  They  are  the  "  objects"  of  every- 
day experience,  the  common  facts  given  us  by  sensation. 

SYNTHETIC  JUDGMENTS  A  PRIORI  IN  MATHEMATICS. — Sir 
William  Eowan  Hamilton,  the  originator  of  the  calculus  of 
quaternions,  called  algebra  the  science  of  time  and  geometry 
the  science  of  space.  Under  one  or  both  of  these  most  general 
forms  it  is  perhaps  possible  to  subsume  every  branch  of  modern 
mathematics.  Hamilton  was  a  disciple  of  Kant  in  metaphysics, 
and  this  observation  well  illustrates  the  stand-point  of  the 
Critical  Philosophy  towards  mathematical  science.  If  the 
mathematical  truths  have  their  source  in  an  ultimate  reference 
to  space  and  time  they  would  rest  on  a  humanistic,  subjective, 
or  idealistic  element;  they  would  be  referable  to  conditions  of 
mental  apprehension  rather  than  to  the  external  world.  Now, 
since  the  mere  forms  of  spacial  and  temporal  apprehension  are 
identical  for  all  men  throughout  all  possible  ranges  of  experi- 
ence, then  what  is  true  with  reference  to  the  space  and  time  of 

• "  Erscheinungen  (Gegenstande  der  sinnlichen  Anschauung)." — 
Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  Second  Edition,  p.  52. 


IMMANUEL  KANT.  199 

one  person  remains  true  to  everybody  at  all  times.  Thus,  if  I 
assert  that  within  the  Euclidian  postulates  three  angles  of  a 
triangle  are  equal  to  a  straight  angle,  I  have  declared  what  is 
true  to  every  person  under  any  condition,  because  the  space  in 
which  this  proposition  holds  true  is  the  same  space  as  that 
through  which  we  all  receive  our  experiences.  This  proposition 
is  universally  and  necessarily  true,  because  it  is  required  by 
what  is  universal  and  necessary  for  all  mankind, — space.  This 
is  the  reply  by  which  Kant  himself  answers  his  original  ques- 
tion :  How  are  synthetic  judgments  a  priori  possible  in  mathe- 
matics ?  They  are  possible  because  space  and  time,  the  forms  of 
mathematics,  are  subjective  elements  universal  for  all  men 
under  all  circumstances. 

"  TRANSCENDENTAL  FORM." — Our  experiences,  hitherto  con- 
sidered so  simple  and  so  ultimate,  seem  to  appear  in  a  new 
light  if  the  bearing  of  this  theory  of  Kant  is  understood.  And 
especially  interesting  does  this  analysis  of  experience  appear 
if  considered  in  connection  with  Hume's  sceptical  attitude 
towards  the  sciences.  The  Scotchman  had  left  philosophy  in 
an  unhappy  plight.  While  resting  all  the  assurance  of  knowl- 
edge on  experience  he  had  in  the  next  breath  shown  that  experi- 
ence gives  us  no  basis  for  such  an  assurance.  Driven  to  this 
stand-point  by  the  irresistible  logic  of  the  Briton,  Kant  sought 
to  re-establish  the  dignity  of  mathematics  and  the  sciences  by 
criticising  experience.  He  recognized  that  Hume's  position  was 
unassailable  so  long  as  the  experience  itself  was  considered  ulti- 
mate, but  by  analyzing  this  experience  he  hoped  to  avoid  a 
sceptical  outcome.  The  " thing-in-itself ,"  like  the  "impres- 
sions" of  Hume,  can  itself  lead  us  nowhere,  but  the  phenomenon 
.formed  by  the  union  of  this  "thing-in-itself"  with  space  and 
time  may  lead  us  to  true  knowledge  through  the  subjective  uni- 
versality of  the  latter  elements.  These  two  necessary  forms  of 
experience,  by  which  Kant  is  able  to  escape  the  scepticism  of 
Hume,  were  called  by  him  "  transcendental;'  because  their  ex- 
istence is  necessary  for  even  the  possibility  of  experience.  The 


200  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

term  a  priori,  earlier  referred  to  in  connection  with  universal 
and  necessary  judgments,  is  often  used  with  a  similar  signifi- 
cance, for  it  is  by  means  of  the  implicit  necessity  which  attaches 
itself  to  the  transcendental  elements,  that  the  a  priori  judg- 
ments are  possible.  Briefly  defined,  the  transcendental  elements 
in  the  "  Critique  of  Pure  Reason"  are  those  forms  which  are 
necessarily  required  by  the  very  nature  of  the  possibility  of 
experience  itself.  This  term  must  not  be  confused  with  tran- 
scendent, which  has  an  altogether  different  meaning,  the  latter 
referring  to  that  which  goes  beyond  or  transcends  all  possible 
experience, — as  God  and  the  conception  of  the  world's  be- 
ginning. 

The  Understanding. — We  have  just  seen  that  the  faculty 
of  the  sensibility  has  transcendental  ways  of  looking  at  experi- 
ence, and  we  now  have  to  inquire  as  to  the  nature  of  the  second 
faculty  of  the  mind,  the  understanding.  It  is  here  that  the 
phenomena  produced  by  the  sensibility  from  the  "thing-in- 
itself"  and  its  transcendental  elements  of  space  and  time  are 
synthesized  into  the  propositions,  thoughts,  and  statements 
of  scientific  knowledge.  That  is,  the  understanding  is  the 
faculty  that  judges;  it  brings  together,  according  to  the  nat- 
ural laws  of  thought,  the  mere  unconnected  experiences  or 
phenomena  presented  to  it  by  the  sensibility.  The  understand- 
ing is  an 'active  faculty,  for  besides  the  mere  reception  of  the 
phenomena  from  fhe  sensibility,  it  is  able  to  rethink,  according 
to  its  own  laws,  these  phenomena  into  the  distinct  propositions 
of  thought. 

THE  MEDIACY  OF  ALL  EXPERIENCES. — But  before  we  inquire 
into  these  laws  by  which  the  understanding  unites  the  experi- 
ences it  may  be  possible  to  simplify  the  task  by  the  discovery  of 
some  general  character  common  to  all  experience.  We  have 
all  probably  observed  that  no  single  experience  comes  to  us 
entirely  disconnected  from  its  context  in  thought.  When  we 
recognize  the  experience  of  something,  say  a  mountain,  the 
mere  sensuous  perception  is  never  unmixed  with  the  memory  of 


IMMANUEL  KANT.  201 

some  other  experiences  which  it  serves  to  recall,  or  with  the 
train  of  thought  which  it  initiates.    The  perception  never  occurs    l 
emotions.     It  is  quite  true  that  these  psychological  processes  3 
pure,  it  is  always  set  in  a  context  of  other  ideas,  thoughts,  and     ^ 
which  accompany  the  mere  perception  are  seldom  consciously 
recognized,  they  are  noted  only  by  subsequent  reflection.    This 
elementary  fact  of  psychology,  that  all  our  experiences  are 
united  by   subtle  bonds   of  subconscious  thought,   is  known 
as  the  interrelatedness  or  mediacy  of  experience.     By  sup- 
plying a  ground  or  point  of  reference  for  all  experiences, 
even  of  the  most  diverse  character,  it  gives  unity  to  our  con- 
sciousness and  purposive  form  to  our  life. 

Although  one  may  perhaps  doubt  that  all  our  experiences 
are  as  intimately  connected  with  one  another  as  this  description 
might  imply,  we  would  all  probably  agree  with  Kant  that  the 
flow  of  time  at  least  is  a  bond  of  unity  for  every  experience.  It 
is  always  possible  to  connect  two  experiences  by  the  before  and 
after  relation,  by  representing  them  both  in  one  temporal  series. 
It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  the  continuity  of  time  is  the 
simplest  form  of  mediacy,  for  every  fact  of  our  conscious  life 
has  some  relative  position  in  the  temporal  series,  and  no  ex- 
perience can  be  even  thought  which  has  not  a  place  in  time. 

THE  TRANSCENDENTAL  SELF. — Although  this  mediacy  or 
connectiveness  of  experience  may  appear  to  be  very  simple  and 
hardly  worth  mentioning,  it  seems  to  carry  with  it  consequences 
of  a  most  important  character.  To  illustrate  what  is  involved 
in  the  unitv  of  our  temporal  consciousness  let  us  take  the  ex- 
perience of  a  single  event  and  trace  its  logical  implications. 
When  I  cast  my  eyes  towards  the  west  we  will  say  that  a  certain 
pointed  irregularity  meets  my  gaze.  At  first  I  merely  appre- 
hend or  perceive  it,  but  coincident  with  the  mere  unconscious 
perception  there  comes  the  thought, — what  is  it  ?  To  this  half- 
conscious  query  there  appear  the  vague  images  of  other  experi- 
ences which  I  momentarily  reproduce  in  my  imagination.  By 
means  of  these  images  of  other  experiences  I  am  able  to  recog- 


202  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

nize  that  this  irregularity  in  the  landscape  denotes  a  mountain. 
From  certain  topographical  features  I  recognize  that  the  moun- 
tain is  familiar  to  me,  it  recalls  past  experiences,  it  serves  to 
unite  my  present  consciousness  to  the  thoughts  and  experiences 
of  other  days.  An  occurrence  like  this  is  constantly  happening 
to  all  of  us,  but  owing  to  its  familiarity  we  have  long  since 
ceased  to  wonder  at  the  process  or  examine  its  nature.  But  yet 
there  is  something  very  striking  about  this  power  of  a  single 
sensation  to  awaken  nearly  forgotten  memories  of  the  past  and 
to  change  the  whole  current  of  our  thought.  Through  all 
these  past  experiences  thus  reproduced  in  memory  there  must 
have  been  a  certain  sameness  or  unity,  else  the  single  experience 
of  the  familiar  mountain  would  have  been  unable  to  bring  them 
into  consciousness.  In  fact  the  existence  of  a  certain  unper- 
ceived  bond  of  unity — my  own  self -bond — is  presupposed  by 
the  simplest  unity  or  mediacy  of  our  experience.  This  inner- 
most Ego/  whose  function  it  is  to  bind  together  into  a  single 
conscious  life  all  the  experiences  of  a  person,  is  never  itself 
perceived.  Yet  unless  we  presuppose  its  existence  the  experi- 
ences of  the  past  would  lack  all  familiarity;  we  would  be  con- 
scious only  of  the  momentary  present.  We  only  appreciate  the 
existence  of  this  deepest  self  because  experience,  as  we  know  it, 
would  be  impossible  without  such  a  bond  of  unity ;  its  existence 
is  inferred  as  the  necessary  condition  for  the  possibility  of  our 
common  experiences.  In  a  previous  paragraph  those  elements 
which  were  necessary  for  our  experience,  as  space  and  time,  were 
denoted  by  the  Kantian  term  "  transcendental/'  And  this  self 
which  we  have  just  described  as  the  central  unity  of  our  con- 
scious life  is  the  "transcendental  Ego."  Although  it  can  never 
itself  be  directly  perceived,  its  binding  nature  is  demanded  btt^ 
the  unity  of  our  conscious  life. 

THE  CATEGORIES. — It  is  now  possible  for  us  to  return  to 
the  laws  of  the  understanding,  for  we  are  able  to  perceive  that  \ 
there  is  a  transcendental  element,  the  Ego,  involved  in  the 
experiences  or  phenomena  with  which  the  understanding  deals. 


IMMANUEL  KANT.  203 

The  operations  of  this  faculty  are  above  all  else  orderly.  The 
very  fact  that  in  the  background  lies  the  transcendental  Ego, 
synthesizing  all  the  experiences  into  an  interrelated  whole,  re- 
quires that  unity  lies  at  the  very  heart  of  the  understanding. 
And,  moreover,  this  unity  of  the  understanding  shows  itself  in 
the  laws  of  the  judgment,  for  we  earlier  saw  that  judgment  was 
the  special  duty  of  this  faculty.  And  behind  these  laws  there  is 
a  unity  of  motive,  in  that  all  judgments  of  whatever  character 
seek  to  attain  the  truth.  Now  since  this  unity  of  the  under- 
standing rests  on  the  transcendental  Ego,  the  laws  by  which 
this  faculty  acts  must  themselves  be  transcendental.  In  other 
words,  the  laws  of  the  understanding,  or,  as  Kant  calls  them, 
the  Categories,  are,  like  space  and  time,  transcendental  in  their 
nature.  They  are  the  subjective,  or  a  priori,  or  transcendental 
forms  by  which  the  understanding  unites  the  phenomena 
handed  over  to  it  by  the  sensibility ;  the  conditions  which  make 
possible  the  orderly  processes  of  thought.  We  have  thus  dis- 
covered that  the  understanding  as  well  as  the  sensibility  has 
certain  rules  or  formal  conditions  which  it  impresses  upon  the 
phenomena.  The  categories,  however,  are  not,  like  space  and 
time,  mere  forms  of  apprehension,  but  rather  the  laws  by  which 
the  understanding  must  operate.  Owing  to  the  unity  and  pur- 
pose of  the  understanding  it  is  possible  to  be  perfectly  sure  as 
to  the  number  and  character  of  these  categories,  for  they  are 
identical  with  the  general  principles  which  the  judgment  em- 
ploys in  its  search  for  the  truth.  They  are  twelve  in  number 
and  are  divided  into  four  groups  of  three  each.  In  Kant's  mind 
they  corresponded  exactly  to  the  laws  of  the  judgment  or  think- 
ing process,  as  exemplified  by  formal  logic.  They  represent  the 
way  the  human  intellect  must  proceed  in  its  thought  in  order  to 
approach  the  ideal  of  truth. 

CAUSALITY. — Of  the  twelve  categories  that  of  causal  relation 
may  be  regarded  as  the  most  important  and  will  be  employed 
to  illustrate  the  general  nature  of  the  others.  Let  us  consider 
for  a  moment  the  case  of  two  billiard-balls  moving  towards  each 


204  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

other.  The  phenomena  of  their  movement,  the  contact,  and 
the  reaction  are  thought  by  the  understanding  under  its  own 
transcendental  laws  or  categories.  The  three  positions  of  the 
billiard-balls  are  not  regarded  as  mere  unconnected  events,  but 
are  rather  united  by  the  understanding  into  a  causal  series. 
Wherever  we  apprehend  nature  the  phenomena  come  to  the 
understanding  unrelated,  in  simple  temporal  succession,  like 
the  observed  sequences  of  impressions  which  was  all  that  Hume 
could  find  in  nature ;  they  are  then  thought  by  the  understand- 
ing according  to  its  own  forms  or  categories.  Causality  does 
not  exist  in  the  world  of  the  "  thing-in-itself,"  it  is  only  one  of 
the  ways  by  which  the  understanding  relates  the  phenomena. 
Causality,  law,  order  are  imposed  upon  the  world  by  the  mind 
and  are  not  found  in  the  world  itself. 

SYNTHETIC  JUDGMENTS  A  PRIORI  IN  SCIENCE. — In  view  of 
this  theory  of  the  transcendental  character  of  the  laws  of 
thought  it  is  not  difficult  for  Kant  to  answer  his  original 
question  concerning  synthetic  judgments  a  priori  in  physical 
science.  For  if  it  is  the  universal  laws  of  the  human  under- 
standing which  give  the  regularity,  unity,  and  apparent  neces- 
sity to  the  world  of  outer  nature,  then  it  is  perfectly  possible 
for  knowledge  to  fall  within  the  limits  of  truth,  so  long  as  it 
arises  from  the  legitimate  exercise  of  the  categories  of  the  un- 
derstanding. The  mind  through  its  faculty  of  the  understand- 
ing impresses  the  laws  upon  nature.  This  faculty  is,  like  the 
sensibility,  universal  among  men,  so  that  the  valid  operation  of 
its  transcendental  elements  will  always  give  rise  to  perfectly 
true  and  scientific  judgments  a  priori, — these  judgments  arise 
from  the  universal  nature  of  the  categories  themselves  and  in 
no  wise  refer  to  the  objective  reality  of  law  in  the  world  of  the 
"  thing-in-itself/'  Thus  far  Kant's  work  has  been  distinctly 
positive.  He  set  before  himself  the  problem:  How  are  syn- 
thetic judgments  a  priori  possible  ?  To  this  he  replies,  they  are 
possible  because  their  a  priori  or  universally  necessary  nature 
arises  from  the  inherent  laws  of  the  mind's  activity,  and  not 


IMMANUEL  KANT.  205 

from  any  externally  valid  relations.  Mathematical  predictions 
remain  true;  scientific  laws  are  universally  accepted  because 
the  transcendental  elements  upon  which  both  depend  are  uni- 
versal and  necessary  for  all  mankind.  The  outer  world  in  its 
absolute  reality,  the  " thing-in-itself,"  is  forever  unknowable; 
the  nature  known  to  our  own  consciousness  is  this  unknowable, 
apprehended  under  the  forms  of  space  and  time  and  interpreted 
in  terms  of  the  categories. 

NOUMEN"A. — It  is  true  that  the  understanding  sometimes 
meets  with  ill-fated  results  when  it  attempts  to  deal  with  con- 
cepts which  are  not  themselves  phenomena,  but  which  arise 
within  the  mind  independently  of  the  sensibility.  These  non- 
spacial  and  non-temporal  concepts  which  the  understanding 
finds  it  cannot  employ  in  its  processes  of  thought  are  called  by 
Kant,  "noumena"  The  self  is  an  example  of  such  a  concept. 
In  its  innermost  nature  the  soul  is  outside  of  time  and  space, 
and  cannot  therefore  be  employed  by  the  understanding  in  its 
processes  of  thought.  All  attempts  to  think  a  "noumenon" 
are  by  their  nature  doomed  to  failure.  Our  mind  can  go  no 
further  than  the  sensibility  permits ;  the  understanding  can  deal 
only  with  its  phenomena.  Kant  thus  far  is  in  agreement  with 
Locke  as  to  the  limits  of  our  sensuous  knowledge,  only  we  shall 
see  later  that  he  denies  the  intuitive  knowledge  of  the  soul  and 
the  rationally  demonstrable  knowledge  of  God. 

Kant's  reply  to  the  scepticism  of  Hume  is  distinctly  ideal- 
istic. Instead  of  refuting  the  observation  of  the  acute  Scotch- 
man that  natural  laws  are  only  observed  sequences,  he  accepts 
it  with  all  that  it  implies,  only  he  asks  us  to  consider  for  a 
moment  the  inner  nature  of  these  sequences.  Criticise  the 
experiences  of  which  the  sequences  consist  and  we  may  not  find 
them  as  simple  as  might  appear  at  first  sight.  The  error  of 
Hume,  according  to  Kant,  consisted  in  the  belief  that  the  given 
impression  was  ultimate.  By  an  analysis  of  experience  Kant 
discovered  not  only  the  objective  and  given,  but  also  a  subjective 
and  universal  character.  Thus  conceived,  the  scepticism  of 


206  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

Hume  vanishes.  Eeality  has  become  internal  rather  than  ex- 
ternal, subjective  instead  of  objective. 

The  Reason. — Although  Kant  rejected  Hume's  attitude  to- 
wards the  possibility  of  a  true  science,  he  did  not  hesitate  to 
follow  him  in  certain  respects.  By  means  of  his  transcendental 
stand-point  he  had  defined  the  limits  of  the  human  intellect, 
and  he  was  disinclined  to  desert  his  convictions.  There  was, 
however,  a  region  of  inquiry  to  which  the  understanding, 
limited  to  a  few  phenomena,  could  not  attain;  and  it  was  the 
office  of  the  third  faculty  of  the  reason  to  investigate  those 
subjects  which  lay  beyond  the  power  of  the  former.  If  we 
regard  the  understanding  as  the  faculty  of  rules™  Kant  believes 
that  the  reason  may  be  defined  as  the  faculty  of  principles.^ 
By  this  Kant  would  indicate  the  highest  power  of  the  mind, — a 
faculty  which  concerns  itself  with  general  propositions  and  con- 
ceptions and  does  not  hesitate  to  penetrate  to  the  broadest  and 
deepest  generalities.  The  operation  and  the  results  of  the  un- 
derstanding are  legitimate,  they  are  founded  directly  on  ex- 
perience and  proceed  no  further  than  the  separate  phenomena 
will  permit.  But,  on  the  contrary,  the  reason  seeks  to  go  far 
beyond  the  legitimate  ground  of  the  phenomena  and  construct 
ideas  of  its  own  from  the  insufficient  data  received  from  the 
understanding. 

THE  IDEAS  OF  THE  KEASON. — In  this  illusory  procedure  of 
the  reason  it  is  especially  concerned  with  the  ideas  of  the  unity 
of  the  soul,  the  ultimate  character  of  the  world,  and  finally 
with  the  Ideal  of  God.  After  repeated  failures  on  the  part  of 
the  baffled  reason  to  establish  anything  of  value,  it  discovers  that 
these  ideas  belong  to  a  realm  beyond  experience  and  higher  than 
the  speculative  faculty  of  man  can  penetrate.  The  manner  in 
which  Kant  shows  the  insufficiency  of  the  speculative  reason  in 

10 «  Vermogen  der  Regeln." — Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  Second  Edi- 
tion, p.  356. 
u  "  Vermogen  der  Principien." — Ibid. 


IMMANUEL  KANT.  207 

the  presence  of  these  problems  has  exerted  a  lasting  influence 
on  later  philosophy.  The  arguments  in  each  case  are  founded 
in  the  fact  that  the  reason  can  never  deal  with  a  totality  of 
phenomena,12  because  the  understanding  cannot  supply  the 
necessary  data.  Totality  implies  a  limited  whole  which  can 
never  under  any  condition  be  attained  through  the  phenomena 
themselves.  And  the  three  central  ideas  are  deduced  from  a 
totality  of  phenomena;  hence  the  reason  is  baffled  in  their 
presence. 

THE  PARALOGISMS  OP  PSYCHOLOGY. — When  the  reason  en- 
deavors to  make  assertions  regarding  the  soul  it  becomes 
involved  in  certain  difficulties  which  Kant  calls  the  "para- 
logisms" They  deal  with  the  presuppositions  of  rational  psy- 
chology and  illustrate  the  results  to  the  reason  in  its  attempt 
to  discover  a  spiritual  essence  of  man,  called_the^gQul,  incor- 
ruptible and  immortal.  The  several  paralogisms  appear  per- 
fectly logical  on  the  surface,  for  they  observe  the  form  of  the 
syllogism  of  logic.  But  when  they  are  further  examined  we 
find  that  the  reason  has  constructed  them  on  the  premise  of  the 
subjective  totality  of  experience.  This,  however,  is  forbidden 
ground,  for  the  concept  of  a  totality  of  phenomena  of  whatever 
character  lies  beyond  the  legitimate  field  of  the  intellect.  Kea- 
son  feels  conscious  that  it  is  able  to  deal  with  the  self  of  self- 
consciousness,  but  fails  in  its  attempt,  because  the  only  self  is 
the  "transcendental  Ego,"  which  we  earlier  saw  was  only  an 
implication  of  experience  and  not  a  reality  directly  perceived. 
In  brief,  the  speculative  reason  of  metaphysics  cannot  know, 
anything  about  the  soul,  because  its  nature  is  bound  up  in  that 
totality  of  experience  which  itself  lies  beyond  all  experience. 
And,  furthermore,  Kant  discards  the  proof  of  the  soul's  exist- 
ence given  by  Descartes.  "  I  think,  therefore  I  am,"  said  the 
Frenchman,  but  Kant  replies  that  the  aot  of  thinking  is  itself 

12 ".  .  .  Anschauungen  die  Allheit  ( universitas )  oder  Totalitat  der 
Bedingungen." — Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  Second  Edition,  p.  379. 


208  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

a  single  experience  and  cannot  lead  us  to  the  reality  of  that 
unity  which  expresses  the  totality  of  all  our  experience.     It 
proves  the  momentary  existence  of  thought,  but  not  the  con- 
^tinuity  of  selfhood. 

THE  ANTINOMIES  OF  COSMOLOGY. — The  soul  is  not  the  only 
forbidden  ground  for  the  reason;  psychology  is  not  the  only 
science  in  which  the  reason  may  go  astray  by  placing  too  great 
reliance  on  its  power.  It  seems  to  be  the  universal  custom  to 
construct  theories  of  the  world, — concerning  its  beginning,  its 
limits  in  space  and  time,  and  the  extent  of  its  physical  laws.  In 
all  these  inquiries,  which  generally  appear  under  the  name  of 
cosmology,  the  human  reason  is  the  guide.  We  are  apt  to 
declare  that  the  world  had  no  beginning,  or  that  freedom  of 
volition  is  impossible,  because  the  opposite  premises  contradict 
reason.  Kant  therefore  set  himself  to  discover  the  real  powers 
of  our  speculative  reason  in  the  presence  of  these  problems,  and 
arrived  at  conclusions  not  altogether  gratifying.  The  reason 
when  confronted  with  the  cosmical  questions  finds  itself  in  a 
strange  predicament.  It  is  able  to  reach  opposing  and  con- 
tradictory solutions  to  the  same  problem  by  equally  valid 
methods  of  procedure.  These  equally  valid  contradictions  are 
called  antinomies  by  Kant.  They  are  four  in  number  and 
represent  the  exertions  of  the  reason  while  trying  to  conceive 
of  the  totality  of  the  world.  The  reason  is  able  to  prove  conclu- 
sively that  the  universe  is  limited  in  time  and  space,  yet  in  the 
next  breath  it  is  able  also  to  prove  the  opposite  or  antithesis. 
Still  again  the  reason  finds  that  invariable  mechanical  laws  are 
universal  in  the  control  of  the  human  will  as  well  as  external 
nature.  Then,  as  if  playing  with  our  convictions,  it  brings 
forward  irresistible  arguments  to  prove  the  necessity  of  free- 
dom. The  antinomies  are  thus  logical  contradictions.  They 
arise  from  the  same  error  that  permeates  the  paralogisms. 
Only  in  the  former  case  the  reason  tried  to  deal  with  the 
totality  of  phenomena  within  the  grasp  of  a  single  conscious- 
ness, here  in  the  antinomies  it  is  the  totality  which  is  repre- 


IMMANUEL   KANT.  209 

sented  by  the  universe;  the  former  was  a  subjective  totality, 
this  latter  is  objective.  We  cannot  grasp  the  origin  of  the 
world,  nor  its  ultimate  nature,  for  these  concepts,  depending  on 
the  conception  of  the  objective  totality  of  all  phenomena,  are 
absolutely  beyond  the  range  of  the  speculative  reason. 

THE  IDEAL  OF  THEOLOGY. — The  third  employment  of  the 
reason  leads  us  to  a  higher  totality  than  belonged  to  either  the 
paralogisms  of  the  soul  or  the  antinomies  of  the  universe. 
He  is  the  ultimate  Ideal  of  Pure  Reason,,  God.  Just  as  the 
reason  sought  to  regard  the  subjective  totality  of  all  our  experi- 
ence as  the  concept  of  the  soul  and  the  objective  totality  of 
phenomena  as  the  concept  of  the  universe,  it  now  endeavors  to 
unite  or  synthesize  these  two  totalities  into  the  all-inclusive 
Ideal  of  God.  Theology,  therefore,  as  a  science,  unites  both  the 
premises  of  psychology  and  cosmology;  the  concept  of  God 
is  the  union  of  the  subjective  and  the  objective, — the  soul 
and  external  nature.  Just  as  surely  as  the  speculative  reason 
failed  in  its  attempt  to  deal  with  the  other  two  ideas,  so  also 
is  it  doomed  to  failure  when  it  seeks  to  conceive  of  the  in- 
finite totality  of  all  possible  phenomena  in  God.  But  further 
than  the  mere  conception  of  God,  the  reason  believes  itself  able 
to  prove  His  existence.  In  the  history  of  previous  philosophy 
Kant  recognizes  three  general  types  of  proof,  all  of  which  are 
familiar  to  the  student.  The  ontological  proof  endeavors  to 
move  from  essence  to  existence,  from  an  Absolute  Concept  to 
the  reality  of  that  concept.  The  cosmological  proof  requires 
a  First  Cause;  while  the  teleological  proof  moves  from  the 
purposes  in  nature  to  their  Divine  Author. 

THE  ONTOLOGICAL  PROOF. — The  ontological  proof,  earlier 
met  with  in  Anselm,  Descartes,  and  Spinoza,  was  believed  by 
Kant  to  lie  at  the  foundation  of  all  rationalistic  conceptions  of 
God.  This  declares  that  the  idea  of  the  Perfect,  which  we 
realize  by  means  of  contrast  with  our  own  imperfection,  must 
have  all  possible  attributes,  else  it  would  not  be  Perfect.  Ex- 
istence, however,  is  a  positive  attribute,  and  therefore  must  be 

14 


210  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

included  in  the  idea  of  the  Perfect.  In  reply  to  this  Kani 
observes  that  the  ideas  of  perfection  and  existence  are  in  nc 
wise  related  to  one  another.  Logic  would  say  that  the  two  ideas 
do  not  belong  to  the  same  universe  of  discourse.  For  although 
I  may  think  of  the  Perfect,  its  nature  is  in  no  wise  affectec 
by  the  further  addition  or  subtraction  of  the  quality  of  exist- 
ence. "  A  hundred  real  dollars/'  observes  Kant,  "  contain  noi 
the  least  more  than  a  hundred  possible  dollars."  13  The  exist 
ence  of  God  is  a  matter  altogether  different  from  the  concep 
of  perfection ;  and  the  former  can  in  no  wise  be  inferred  f ron 
the  latter. 

THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROOF. — The  ontological  proof  is  diffi 
cult  to  comprehend  and  appeals  only  to  those  metaphysically 
inclined.  Another  type  of  proof  which  has  been  long  em 
ployed  to  establish  the  necessary  existence  of  a  Divine  Bein^ 
as  the  Author  of  the  Universe  is  called  the  cosmological  proof 
.It  will  be  remembered  that  Locke  employed  it  as  the  mos 
certain  of  the  proofs  of  God's  existence.  It  starts  with  th< 
intuitive  existence  of  the  thinking  self,  or  some  observed  phe 
nomena,  as  the  premise.  From  this  simple  fact  it  revert 
backward  by  the  law  of  cause  and  effect  to  a  necessary  Firs 
Cause,  the  Author  of  that  series  of  events  of  which  the  sel 
is  the  present  stage.  "I  exist/'  the  cosmological  proof  de 
clares,  "and,  therefore,  God,  the  First  Cause  of  the  univers* 
and  Author  of  my  being,  must  also  exist."  So  stated  it  i 
observed  that  the  premises  of  the  cosmological  proof  are  reall; 
three  in  number, — the  existence  of  the  self  or  some  observe* 
phenomena,  the  absolute  reality  of  the  law  of  cause  and  effect 
and  the  impossibility  of  an  infinite  series  of  events.  To  ou 
minds,  inclined  to  the  ordinary  ways  of  thinking,  the  greate 
simplicity  of  this  proof  is  perhaps  more  convincing  than  th 
subtility  of  the  ontological  proof.  But  not  so  in  Kant's  estima 
tion;  the  cosmological  proof  is  a  form  only  of  the  more  funda 

18  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  Second  Edition,  p.  627. 


IMMANUEL  KANT.  211 

mental  ontological  proof;  here  also  the  movement  is  made 
from  essence  to  existence,  from  absolute  causality  to  the  exist- 
ence of  the  First  Cause.  And,  further,  the  cosmological  proof 
rests  the  entire  stress  of  authority  on  the  uncritical  acceptance 
of  the  absolute  reality  of  the  principle  of  causality.  Already 
in  the  treatment  of  the  understanding  Kant  had  placed  the  law 
of  cause  and  effect  among  the  transcendental  or  subjective 
elements  of  the  understanding, — it  pointed  therefore  to  no 
absolute  reality  outside  of  the  mind.  But  the  cosmological 
proof  rests  its  whole  validity  upon  the  objective  and  absolute 
reality  of  this  principle.  It  is  therefore,  in  the  opinion  of 
Kant,  even  less  reliable  than  the  ontological  proof,  for  it  con- 
tradicts the  essence  of  the  transcendental  character  of  the  laws 
of  thought. 

TELEOLOGICAL  PROOF. — The  teleological  or  third  proof  for 
the  existence  of  God  is  far  simpler  and  more  silently  con- 
vincing than  the  other  two.  It  was  met  with  in  connection 
with  the  "  Pre-established  Harmony"  of  Leibnitz  and  was 
especially  prominent  among  his  disciples.  Briefly  stated,  it 
depends  on  the  rational  and  purposive  structure  of  nature.  We 
see  the  different  phases  of  nature  following  one  another  in 
perfect  harmony  according  to  fixed  and  invariable  laws.  We 
see  that  certain  results  are  accomplished  by  the  operation  of 
these  laws,  that  certain  ends  seem  realized  and  certain  purposes 
fulfilled.  All  of  which  seem  the  expression  of  thought  and 
design  rather  than  the  result  of  chance  or  accident.  The 
teleological  proof  tells  us  that  we  behold  in  nature  an  intelli- 
gence that  could  only  proceed  from  the  Infinite  Reason  of  God. 
Thus  stated,  the  argument  from  design  lays  all  its  stress  upon 
the  observation  of  rational  ends  in  nature.  But  Kant  in  his 
transcendental  mood  of  thought  finds  these  ends,  these  laws 
of  nature,  in  the  mind,  and  not  in  the  unknowable  objective 
world,  as  it  is  in  itself.  The  rational  laws  of  nature  arise  from 
the  transcendental  nature  of  human  thought,  the  purposes  of 
nature  are  the  purposes  of  mind;  the  Infinite  Intelligence  of 


212  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

God  exists  only  in  my  consciousness,  and  not  in  the  world  of 
external  reality. 

Thus  with  a  single  stroke,  so  to  speak,  Kant  feels  that  he 
has  undermined  the  whole  superstructure  of  natural  religion. 
He  has  shown  that,  according  to  the  data  of  the  "  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason/'  the  belief  in  the  reality  of  an  absolutely  neces- 
sary Being  is  founded  on  the  illegitimate  claims  of  the  specula- 
tive reason.  God  has  no  place  in  the  cold  world  of  the  fact 
phenomena.  This  conclusion  is  directly  opposite  to  that  of 
Locke,  who,  like  Kant,  limits  our  possible  knowledge  to  the 
extent  of  sense-impression,  but  yet  ascribes  to  the  reason  the 
power  of  attaining  to  the  truth  of  God  by  infallible  demonstra- 
tion. Kant  finds  that  the  epistemological  stand-point  of  the 
English  thinkers  requires  criticism;  and  although  this  criti- 
cism establishes  more  firmly  their  reliance  on  experience,  it 
destroys  altogether  the  rational  belief  in  God. 

THE  "  CRITIQUE  OF  PRACTICAL  SEASON." 

Transition  from  former  "  Critique." — In  the  "  Critique 
of  Pure  Reason"  Kant  laid  down  the  premises  of  his  stand-point 
and  the  principles  of  his  method.  In  the  criticism  of  experi- 
ence he  finds  that  a  certain  unknowable  something,  the  "  thing- 
in-itself,"  serves  as  the  logical  basis  of  our  knowledge,  while 
the  mind  looks  at  this  something  in  terms  of  its  transcendental 
elements,  time  and  space  and  the  categories.  Just  so  long  as 
our  ambitions  are  restricted  to  this  field  of  the  phenomena  and 
we  are  contented  to  consider  the  phenomena  singly  and  not  in 
their  impossible  totality,  our  knowledge  finds  its  legitimate 
field.  But  when  finally  speculative  reason  tries  to  create  for 
itself  the  conceptions  of  the  self,  the  universe,  and  God  by  the 
hypothesis  of  a  totality  of  phenomena  which  it  can  never  right- 
fully perceive,  it  is  proper  to  recall  the  mind  from  the  impos- 
sible task.  Strange  as  it  may  seem,  these  conclusions  of  the 
"  Critique  of  Pure  Reason"  by  no  means  represent  the  deeper 
meaning  of  the  Critical  Philosophy. 


IMMANUEL  KANT.  213 

We  have  earlier  said  that  religion  in  Kant's  mind  took  the 
form  of  morality.  His  nature  was  truly  moral,  but  hardly 
religious.  The  dignity  of  the  moral  man  appealed  more  to 
him  than  the  complicated  systems  of  theology  or  the  emotional 
sentimentality  of  religious  feeling.  His  God  sprung  from 
this  innate  reverence  for  morality,  and  not  from  any  acquired 
belief  in  revelation.  So  that  the  first  "  Critique"  gave  expres- 
sion to  only  half  his  faith,  and  the  latter  portion  of  this  was 
negative.  It  merely  prepared  the  way  for  a  moral  metaphysic 
by  showing  that  the  metaphysic  based  on  the  speculative  reason 
failed  altogether  to  understand  the  soul,  the  universe,  and  God. 
In  the  <c  Critique  of  Practical  Reason"  it  was  Kant's  purpose  to 
treat  these  same  problems  from  the  stand-point  of  action  rather 
than  of  thought,  and  to  show  if  possible  that,  although  rejected 
by  the  speculative  reason,  they  formed  the  necessary  grounds 
for  the  very  existence  of  morality.  The  "Critique  of  Pure 
Reason"  was  sceptical  towards  those  ideas  of  metaphysics ;  the 
"Critique  of  Practical  Reason"  sought  to  establish  their 
validity  from  the  stand-point  of  the  moral  life. 

Will  in  Morality. — Should  we  desire  to  analyze  the  moral 
nature  of  man  it  is  not  at  all  unlikely  that  before  long  we 
should  find  that  the  will  is  especially  important  to  both  the 
ethical  and  psychological  treatments  of  morality.  Very  soon 
we  should  discover  that  morality  and  the  will  seem  in  such 
close  connection  that  the  one  is  almost  necessary  for  the  other. 
This  was  not  a  discovery  of  Kant's,  but  is  common  to  many 
ancient  and  modern  systems  of  ethics.  In  the  present  instance, 
however,  it  is  of  special  importance, 'because  Kant  was  able  to 
analyze  the  authority  of  the  will  and  discover  the  secret  of  its 
moral  power. 

With  him  the  value  of  the  act  is  solely  determined  by  the 
character  of  the  will  from  which  it  springs.  In  the  first  sen- 
tence of  one  of  his  ethical  treatises14  Kant  says,  "Nothing 

14  Grundlegung  zur  Metaphysik  der  Sitten. 


214  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

can  possibly  be  conceived  in  the  world,  or  even  out  of  it,  which 
can  be  called  good  without  qualification,  except  a  Good  Will." 

From  its  nature  the  will  is  coextensive  with  the  possibility 
of  morality,  yet  it  is  itself  moral  only  so  far  as  it  is  good. 
Through  this  distinction  between  the  good  and  the  bad  Kant 
reduces  the  will  to  a  principle  which  lies  behind  it  and  from 
which  the  will  derives  its  moral  worth;  some  principle,  such 
as  a  maxim  or  rule  of  conduct,  may  be  regarded  as  the  sub- 
jective source  of  the  act.  The  moral  worth  of  the  act  is 
therefore  identical  with  the  moral  worth  of  the  principle  from 
which  it  springs.  The  outward  act  is  the  temporary  reflection 
of  the  inner  law,  the  goodness  of  the  will  is  derived  from  a 
determining  principle. 

The  Imperatives. — These  subjective  rules  of  conduct  or 
subjective  principles  which  guide  the  will  are  most  diverse  in 
character.  They  form  the  temporary  and  often  subconscious 
sources  of  our  daily  actions.  Although  fundamental  to  the 
moral  acts  they  are  too  transient  to  serve  as  an  ideal  which 
shall  endure  unchanged  throughout  long  periods  of  life.  This 
latter  is  the  function  of  the  imperative  or  objective  and  uni- 
versally appreciable  laws  upon  which  the  temporary  rules  above 
referred  to  are  founded.  It  is  to  one  of  the  imperatives  that 
we  almost  instinctively  appeal  in  all  our  decisions  of  conduct. 
They  are  the  broad  and  general  laws  which  lie  at  the  root  of  the 
moral  judgments, — the  universal  but  hidden  springs  which 
give  stability  to  character  and  constancy  to  purpose. 

HYPOTHETICAL  IMPERATIVES. — There  is  one  class  of  these 
imperatives,  such  as  wealth,  honor,  happiness,  or  hope  in  a 
life  hereafter,  which  obtain  their  binding  character  because  of 
the  reward  which  they  depict.  Thus  one  might  say,  "  If  you 
wish  to  possess  happiness,  then  love  thy  neighbor."  In  this 
instance  the  appeal  is  made  in  terms  of  an  "  if,"  and  loses  all 
its  force  in  those  cases  in  which  the  imperative  appealed  to  is 
not  regarded  as  final.  It  is  by  means  of  the  hypothetical  im- 
peratives that  virtue  and  action  are  correlated  with  some 


IMMANUEL  KANT.  215 

specific  reward.  Sensuous  immortality  is  often  the  hypothetical 
imperative  of  righteousness.  Political  economy  derives  its 
character  as  a  science  from  the  fact  that  all  its  judgments  are 
based  on  the  hypothetical  imperative  of  wealth.  Most  forcible, 
however,  of  all  the  hypothetical  imperatives  is  that  of  the  pur- 
suit of  happiness  in  general.  Kant  rightly  agrees  with  the 
Hedonists  that  it  is  involved  in  the  very  being  of  man,  but  can- 
not regard  it  as  ultimate  in  the  moral  life.  Happiness  through 
riches  brings  envy,  care,  and  anxiety;  a  long  life  may  carry 
misery  with  it;  and  even  knowledge  is  by  no  means  a  sure 
guide  to  happiness.  Instinctive  as  this  hypothetical  imperative 
may  appear,  it  is  of  little  value  in  our  moral  decisions,  because 
we  are  always  unaware  of  the  paths  that  will  ultimately  lead 
to  its  largest  fulfilment.  If,  however,  these  rules  for  a  happy 
life  could  be  learned  from  experience  and  could  afterwards  be 
trusted  with  absolute  certainty,  we  would  undoubtedly  employ 
them  in  all  our  actions,  but  without  the  possibility  of  such 
permanent  precepts  Kant  seeks  beyond  happiness  for  an  ulti- 
mate imperative,  self-sufficient  in  its  nature.  On  account  of 
this  lack  of  absolute  permanency  the  hypothetical  imperatives, 
such  as  happiness  or  wealth,  can  never  lead  to  morality.  An 
imperative  with  this  latter  as  its  object  must  define  the  nature 
of  morality  at  the  same  time  that  it  indicates  the  means  for  its 
attainment. 

CATEGORICAL  IMPERATIVE. — All  our  conduct  is  guided  by 
rules,  only  the  variety  of  our  life  requires  many  such  rules  to 
fit  every  possible  circumstance.  Should  we  discover  some  pre- 
cept broader  than  the  rest  which  might  be  regarded  as  applic- 
able to  every  possible  occasion,  we  would  have  discovered  a  law 
which  would  be  sufficient  to  divide  every  phase  of  the  will  into 
either  good  or  bad.  This  law,  or  moral  imperative,  would  be 
the  final  criterion  of  worth  when  applied  to  the  other  rules  of 
conduct ;  it  would  in  fact  be  categorical.  This  universal  moral 
law  is  stated  by  Kant  in  the  following  terms,  "  So  act  that  the 
rule  which  guides  thy  will  can  always  under  the  same  circum- 


216  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 


hold  true  as  a  principle  of  universal  legislation."  15  We 
can  thus  recognize  the  meaning  of  Kant's  assurance  that  the 
«tegorical  imperative  is  the  "  a  priori  principle  of  morality," 
for  by  its  Terr  nature  it  is  universally  applicable  throughout 
the  whole  field  of  action. 

Undoubtedly  such  a  moral  law  appears  at  first  sight  too 
formal,  and  perhaps,  after  all,  like  happiness,  ineffectual  in  our 
daily  life.  Although  necessarily  formal,  because  of  its  gen- 
erality, it  is  possible  to  trace  its  application  in  the  simplest 
acts  of  life.  Conduct  is  right  if  at  the  moment  of  decision  we 
may  consistently  will  that  the  transitory  rule  that  prompts 
the  action  may  become  universal  throughout  nature.  The  cate- 
gorical imperative  regards  suicide  as  immoral,  because  no  one 
can  consistently  will  self-destruction  throughout  all  nature. 
Theft  is  wrong,  because  if  made  universal  it  would  destroy 
itself.  Lying  would  lose  its  character  if  made  a  principle  of 
universal  legislation.  The  categorical  imperative  is  of  extreme 
importance  to  the  whole  philosophy  of  Kant.  It  was  pointed 
out  in  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  that  the  Critical  Philosophy 
as  a  whole  sought  to  develop  the  supremacy  of  morality  over 
the  speculative  reason.  The  categorical  imperative,  as  the 
expression  of  the  principle  of  morality,  is  thus  raised  to  a 
unique  position  in  the  Kantian  system.  And  presently  we 
shall  discover  that  it  is  by  the  aid  of  this  principle  that  Kant 
feels  himself  able  to  go  beyond  the  mere  negative  results  of  the 
"  Critique  of  Pure  Reason"  and  establish  more  firmly  than  ever 
before  the  existence  of  God,  freedom  and  human  immortality. 

The  concept  of  duty  derives  its  force  from  the  a  priori, 
or  necessary  and  universal  character  of  the  categorical  impera- 
tive, for  when  we  have  conceived  of  the  peculiar  nature  of  the 
moral  law  we  have  a  means  for  discovering  at  once  the  meaning 


* "  Handle  so,  dass  die  Maxime  deines  Willens  jederzeit  zugleich  als 
Princip  einer  allgemeinen  Gesetzgebung  gelten  konne." — Kritik  der 
praktiachen  Vernunft,  L,  7. 


IMMAXUEL  KAXT.  217 


of  duty.    Tins  lattrr  is  taw 

feel  within  us  that  impels  us  towards  the 
bv  the  categorical  impel  ai  ire  as  the  objecti 


law.    It  is  a  doty  for  one  to  lire,  for  sui 

to  the  moral  law;    likewise,  truth,  honesty,  indnstiy 

required  by  duty,  because  each  k  the  rlpmnd  of 

imperative, 

The  Postulates  of  Practical  Reason.— Thus  far 
only  stated  the  general  conditions  for  a  universal 
ethics,  We  have  by  no  means  indicated  what  would  follow 
the  categorical  imperative  if  it  is  recognized  as  the 
morality.  In  the  ' '  Critique  of  Pmn  Emmm"  the 
tal  elements,  time,  space,  and  the  categories,  were  of 
importance,  since  they  were  necessarily  assumed  by 
possibility  of  experience  and  thought  From  a  similar 
point  Kant  believes  that  there  are  certain  premises,  or 
postulates,  transcendental  in  their  character,  which  at 
be  required  by  the  very  nature  of  morality, 
are  of  such  a  nature  that  given  even  the  thooghi  of  the 
gorical  imperative  as  the  universal  expression  of  the  moral  law 
and  their  realitv  is  necessarilv  included.  They  are  three  in 
number,— &«SM»  freedom,  fke  immwrialitf  of  ike  soml,  and 
ike  existence  of  God, 

THE  SELF  ix  MORALITY. — These  p*ffifo1afr'»  would  be  real 
only  on  the  condition  that  Kant  admits  of 
the  self.  For  certainly  some  knowledge  of  the  moral 
required  before  we  can  intelligently  refer  to  its  fiuedum  or  to 
its  immortality.  In  the  paralogisms  of  the  "  Critique  of  Pmn 
Eeason"  we  were  shown  the  futility  of  all  mnq^itJiHm  of  the 
soul.  They  were  valueless  because  the  reason  endeavored  to 
deal  with  a  totality  of  phenomena  by  carrying  its  inquiries  be- 
yond the  limits  of  experience.  At  the  same  time,  howcici,  that 
Kant  sought  to  dissuade  all  attempts  to  understand  the  concept 
of  the  soul  he  yet  recognized  a  substratum  of  personal  identity. 
The  transcendental  elements,  time,  space,  and  the 


218  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

all  required  a  base  or  subject  in  which  they  might  subsist.  And 
we  saw  that  the  mediacy  of  experience  pointed  to  the  existence 
of  the  transcendental  Ego,  incapable  itself  of  direct  perception, 
yet  required  by  the  very  nature  of  experience  itself.  Without 
this  noumenal  or  transcendental  Ego  the  application  of  the 
transcendental  elements  to  the  "  thing-in-itself "  would  be  im- 
possible, life  would  become  dissipated  into  a  mere  flux  of  sen- 
sations. In  the  "Critique  of  Practical  Reason"  this  noumenal 
Ego,  the  presence  of  which  was  only  implicitly  recognized  in 
the  former  "  Critique,"  was  here  brought  into  the  foreground. 
Further  than  the  mere  substratum  of  personal  identity  as 
the  ground  of  the  transcendental  elements,  the  noumenal  Ego 
here  becomes  the  logical  basis  of  morality,  the  self  of  the 
moral  agent.  Unlike  the  phenomenal  or  perceptional  self,  this 
inner  soul  of  man  is  beyond  the  limiting  conditions  of  time, 
space,  and  the  categories.  It  is  therefore  unknowable  in  its 
true  nature,  but  yet  real  in  the  deepest  sense;  it  is  required  by 
the  unity  of  the  conscious  life  and  directly  assumed  by  morality. 
THE  POSTULATE  OF  FREEDOM. — With  the  categorical  impera- 
tive as  the  universal  law  of  morality  and  the  innermost  reality 
of  the  noumenal  Ego  as  its  source,  Kant  finds  himself  in  a 
position  to  deal  with  those  problems  laid  aside  by  the  specu- 
lative reason  of  the  former  "  Critique."  The  existence  of  free- 
dom was  perhaps  the  most  vital  question  in  the  antinomies  of 
cosmology,  especially  when  considered  from  the  stand-point  of 
morality.  But  the  concept  was  then  discarded  because  the 
reason  found  itself  able  to  prove  its  existence  as  well  as  its 
non-existence  by  equally  valid  methods.  It  is  to  be  noted, 
however,  that  the  speculative  reason  regards  the  freedom  of  the 
noumenal  Ego  as  highly  probable,  owing  to  its  transcendental 
nature,  but  was  incompetent  to  present  any  direct  proof.  In 
the  "Critique  of  Practical  Reason"  the  problem  assumes  a 
new  aspect,  freedom  becomes  one  of  the  postulates  of  the  moral 
law;  freedom  and  morality  are  inseparable.  Discard  personal 
choice  in  the  decision  of  conduct  and  we  would  at  the  same  time 


IMMANUEL  KANT.  219 

refuse  to  admit  even  the  possibility  of  morality.  The  binding 
force  as  well  as  the  dignity  of  the  categorical  imperative  arises 
from  the  belief  that  man  is  free  to  observe  it.  Freedom  and 
morality  are  inseparable, — deny  the  one  and  you  cannot  admit 
the  other;  recognize  either  and  the  other  necessarily  follows. 
Kant  does  not  attempt  to  prove  that  the  noumenal  Ego  is  free, 
he  only  requires  that  we  observe  the  close  connection  between 
the  concepts  of  freedom  and  morality  and  from  this  intimate 
association  recognize  the  existence  of  both. 

THE  POSTULATE  OF  IMMORTALITY. — Human  immortality 
was  discarded  in  the  paralogisms  of  the  first  "  Critique"  be- 
cause, like  other  attributes  of  the  soul,  it  lay  beyond  the  power 
of  human  reason.  When,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  considered 
in  connection  with  morality,  the  belief  in  immortality  assumes 
a  new  value.  We  constantly  observe  a  conflict  between  the 
desires  of  the  sense  and  the  demands  of  the  categorical  impera- 
tive. A  state  in  which  there  is  no  such  conflict  would  be  a  con- 
dition of  perfect  goodness, — the  summum  bonum  of  morality. 
Such  a  state  Kant  believes  to  be  necessarily  implied  in  morality. 
It  cannot,  however,  become  realized  in  any  temporal  existence, 
for  time  always  carries  with  it  the  desires  of  the  external  world. 
The  realization  of  perfect  morality  is  therefore  attainable  only 
in  a  timeless  existence, — that  is,  in  a  state  of  immortal  life. 
This  endless  process  towards  the  ideal  of  perfection  serves  as 
an  inspiration  to  man.  It  points  out  to  him  a  state  of  holiness 
which,  although  unattainable  in  this  life,  is  yet  possible  in  the 
infinite  life  of  the  world  beyond  the  grave. 

THE  POSTULATE  OF  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  GOD. — And  finally 
morality  gives  us  the  assurance  in  the  existence  of  God  alto- 
gether unattainable  by  the  direct  proofs  of  the  reason.  The 
binding  force  of  the  categorical  imperative  as  well  as  the  ideal 
of  morality  in  the  life  to  come,  require  a  source  beyond  the 
individual  man.  The  objective  universality  of  the  moral  law 
arises  from  an  external  source,  and  this  source,  infinite  in  its 
nature  because  morality  is  infinite,  is  God.  It  is  He,  through 


220  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

the  moral  law,  that  is  truly  the  ruler  of  the  universe,  the  seat 
of  divine  intelligence. 

This  conception  of  God  as  the  necessary  fulfilment  of  mo- 
rality is  the  culmination,  although  not  the  completion,  of  the 
whole  Critical  Philosophy  of  Kant;  it  supplies  both  a  founda- 
tion and  a  unity  to  his  whole  system.  It  removes  the  grounds 
for  any  charge  of  atheism  which  might  have  arisen  from  an 
imperfect  understanding  of  the  "  Critique  of  Pure  Reason." 
As  to  whether  Kant  is  justified  in  the  means  by  which  he 
proves  the  existence  of  God,  as  well  as  the  other  postulates,  is  a 
matter  which  does  not  concern  us  at  present.  Our  work  is  to 
understand  rather  than  criticise,  to  appreciate  rather  than 
deprecate. 

THE  "  CRITIQUE  OF  JUDGMENT." 

But  even  with  this  final  postulate  of  God's  existence  Kant  by 
no  means  considered  his  philosophical  system  complete.  The 
"  Critique  of  Pure  Reason"  proved  to  us  the  validity  of  science ; 
it  opened  up  the  vast  extent  of  the  objective  world  and  estab- 
lished the  critical  basis  for  a  philosophy  of  nature.  The  "  Crit- 
ique of  Practical  Reason"  on  the  contrary,  was  restricted  to  the 
subjective  world  of  morality  rather  than  to  the  objective  world 
of  fact ;  to  the  mobility  of  action  and  not  to  the  fixity  of  event. 
Even  with  this  exhaustive  division  of  the  world  of  human  expe- 
rience Kant  regarded  the  gulf  between  these  two  stand-points  as 
too  wide.  There  was  still  lacking  a  critique  of  those  judgments 
which  are  neither  concerned  altogether  with  fact  nor  with 
action,  but  which  seem  to  belong  to  a  faculty  of  the  mind 
lying  between  the  understanding  and  the  moral  reason.  These 
are  the  judgments  of  mere  approval,  considered  at  length  in  the 
third  "  Critique/'  that  of  the  "  Judgment"  proper.  On  the  one 
side  these  judgments  of  approval  are  like  those  of  the  under- 
standing, in  so  far  as  they  express  a  given  unchangeable  fact; 
and  on  the  other  side  they  require  the  conception  of  an  ideal 
which  allies  them  closely  to  the  moral  judgments  of  the  "  Prac- 
tical Reason."  We  cannot  approve  or  disapprove  of  a  certain 


IMMANUEL  KANT.  221 

object  without  having  in  mind  some  purpose  which  it  partially 
or  wholly  exemplifies.  Judgments  of  approval  arise  from  the 
comparison  of  the  object  and  the  ideal  of  the  complete  reali- 
zation of  its  purpose — the  comparison  between  the  imperfect 
and  the  perfect  representation  of  some  conception. 

Its  Transcendental  Basis. — Judgments  of  mere  approval, 
like  those  of  natural  science  and  morality,  rests  upon  a  tran- 
scendental basis.  In  science  it  is  the  categories,  in  ethics  it  is 
freedom,  and  finally  in  these  judgments  of  approval  it  is  the 
belief  in  the  purposiveness  of  nature.  Just  as  the  categories 
were  the  necessary  conditions  for  the  possibility  of  synthetic 
judgments  a  priori  and  freedom  a  necessary  postulate  for  the 
reality  of  the  moral  life,  so  also  the  belief  in  the  existence  of 
ends  or  purposes  in  nature  is  necessarily  required  for  the  pos- 
sibility of  the  judgments  of  approval.  Like  the  other  transcen- 
dental principles, — time,  space,  and  the  categories, — purpose 
cannot  be  attributed  to  the  "  thing-in-itself "  as  the  final  reality, 
but  only  represents  one  way  of  looking  at  the  world  of 
phenomenal  appearances.  Purpose  is  a  concept  which  the 
human  mind  imprints  on  nature,  an  attribute  of  the  intellect, 
a  stand-point  for  the  judgments  of  approval. 

Kinds  of  Purpose. — The  judgments  of  purposive  approval 
which  we  impress  upon  nature  are  of  two  kinds, — those  which 
arise  from  regarding  the  object  as  the  embodiment  of  its  own 
purpose  and  those  judgments  which  connect  the  single  object 
with  a  purpose  beyond  itself.  In  the  former  case  we  have  a 
feeling  of  pleasure  towards  the  form  of  the  object  alone;  in 
the  latter  case  the  object  points  to  an  all-inclusive  purpose 
beyond  itself.  This  feeling  of  pleasure  in  the  presence  of  an 
object  which  embodies  its  own  purposes  already  fulfilled,  arises 
from  judgments  of  taste; 16  whereas  the  recognition  that  the 
single  object  before  us  partially  expresses  the  universal  purpose 
of  Nature  is  teleology. 

18  Gesehmacksurtheils. 


222  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

Beauty. — The  philosophy  of  taste  regards  its  object  as 
beautiful  when  the  purpose  which  it  embodies  is  distinctly  ex- 
pressed in  definite  form.  That  object  appears  to  the  mind  as 
beautiful  when  it  can  excite  disinterested  and  universal  ap- 
proval without  requiring  a  purpose  beyond  itself.  The  mind 
regards  a  statue  to  be  beautiful  because  it  conceives  the  sensuous 
object  to  express  fully  the  idea  or  conception  which  it  sug- 
gests. Beauty  arises  from  the  mental  judgment  that  repre- 
sentation and  conception  are  approved  to  be  the  same.  Beauty 
is  therefore  only  a  way  of  looking  at  those  objects  which  are 
sufficient  in  themselves,  it  is  the  transcendental  element  of  the 
aesthetic  judgment. 

Sublimity. — Close  to  our  judgments  of  the  beautiful,  but 
differing  from  them  in  certain  important  respects,  are  the  emo- 
tions of  the  sublime.  A  beautiful  object  is  definite  in  form,  an 
isolated  perfection  in  so  far  as  it  embodies  its  completely 
determined  purpose.  The  sublime  object,  on  the  contrary, 
represents  boundlessness.  It  excites  our  admiration  and  respect 
by  presenting  to  view  an  object  or  idea  which  cannot  be  en- 
compassed by  the  senses  but  is  comprehended  in  its  almost 
infinite  immensity  only  by  the  intellect.  The  incomparably 
great  are  alone  sublime, — forces  of  nature  or  the  system  of 
stars. 

Teleology. — The  judgments  of  taste,  beauty  and  sublimity, 
recognize  a  purpose  fufilled  in  the  object.  The  Teleological 
judgments,  on  the  contrary,  are  based  on  the  universal  pur- 
posiveness  of  nature.  Mechanism  interprets  phenomena  as 
causal  sequences  only  without  any  reference  to  the  purposes 
and  ends  involved.  Teleology  regards  the  processes  of  nature 
as  if  controlled  by  rational  purposes ;  every  event  is  a  step  to- 
wards the  fulfilment  of  an  ideal.  Mechanism  and  teleology, 
causality  and  purpose,  these  form  contradictory  stand-points 
for  the  explanation  of  nature;  both  are  transcendental  ways 
of  looking  at  the  real.  And,  moreover,  this  reality,  the 
"  thing-in-itself,"  is  as  unknowable  to  one  as  it  is  to  the  other. 


IMMANUEL   KANT.  223 

The  mechanical  view  of  nature  presents  us  with  a  systematic 
science;  the  purposive  view  discloses  to  us  the  ideals  of  life, 
art,  and  religion. 

Retrospect. — These  three  works  of  Kant,  the  Critiques  of 
Pure  Beason,  of  Practical  Keason,  and  of  Judgment,  present  to 
us  an  elaborate  system  of  philosophy  erected  around  certain 
central  ideas;  a  unity  wonderful  in  its  scope  and  organic 
structure.  Towards  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  three  factors 
were  mentioned  which  may  well  be  considered  the  important 
elements  from  which  Kant  formed  his  system.  These  were, 
first,  the  rationalistic  conceptions  which  Kant  acquired  from 
the  teachings  of  Leibnitz  and  Wolff;  second,  the  importance 
and  limitations  of  experience  which  Locke  and  Hume  had 
taught  him;  and,  finally,  the  moral  and  religious  elements 
which  influenced  his  character  in  early  childhood.  Each  of 
these  factors  finds  its  place  in  the  Critical  Philosophy  when 
this  is  regarded  as  an  organic  whole.  The  Eationalists  are 
responsible  for  the  importance  of  the  human  mind  in  all  knowl- 
edge, for  the  transcendental  principles  of  time,  space,  and  the 
categories,  freedom  and  purpose,  and  finally  for  the  construc- 
tive and  uniting  power  of  the  transcendental  Ego.  Not  that 
these  specific  elements  may  be  found  in  any  one  of  the  earlier 
thinkers,  but  only  that  the  rationalistic  tendencies  of  thought 
led  Kant  to  these  conclusions.  To  the  English  Empiricists  may 
be  attributed  the  sensuous  foundation  for  all  scientific  knowl- 
edge and  the  sceptical  attitude  which  supplements  the  positive 
teaching  of  the  "  Critique  of  Pure  Reason."  And  finally  his 
moral  nature  asserted  itself  in  the  presence  of  the  ultimate 
problems  of  life.  When  both  reason  and  experience  proved 
inadequate,  simple  morality  constructed  for  itself  with  absolute 
certitude  the  existence  of  God.  Kant's  God  was  the  God  of 
morality,  his  religion  was  a  metaphysic  of  ethics.  His  interest 
was  thus  divided  between  the  field  of  scientific  fact  and  that 
of  the  moral  ideal;  between  the  understanding  and  the  prac- 
tical reason.  "  Two  things  fill  the  soul  with  ever  new  and 


224  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

increasing  wonder  and  respect,  the  oftener  and  more  attentively 
we  reflect  on  them :  the  starry  heaven  above  me'  and  the  moral 
law  within  me." 1T  These  are  the  words  with  which  Kanl 
closes  the  "  Critique  of  Practical  Reason"  and  they  form  the 
inscription  on  his  monument  in  Konigsberg. 

Prospect. — We  are  introduced  by  the  philosophical  system 
of  Kant  to  a  new  interpretation  of  nature.  Instead  of  the  certi- 
tude of  the  rationalistic  reliance  on  reason  and  the  simple  faith 
of  the  empirical  confidence  in  the  testimony  of  the  senses,  the 
Critical  Philosophy  substitutes  an  analysis  of  experience  ac- 
cording to  the  principles  of  the  reason.  By  analyzing  experi- 
ence it  discovers  that  the  nationalists  and  Empiricists  wen 
both  in  a  sense  correct, — the  former,  when  they  'asserted  thai 
our  world  was  transformed  through  mind,  the  latter  when  the} 
founded  the  origin  of  knowledge  on  experience  and  restricted 
its  limits  to  empirical  data.  The  philosophy  of  Kant  is,  there- 
fore, the  synthesis  of  both  schools.  But  in  this  synthesis  ne^w 
problems  arose,  the  ancient  values  of  life  and  nature  wen 
given  a  new  setting,  the  changing  view-point  rendered  obsolete 
the  discussions  of  former  centuries.  These  new  problems  could 
not  be  completely  understood  and  developed  by  Kant  himself, 
His  own  mind  passed  quickly  over  the  presuppositions  of  his 
system;  continued  thinking  had  given  them  a  unique  value, 
Bacon  cautioned  us  to  avoid  the  "Idols  of  the  Den,"  recog- 
nizing that  the  plausible  will  often  become  the  true  unless  we 
temper  our  own  conclusions  by  those  of  others.  Kant  was  a 
solitary  thinker;  the  truth  of  his  own  stand-point  was  sc 
firmly  impressed  on  his  own  consciousness  that  he  found  him- 
self, especially  in  his  latter  life,  altogether  unable  to  compre- 


17 "  Zwei  Dinge  erfiillen  das  Gemiith  mit  immer  neuer  und  zunehmen- 
der  Bewunderung  und  Ehrfurcht,  je  ofter  und  anhaltender  sich  das 
Nachdenken  damit  beschaftigt:  der  bestirnte  Himmel  iiber  mir,  und 
das  moralische  Gesetz  in  mir.'* — Kritik  der  praktischen  Vernunft,  Be- 
schluss. 


IMMANUEL  KANT.  225 

hend  the  opposition  which  arose  about  him.  Under  these  cir- 
cumstances it  is  not  strange  that  Kant,  like  Locke  and  Aristotle, 
is  to  be  regarded  rather  as  the  founder  of  a  magnificent  move- 
ment than  as  a  thinker  who  has  definitely  solved  the  ultimate 
problems  of  philosophy.  His  importance  rests  more  in  the 
statement  of  new  issues  of  philosophical  moment  than  in  the 
solutions  which  they  received  at  his  own  hands.  The  astronomy 
of  Copernicus  attained  its  fulfilment  two  centuries  after  in  the 
nebular  hypothesis  of  Kant,  and  the  fulfilment  of  Kant's  meta- 
physics is  yet  unwritten. 


16 


CHAPTER   VII. 
THE    GERMAN   TRANSCENDENTAIJSTS. 

THE  POST-KANTIAN  TENDENCIES. 

EVERY  original  mind  stimulates  a  group  of  brilliant  men  to 
follow  in  the  same  direction,  but  these  disciples  are  apt  to  give 
their  master's  teachings  a  more  intense  interpretation.  Three 
distinct  lines  of  thought  emanate  from  the  critical  ethics  of  the 
Platonic-Socrates:  a  metaphysical  movement  which  was  ex- 
pressed by  Aristotle  and  his  mediaeval  commentators;  the  dis- 
tinctly ethical  phase  of  the  Cyrenaics  and  Epicureans;  and, 
lastly,  the  pessimistic  naturalism  of  the  Cynics  and  the  Stoics. 
Locke,  whose  influence,  if  not  his  originality,  is  to  be  classed 
with  the  Platonic-Socrates,  also  inaugurated  movements  which 
are  comparable  with  those  of  later  Greek  thought.  We  have 
here  the  idealistic  metaphysics  of  Berkeley  with  its  sceptical 
outcome  in  Hume,  the  ethical  tendencies  of  Clarke,  Shaftes- 
bury,  and  Butler,  and  the  pessimistic  naturalism  of  the  French 
Materialists.  And,  finally,  Kant,  whose  originality,  and  prob- 
ably his  influence,  will  prove  as  great  as  that  of  either  the 
Greek  or  of  the  Englishman,  set  in  motion  certain  lines  of 
thought  which  bear  a  close  resemblance  to  those  of  Greek  and 
British  philosophy.  This  analogy  is  by  no  means  perfect.  The 
metaphysical  character  of  the  German  mind  permitted  an 
ethics  or  a  pessimism  only  on  a  metaphysical  background,  while 
in  Greece  the  ethical  element  was  prominent  and  in  England 
the  epistemological.  There  were  several  distinct  elements  in 
the  Kantian  system  which  hardly  received  adequate  treatment 
in  their  original  setting,  and  the  disciples  of  the  Critical  Phi- 
losophy sought  to  remedy  these  defects.  They  found  them, 
however,  so  intimately  interwoven  with  the  organic  unity  of  the 
system  itself  that  a  radical  change  in  any  part  meant  the  reor- 
226 


THE   GERMAN   TRANSCENDENTALISTS.  227 

ganization  of  the  whole.  This  transformation  of  the  Critical 
Philosophy,  in  order  to  give  one  or  another  element  greater 
logical  clearness  and  consistency,  was  attempted  by  the  imme- 
diate successors  of  Kant.  The  dissolution  of  a  system  into 
parts  always  destroys  the  organic  structure  of  the  system  itself 
and  brings  the  elements  into  new  and  generally  extravagant 
relations.  But  should  one  wish  to  dismember  the  Critical 
Philosophy  for  the  purpose  of  comparison  only,  it  would  be 
possible  perhaps  to  discover  in  it  three  central  factors.  These 
are  the  reality  of  the  "  thing-in-itself,"  the  logical  existence 
of  the  ethical  Ego  with  its  postulates,  and,  lastly,  the  will 
activity  of  the  mind  in  the  creation  of  the  world  of  phenomena. 
Each  of  these  is  of  extreme  importance  and  each  becomes  the 
nucleus  of  a  distinct  movement  in  the  philosophy  of  post- 
Kantian  Germany.  And  just  as  in  the  case  of  Platonic- 
Socrates  and  Locke,  each  becomes  identified  with  a  metaphysics, 
a  metaphysical  ethics,  and  a  pessimistic  naturalism. 

The  Metaphysics  of  the  "  Thing-in-itself  ."—To  all  stu- 
dents of  the  Critical  Philosophy  the  ghostly  reality  of  the 
"  ihing-in-itself"  appears  somehow  mystifying.  We  do  not 
know  exactly  where  to  place  it,  and  fail  to  find  any  relation  or 
character  which  will  relieve  the  difficulty.  This  predicament 
appealed  particularly  to  Herbart,  Kant's  successor  at  Kb'nigs- 
berg,  who  sought  to  modify  the  metaphysics  of  his  master  in 
such  a  manner  that  the  "thing-in-itself"  would  no  longer 
appear  contradictory  or  incomprehensible.  With  him  the 
"  thing-in-itself "  still  retained  its  original  significance,  only  it 
became  richer  in  meaning,  through  a  broader  psychological 
context.  Let  us  call  this  general  school  of  metaphysics,  which 
finds  a  real  existence  independent  of  the  mind  and  behind  the 
phenomena  of  sense,  Realism. 

The  Ethical  Ego. — The  nucleolus  of  the  whole  Kantian 
world  is  the  Ego.  In  the  "  Pure  Keason"  it  is  only  the  neces- 
sary background  for  the  several  transcendental  elements,  but 
becomes  in  the  "  Practical  Reason"  the  essential  basis  for  the 


228  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

moral  postulates  of  freedom,  immortality,  and  God.  Yet,  not- 
withstanding its  importance,  Kant  does  not  seem  to  give  us  any 
adequate  idea  upon  which  we  may  base  our  concept  of  this 
deepest  self.  We  are  constantly  reminded  of  its  importance, 
yet  there  is  the  "  thing-in-itself "  which  looms  up  apparently 
beyond  the  Ego.  Perhaps  there  is  some  relationship  between 
the  two.  Perhaps  it  is  possible  to  erect  a  metaphysical  struc- 
ture within  which  our  ethical  Ego  may  reign  supreme;  a 
system  in  which  some  aspect  of  the  Ego  occupies  the  funda- 
mental position  of  an  absolutely  real  "  thing-in-itself"  and  also 
gives  unity  and  internal  harmony  to  the  whole  structure, — in 
fact  the  metaphysic  of  a  world  of  self.  This  was  attempted 
by  a  long  line  of  thinkers  beginning  with  Reinhold  and  ending 
with  Hegel.  Each  sought  to  add  a  little  to  Kant's  theory  of 
the  self,  each  contributed  a  little  more  to  a  consistent  idealism, 
and  each  advanced  a  little  beyond  his  predecessors.  Let  us  call 
these  thinkers,  who  find  the  ultimate  reality  of  the  world  in 
the  subjective  consciousness  alone,  Absolute  Idealists. 

The  Naturalistic  Pessimism  of  the  Will.— And  still 
another  figure  appears  in  this  little  group  of  Kantian  disciples 
who  have  exerted  such  a  tremendous  influence  on  the  thought 
of  the  nineteenth  century.  We  cannot  discover  a  place  for 
Schopenhauer  in  either  of  the  former  tendencies.  His  person- 
ality and  the  results  of  his  philosophy  are  somehow  outside  the 
general  current  of  the  time;  we  do  not  know  whether  to  con- 
nect him  with  the  Buddhists  of  India,  the  Mystics  of  Persia, 
or  the  idealists  of  Germany.  His  idealism  is  both  mystical  and 
transcendental.  The  creative  faculty  of  the  mind,  upon  which 
Kant  bases  his  transcendentalism,  indicates  to  Schopenhauer 
an  aspect  of  a  great  world-force  which  becomes  exemplified 
in  the  will  of  man.  This  is  the  essence  of  the  idealism  of 
Schopenhauer.  On  closer  examination,  however,  we  find  that 
will  implies  incessant  struggle  and  can  be  interpreted  to  phi- 
losophy only  as  a  pessimism ;  the  world-force  is  purely  mechani- 
cal in  its  operation  and  produces  evil  with  an  irresistible  relent- 


THE   GERMAN  TRANSCENDENTALISTS.  229 

lessness.  "  Die,  and  unite  thy  limited  will  with  the  universal 
Will"  is  the  creed  of  Schopenhauer.  This  philosophical  stand- 
point, which  is  not  common  in  our  Western  world,  may  be 
called  Mystical  Idealism. 

The  Relation  of  Previous  Idealism. — While  considering 
this  whole  movement  of  transcendental  idealism  which  arose 
from  the  Critical  Philosophy  of  Kant,  it  is  interesting  to  note 
the  relation  to  previous  idealistic  tendencies.  The  whole  post- 
Kantian  transcendentalism  represents  an  idealism  in  metaphy- 
sics erected  on  a  rationalistic  epistemology.  In  earlier  philoso- 
phy Leibnitz  first  develops  a  rationalistic  idealism,  but  his 
incoherent  system  lacked  the  critical  and  analytic  stimulus  of 
Kant.  The  idealism  of  Berkeley,  on  the  other  hand,  differed 
essentially  from  that  of  later  Germany  in  two  important  re- 
spects,— the  epistemological  starting-point  and  the  final  inter- 
pretation of  the  Universal  Mind.  In  the  case  of  Leibnitz  it  will 
be  remembered  that  the  unity  of  the  individual  monads  was 
founded  on  the  "ideal  principle"  of  "Pre-established  Har- 
mony." His  monism  was  therefore  conceptual  or  idealistic  and 
stood  in  sharp  contrast  to  a  realistic  or  objective  monism  like 
that  indicated  by  the  all-inclusive  character  of  Spinoza's  Sub- 
stance. This  idealistic  principle  of  Leibnitz  was  defined  with 
the  expressed  intention  of  penetrating  to  the  ultimate  essence  of 
the  world,  and  hence  was  a  nature-philosophy  in  the  broadest 
sense.  But  the  relative  importance  of  the  human  soul-monad 
rendered  this  early  idealism  distinctly  humanistic  and  self- 
centred  when  interpreted  by  the  immediate  disciples  of  Leib- 
nitz. In  contrast  to  this  narrower  reaction  the  German  idealists 
seek  to  re-establish  rationalistic  idealism  on  the  broader  plane 
of  a  nature-philosophy.  But  in  so  doing  pantheism  takes  the 
place  of  theism,  the  universal  moral  law  supplants  the  arbitrary 
freedom  of  the  individual. 

The  conditions  under  which  Berkeley's  idealism  arose  places 
it  in  sharp  contrast  to  German  transcendentalism.  Like  nearly 
all  the  British  thinkers,  Berkeley  is  an  empiricist  in  his  epis- 


230  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

temology, — he  bases  the  reality  of  ideas  on  the  perception  of 
the  senses.  The  Germans,  on  the  contrary,  follow  the  lead  of 
Kant  and  discover  in  the  given  experience  a  rational  element 
which  constitutes  the  form  of  true  knowledge.  Aside  from 
this  epistemological  difference,  Berkeley  was  under  the  influence 
of  Christian  theism;  he  opposes  any  pantheistic  tendencies 
which  might  seem  to  arise  from  his  idealism.  Kant,  however, 
had  undermined  the  rationalistic  foundation  for  theism  and 
transformed  the  conception  of  God  into  a  Moral  Ideal.  So 
that  the  Absolute  Mind  which  the  Germans  as  well  as  Berkeley 
believed  to  be  the  source  of  all  intellectual  forms  could  be  de- 
scribed by  the  post-Kantians  as  a  World-Idea  of  activity,  of 
thought,  or  of  will  without  involving  theistical  attributes  in 
its  conception. 

JOHANN  FBIBDRICH  HERBART. 
LIFE. 

The  first  of  the  important  Kantian  schools  is  that  of  the 
Realism  of  Johann  Herbart.  Its  founder  was  born  in  Northern 
Germany,  the  son  of  a  lawyer,  on  April  4,  1776.  While  yet 
a  young  man,  and  before  he  entered  the  University  of  Jena, 
Herbart  became  acquainted  with  the  works  of  the  Leibnitz- 
Wolffian  school  and  also  with  those  of  Kant.  At  the  age  of 
eighteen  he  came  under  the  influence  of  those  thinkers  who 
sought  to  bring  into  prominence  the  ethical  Ego  in  Kant's 
system,  but  the  young  Herbart  was  repelled  by  their  absolute 
idealism.  After  leaving  Jena,  he  spent  several  years  in  Switzer- 
land as  tutor  in  a  private  family.  Eeturning  to  Germany, 
he  became  a  teacher  in  Gottingen,  afterwards  occupying  Kant's 
chair  at  Konigsberg.  He  died  in  1841.  Herbart  belongs  to 
that  large  class  of  thinkers  who  are  impressed  with  the  depth 
of  the  problem  of  existence  and  at  the  same  time  seek  to  ex- 
plain it  in  the  simplest  manner  possible;  but  this  very  desire 
for  simplicity  often  leads  to  the  presupposition  of  something 


JOHANN   FRIEDRICH   HERBART.  231 

that  is  far  from  simple,  in  order  that  reality  and  common 
sense  may  become  harmonized. 

METAPHYSICS. 

Herbart  approaches  the  Kantian  problem  of  reality  from  the 
stand-point  of  Descartes.  He  doubts  everything.  But  even 
after  he  has  thus  placed  himself  in  a  completely  sceptical  atti- 
tude he  finds  that  he  cannot  resist  one  reality, — namely,  the 
mere  appearance  of  something.  The  appearances  which  we 
call  our  experiences  are  at  least  real,  although  they  may  or  may 
not  indicate  anything  beyond ;  the  determination  of  this  latter 
problem  is  the  work  of  philosophy.  We  must  assume  that  the 
appearances,  the  phenomena  themselves,  exist  and  are  real; 
they  form  the  necessary  starting-point  for  any  philosophy. 
But  with  the  existence  of  the  representations  presupposed,  we 
have  no  further  ground  for  inferring  that  what  they  present  is 
true  absolutely.  Are  time  and  space  or  the  causal  relations 
among  phenomena  real  in  themselves,  or  are  they  merely  super- 
ficial appearances  involving  contradiction?  To  determine  this 
question  it  is  necessary  for  metaphysics  to  analyze  some  simple 
relation  among  phenomena,  such  as  change. 

The  Changeless  Real. — When  a  certain  event  occurs  we 
may  say  that  a  change  of  some  kind  has  taken  place, — the 
water  has  changed  to  ice.  By  this  we  mean  that  a  certain 
phenomenon  of  water  has  passed  into  another  called  ice.  We 
require  that  the  water  and  the  ice  shall  have  something  in 
common,  else  we  could  not  connect  them  by  means  of  a  causal 
relation,  yet  at  the  same  time  we  observe  that  there  is  a  dis- 
tinct difference  between  the  two  phenomena.  Here  we  have 
identity  and  diversity  united  in  a  single  concept,  —  that  of 
change.  We  have  a  thing  remaining  the  same  and  yet  be- 
coming different,  a  contradiction  of  the  most  decided  character. 
Change  of  all  kinds  is  therefore  discarded  by  Herbart  as  mere 
appearance,  belonging  only  to  the  phenomena  and  not  to  the 
real  world  beneath.  This  gives  to  Herbart  a  motionless,  static, 


232  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

inane  world  of  reality,  not  very  much  unlike  the  "thing-in- 
itself"  of  his  master. 

The  Plurality  of  Reals.— But  he  is  not  satisfied  with  this 
definition  of  his  ultimately  real  universe.  He  has  still  before 
him  the  old  problem  of  metaphysics,  the  unity  and  diversity, 
the  one  and  the  many.  Spinoza  solved  this  by  a  monism; 
Leibnitz,  whom  Herbart  early  read,  placed  his  stress  on  the 
objective  pluralism  of  the  monads  united  within  a  system  by 
the  ideal  unity  of  the  principle  of  "Pre-established  Har- 
mony." Herbart  follows  Leibnitz  in  the  plurality  of  Reals 
(das  Reale).  Every  phenomena,  because  it  is  a  presentation, 
must  point  to  something  which  is  itself  presented.  There  can 
be  no  outward  appearance  without  some  sort  of  inner  reality. 
Behind  every  sensation  there  lies  a  something  which  is  given 
to  us ;  nothing  can  transform  this  nucleus  into  subjective  fact ; 
it  is  purely  objective  in  its  nature, — it  is  the  ultimate  basis  of 
being.  "We  cannot  remove  this  difficulty;  the  form  of  ex- 
perience becomes  changed  into  the  forms  of  the  supposition  of 
the  Reals ;  .  .  .  and  it  is  forced  upon  us  that  the  Reals  are  to  be 
presupposed  and  defended."1  And,  furthermore,  these  Reals 
behind  sensation  are  absolutely  simple,  their  reality  is  fully 
explained  by  the  possession  of  a  single  ultimate  quality.  It  is 
true  our  consciousness  cannot  understand  what  these  atomic 
qualities  truly  are,  we  only  know  of  their  existence  through  an 
analysis  of  the  phenomena. 

The  Phenomenal  Appearance. — But,  even  with  the  pre- 
supposition of  these  metaphysical  atoms,  Herbart  finds  some 
little  difficulty  when  he  comes  to  explain  just  what  is  in  our 
experiences.  The  "thing,"  which  we  observe  through  sensa- 
tions, consists  of  many  properties  or  qualities.  Each  one  of 

1 "  Man  kann  diese  Sorge  nicht  ablehnen ;  die  Formen  der  Erf ahrung 
verwandeln  sich  in  Formen  der  Setzung  des  Realen;  ...  so  zwingen 
sie  uns,  das  Reale  zu  setzen  und  zu  hiiten." — Allgemeine  Metaphysik, 
Section  199. 


JOHANN   FRIEDRICH   HERBART.  233 

these  qualities  represents  a  single  Real,  undifferentiated,  simple 
and  eternal, — like  the  quality-atoms  of  a  Greek  philosopher, 
Anaxagoras.  Thus  the  whiteness  of  sugar  is  furnished  by  a 
certain  group  of  Reals,  the  sweetness  by  another  group,  the 
crystalline  form  by  still  another,  and  so  on  until  all  the  proper- 
ties of  sugar  have  been  exhaustively  ascribed,  each  to  a  certain 
class  of  Reals.  "  Matter  is  real  as  a  sum  of  divisible  Being ; 
and  in  this  Being  something  truly  happens,  as  a  consequence 
of  which  it  has  the  appearance  of  a  special  existence/' 2  Thus 
the  "  thing"  observed  by  sensation  is  never  the  Real,  it  is 
always  a  large  group  of  these  Reals.  To  explain  the  fact  that 
the  several  qualities  of  an  experience  seem  to  form  a  single 
object  Herbart  has  recourse  to  a  distinction  between  intel- 
lectual and  phenomenal  space,  which  recalls  to  mind  the  pecu- 
liar spacial  qualities  of  the  Leibnitzian  monads.  In  intellectual 
space  two  or  more  Reals  may  occupy  the  same  point,  forming 
an  intimate  relation;  change  is  explained  by  the  transforma- 
tion of  this  relation,  thus  permitting  the  Reals  to  form  new 
configurations.  According  to  this  hypothesis  of  intellectual 
space  it  is  readily  seen  that  each  grain  of  sugar,  no  matter  how 
small,  may  possess  all  the  quality  Reals  which  together  com- 
prise sugar.  Phenomenal  space  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
inherence  of  many  Reals  in  a  single  point  of  intellectual  space. 
Psychology  and  the  Soul-Real. — Prominent  among  the 
Reals  is  the  subjective  unit,  the  soul.  In  Herbart's  estimation 
all  previous  psychology  was  in  error  in  so  far  as  it  regarded 
the  soul  as  the  bond  of  unity  existing  between  the  several 
faculties  of  the  mind.  The  true  Ego  cannot  be  known  in  self- 
consciousness,  for  a  subject  can  never  perceive  itself.  The  Ego 
is  a  Real  like  other  truly  existent  Beings,  indestructible,  space- 
less, and  eternal;  but  its  existence  can  be  inferred  only  from 
the  analysis  of  the  various  states  of  mind.  It  is  not,  however, 
the  unity  of  our  plural  consciousness,  as  Kant  and  the  later 

2  Lehrbuch  zur  Psychologic,  Section  156. 


234  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

idealists  believed;  it  is  rather  the  single  unit  which  can  exist 
in  innumerable  combinations.  Its  only  property  is  that  of  a 
continued  assertion  manifested  in  whatever  combination  of 
other  Eeals  it  may  find  itself. 

THE  MEANING  OF  REPRESENTATIONS.  —  With  this  meta- 
physical starting-point  of  the  unit  Ego,  Herbart  begins  to  con- 
struct a  psychology.  The  starting-point  of  psychology  is  not  the 
hidden  Ego,  but  rather  its  own  representations  of  which  the 
flux  of  human  consciousness  is  composed.  The  initial  problem 
of  psychology  becomes,  therefore,  the  discovery  of  the  relation 
between  the  Ego  and  its  appearances  in  the  phenomenal  world. 
To  explain  variety  in  consciousness  Herbart  recognized  that 
the  Ego  may  assert  itself  in  numberless  combinations  of  other 
Reals,  although  it  still  retains  its  own  indestructible  simplicity. 
These  combinations,  infinite  in  variety,  yet  all  stamped  by  the 
presence  of  the  Ego,  are  what  we  call  the  representations,  the 
phenomena,  the  experiences  of  our  daily  life.  In  all  this  flux 
of  changing  combinations  or  representations  the  Ego  can  be 
abstractly  recognized  by  thought;  in  the  same  manner  that 
the  point  of  a  wedge  may  always  be  distinguished  from  its 
path,  although  it  is  seen  in  constantly  changing  relations. 

PSYCHOLOGY  OF  SENSATIONS. — The  sensations  are  the  most 
elemental  representations;  they  form  the  starting-point  of 
psychology.  And,  furthermore,  just  as  the  combinations  in  the 
physical  world  are  capable  of  mathematical  treatment,  so  these 
psychical  combinations  known  as  the  sensation-representation 
can  be  treated  from  the  stand-point  of  mathematics.  This  is 
generally  recognized  as  Herbart's  greatest  contribution  to  psy- 
chology,— the  introduction  of  the  exact  methods  of  mathe- 
matics within  its  borders. 

INFLUENCE  OF  HERBART. 

Besides  his  metaphysics  and  psychology,  Herbart  made  Im- 
portant contributions  to  pedagogics,  and  has  often  been  re- 
garded as  the  first  to  establish  the  art  of  teaching  on  the  firm 


JOHANN  FRIEDRICH   HERBART.  235 

basis  of  a  science.  The  history  of  philosophy  has  rather  under- 
estimated his  importance  in  metaphysics  proper.  It  has  em- 
phasized as  Kant's  logical  successor  the  more  brilliant  but 
perhaps  less  scientific  mind  of  Fichte.  Herbart  called  himself 
a  "  Kantian  of  the  year  1828,"  meaning  thereby  that  he  had 
remodelled  the  Kantian  stand-point  so  that  it  might  better 
agree  with  the  later  philosophical  environment.  In  reality 
Herbart  represents  a  remarkable  synthesis  of  Leibnitzian  meta- 
physics and  Kantian  criticism  with  the  English  demand  for  a 
scientific  psychology.  The  first  influences  of  his  boyhood  were 
those  of  Leibnitz  and  Kant;  his  whole  philosophy  was  the 
transformation  of  the  pluralism  of  the  former,  with  its  loyalty 
to  science  and  mathematics,  into  the  criticism  of  the  latter.  In 
this  process  he  and  his  immediate  disciples  carried  the  Realistic 
premise  of  Kant  to  its  legitimate  conclusions. 

ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM. 

The  second  tendency  of  thought  which  arose  from  the  in- 
fluence of  Kant  we  have  chosen  to  call  Absolute  Idealism,  for 
want  of  a  better  term.  It  is  difficult  to  determine  a  single  ele- 
ment which  may  serve  to  designate  the  definitive  character  of 
this  movement.  The  school  of  Herbart  assures  us  of  the  real 
existence  of  something  behind  our  phenomena,  it  makes  this 
"Real"  objective.  Absolute  Idealism,  on  the  contrary,  is  im- 
pressed with  the  subjective,  the  mental,  the  idealistic  source 
of  experience.  It  fails  to  find  any  reality  beyond  the  thought, 
no  existence  beyond  the  conditions  of  mental  activity,  and  no 
facts  beyond  the  facts  of  consciousness.  This  is  perhaps  the 
central  theme  in  the  entire  movement,  but  it  is  susceptible  to 
many  interpretations,  varying  with  the  stress  of  emphasis  and 
the  temperament  of  the  thinker. 


236  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

KARL   LEONHABD   BEINHOLD. 

LIFE. 

Unity  was  the  demand  from  all  the  disciples  of  Kant,  and 
it  was  this  element  which  they  found  wanting  in  the  Critical 
Philosophy  itself.  Reinhold,  the  founder  of  the  so-called 
"  Kantian  school,"  attempts  to  remedy  this  difficulty  by  intro- 
ducing a  greater  emphasis  on  consciousness  or  the  power  of 
representing.  Reinhold's  parents  were  Austrians,  and  he  was 
born  at  Vienna  in  1758.  Educated  by  the  monks  of  the  Jesuit- 
Barnabite  order,  he  became  dissatisfied  with  the  restricted  field 
of  the  Church  and  sought  greater  intellectual  freedom  in  Ger- 
many. There  he  became  interested  in  the  works  of  Kant,  and 
obtained  the  professorship  at  the  University  of  Jena  by  his 
brilliant  exposition  of  the  Critical  Philosophy.  Latterly  the 
numerous  changes  in  his  opinions  lost  for  him  the  positive 
position  and  the  influence  which  he  had  earlier  exerted.  Rein- 
hold  died  in  1823,  while  holding  the  position  of  Professor  at 
Kiel. 

STAND-POINT. 

Herbart  based  his  philosophy  on  our  representations,  so  also 
did  Reinhold.  There  is,  however,  a  very  fundamental  distinc- 
tion between  them;  to  Herbart  the  representations  pointed  to 
an  objective  plurality  beyond,  while  to  Eeinhold  they  pointed 
to  a  subjective  unity  within.  The  great  fault  of  the  Kantian 
system  seemed  to  consist  in  the  lack  of  some  absolutely  ele- 
mental principle.  It  was  a  fundamental  belief,  not  only  on  the 
part  of  Reinhold  but  also  with  many  others,  that  the  whole  of 
the  Critical  Philosophy  could  perhaps  be  deduced  from  a 
single  basal  principle.  In  his  important  work,  "Suggestions 
towards  a  New  Theory  of  the  Human  Faculty  of  Representa- 
tions/' 3  Reinhold  believes  himself  able  to  deduce  a  f unda- 

*Versuch  einer  neuen  Theorie  des  menschlichen  Vorstellungsver- 
mogens. 


JOHANN   GOTTLIEB   FICHTE.  237 

mental  principle  of  this  character  from  an  analysis  of  our  repre- 
sentations (Vorstellung).  When  we  experience  an  object,  it 
is  not  the  object  itself  that  points  to  reality, — as  Herbart 
thought, — nor  is  it  the  presence  of  the  subject  in  the  represen- 
tation,— as  we  shall  soon  find  was  the  conclusion  of  Fichte, — 
but  it  is  rather  the  conscious  relation  of  these  two.  In  con- 
sciousness both  object  and  subject  meet  in  their  ultimate  unity. 
It  is  consciousness  alone  that  is  Eeal. 

The  Primacy  of  Consciousness. — The  "  thing-in-itself," 
which  possessed  a  sort  of  phantom  reality  in  Kant's  own  mind 
and  which  was  a  plurality  of  Eeals  to  Herbart,  became  the 
principle  of  consciousness  with  Keinhold.  And,  true  to  his 
own  stand-point,  he  realized  that  if  consciousness  truly  pos- 
sessed this  primacy  which  he  ascribed  to  it  he  could  deduce 
therefrom  all  the  transcendental  elements  or  forms  of  knowl- 
edge. In  the  conscious  representation — the  phenomenon  of 
Kant — we  have  the  unity  of  two  aspects, — the  formal  side, 
which  is  related  to  the  subject  and  gives  rise  to  the  transcen- 
dental forms  of  our  knowledge,  and  an  objective  or  material 
side  which  is  seemingly  beyond  consciousness.  Reinhold  is 
not  clear  as  to  this  objective  content  of  our  consciousness, 
and  seems  to  liken  it  to  the  unknowable  "thing-in-itself"  of 
Kant.  This  fundamental  difficulty  in  the  explanation  of  the 
objective  side  of  consciousness  forms  the  transition  to  the 
second  thinker  of  this  Idealistic  School,  Johann  Fichte. 

JOHANN   GOTTLIEB   FICHTE. 

LIFE. 

Fichte,  the  son  of  a  poor  peasant,  was  born  in  1762,  in 
Lusatia,  in  the  southwestern  part  of  Germany.  He  spent  his 
early  childhood  in  herding  geese,  but  later  attracted  the  notice 
of  a  wealthy  land-owner  by  his  marvellous  memory  and  ap- 
parent aptitude  for  study.  The  incident  is  worth  repeating. 
A  rich  nobleman  of  Saxony  visited  Fichte's  native  village  for 


238  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  purpose  of  hearing  a  sermon  from  the  pastor,  but  arriving 
too  late,  he  was  told  that  a  young  boy  could  reproduce  the 
entire  discourse.  Fichte  so  impressed  the  company  by  his 
accurate  and  forcible  repetition  of  the  morning  sermon,  his 
earnestness  and  moral  force,  which  seemed  to  spring  from  a 
strength  of  character  already  clearly  defined,  that  the  nobleman 
readily  consented  to  take  charge  of  Fichte's  education.  The 
fact  that  a  boy  of  eight  years  could  arouse  the  interest  of  a 
stranger  by  his  unusual  personality  illustrates  that  native  force 
of  character  which  was  the  key  to  Fichte's  remarkable  influence 
on  the  history  of  philosophy  and  the  part  which  his  popular 
lectures  played  in  arousing  German  patriotism  at  the  out- 
break of  the  War  of  Liberation.  Fichte  was  placed  by  his 
benefactor  in  a  preparatory  school  and  afterwards  sent  to  the 
universities  of  Jena  and  Leipzig.  Later  he  became  a  private 
tutor  in  Zurich,  but  did  not  give  satisfaction,  for  he  sought 
to  instruct  the  parents  as  well  as  the  children. 

Influence  of  Kant. — Already  deeply  impressed  by  the 
"  Ethics"  of  Spinoza,  he  became  about  this  time  acquainted  with 
the  first  two  "  Critiques"  of  Kant.  He  writes  that  his  life 
is  altogether  changed  by  the  Critical  Philosophy ;  some  uncon- 
scious principle  is  stirred  within  him  and  cries  for  expression. 
He  was  possessed  with  a  desire  to  do  something.  He  felt  the 
pressure  of  an  inner  force  endeavoring  to  realize  itself  in  the 
outside  world,  a  struggle  of  the  will  for  expression.  His 
whole  attitude  towardsjif e  is  erected  on^lie^supremacy  of  the 
active  moral  will  over^the  ^external  facts^pf  the  senses.  This 
feeling,  first  brought  to  his  own  consciousness  by  the  writings 
of  Kant,  developed  later  into  the  central  theme  of  his  entire 
philosophy.  Subsequently  a  tutor's  position  called  him  to  East 
Prussia,  and  he  took  this  opportunity  to  visit  Kant.  In  order 
to  win  the  latter's  approval  he  prepared,  in  a  very  short  time, 
an  essay  treating  of  the  Critical  Philosophy  as  applied  to 
revealed  religion.  Fichte  suggested  that  the  moral  law,  or  the 
universal  validity  of  the  categorical  imperative,  might  become 


JOHANN   GOTTLIEB   FICHTE.  239 

endowed  with  personal  attributes  and  thus  represent  the  God 
of  religious  reverence.  In  this  first  essay  one  recognizes  the 
central  element  in  both  the  personality  and  the  philosophy  of 
Fichte, — the  primacy  of  the  active  moral  will.  Instead  of 
degrading  the  Christian  conception  of  the  Deity,  he  believed 
that  he  had  exhalted  God  to  the  Supreme  Force  of  the  universe 
by  identifying  Him  with  the  moral  law.  This  work,  although 
published  anonymously,  won  for  Fichte  the  respect  of  Kant 
and  a  literary  recognition  throughout  Germany. 

University  Career. — Probably  as  a  result  of  this  promi- 
nence he  was  called  to  occupy  the  chair  of  Eeinhold  at  Jena. 
Here  he  began  the  preparation  of  his  classic  work,  "  The  Science 
of  Knowledge,"  *  published  in  1794,  but  revised  several  times 
later.  ff  The  Vocation  of  Man,"  5  published  in  1800,  is  a  popu- 
lar and  brilliant  presentation  of  his  system;  it  develops  the 
conception  of  true  knowledge,  as  Fichte  considered  his  funda- 
mental idea,  from  the  three  stand-points  of  doubt,  knowledge, 
and  faith.  At  Jena  he  became  involved  in  several  controversies, 
and  at  last  he  was  compelled  to  withdraw.  These  controversies 
illustrate  the  distinctness  of  purpose  and  self-reliance  which 
was  characteristic  of  Fichte,  as  well  as  a  certain  officiousness 
which  obscured  his  real  motive  and  made  enemies  for  him  on 
every  side.  He  enraged  the  students  by  inducing  them  to  give 
up  duelling,  he  offended  the  authorites  by  conducting  popular 
lectures  on  Sunday  afternoons.  During  this  "  atheistic  con- 
troversy," as  it  is  called,  Fichte  addressed  an  appeal  to  the 
public,  in  which  he  sought  to  show  that  the  real  motive  for 
molesting  him  was  due  to  his  sympathy  with  political  freedom 
rather  than  from  any  sincere  religious  scruples  on  the  part  of 
the  authorities  of  the  university.  At  the  same  time  he  addressed 
a  private  letter  to  a  friend,  in  which  he  stated  in  rather  arro- 
gant language  that  any  rebuke  from  the  government  would 


*  Wissenschaftslehre. 

5  Die  Bestimmung  des  Menschen. 


240  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

be  followed  by  his  resignation.  This  letter  was  placed  before 
the  Council,  who  promptly  removed  him  from  the  professorship. 
After  leaving  Jena,  Fichte  finally  settled  at  Berlin,  where  in 
1810  he  became  professor  of  philosophy  and  rector  at  the 
recently  founded  university  of  that  city.  While  here  he  de- 
livered a  series  of  addresses,  entitled  "Talks  to  the  German 
People/'6  which  served  more  perhaps  than  any  other  single 
intellectual  force  to  arouse  enthusiasm  in  the  War  of  Libera- 
tion. Fichte  died  in  1814. 

STAND-POINT. 

These,  in  brief,  are  the  facts  of  Fichte's  life;  but  behind 
them  there  was  a  personality  of  unusual  force  and  power, 
although  not  wholly  free  from  the  emotional  influences  of  his 
nature.  It  is  a  fact  of  unusual  significance  that  a  person's 
system  of  philosophy  is  often  merely  the  outward  expression  of 
the  inner  character  and  personality.  And  this  observation  is 
especially  true  in  the  case  of  Fichte.  He  was  more  the  man  of 
the  world,  the  actor,  who  sought  to  establish  a  rational  and 
philosophical  background  for  his  emotional  convictions  and  to 
bring  into  the  foreground  the  dignity  of  the  moral  law.  Kant 
began  with  the  "  thing-in-itself "  and  finished  his  philosophy 
with  the  supremacy  of  the  moral  reason.  Fichte  interpreted 
both  as  the  free  act  of  an  absolute  self.  Action  and  not  thought, 
the  moral  will  and  not  the  analytical  reason,  was  to  him  the 
ultimate  reality  of  the  universe, — the  "  thing-in-itself"  of  Kant 
and  the  Principle  of  Consciousness  of  Keinhold.  Fichte,  like 
the  other  two  thinkers  who  have  just  received  our  attention, 
began  his  philosophical  investigations  by  means  of  the  repre- 
sentation. He  considered  them  to  be  the  empirical  basis  of  all 
philosophy,  but  as  such  implied  nothing  beyond  the  activity 
of  the  subject.  Fichte,  like  Keinhold,  was  impressed  by  the 
conscious  or  subjective  meaning  of  our  representations,  but 

6  Keden  an  die  Deutsche  Nation. 


JOHANN   GOTTLIEB   FICHTE.  241 

unlike  him  he  sought  to  make  this  subjectiveness  absolute  in- 
stead of  relative.  Keinhold  had  found  two  elements  in  the 
Principle  of  Consciousness,  a  subjective  and  an  objective; 
Fichte  found  but  one,  the  subjective  act. 

THE  PRIMACY  OF  THE  EGO. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Kant  himself  found  it  difficult 
to  describe  the  "  thing-in-itself "  by  any  other  means  than  its 
unknowability.  Herbart  met  with  the  same  difficulty  in  his 
treatment  of  the  Eeals,  and  Reinhold  found  himself  at  a  loss 
to  account  for  the  objective  element  in  consciousness.  Fichte 
recognized  this  inherent  difficulty  present  in  the  metaphysics 
of  any  dualistic  realism.  Consciousness  as.  the  unity  of  life 
explained  only  the  subjective  part  of  the  world;  it  could  not 
account  for  a  purely  objective  element  without  becoming  in- 
volved in  contradictions.  In  the  spirit  of  the  movement  of 
Absolute  Idealism  which  he  himself  initiates  he  sought  to  im- 
merge  this  duality  of  subject  and  object  in  the  simple  conscious 
act,  the  inner  expression  of  the  Ego.  Fichte,  who  believed 
himself  to  be  merely  an  interpreter  of  Kant,  saw  in  the  asser- 
tive act  of  the  Ego  not  only  the  moral  background  for  freedom, 
immortality,  and  God,  but  also  the  metaphysical  unity  of  both 
the  "thing-in-itself"  and  its  transcendental  forms  of  apper- 
ception. By  immerging  the  objective  "thing-in-itself"  and 
the  subjective  transcendental  elements  into  the  deepest  reality 
of  the  Deed-act,  Fichte  hoped  to  avoid  the  avowed  dualism  of 
Kant  and  the  implied  dualism  of  Reinhold.  Activity,  as  Ego, 
by  supplying  all  the  conditions  for  the  possibility  of  knowledge, 
is  likewise  the  full  condition  for  its  own  existence.  From  this 
absolute  point  of  view — that  is,  from  the  point  of  view  which 
regards  the  Ego-activity  as  the  single  condition  for  all  existence 
— we  can  conceive  of  this  Ego  as  in  itself  free,  and  likewise  as 
that  from  which  arises  all  the  material  and  forms  of  our  world 
of  sense  and  knowledge. 

The  Assertion  of  the  Ego.  — The  development  of  this 

16 


242  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

central  theme  forms  the  subject  of  Fichte's  classic  work,  "  The 
Science  of  Knowledge/'  which  appeared  in  various  forms.  This 
critique  of  the  conditions  of  absolute  knowledge,  to  use  a  phrase 
which  shows  the  connection  between  Kant  and  Fichte,  regards 
all  approaches  to  Eeality  as  empirically  starting  with  a  fact  of 
knowledge.  In  the  earliest  presentation  of  the  work  it  was 
the  knowledge  of  identity,  while  in  a  later  exposition  it  was  a 
mathematical  truth  which  formed  the  starting-point  for  the 
science  of  knowledge.  The  highest  form  of  knowledge  is  "  the 
intuition  of  all  intuitions;  the  absolute  uniting  of  all  intui- 
tions into  one."  7  Knowledge  of  this  character  is  above  contra- 
diction, because  to  contradict  it  we  should  be  compelled  to  use 
some  form  of  it.  To  discover  the  central  principle  of  this  kind 
of  knowledge  is  the  immediate  problem  which  presents  itself  to 
Fichte  and  through  which  he  hopes  to  give  unity  not  only  to 
the  system  of  Kant  but  also  to  the  whole  problem  of  philosophy. 

In  view  of  this  demand  Fichte  seeks  to  discover  the  "  abso- 
lute first  and  undeniably  unconditioned  fundamental  proposi- 
tion" 8  of  all  human  knowledge,  believing  that  if  such  a  propo- 
sition could  be  found  it  would  lie  at  the  basis  of  a  science  of 
all  sciences,  the  "Science  of  Knowledge/'  He  had  already 
pointed  out  in  the  essay  "  Concerning  the  Concept  of  the 
Science  of  Knowledge"  9  that  such  a  ground-proposition  really 
exists  as  the  form  or  manner  of  uniting  all  the  facts  of  all  the 
sciences.  The  world  of  scientific  knowledge,  he  observes,  is  like 
a  building, — at  the  foundation  there  is  one  element  that  sup- 
ports the  superstructure.  The  discovery  of  this  element  is  the 
purpose  of  the  true  science  of  knowledge. 

Every  proposition  that  is  a  fact  of  empirical  science  is  not 
itself  absolutely  elemental,  there  are  always  earlier  propositions 

7  Darstellung  der  Wissenschaftslehre  von  1801. 

8  "  Erster,  schlechthin  unbedingter  Grundsatz." — Wissenschaftslehre, 
1794. 

9  Ueber  den  Begriff  der  Wissenschaftslehre. 


JOHANN   GOTTLIEB   FICHTE.  243 

upon  which  it  depends.  But  there  is,  nevertheless,  one  single 
proposition  which  cannot  be  reduced  into  simpler  terms.  It  is 
the  deed-act  of  assertion.  I  must  will  to  search  for  knowledge 
before  knowledge  is  possible.  And  the  existence  of  this  will- 
act  can  never  be  directly  proved,  because  it  is  deeper  than  all 
proof.  Of  its  existence,  however,  I  am  certain  beyond  doubt, 
for  it  is  presupposed  by  every  reflective  process,  even  that  of 
doubting  its  existence.  "  The  Subject  of  self-conscious  knowl- 
edge and  the  Principle  of  actual  existence  are  the  same/' 10 
Kant  had  already  employed  this  transcendental  method  of 
proof  when  he  demonstrated  that  time,  space,  and  the  categories 
were  necessary  even  for  the  possibility  of  experience,  and  Fichte 
used  it  to  show  that  the  reality  of  the  act  of  a  self -asserting 
consciousness  is  necessarily  presupposed,  not  only  for  experi- 
ence, but  even  for  the  possibility  of  thought. 

To  illustrate  this  transcendental,  character  of  the  self,  let  us 
consider  the  proposition  "  A  is  A."  Although  apparently  a 
mere  judgment  of  repetition  and  at  first  sight  of  no  value,  yet 
a  little  reflection  will  show  that  a  judgment  even  as  simple  in 
character  as  this,  undoubtedly  implies  the  assumption  that  I, 
a  person,  make  the  statement.  That  is,  the  simplest  fact  of 
knowledge  is  derived  from  the  proposition, — I,  an  existent 
being,  act.  This  is  of  the  deepest  consequence  to  Fichte's 
system.  It  clearly  indicates  that  the  whole  science  of  knowl- 
edge is  based  on  the  existence  and  activity  of  the  Ego;  that 
the  Ego — and  not  some  outside,  objective,  inane  world — is 
the  source  of  our  representations,  the  fundamental  principle  of 
all  knowledge,  and  the  ground  of  all  reality.  "Before  all 
assertions  the  Ego  must  be  asserted  through  itself."  xl  Fichte 
did  not  mean  to  declare,  however,  as  many  of  his  critics  seem 
to  imply,  that  the  individual,  finite  self  creates  arbitrarily  the 


10  Das  System  der  Sittenlehre,  Paragraph  4. 

11 "  .  .  .  vor  allem  Setzen  im  Ich  vorher  das  Ich  selbst  gesetzt  sey." — 
Wissenschaftslehre,  1794,  Section  1,  Paragraph  5. 


244  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

world  about  it  from  a  previous  condition  of  non-existence.  He 
wished  only  to  point  out  that  the  "Rpo  must,  a^grf.  if«  r>wn 
reality  before  it  can  assert  the  sense-world.  Th  fundamental 
proposition  oi  all  science  is  thus  expressed,  "  The  Ego  asserts 
originally  its  own  being." 12  A  proposition  so  simple  in  charac- 
ter as  to  receive  at  once  universal  assent.  It  was  suggested  by 
Descartes  when  he  derived  all  reality  from  the  existence  of 
the  self,  by  Kant  when  he  defined  the  transcendental  Ego,  and 
still  again  by  Eeinhold  when  he  made  consciousness  the  prin- 
ciple for  the  unity  of  the  subjective  and  the  objective.  To 
Fichte,  however,  the  Ego  meant  something  more  real,  more 
central  than  it  did  to  the  earlier  thinkers;  as  act,  it  expressed 
the  identity  of  subject  and  object;  as  will,  it  unfolded  the 
moral  freedom  of  the  individual.  It  is  that  reality  which 
exists  for  itself,  "for  whatever  is  not  for  itself  is  not  for  an 
Ego."  Its  very  being  consists  in  merely  asserting  itself  as 
existent. 

The  Assertion  of  the  Non-Ego. — The  classic  objection  to 
all  forms  of  absolute  idealism  demands  an  explanation  of  the 
return  from  the  Absolute  to  common  experience.  And  Fichte 
recognized  that  his  Ego,  as  the  highest  condition  of  knowledge, 
once  defined,  had  little  value  unless  applicable  to  life.  In  the 
bare  absoluteness  of  this  first  proposition  of  the  science  of 
knowledge  one  perceives  only  a  principle,  and  not  a  system. 
The  mere  assertiveness  of  the  Ego,  the  mere  will  activity,  can- 
not produce  a  world  of  experience  and  of  thought.  Some 
object,  some  non-Ego  is  necessary  to  supplement  the  abstract 
reality  of  the  Ego.  But  this  non-Ego  must  be  derived  from  the 
Ego  itself,  since  the  assertion  of  the  Ego  is  at  the  foundation 
of  all  science  and  all  knowledge.  A  non-Ego,  or  medium  for 
expression,  is  asserted,  opposited,  or  demanded  by  the  free  ac- 
tivity of  the  Ego,  in  order  that  the  Ego-niay  have  an  object 
\  -^ j 

12 "Das  Ich  setzt  ursprtinglich  schlechthin  sein  eigenes  Seyn." — 
Wissenschaftslehre,  1794,  Section  1,  Paragraph  10. 


JOHANN  GOTTLIEB  FICHTE.  245 

against  which  to  assert  its  own  self-consciousness.  This  non- 
Ego,  which  is~trulylisserted  by  the  Ego,  is  known  to  the  em- 
pirical consciousness  of  man  as  a  "  fact/'  an  object,  or  an  ex- 
perience; its  assertion  is  the  second  proposition  of  the  science 
of  knowledge. 

Fichte  is  very  careful  to  insist  that  our  concept  of  the  so- 
called  external  world  is  not,  as  is  ordinarily  supposed,  the 
product  of  abstracting  the  given  element  from  all  our  repre- 
sentations. Very  ingeniously  he  points  out  that  the  process 
of  abstraction  by  which  we  define  a  Real,  external  world — 
independent  of  the  Ego — is  a  process  which  takes  place  only 
through  the  activity  of  the  Ego.  I  believe  in  a  real,  external 
world  because  I  have  previously  willed  to  do  so;  the  Ego 
freely  wills  the  external  world,  and  truly  wills  it  to  be  such 
as  it  is.  This  method  of  demonstrating  the  subjective  character 
of  any  concept  has  been  often  employed  by  subsequent  idealists. 
Schopenhauer,  and  more  recently  Royce,  have  used  the  same 
method  to  prove  the  subjectivity  of  the  principle  of  causality. 
The  subject  must  already  have  the  idea  of  the  necessary  con- 
nection between  two  phenomena  before  he  can  objectify  the 
idea  in  the  world  of  fact-experience.  The  principle  of  causality 
arises  from  the  mind,  and  the  non-Ego  only  supplies  the 
material  for  its  realization. 

The  Limitation  of  the  Ego  and  the  Non-Ego. — But  to 
return  to  Fichte's  philosophy  of  self-assertion.  He  had  already 
defined  the  existence  of  the  Ego  as  the  first  proposition  of 
every  philosophy  and  the  assertion  of  the  non-Ego  as  the 
second.  But  these  two  propositions  are  evidently  opposed  to 
one  another;  a  third  proposition  is  required  to  exhibit  their 
internal  unity.  This  cannot,  however,  be  absolutely  different 
from  either;  it  must  be  deduced  from  a  synthesis  of  both. 
The  Ego  could  not  fully  realize  itself  unless  it  freely  asserted 
the  non-Ego ;  the  non-Ego  could  not  exist  unless  it  was  asserted 
by  the  Ego.  But  the  Ego  which  in  the  pure  conscious  activity 
is  the  ground  for  both  the  asserted  Ego  and  the  asserted  non- 


246  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

Ego  is  more  unlimited  than  the  limited  Ego  which  is  asserted. 
This  must  be  recognized  in  the  third  proposition  which  syn- 
thesizes the  former  two.  As  stated  by  Fichte,  it  is  as  follows : 
"  The  Ego  asserts  a  distinguishable  Ego  over  against  a  distin- 
guishable non-Ego."  13  This  distinction  between  the  unlimited 
and  limited  Egos,  which  was  more  emphasized  in  his  later 
works,  will  be  referred  to  under  the  section  treating  of  the 
Absolute  in  Fichte's  Idealism. 

Deductions  from  the  Fundamental  Propositions. — These 
three  propositions  lie  at  the  foundation  of  the  Fichteian  phi- 
losophy. They  are  the  result  of  a  process  of  reflection,  gradu- 
ally exhibiting  to  the  empirical  consciousness  its  true  existence 
in  a  Principle  of  Pure  Consciousness.  But  as  mere  statements 
they  are  formal,  abstract,  and  far  from  those  processes  of 
thought  usually  employed.  Fichte,  like  his  master,  felt  it 
necessary  to  show  wherein  the  categories  of  thought  might  be 
deduced  from  a  single  fundamental  principle.  The  category 
of  reality  is  implied  by  the  mere  assertion  of  the  Ego,  that  of 
negation  by  the  assertion  of  the  non-Ego;  and,  further,  the 
reciprocity  of  Ego  and  non-Ego  leads  us  to  the  category  of 
limitation.  This  reciprocal  limitation  of  Ego  and  non-Ego 
develops  as  a  process  through  which  the  limited  Ego  struggles 
to  assert  its  absolute  freedom.  The  continual  process  gives  rise 
to  the  various  stages  of  knowledge  of  which  sensation  is  the 
lowest  and  reason  is  the  highest. 

The  inner  being  of  reality  may  be  called  "  Egoness,  Intelli- 
gence, Eeason,  or  whatever  one  might  wish  to  call  it."  14  Be- 
sides this  intellectual  description  we  may  also  add  the  moral, 
the  Ego  is  Will  and  Freedom.  When  regarded  as  the  basis  of 
all  contemplative  knowledge  it  is  Intelligence;  when  regarded 
as  activity  it  is  Will;  and  when  regarded  as  the  unconditioned 

u  "  Ich  seize  im  Ich  dem  theilbaren  Ich  ein  theilbares  Nicht-Ich  ent- 
gegen." — Wissenschaftslehre,  1794,  Section  3,  D. 
"Das  System  der  Sittenlehre. 


JOHANN   GOTTLIEB   FICHTE.  247 

principle,  or  as  the  ground  of  the  moral  law,  it  is  Freedom. 
The  description  opens  up  at  once  two  distinct  problems.  We 
inquire,  as  did  Fichte  in  his  later  life,  the  meaning  of  the  Ego 
as  Absolute,  the  possibility  of  moving  from  the  individual  self 
to  the  Highest  Self.  And  then  again  there  is  the  significance 
of  the  moral  law  which  especially  appealed  to  Fichte.  Like 
Kant,  he  sought  to  emphasize  the  true  dignity  of  morality  and 
the  perfect  equilibrium  between  the  free  Ego  and  the  moral 
ideal. 

The  Absolute. — The  first  of  these  problems — namely,  to 
show  the  relation  between  the  individual  conscious  act  and  a 
higher  Principle  of  Consciousness  or  the  Absolute — especially 
attracted  Fichte's  attention  in  the  later  expressions  of  his 
system.  It  is  a  problem  that  may  be  approached  from  various 
stand-points,  all  of  which  lead  to  the  same  conception  of  the 
Absolute  Self.  Like  Berkeley,  Fichte  began  with  a  Principle, 
the  deed-act, — rather  than  the  ef  esse  is  percipi"  of  the  British 
Idealist, — and  from  this  moved  upward  to  the  Absolute  which 
was  implicitly  required  in  the  whole  mental  process.  And,  like 
Berkeley,  he  tended  to  emphasize  this  Absolute  more  in  his 
later  expositions  than  in  the  first  expression  of  the  "  Science  of 
Knowledge."  It  represented,  however,  not  so  much  the  creative 
Spirit  of  God, — which  the  British  Idealist  had  brought  into 
the  foreground, — as  a  universal  Principle  of  self-conscious 
activity. 

Of  the  various  avenues  of  approach  to  Fichte's  Absolute 
there  are  three  which  seem  of  extreme  importance.  The  first 
of  these  has  already  been  referred  to  in  connection  with  the 
third  fundamental  proposition  of  the  "  Science  of  Knowledge," 
which  required  an  Ego  over  and  above  the  mutual  limitations 
of  the  divisible  Ego  and  non-Ego.  Since  my  individual  self 
is  constantly  asserting  the  not-self,  and  at  the  same  time  the 
not-self  is  compelling  it  to  take  successively  higher  and  higher 
points  of  view,  then  in  Fichte's  mind  there  seemed  to  be  the 
necessity  of  a  Universal  Principle  in  which  all  such  finite 


248  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

activites  could  be  included.  It  must,  however,  be  of  the  general 
form  of  the  individual  Ego,  since  it  is  self -activity  to  which 
everything  in  the  universe  is  referred.  Another  approach  to 
the  Absolute  may  be  made  through  the  nature  of  thought. 
All  our  finite  thought-processes  are  somehow  only  portions  of 
reality, — they  never  express  its  full  nature.  We  can,  however, 
conceive  of  a  highest  form  of  thought  which  is  free  from  the 
imperfections  of  the  lower  forms,  that  is  in  fact  Absolute 
in  its  nature.  While  still  again  there  is  a  third  side  from  which 
the  Absolute  may  be  approached.  It  may  be  regarded  as  the 
unity  of  moral  freedom  and  moral  law.  The  human  self  is 
free,  yet  it  finds  that  its  freedom  is  possible  only  in  the  presence 
of  the  moral  force  o'f  the  world.  This  conception  of  the  har- 
mony, of  freedom  and  law  is  possible  only  when  we  conceive  of 
a  Universal  Moral  Being  from  whom  sprang  both  human  free- 
dom and  the  moral  law.  This  conception  of  the  moral  aspect  of 
the  Absolute  suggesfs"at  once  Fichte's  interpretation  of  God.  If 
the  inference  from  various  of  his  writings  is  correct,  the  term 
God  always  indicated  to  him  the  moral  order  of  the  universe; 
as  such  it  was  asserted  by  a  free  act  of  the  Ego  as  the  complete 
fulfilment  of  its  moral  Ideal.  Knowledge  as  the  operation  of 
the  human  Ego,  the  moral  law  as  it  is  reflected  in  human  con- 
sciousness, are  truly  identical  with  the  fundamental  essence  of 
all  being.  There  is  but  one  Absolute,  one  God,  and  one  Keality. 
This  later  emphasis  on  God  and  the  Absolute  Ego  seems  truly  a 
completion  of  his  earlier  thought,  although  many  have  con- 
sidered it  an  altered  stand-point.  He  had  earlier  defined  the 
relation  between  the  empirical  and  the  pure  consciousness,  he 
now  defined  the  relation  between  the  human  Ego  and  its  In- 
finite Ideal. 

Morality. — Besides  the  general  nature  of  the  Absolute,  the 
problem  of  the  moral  relation  among  men  appeared  to  Fichte 
of  great  importance.  This  he  discusses  at  length  in  two  trea- 
tises. The  one  deals  with  the  inner  laws  and  principles  of 
morality  and  shows  the  development  of  duty  in  its  various 


I    UNIVERSITY 

V      or 


JOHANN   GOTTLIEB   FICHTE.  249 


forms  out  of  a  single  abstract  conception,  while  a  second  work 
traces  the  external  conditions  for  moral  relations  among  men. 
In  "  The  System  of  the  Science  of  Ethics/' 15  Fichte  sought  to 
apply  the  chief  conclusions  of  his  more  theoretical  philosophy  to 
the  meaning  of  conduct.  Starting  with  the  conception  of  the 
free  Ego,  he  explains  that  freedom  requires,  for  its  very  concep- 
tion, a  law  of  harmonious  action  which  the  free  Ego  may 
freely  observe.  Freedom  can  only  be  freedom  if  it  asserts  a 
law  to  control  its  actions, — the  free  Ego  wills  Law.  This  law, 
which  is  truly  at  one  with  the  inner  meaning  of  the  Ego,  is  the 
fundamental  principle  of  morality.  It  is  purely  formal,  it 
simply  says,  "to  be  morally  f r^e. thexfi.muat  be  a  certain  law  or 
regularity  to  the  conduct."  The  transition  from  this  formal 
condition  of  morality  to  its  various  manifestations  as  the  moral 
feeling,  is  accomplished  by  the  practical  aphorism  "Act  ac- 
cording to  the  best  belief  in  thy  duty,  or  act  according  to  thy 
conscience."  16  In  the  practical  application  of  this  command- 
ment Fichte  outlines  the  general  nature  of  duty — as  obligation 
to  the  moral  law — and  its  various  requirements-  for  men  in 
different  walks  of  life. 

The  other  treatise  on  conduct,  "  The  Foundation  of  Natural 
Rights/' 17  is  distinctly  objective  and  is  concerned  neither  with 
the  moral  law  or  with  the  conception  of  duty.  It  has  as  its 
problem  the  discovery  of  the  conditions,  six  in  number,  for 
the  expression  of  individual  freedom  in  the  external  world. 
Among  these  conditions  the  most  important,  from  a  certain 
point  of  view,  is  the  existence  of  other  free  beings.  Fichte 
believes  that  the  existence  of  other  persons  can  be  directly 
developed  or  unfolded  from  the  conception  of  a  single  free  in- 
dividual. This  removes  any  objection  to  his  system  that  might 

15  Das  System  der  Sittenlehre. 

""  Handle  stets  nach  bester  Ueberzeugung  von  deiner  Pflicht;  oder: 
handle  nach  deinem  Gewissen." — Das  System  der  Sittenlehre,  Part  I., 
Section  13. 

"  Grundlage  des  Naturrechts. 


250  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

be  advanced  on  the  ground  that  he  believed  only  in  the  exist- 
ence of  himself, — a  way  of  philosophizing  known  as  Solipsism. 
The  immediate  problem  of  the  "  Natural  Eights"  is  to  discover 
the  various  means  by  which  the  freedom  of  the  single  indi- 
vidual can  exist  in  harmony  with  other  free  beings  so  that  each 
may  assist  the  others  to  fuller  and  nobler  lives.  "  The  concep- 
tion of  right  is  the  conception  of  the  necessary  relations  among 
free  beings." 18  This  introduces  us  to  the  legal  relations 
among  men,  and  the  institutions — the  State,  the  city,  the 
family — through  which  man  seeks  to  attain  a  fuller  realization 
of  his  own  particular  freedom  in  harmony  with  the  rest  of 
mankind. 

INFLUENCE  OF  FICHTE'S  IDEALISM. 

The  philosophy  of  Fichte  is  above  all  else  original,  impres- 
sive, and  striking.  Although  often  lacking  in  orderly  arrange- 
ment of  parts  and  logical  consistency  in  presentation,  it  is 
remarkable  for  its  scope  and  magnitude.  This  breadth  supplies 
the  ground  for  three  movements  not  unlike,  in  general  char- 
acter, the  movements  which  we  traced  from  Kant.  The  exces- 
sive emphasis  on  the  value  of  individual  man  finds  an  expres- 
sion in  the  passionate  sentimentality  of  the  Romanticists.  And, 
further,  the  mystical  or  Absolute  element  in  Fichte  is  em- 
phasized by  Schelling,  who  discovers  a  dual  aspect  in  the  prin- 
ciple to  Self-Consciousness.  But  by  far  the  most  important 
result  of  Fichte's  system  is  to  be  found  in  Hegel.  The  transi- 
tion from  Fichte  to  Hegel  will  be  outlined  in  connection  with 
the  latter. 

THE  ROMANTICISTS. 

Frequently  in  the  history  of  thought  the  symbolism  of  theo- 
retical principles  becomes  the  ideal  of  life.  The  reaction 
against  the  formal  aestheticism  of  the  mediaeval  Church  ex- 
hibited itself  in  the  over-assertion  of  the  individual, — the 
characteristic  of  the  period  of  the  Renaissance.  In  that  case, 

"  Grundlage  des  Naturrechts,  Section  2. 


FRIEDRICH   WILHELM   JOSEPH   SCHELLING.  251 

however,  the  individualism  represented  merely  a  subjective 
reaction  against  outward  forms,  and  not  an  objective  assertion 
of  a  subjective  caprice.  This  latter  is  characteristic  of  the 
stand-point  of  the  Romanticists  who  applied  the  Fichteian 
principle — the  Ego  asserts  its  object — to  the  interpretation  of 
life.  The  one  element  of  agreement  among  all  the  Roman- 
ticists, no  matter  how  much  they  disputed  with  one  another 
in  regard  to  particular  points,  seems  to  have  been  the 
supremacy  of  an  intuitive  feeling,  an  emotional  rather  than  a 
logical  approach  to  ultimate  questions.  The  play  of  analogy 
often  takes  the  place  of  reason,  vain  sentimentality  not  infre- 
quently supplies  the  ground  of  reality.  Such  are  the  depths 
into  which  philosophy  sometimes  falls. 

The  Romantic  school  includes,  among  others,  Novalis  (Har- 
denberg),  the  two  Schlegels,  and  Tieck.  They  all  attempt  to 
discover  in  the  feelings  a  single  emotion  which  shall  explain 
the  mysteries  of  all  things.  Novalis  tries  to  deduce  a  philos- 
ophy from  poetry  and  sexual  emotion.  An  unfinished  lyric  of 
his  defines  poetry  and  art  as  the  outward  expressions  of  inner 
reality.  Philosophy,  he  tells  us,  is  only  the  theory  of  poetry, — 
at  the  root  they  are  identical.  Some  mystic  word,  perhaps, 
may  explain  the  essence  of  the  subjective  and  the  objective! 
In  his  life  also  Novalis  defines  poetry  as  the  innermost  essence 
of  things.  He  gives  his  soul  a  year  to  prepare  for  suicide,  that 
he  might  join  his  departed  love, — at  the  end  of  the  year  he 
marries  elsewhere. 

FRIEDRICH   WILHELM   JOSEPH   SCHELLINO. 

LIFE. 

The  most  influential  of  the  Romanticists,  as  far  as  further 
tendencies  in  philosophy  are  concerned,  was  Friedrich  Wil- 
helm  Joseph  Schelling,  born  in  1775,  in  Wurtemberg,  and  edu- 
cated at  Tubingen.  About  1798  he  went  to  Jena,  where,  under 
the  influence  of  the  Kantians,  Reinhold,  and  especially  Fichte, 


252  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

he  prepared  his  more  important  contributions  to  the  history  of 
thought.  After  1803  he  served  as  profesor  of  philosophy  at 
various  German  universities,  and  latterly  lost  that  vigor  of 
philosophic  expression  which  characterized  his  early  manhood. 
Schelling  succeeded  Hegel  at  Berlin,  but  failed  to  counteract 
the  pantheistic  tendencies  then  prominent.  He  died  in  1854. 

STAND-POINT. 

The  system  of  absolute  idealism,  as  it  appears  in  the  early 
writings  of  Fichte,  presented  a  universe  of  self,  but  neglected 
an  adequate  treatment  of  the  not-self.  Schelling  realized  the 
one-sidedness  on  the  part  of  his  master,  and  sought  to  obviate 
the  defect  by  developing  a  parallelism  between  subject  and 
object.  Fichte's  subjective  idealism  was  true  so  far  as  it  went, 
so  Schelling  thought  in  his  early  life,  but  it  represented  only 
half  the  world.  It  was  believed  by  this  disciple  of  idealistic 
parallelism  that  the  explanation  of  the  agreement  between  sub- 
ject and  object,  which  constitutes  philosophy,  may  be  reduced 
to  two  original  premises. 

Nature-Philosophy. — According  to  one  point  of  view  it 
may  be  supposed  that  "the  objective  is  first  made,  and  the 
question  then  arises  as  to  how  the  subjective  may  be  made  to 
correspond  to  it."  19  This  proposition  gives  rise  to  the  Phi- 
losophy  of  Nature,  or  speculative  physics,  the  task  of  which  is 
"  to  explain  the  ideal  from  the  real/' 20  Nature  is  not  a  mere 
product  (natura  naturata),  the  sum  total  of  material  objects, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  the  essence  of  nature  is  the  esoteric  and 
imperishable  force  behind  all  appreciable  phenomena;  it  is 
called  by  Schelling  "  projlujgtivity," 21  or  generating  nature 


"System  des  transcendentalen  Idealismus,  1800,  Einleitung,  Sec- 
tion 1. 

30 "  Das  Ideelle  aus  dem  Reellen  zu  erklaren." — Naturphilosophie, 
1799..  Section  1. 

21  Naturphilosophie,  Section  6,  ii. 


FRIEDRICH   WILHELM  JOSEPH   SCHELLING.  253 

(natura  naturans).  Pure  productivity,  however,  is  formless; 
in  order  for  it  to  become  definite  it  must  set  limits  for  itself. 
This  self-limiting  principle  of  productivity,  the  force-substance 
of  theHLeilmitzian  school,  gives  nse Tf <T  tlie  Hmle"  products  or 
separate  objects  of  sense-perception.  Nature,  as  we  know  it, 
is  the  unending  struggle  of  this  inner  essence  of  productivity 
to  limit  itself  as  product,  an  infinite  metamorphosis. 

Transcendental  Idealism. — Instead  of  beginning  with  the 
objective,  we  may  believe  the  "  subjective  made  first,  and  the 
question  arises  as  to  how  the  objective  may  be  brought  to  cor- 
respond with  it ;" 22  this  is  the  idealistic  attitude  towards  the 
world  and  the  true  basis  of  any  transcendental  philosophy.  In 
the  " System  of  Transcendental  Idealism'"  published  in  1800, 
Schelling  observes,  in  outward  form  at  least,  the  method  of 
Fichte,  whereas  in  the  previous  Nature-Philosophy  he  leans 
towards  the  scientific  premises  of  Kant's  later  writings.  On  a 
more  minute  comparison  between  Fichte's  ff  Wissenschafts- 
lehre"  and  Schelling's  "  Transcendentalen  Idealismus"  a  very 
important  distinction  is  discovered,  which  is  perhaps  the  most 
fundamental  difference  between  master  and  pupil.  Fichte 
found  that  a  mere  assertion  of  logical  identity  implied  the 
existence  of  the  Ego,  and  its  activity  was  the  first  principle 
of  all  philosophy.  Schelling  discovered  in  this  identity  not  a 
mere  activity  of  the  Ego,  but  rather  an  antithesis  between  sub- 
ject and  object  to  be  thought  only  in  terms  of  a  universal  prin- 
ciple of  self-conscious  limitation.  Fichte  defined  the  Ego  as 
esentially  activity,  Schelling  found  it  to  consist  in  an  act  of 
self-knowledge,  _eternally  limiting  itself, — a  synthesis  which 
implies  both  the  contrast  and  the  imity"of  subject  and  object. 

EXPRESSION  OF  SELF-CONSCIOUS  LIMITATION. — This  funda- 
mental principle  of  the  self-conscious  antithesis  of  subject  and 
object  forms  a  basis  for  subsequent  deductions  in  the  regions 
of  theoretical  and  practical  philosophy,  history,  religion,  and 

B  System  des  transcendentalen  Idealismus,  Section  1. 


254  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

the  fine  arts.  In  theoretical  philosophy  Schelling  endeavors 
to  trace  the  successive  steps  or  "spocljg^  whereby  the  absolute 
principle  earlier  defined  is  able  to  appear  in  the  various  psy- 
chological activities  of  the  mind.  The  first  epoch  traces  the 
principle  of  self-conscious  limitation  from  sensation  to  produc-^ 
tive  intuition,  from  mere  limitation  to  a  consciousness  of  lhat 
limitation.  Commencing  with  productive  intuition,  which 
requires  the  recognition  of  the  contrast  between  the  material 
and  ideal  worlds,  the  second  epoch  defines  a  process  by  which 
this  productive  intuition  develops  into  reflection,  wherein  the 
self  is  not  only  conscious  of  its  limitations,  but  is  likewise  con- 
scious of  itself  as  limited.  The  third  and  last  epoch  of  the 
theoretical  philosophy  carries  reflection  over  into  the  realm 
of  Will,  a  process  during  which  Schelling  finds  himself  able  to 
give  greater  unity  and  internal  consistency  to  Kant's  system  of 
categories.  This  portion  of  Schelling's  transcendental  philoso- 
phy is  thus  seen  to  be  a  natural  history  of  the  chief  mental 
processes,  an  attempt  to  exhibit  their  internal  structure  or 
logico-genetic  relationship.  Such  an  undertaking,  which  had 
already  been  outlined  by  Fichte,  later  received  exhaustive  treat- 
ment in  Hegel's  "  Phenomenology  of  Mind." 

NORMATIVE  EXPRESSIONS. — In  the  latter  portions  of  his 
"  Transcendental  Idealism"  Schelling  describes  the  freedom  of 
the  infh'virhja]  mill,  the  selLdetermination  of  which  constitutes 
the  ground  of  unity  between  theoretical  and  practical  phi- 
losophy. In  the  political  state  the  will  observes  the  moral  law 
of  justice,  history  is  the  embodiment  of  its  progress,  while 
religion  expresses  its  ultimate  ideal.  Finally,  in  the  last  section 
of  his  work  Schelling  outlines  the  philosophy  of  art,  which 
offers  to  his  romantic  mind  an  appropriate  close  to  "Tran- 
scendental Idealism/'  He  has  constantly  referred  to  the  im- 
plied antithesis  between  subject  and  object,  and  now  through 
the  aesthetic  feeling  he  discovers  a  state  of  self-consciousness 
wherein  this  opposition  is  lost,  where  the  intellect  perceives 
that  it  is  both  self-conscious  and  self -created. 


FRIEDRICH   WILHELM  JOSEPH   SCHELLING.  255 

Philosophy  of  Identity. — Schelling  thus  far  appears  as  a 
transcendental  parallelist, — one  who  discovers  by  the  implica- 
tions of  thought  two  relatively  independent  worlds.  The  objec- 
tive  world  of  nature  is  pure  productivity,,  limiting.- itself  as 
product;  the  subjective,  world  of  thought  is  self-consciouin 
limiting  Itself  through  successive  stages  of  development. 
Within  nature  the  infiTJfe  fitirilgu^p  °^  prorl  ;preme, 

within  mind  self-consciousness  is  the  highest  principle.  An 
opposition  of  worlds  so  marked  as  this  was  soon  recognized  by 
Schelling  himself  to  be  illogical  unless  he  united  the  nature- 
philosonhy  and  the  transcendental  idealism  by  the  conception 
of  an  all-inclusive  Absolute.  He  is  therefore  a  disciple  of 
Spinoza  born  under  Kantian  and  Fichteian  influences.  Schell- 
ing develops  his  conception  of  the  Absolute  as  the  ground  of 
the  identity  of  nature  and  mind  in  a  brief  outline  entitled 
"Presentation  of  my  System  of  Philosophy'"™  published  the 
year  after  the  "  Transcendental  Idealism"  This  short  essay, 
which  suggests  the  "  Ethica"  of  Spinoza  in  the  geometrical 
method  of  proof  and  in  the  metaphysical  stand-point,  is  a  work 
of  remarkable  logical  power,  and  seems  to  deserve  a  deeper 
consideration  than  it  has  generally  received.  As  far  as  Schell- 
ing's  future  influence  is  concerned,  it  denotes  the  culmination 
of  his  philosophical  career. 

The  broadest  conception  of  the  human  intellect  is 
liifaReasatir  "  thought  as  the  +r>fa1  JT^jffprp™™>  flf 
and  objective."  24  it  is  the  unconditioned  beyond  which  there 
nothing.     It  corresponds  in  the  main  to  the  Substance  of 
Spinoza,  although  it  is  perhaps  less  abstract.     The  general 
form  of  this  principle  of  Absolute  Reason  may  be  expressed  by 


a  Darstellung  meines  Systems  der  Philosophic,  1801. 

M  The  first  proposition  of  the  "  Darstellung  meinea  Systems  der 
Philosophic"  is  as  follows:  "  Ich  nenne  Vernunft  die  absolute  Ver- 
nunft,  oder  die  Vernunft,  insofern  sie  als  totale  Indifferenz  des  S«b- 
jektiven  und  Objektiven  gedacht  wird." 


256  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

the  logical  proposition  of  identity, — A  is  A, — since  the  latter  is 
true  beyond  the  conditions  of  time,  "eternal  in  an  absolute 
but  not  empirical  sense."  The  Absolute  Reason_cannot  be  con- 
ceived as  infinite  unless  it  includes  both  the  subjective  realm 
of  self-consciousness  and  the  objective  realm  of  productive 
nature.  This  internal  separation  of  subject  and  object  within 
the  conception  of  the  Absolute  involves  a  certain  quantitative 
differentiation  which  becomes  definitely  expressed  in  the  finite 
objects  of  the  world,  such  as  the  mechanical  and  electrical  phe- 
nomena, the  various  plants  and  animals, — in  fact  the  modes  of 
Spinoza  or  the  things  of  ordinary  speech. 

POSITION  OF  SCHELLING. 

After  the  publication  of  the  theory  of  the  Absolute,  Schell- 
ing's  philosophy  began  to  assume  a  theistical  form  and  to  show 
signs  of  degeneration  into  the  poetical  mysticism  of  the  other 
Romanticists.  An  essay  entitled  "  Bruno,  or  the  God-like  and 
Natural  Principle  of  Tilings,"  a  strong  though  rather  diffuse 
work,  marks  the  beginning  of  this  later  period  of  his  phi- 
losophy. Many  years  before  Schelling's  death  the  superior 
brilliancy  of  Hegel  had  obscured  the  Philosophy  of  Identity, 
with  its  "  night-black"  Absolute.  Yet  it  is  to  be  remembered 
that  the  conception  of  dynamic  process,  the  germ  of  Hegel's 
evolutionary  philosophy,  is  strongly  in  evidence  throughout 
Schelling's  early  thought.  In  the  history  of  German  philosophy 
the  idealistic  parallelism  of  Schelling  is  important  as  the  tran- 
sition from  Fichte's  subjectivism  to  the  deeper  and  richer  sys- 
tem of  Hegel.  The  Principle  of  Self-conscious  Reason  pre- 
sented to  Schelling  a  duality,  the  self  perceived  its  object;  it 
recognizes  it  as  another  beyond  itself.  But  in  a  subsequent 
reflective  attitude  the  self  discovers  that  this  object  is  only 
another  form  of  its  own  inner  reality.  Object  and  subject  are 
truly  one,  they  exist  in  and  through  the  Absolute.  The  pan- 
theism of  Bruno,  of  Spinoza,  and  of  Schelling  have  much  in 
common;  Nature,  Substance,  and  Reason  are  conceptions 


GEORG  WILHELM   FRIEDRICH   HEGEL.  257 

which  express  each  in  its  own  way  the  monistic  truth  of  the 
Universe, — the  Imminent  Absolute  is  all. 


GEORG  WILHELM   FRIEDRICH   HEGEL. 

The  Fichteian  philosophy  was  more  an  attitude  towards  life 
than  an  arbitrarily  finished  system.  Like  the  self  which  it 
formulates,  the  Fichteian  world  always  implies,  for  the  full 
expression  of  its  meaning,  an  unrealized  something  beyond. 
Fichte  is  the  transition  between  Eeinhold  and  Schelling,  be- 
tween the  identity  of  subject  and  object  in  consciousness  and 
their  identity  in  the  Absolute.  But  even  Schelling  with  this 
formal  unity  of  the  two  worlds  sacrificed  meaning  to  abstract- 
ness.  His  Absolute  was  merely  the  identity  of  subject  and 
object,  nothing  else.  Some  meaning  must  be  attributed  to  the 
Absolute  if  it  is  to  be  conceived  as  actual.  This  task  was 
accomplished  by  Hegel,  the  profoundest  and  by  far  the  most 
influential  of  the  post-Kantians. 

LIFE. 

Hegel  was  born  at  Stuttgart,  the  capital  of  Wiirtemberg,  on 
April  27,  1770.  He  received  his  early  education  in  the  schools 
of  his  native  city  and  at  Tubingen.  After  serving  as  a  private 
tutor  in  Switzerland,  he  followed  Schelling  to  Jena,  where  the 
two  together  edited  a  journal  in  the  interests  of  the  "  Philos- 
ophy of  Identity."  The  battle  of  Jena  occurred  just  as  Hegel 
was  finishing  the  last  sheets  of  his  first  important  work,  the 
"  Phenomenology  of  Mind."  25  This  is  the  introduction  to  the 
Hegelian  system  and  attempts  to  trace  the  logical  development 
of  "  mind"  through  successive  stages.  The  defeat  of  the  Prus- 
sians at  Jena  made  it  necessary  for  Hegel  to  seek  elsewhere  for 
a  means  of  livelihood,  and  he  undertook  the  editorship  of  a 
newspaper  in  a  neighboring  town.  He  resigned  this  position 


25  Phanomenologie  dea  Geistes. 
17 


258  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

the  following  year  for  that  of  rector  in  a  preparatory  school. 
Here  he  prepared  an  extensive  statement  of  the  formal  elements 
of  his  system, — the  "Logic"  so  called.  Even  at  that  time 
the  outlines  and  more  important  features  of  his  whole  system 
were  clearly  in  his  mind,  and  the  last  twenty  years  of  his  life 
were  occupied  mainly  in  their  unfolding. 

When  Hegel  was  forty-six  years  of  age,  with  a  clear  con- 
ception of  his  own  philosophical  position  and  with  an  equally 
forcible  conception  of  its  truth,  he  began  lecturing  as  professor 
of  philosophy  at  Heidelberg.  While  there  he  wrote  an  outline 
to  his  whole  system, — the  "  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophical 
Sciences."  26  This  is  the  most  concise  and  exhaustive  presen- 
tation of  his  system.  The  first  part  is  an  outline  of  the  larger 
"Logic"  published  a  few  years  before;  the  second  part  deals 
with  natural  science;  while  the  third  part  outlines  his  general 
theory  of  psychology,  morality,  art,  religion,  and  the  purpose 
of  philosophy.  In  1818  he  removed  to  Berlin  to  fill  the  chair 
of  Fichte,  where  he  remained  until  his  death  in  1831.  At 
Berlin,  Hegel  prepared  a  more  detailed  statement  of  the  latter 
portions  of  the  "Encyclopedia."  Here  he  became  famous 
throughout  Germany,  and  acquired,  through  his  published 
works  and  various  official  positions  a  remarkable  influence. 

The  character  of  Hegel  is  that  of  a  student  and  thinker, 
every  act  is  the  result  of  careful  consideration,  his  slow  and 
studied  utterances  are  devoid  of  feeling  and  sympathy.  He  was 
shrewd,  reserved,  and  conservative,  harsh  to  his  inferiors  and 
opponents,  often  patronizing  to  those  from  whom  he  sought  to 
derive  benefit.  He  was  the  philosopher  rather  than  the  man  of 
the  world,  the  observer  and  not  the  actor.  In  character,  breadth 
of  mind,  and  acumen  he  closely  resembles  Kant.  They  were 
both  constructors  and  systematizers,  but  their  minds  were  of 
different  types.  Kant  was  original,  suggestive,  and  impressive ; 
Hegel  was  acute,  penetrating,  and  concise.  Both  were  men  of 

86  Encyklopadie  der  philosophischen  Wissenschaften  im  Grundrisse. 


GEORG  WILHELM  FRIEDRICH   HEGEL.  259 

thought  rather  than  of  action,  to  whom  logical  consistency  was 
the  basis  of  the  world. 

KELATION  TO  FORMER  IDEALISTS. 

The  Critical  Philosophy  of  Kant  was  a  wonderful  synthesis 
of  the  subjective  or  mental  insight  of  the  rationalists  and  the 
objective  or  nature  philosophy  of  the  Englishmen.  The  sys- 
tem of  Hegel  unfolds  a  similar  synthesis.  It  unites  the  intense 
subjectivism  of  Fichte,  full  of  meaning  and  form,  but  in  the 
end  only  symbolic,  with  the  breadth  of  Schelling's  nature- 
philosophy,  so  exhaustive  as  to  be  devoid  of  definite  form  and 
meaning. 

Fichte. — The  transition  from  the  Fichteian  activity  of  the 
Ego  to  the  Hegelian  world  of  reason  presents  a  remarkable  in- 
sight into  the  distinction  between  the  two  stand-points.  Fichte 
had  declared  that  the  Ego  freely  created  the  non-Ego,  in  order 
that  it  might  have  a  ground  for  its  self-assertion.  Hegel,  how- 
ever, saw  in  this  merely  a  process  in  which  the  Absolute  Reason 
manifested  itself  through  both  Ego  and  non-Ego.  The  self 
could  not  know  that  it  had  asserted  the  not-self, — or  even  con- 
ceive of  the  possibility  of  such  an  assertion, — unless  it  was 
itself  grounded  on  a  principle  of  reason.  In  order  to  distin- 
guish Ego  from  non-Ego,  subject  from  object,  some  common 
element  must  include  them  both.  And  reason  as  this  ground 
is  more  fundamental  than  the  will-assertive  force  of  Fichte, 
because  it  alone  can  be  the  basis  for  consciousness,  freedom,  and 
purposive  thought. 

Schelling. — This  difficulty  of  the  Fichteian  system  was 
recognized  by  Hegel's  early  friend  Schelling,  whose  brilliant 
exposition  of  the  philosophy  of  identity  rather  startled  the 
meditative  and  conservative  Hegel.  But  the  latter  soon  dis- 
covered that  behind  the  various  attempts  on  the  part  of 
Schelling  to  transcend  the  seemingly  magic  circle  of  Fichte's 
Ego  and  non-Ego  by  a  kind  of  poetic  intuition  there  lurked  a 
mystic  element  altogether  unintelligible  to  Hegel.  Schelling 


260  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

had,  it  is  true,  supplied  a  ground  of  identity  for  both  Ego  and 
non-Ego,  but  unfortunately  this  "  night-black"  Absolute,  as  the 
mere  identity  of  the  two  world-aspects,  was  a  formal  and 
abstract  something,  inconceivable  except  in  terms  of  the  Mystic 
One.  Hegel  regarded  Schelling's  Absolute  as  a  more  recent 
form  of  Spinoza's  Substance, — only  an  abstract  universal, — 
and  this  Substance  or  Absolute,  as  the  mere  identity  of  thought 
and  extension,  of  Ego  and  non-Ego,  represented  to  him  a  mean- 
ingless abstraction.  Schelling  laid  stress  on  the  immediate 
or  intuitive  nature  of  thought  in  the  comprehension  of  the 
Absolute.  Hegel  required  that  thought  must  be  mediate  in 
all  cases  in  order  to  be  intelligible. 

FUNDAMENTAL  CONCEPTIONS. 

There  is  something  magnificent  in  the  completeness  and  con- 
ciseness— lacking  literary  form,  yet  suggestive  of  latent  power 
— that  lurks  in  the  expositions  of  Hegel's  system.  Analysis 
shows  us  that  this  fascination  arises  mainly  from  the  impres- 
sion which  we  receive  of  thoroughness  in  its  presentation. 
This  thoroughness,  together  with  the  precision  of  his  utter- 
ances, shows  plainly  that  the  system  is  at  least  clear  in  its 
author's  mind.  Hegel's  philosophy  is  an  intellectualism.  He 
represents  the  culmination  of  the  rationalistic  methods  of 
analysis.  The  pantheism  of  Spinoza  with  its  two  equally  fun- 
damental attributes  of  thought  andextension  is  reduced  by 
Loffism"  of  thought?  Logical 


Hegel  to  a  "  panlogism"  of  thought?  Logical  process,  matter, 
extension,  the  phenomenal  world,  and  the  world  of  ideals  are 
all  different  modes  or  aspects  of  a  universal  Thoupht-Idea  un- 
folding itself  in  various  forms.  The  individualism  of  Leib- 
nitz, with  its  ideal  principle"  6±  "  Pre-established  Harmony,"  is 
transformed  into  a  universalism  which  yet  retains  all  the 
richness,  all  the  finite  differentiation  of  a  pluralism.  Like  the 
series  of  monads  ordered  by  the  truth  of  God,  the  Hegelian 
world  is  a  universe  of  particulars,  each  of  which  expresses  in 
its  own  finite  way  the  Thought-Idea  of  the  whole.  Hegel's 


GEORG  WILHELM   FRIEDRICH   HEGEL.  261 

system  is  a  monism,  but  yet  a  monism  in  which  every  fact  of 
life,  even  every  feeling,  emotion,  or  will-activity,  finds  its 
ordered  place, — not  through  contrast  with  other  objects,  but 
through  the  expression  of  its  own  definite  meaning  in  the 
Thought- Absolute.  In  this  system  which  thus  unfolds  a  logical 
evolution  of  the  World- Forms  we  are  able  to  discover  two  fun- 
damental conceptions,  which  together  give  life  and  character 
to  the  Hegelian  world.  The  dialectic  movement,  a  process  of 
development  in  three  stages,  might  be  regarded  as  the  form; 
while  the  concept  of  free  and  actual  thought  as  the  World- 
Idea — manifesting  itself  through  the  dialectic  movement  as  its 
form — might  be  conceived  as  the  content  of  the  system. 

The  Form  of  Philosophy  as  the  Dialectic  Movement. — 
It  is  a  common  aphorism  that  an  extreme  of  some  kind  often 
induces  a  reaction  in  the  opposite  direction.  And  it  is  often 
noticeable  that  both  the  action  and  reaction  finally  unite  in  a 
third  stage  which  combines  the  essential  features  of  each.  Such 
a  process  is,  in  brief,  the  dialectic  movement  made  prominent 
in  Hegelianism.  It  is  by  no  means  original  with  Hegel,  but 
represents  a  formal  element  common  to  Kant  and  many  of  his 
successors.  This  dialectic  movement  is  not  necessarily  a  tem- 
poral development.  It  is  rather  a  thought  or  logical  process  of 
unfolding,  in  which  each  stage  is  conceived  as  a  necessary  sup- 
plement,— the  development, — directly  deducible  from  the  pre- 
vious stage.  This  process  is  not  an  infinite  regression  like  the 
number  series,  but  rather  a  closed  circle  in  which  every  element 
dovetails  into  its  predecessor  and  its  successor. 

THE  HISTORY  OF  THE  DIALECTIC  CONCEPTION. — In  the 
treatment  of  the  ideas  of  the  speculative  Keason  in  the  third 
part  of  Kant's  first  "  Critique"  it  will  be  remembered  that  Kant 
laid  especial  stress  on  the  meaning  of  "  totality  of  phenomena." 
In  the  case  of  the  paralogisms  we  noticed  that  it  was  a  subjec- 
tive totality  of  mental  states,  from  which  the  reason  inferred 
the  absolute  unity  of  the  soul-subject;  and  in  the  antinomies 
it  was  the  objective  totality  of  the  phenomena  that  led  to  the 


262  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

concept  of  the  universe.  And,  moreover,  the  Ideal  of  God 
united  both  the  subjective  and  the  objective  in  a  single  totality, 
— "the  synthetic  unity  of  all  conditions  of  the  possibility  of 
things  in  general."  27  It  is  quite  obvious  that  in  Kant's  mind 
the  concept  of  God  included  or  synthesized  the  abstract,  subjec- 
tive self  and  the  multiform,  objective  world.  This  is  in  brief 
the  conception  which  the  later  idealists  employed,  not  only  in 
this  single  instance,  but  throughout  their  entire  philosophical 
systems. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Fichte  introduced  us  to  his 
system  by  means  of  three  propositions, — the  assertion  of  the 
Ego,  the  assertion  of  the  non-Ego,  and  their  reciprocal  limita- 
tion. There  can  be  observed  in  this  process  the  same  stages 
which  Kant  employed  in  the  ideas  of  the  reason, — the  abstract 
subjective  and  the  more  concrete  objective,  with  the  final  inclu- 
sion of  both.  Schelling  observed  this  same  movement  when 
he  regarded  the  formal  absolute  as  the  identity  of  the  two 
worlds  of  objective  productivity  and  subjective  self-conscious- 
ness. It  was  to  him  a  poetic  conception  and  lacked  in  its  appli- 
cation the  simplicity  of  the  Fichteian  form  or  the  symmetrical 
precision  of  the  Hegelian  form. 

THE  DIALECTIC  AS  USED  BY  HEGEL. — Although  of  im- 
portance to  the  previous  idealists,  the  dialectic  movement  be- 
comes in  the  hands  of  Hegel  the  formal  principle  of  organic 
harmony  of  the  entire  universe.  To  the  casual  observer  his  sys- 
tem suggests  nothing  more  than  the  world  expressed  in  dialectic 
terms,  for  the  meaning  of  the  world  itself  seems  at  first  obscured 
by  this  outward  form.  With  Hegel  the  first  or  thesis  stage  of 
the  dialectic  is  always  abstract,  indefinite;  it  represents  the  ab- 
stractness  of  our  thought,  and  in  that  sense  it  is  subjective. 
Usually  the  thesis  stage  contains  the  germ  of  all  that  is  to 

27 "...  synthetische  Einheit  aller  Bedingungen  der  Moglichkeit  der 
Dinge  iiberhaupt." — Kant,  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  Second  edi- 
tion, p.  398. 


GEORG  WILHELM   FRIEDRICH   HEGEL.  263 

follow,  but  yet  the  germ  is  so  unconscious  and  indefinite  that 
it  requires  a  further  realization  to  become  truly  itself. 

The  antithesis,  as  the  second  stage,  represents  the  concrete 
objectification  of  the  germ  of  truth,  only  abstractly  stated  in 
the  thesis.  This  truth  has  become  concrete,  definite,  and  real; 
it  is  limited  by  its  conditions  and  is  not  merely  an  indefinite 
something.  But  just  because  it  is  a  concrete  object  it  cannot 
possess  the  abstract  universality  of  the  thesis.  Neither  the 
abstract  thesis  or  the  concrete  antithesis  is  a  full  expression  of 
the  truth  partly  realized  by  each  in  its  own  way.  It  is  neces- 
sary for  a  third  stage  to  unite,  bring  together,  or  transform  28 
the  imperfect  realizations  of  the  truth  in  its  two  former  aspects. 

The  synthesis  stage  is  therefore  a  completion  of  the  dia- 
lectic; it  is  "the  truth  returned  to  itself,"  as  is  often  said. 
It  is  vastly  richer,  more  full  of  meaning  than  either  of  the 
former  stages,  and  just  on  account  of  this  fulness  it  is  both 
abstract  and  concrete.  It  seems  as  if  there  is  a  slight  difference 
between  the  Fichteian  and  the  Hegelian  forms  of  the  dialectic, 
which  it  is  well  to  observe.  Hegel  emphasized  especially  the 
transition  from  the  first  to  the  second  stage,  believing  that  the 
concrete  object  is  directly  deduced  Jrom  its  abstra^Lgoacept ; 
while  Fichte,  on  the  contrary,  regarded  the  separate  proposi- 
tions of  the  Ego  and  non-Ego  to  be  independent  of  each 
other. 

A  familiar  illustration  of  the  dialectic  may  not  be  amiss  at 
this  point.  Take  the  rules  of  any  applied  art  to  represent  the 
thesis  stage.  They  are  abstract  in  character  and  have  no 
reality  beyond  the  subject.  The  specific  application  of  these 
rules  to  a  piece  of  raw  material  represents  the  antithesis  stage. 
The  rules  find  their  realization  in  a  single  phase  of  the  objec- 
tive. And  finally  in  the  synthetic  stage  the  artisan  realizes  that 
the  rules  mean  more  to  him,  have  a  new  value,  after  he  has 
conceived  of  their  concrete  application.  This  third  conception 

28Aufheben  (raise  out  of). 


264  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

opens  up  to  him  the  full  meaning  of  the  rules,  but  partially 
comprehended  in  their  abstract  statement. 

THE  CIRCULAR  FORM  OF  THE  DIALECTIC. — Over  and  over 
again  Hegel  tells  us  that  philosophy  resembles  a  closed  curve, 
the  dialectic  process  is  essentially  a  going  out  and  a  subsequent 
return  unto  itself.  Conceived  in  its  entirety,  philosophy,  as 
the  explanation  of  the  parts  of  a  system — the  system  of  the 
world — is  an  inclusive  circle;  while  each  of  the  subdivisions 
of  philosophy  is  a  lesser  whole  resembling  a  circle  of  smaller 
extension.  This  analogy  of  the  circle  to  the  dialectic  process 
becomes  clearer  if  we  regard  the  infinite  nature  of  both  the 
closed  curve  and  the  world  process.  This  circle-infinity,  how- 
ever, must  be  carefully  distinguished  from  the  endless  suc- 
cession exemplified  by  the  infinite  series  of  whole  numbers; 
the  former  is  the  real  infinite,  full  of  meaning  because  com- 
pletely comprehended  within  itself;  the  latter  is  the  false  in- 
finite, contradictory  because  never  itself.  The  circle  passes 
through  opposite  points  and  finally  returns  to  itself,  only  to 
repeat  the  process  over  and  over  again  and  each  time  with  a 
fuller  meaning. 

The  Content  of  Philosophy  as  Thought-Idea. — In  the 
previous  section  we  have  traced  the  general  form  of  the 
Hegelian  system,  but  in  so  doing  we  were  compelled  to  neglect 
the  content  which  moved  in  this  form.  This  content,  as  we 
shall  presently  recognize,  is  nothing  else  than  the  actuality  of 
the  world,  "  the  outer  and  Inner  worlct  of  Consciousness/' 29 
The  dialectic  movement  supplies  the  steps  for  the  realization 
of  truth  through  a  succession  of  logical  stages;  but  we  very 
naturally  inquire  as  to  the  truth  which  moves  in  this  form. 
We  have  earlier  said  that  the  primacy  of  thought  over  the  deed- 
act  represented  the  transition  from  Fichte  to  Hegel,  and  that 
fulness  of  meaning  represented  the  latter's  advance  over 

29  Aeussern  und  innern  Welt  des  Bewusstseins.  .  .  ." — Encyklopiidie, 
Section  6. 


GEORG  WILHELM   FRIEDRICH   HEGEL.  265 

Schelling.  In  discussing  Hegel's  meaning  of  this  thought- 
idm—mmd.  as  the  content  of  his  system — we  shall  first  briefly 
describe  his  interpretation  of  common  empirical  thought  as  the 
medium  for  philosophical  analysis  before  undertaking  to  trace 
the  successive  appearances  of  mind  from  mere  sensation  up  to 
the  self-conscious  Absolute. 

EMPIRICAL  THOUGHT. — Thought,30  from  its  very  nature,  is 
the  instrument  of  philosophy.  It  is  a  faculty  that  pertains  to 
the  dignity  of  man,  but  its  philosophical  application  must  be 
free  from  habitual  illusions  or  religious  prejudices.  The 
thought  employed  in  philosophical  analysis  is  necessarily  a  re- 
flective process  in  which  the  "thinking  consideration  of  ob- 
jects" is  transformed  into  true  knowledge.  In  this  reflective 
act  thought  is  surrounded  by  what  we  call  experience,  through 
the  medium  of  which  it  struggles  to  understand  its  own  activi- 
ties. From  an  historical  point  of  view  philosophy  arose  from 
the  struggle  of  thought  to  comprehend  itself,  to  understand 
the  process  by  which  it  became  actual. 

THE  "PHENOMENOLOGY  OF  MIND/' 

Thought,  as  the  instrument  of  philosophical  analysis,  o,s_ 
merely  a  phase  of  mind  or  spirit  in  its  broadest  sense.    In  the 
ef  Phenomenology  of  Mind"  31  Hegel  undertakes  to  trace  the 
evolution  or  developing-realization  of  this  concept,  and  enu- 
merates six  stages.    This  natural  history  of  the  mental  process 
was  the  earliest  important  publication  of  Hegel.     It  contains 
in  germ  the  outline  of  his  whole  system,  although  the  parts  are 
not  so  clearly  articulated  as  in  his  more  mature  works.     The 
fundamental  purpose  of  the  "  Phenomenology  of  Mind"  is  an 
interpretation  of  absolute  idealism,  erected  on  the  ideal  char-      . 
acter^oj  mediated  thought  rather  than  on  intuition,  an  ideal-  1 
ism  which^ would  proxe  the  inconsistency  of  a^real  "  thing-in-   *  * 
itselfr'  at  the  same  time  that  it  unfolded  the  richness  of  an 

80  Denken.  n  Phanomenologie  des  Geistes. 


266  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

Absolute-Thought.  It  will  be  remembered  that  such  a  natural 
history  of  mental  processes  was  suggested  by  the  general  ar- 
rangement of  the  three  faculties  in  Kant's  "  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason."  It  was  more  explicitly  attempted  by  Fichte  in  the 
theoretical  portions  of  "  The  Science  of  Knowledge"  and  such 
a  purpose  pervades  the  whole  of  Schilling's  "Transcendental 
Idealism"  But  the  most  carefully  developed  and  finished  treat- 
ment of  the  natural  history  of  the  mental  processes  or  the  forms 
in  which  mind  may  unfold  itself  is  to  be  found  in  this  early 
work  of  Hegel. 

External  Consciousness. — In  his  estimation  the  most  ob- 
jective and  lowest  form  of  mind  is  external  consciousness,  in 
which  the  self  is  viewed  as  essentially  apart  from  the  object. 
The  first  condition  of  this  external  consciousness  would  be  the 
mere  sensu£Uj^Jcnjw&ng  of  an  object,  in  which  the  thing  is 
known  immediately  as  an  independency  absolutely  unrelated 
to  all  else.  But  this  very  attempt  to  view  the  "  thing"  as  im- 
mediate is  meaningless.  Every  present  object  contradicts  its 
predecessors,  if  it  is  regarded  as  the  whole  truth.  The  "  now" 
is  in  eternal  change, — it  is  successively  night  and  noon, — and 
if  it  alone  is  real  there  is  no  constant  reality.  The  "thing" 
as  "  here"  is  successively  a  tree  and  a  mountain ;  it  is,  so  far 
as  any  sameness  is  concerned,  nothing  at  all.  And,  further, 
Hegel  is  quite  as  desirous  as  Berkeley  that  his  opponent  shall 
discover  in  the  "  thing"  some  element  or  quality  which  is  not 
an  idea  expressing  a  relation.  The  object  is  not  a  mere  un- 
intelligible something,  it  is  rather  a  complex  of  relations,  each 
one  of  which  carries  us  beyond  the  object  itself.  Immediate- 
ness  is  an  illusion,  sensuous  knowing  requires  a  relatedness. 
This  analysis  of  the  "thing"  given  in  Hegel's  "Phenomen- 
ology" is  in  striking  contrast  to  the  conclusions  of  Locke, 
Kant,  and  Herbart  on  the  same  topic.  To  Herbart  the 
"  thing"  indicated  at  the  last  analysis  a  substratum  of  "  thing- 
in-itself"  or  Eeal,  existent  apart  from  consciousness,  but  inter- 
preted as  phenomenon  by  the  transcendental  elements  of  the 


GEORG  WILHELM   FRIEDRICH   HEGEL.  267 

mind.  To  Hegel,  on  the  contrary,  the  "thing"  represents  a 
phase  of  mind,  a  complex  which  consciousness  finally  recog- 
nized to  be  the  same  as  itself. 

Perception?2  the  second  condition  of  consciousness,  repre- 
sents the  Taking  together  of  the  accidental  and  hypothetical 
sensations.  It  is  essentially  mediate,  for  it  recognizes  the 
interconnection  among  the  elements  of  consciousness.  The 
understanding  is  the  third  and  last  condition  of  external  con- 
sciousness^pF6p»er.  This  in  a  measure  unites  the  immediacy  of 
sensuous  knowing  and  the  interrelatedness  or  mediacy  of  per- 
ception. It  is  able  to  recognize  the  "  thing"  as  an  appearance 
for  itself  and  also  cognize  its  internal  structure. 

Self-Consciousness. — Succeeding  the  three  conditions  of  ex- 
ternal consciousness,  each  representing  a  phase  of  the  conscious 
apprehension  of  things,  there  is  the  second  stage  in  the  unfold- 
ing of  mind,  that  of  s_elf -consciousness.  Here  the  "  object!! — 
the  mere  ^thing"  of  external  consciousness — becomes  identical 
with,  the  self  that  is  conscious.  The  subject  becomes  aware  of 
itself  in  every  respect.  This  is  essentially  the  basis  of  the  doc- 
trine of  individuality.  The  self-conscious  being  is  all  desire; 
he  is  in  conflict  with  others  because  he  believes  the  world  to  be 
virtually  his  own.  We  may  remark  that  self -consciousness  in 
this  Hegelian  sense  very  well  explains  the  "  genius"  of  the 
Romanticists.  Above  this  stage  there  is  the  reason*3  which,  by 
uniting  external^  consciousness  and  self -consciousness,  forms  the 
synthetic  or  third  phase  in  the  logical  devefopmeniToTmind. 

Reason.— Reason  us  jjiUi^Uliir^Ene  thought  of  "the  object  and 
the  thought  of  the  subject  in, the  one  thought  activity ~  In  its 
operation  it  is  the  reason  that  comprehends  the  laws  that  con- 
trol nature,  the  physical  expression  of  mind.  The  final  stages 
of  mind,  ethical  consciousness34  religion35  and  the  Absolute36 
find  another  and  perhaps  more  satisfactory  treatment  in 

82  Wahrnehmimg.  83Vermmft.  34Der  Geist. 

85  Die  Religion.  *°  Das  absolute  Wissen. 


268  HISTORY   OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

Hegel's  subsequent  works.    They  will  be  mentioned,  therefore, 
in  their  place  in  his  system. 

SYSTEM. 

It  is  an  impossible  task  to  give  in  an  outline  any  adequate 
conception  of  the  breadth  of  the  Hegelian  system.  Transla- 
tions and  exhaustive  commentaries  have  been  published,  and 
must  be  referred  to  by  those  who  desire  a  detailed  statement. 
"The  Encyclopaedia  of  Philosophical  Sciences  in  Outline/' 
published  by  Hegel  while  a  professor  at  Heidelburg,  is  a  com- 
plete and  concise  epitome  of  his  whole  work.  The  latter 
portions  were  amplified  in  the  years  just  before  his  death,  but 
the  ideas  expressed  were  in  the  main  unchanged. 

General  Divisions. — The  three  divisions  of  his  system  cor- 
respond to  three  stages  of  the  dialectic.  The  Logic  represents 
the  abstract  concepts  of  philosophy.  It  is,  so  to  speak,  the  laws 
of  thought  when  thought  is  conceived  in  terms  of  certain 
general  conceptions.  The  antithesis  stage  of  the  system  is 
illustrated  by  the  second  part  of  the  " Encyclopedia"  the  phi- 
losophy of  nature.37  Here  Hegel  outlined  the  objective^develop- 
ment  of  tJieJJaought^idea,  showing  wherein  the  logical  abstract- 
ness  of  the  thesis  stage  becomes  actualized  in  the  objective 
world  of  nature.  And  finally  the  synthesis  stage  of  the  world 
process  is  reached  in  the  philosophy  of  jnind™  where  the 
TTirmght-Irlpfl^attains  itsfull  and^cm^plete  development.  It 
raises  the  Logic  out  of  its  formal  abstractness  and  the  world 
of  nature  out  of  its  concrete  individuality.  In  brief,  the  phi- 
losophy of  mind  treats  of  distinctly  mental  processes,  such  as 
the  soul,  civilization,  art,  religion,  and  the  ultimate  concepts 
of  philosophy.  Throughout  this  whole  statement  it  must  be 
remembered  that  there  are  no  indivisible  elements  anywhere  to 
be  found  in  the  Hegelian  world.  Each  of  these  three  larger 

87  Philosophie  der  Natur. 
K  Philosophie  des  Geistes. 


GEORG  WILHELM   FRIEDRICH   HEGEL.  269 

divisions  is  itself  the  dialectic  circle  which  forms  the  ground 
for  smaller  and  smaller  dialectics.  There  is  no  element  which 
can  be  considered  an  indivisible  entity;  the  large  and  the 
small  alike,  each  is  the  seat  of  a  process  which  when  analyzed 
presents  the  tricotomy  of  the  dialectic  movement. 

The  Logic. — The  Logic  is  the  thesis  stage  of  the  whole 
world  process,  and  as  such  it  is  extremely  abstract  in  its  nature. 
"Logic  is  the  science  ofthe  pure  Idea,  that  is,  the  Idea  as 
the  fl.hRt.ra.nt  pIpmpjrjTof  tEougllL11  M — ft  is  concerned  with  the 
elemental  conce^ts^of  thought, — the  categories  of  being  the 
ground  for  existenclTor  1;he  laws  of  the  judgment.  The  thesis 
of  the  Logic  is  represented  by  as  abstract  a  concept  as  Hegel 
conceived  it  possible  to  define  "  mere  Being" 40  that  which 
requires  for  its  appreciation  quality,  quantity,  and  their  union. 
The  quality  aspect  of  being  is  a  mere  identity-being  without 
definable  attributes.  Hegel,  in  a  famous  passage,  defines  this 
"mere  being,"  without  any  relations,  as  the  same  as  no-being. 
"  This  pure  being  is  a  pure  abstraction,  in  character  absolutely 
negative,  which  likewise  taken  immediately  is  nothing."  41  This 
recalls  Berkeley's  contention  that  mere  "matter,"  which  can 
be  defined  only  in  negative  terms,  is  equivalent  to  nothing. 
In  Hegel's  estimation  the  apparent  contradiction  of  mere 
being — including  everything — and  no-being — equivalent  to 
nothing — is  relieved  only  by  regarding  mere  being  as  essentially 
becoming  a  concept  in  which  both  the  positive  and  negative 
aspects  are  present. 

The  antithesis  and  synthesis  stages  of  the  Logic  are  repre- 
sented respectively  by  the  Doctrine  of  Essence  42  and  the  Doc- 
trine of  the  Concept.43  The  former  represents  the  stages  of 
existence,  such  as  "the  thing,"  the  appearance,  and  the  actu- 


89 "  Die  Logik  ist  die  Wissenschaft  der  reinen  Idee,  das  ist,  der  Idee 
im  abstrakten  Elemente  des  Denkens." — Encyklopadie,   Section  19. 
*°Sein.  ti  Encyklopadie,   Section  78.  "Wesen. 

43  Begriff. 


270  HISTORY   OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

ality.  The  concept  exhibits  itself  in  such  forms  as  the  syllo- 
gisms of  the  traditional  logic,  our  judgments  of  purpose,  and 
finally  as  the  abstract  concept  of  the  Absolute. 

Philosophy  of  Nature. — Nature  represents  the  antithesis 
stage  of  the  whole  world  movement.  The  abstract  and  inde- 
terminate principles  of  the  Logic  find  their  concrete  and 
definite  application — their  finite  realization — in  "tETjIocesses 
ofjiature.  "  Thenature  represents  the  Idea  in  its  otherness."  ** 
In  this  otherness~or  concrete  timtude  the  Thougnt-Idea  becomes 
identified  with  the  facts  and  materials  of  science.  Nature,  in 
its  abstract  form,  is  represented  by  Mechanics  as  the  science  of 
space,  time,  and  motion,  the  laws  of  which  become  concrete  in 
Physical  Chemistry.  This  treats  of  the  different  elements,  the 
forms  of  energy,  and  the  character  of  natural  processes.  And 
finally  objective  nature  attains  its  highest  realization  in  the 
structure  of  organic  bodies, — the  slow  movement  of  geologic 
processes  the  evolution  of  plants,  and  lastly  the  animal  organ- 
isms. 

Philosophy  of  Mind. — The  synthetic  or  completely  realized 
stage  of  the  world  movement  is  attained  in  the  philosophy 
of^mwdLas  it  is  exemplified  in  the  intellectual  activities  of 
man.  This  portion  of  the  "  Encyclopaedia"  is  in  a  measure  the 
restatement  of  the  later  portions  of  the  "Phenomenology" 
earlier  mentioned.  Mind  has  at  once  the  abstract  universality 
of  the  pure  idea,  as  treated  in  the  Logic  and  the  concrete 
definitenegs  of  the  phenomena, .ofJJature.  Within  this  highest 
region  of  mind  one  mayobserve  the  same  dialectic  move- 
ment which  extends  throughout  the  entire  range  of  Hegel's 
system.  The  subjective  phases,  however,  because  they  are 
higher  developments  of  the  Thought-Idea,  have  a  fuller  mean- 
ing than  could  be  discovered  in  either  the  logic  or  philosophy 
of  nature.  They  represent  the  ideals  of  life,  the  teleological 

44 "Die  Natur  hat  sich  als  die  Idee  in  der  Form  des  Andersseins 
ergeben." — Encyklopadie,  Section  247. 


GEORG  WILHELM   FRIEDRICH    HEGEL.  271 

significance  of  those  activities  which  are  characteristic  of  the 
human  intellect. 

SUBJECTIVE  MIND. — The  abstract  form  of  the  philosophy 
of  mind  is  denoted  by  subjective  mind.  This  refers  to  the  soul, 
to  consciousness,  and  to  the  various  psychical  processes.  The 
highest  realization  of  this  subjective  phase  of  mind  is  to  be 
found  in  the  "  free  jadJl  jis^free  jntelligence."  45  A  will  so  free 
that  it  realizes  its  own  freedom;  a  freedom  which  arises  from 
intelligence  and  the  desire  for  the  truly  permanent,  but  never 
from  mere  impulse.  In  this  regard  Hegel  suggests  the  intel- 
lectual freedom  of_Spinoza :  they  both  recognize  true  freedom 
only  so  far  as  it  is  a  freedom  of  the  intellect. 

ETHICS. — The  objectwemfold,  or  second  part  of  the  whole 
division  of  philosophy  of  mind,  refers  to  the  theory  of  ethics 
and  its  various  applications, — "  the  conception  of  right  and  its 
realization  in  the  objective  world."  46  In  the  entire  treatment 
of  this  subject  Hegel  is  in  search  of  the  principles  of  our  daily 
life  and  social  intercourse,  which  exemplify  the  application  of 
the  principle  of  intellectual  freedom,  as  it  is  outlined  in  the 
former  section,  to  the  world  of  experience.  He  recognizes 
everywhere  the  subsistence  of  all  forms  of  morality,  as  well  as 
the  complex  human  institutions,  in  the  single  idea  of  freedom. 
In  the  conception  of  right  it  is  freedom  which  gives  value  to 
property,  contract,  and  the  fundamental  distinction  between 
right  and  wrong;  and  likewise  it  is  jreedorn  upon  which 
morality  and  the  institutions  of  society  are  grounded.  These 
human  institutions  which  Hegel  believes  to  be  fundamental  for 
society  are  three  in  number, — the  jamily,  the  community,  and 
the  state.  Hegel  opposes  the  political  views  of  such"  thinkers 
as  Hobbes,  who  declare  that  the  state  is  a  compact  among  its 
members,  and  follows  the  Aristotelian  view  that  man  is  natur- 

«  «  \ville  als  freie  Intelligenz  1st." — Encyklopadie,  Section  481. 
48 "  Die  Idee  des  Rechts,  den  Begritf  des  Rechts  und  dessen  Verwirk- 
lichung  zum  Gegenstande." — Philosophic  des  Rechts,  Section  1. 


272  HISTORY   OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

ally  a  social  being.  It  is  part  of  one's  nature  to  belong  to  the 
state, — the  man  unrelated  to  organized  society  is  a  contradic- 
tion in  terms.  By  nature  man  is  dependent  on  his  social  con- 
text, and  he  attains  to  the  mastery  of  his  powers  through  his 
subsistence  in  the  state.  The  state  is  not  without  the  indi- 
vidual, nor  is  the  individual  without  the  state.  The  state  "  has 
the  highest  right  over  the  individual,  the  highest  duty  of  whom 
is  to  be  a  part  of  the  state." 4T 

ABSOLUTE  MIND. — The  complete  realization  of  the  world 
process  is  represented  by  the  philosophy  of  Absolute  mind.  It 
is  a  conception  of  an  Ideal  in  which  the  soul  and  its  finite 
manifestations  become  united  into  a  deeper  and  fuller  mind. 
It  is  mind  with  all  its  meaning  realized.  This  Ideal  shows 
itself  in  three  forms, — as  the  Beauty  of  Art,  the  Divine  Per- 
fection in  the  God  of  Religion,  and  finally  as  the  Absolute  of 
Philosophy.  Art  is  the  limited  sensuous  expression  of  the  Idea. 
In  its  history  Art  has  observed  the  same  dialectic  process  which 
is  found  elsewhere;  the  synthetic  stage  of  this  development  is 
found  in  the  poetry  of  modern  times,  wherein  all  artistic  forms 
are  united.  In  religion  Hegel  emphasizes  especially  the  reason, 
in  contradistinction  to  the  prominence  of  feeling.  Not  that 
thinking  is  the  entire  meaning  of  God,  but  that  thought  is  the 
formal  aspect  by  which  alone  the  concept  of  God  may  be  at- 
tained. The  Absolute,  which  is  the  Ideal  of  Philosophy  expressed 
without  anthropomorphic  symbolism,  is  nothing  else  than 
the  world  process  actualized.  It  is  the  Absolute  in  which  the 
logical  principles,  the  natural  phenomena,  and  finally  the  mind 
itself,  all  subsist.  The  Absolute  is  the  Thought-Idea  complete 
with  all  possible  meaning.  It  has  the  abstract  universality  of 
the  "mere  being," — which  was  the  starting-point  in  the  first 
thesis  of  the  whole  world  process ;  it  has  also  the  meaning,  the 


47 "...  Endzweck  das  hb'chste  Recht  gegen  die  Einzelnen  hat,  deren 
hochste  Pflicht  es  1st,  Mitglieder  des  Staats  zu  sehn." — Philosophic  des 
Rechts,  Section  258. 


GEORG  WILHELM   FRIEDRICH    HEGEL.  273 

value,  of  all  the  intervening  stages,  each  of  which  exemplifies 
some  form  of  its  unlimited  truth.  The  Absolute  is  mere  Being, 
but  mere  Being  in  which  all  the  stages  of  its  possible  realiza- 
tion are  actualized^ It  is  this  doctrine  of  the  Absolute  which 
brings  the  Hegelian  monism  clearly  into  the  foreground.  Not- 
withstanding the  diversity  of  world  elements,  the  apparent 
separateness  of  the  stages  of  the  dialectic  process,  and  the  indi- 
viduality which  seems  to  be  implied  in  many  of  the  Hegelian 
terms,  yet  in  its  deeper  meaning  the  philosophy  of  the  Idea  is 
a  compact  unity,  a  monism  in  which  the  diversity  only  assists 
to  the  fuller  meaning  of  the  World-Idea. 

INFLUENCE  OF  HEGEL. 

The  movement  of  Absolute  Idealism,  which  had  begun  with 
Reinhold,  culminated  in  the  universalistic  system  of  Hegel. 
There  is  a  greater  logical  sequence  of  ideas  in  this  movement 
than  it  is  possible  to  discover  in  any  other  period  of  philosophy. 
The  transcendentalism  of  Kant  attained  its  most  finished  ex- 
pression in  Hegel.  In  the  terms  of  his  own  philosophy  Hegel 
represents  the  synthesis  of  Fichte's  abstract  philosophy  of  the 
self  with  the  more  concrete  nature-philosophy  of  Schelling ;  and 
likewise  the  whole  movement  of  idealism  from  Kant  to  Hegel 
represents  a  synthesis  of  the  subjective  rationalists  and  the 
objective  empiricists.  The  year  of  Hegel's  death,  1831,  marked 
the  climax  of  his  power  and  the  most  wide-spread  influence  of 
the  idealistic  tendency  of  thought.  This  very  completion,  how- 
ever, contained  the  germs  of  immediate  decay.  A  philosophical 
movement  has  vitality  just  so  long  as  it  represents  growth; 
dissipation  invariably  follows  completion.  The  immediate  dis- 
ciples of  Hegel  found  themselves  unable  to  interpret  the  Abso- 
lute Thought-Idea  in  any  other  than  pantheistic  terms,  yet  they 
recognized  the  prominence  in  which  Hegel  himself  had  held  the 
Christian  conception  of  God.  The  result  was  the  division  of 
his  disciples  into  two  schools,  each  of  which  professed  to  teach 
the  master's  true  doctrine,  but  differed  as  to  the  fundamental 

18 


274  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

theological  conception.  The  keen  edges  of  his  system,  its 
breadth,  and  its  cogency  disappeared  in  the  hands  of  his  fol- 
lowers. In  their  struggle  to  interpret  his  "  panlogism"  in 
terms  of  a  religion  the  Hegelian  world  was  distorted  beyond 
recognition,  and  in  the  end  every  disciple  struggled  to  remodel, 
according  to  his  own  individual  caprice,  the  dissociated  frag- 
ments of  the  once  homogeneous  whole.  At  the  same  time  the 
dialectic  methods  and  the  possibility  of  deducing  all  things  from 
a  single  principle  were  assailed  by  such  men  as  Herbart, — all  of 
whom  were  repelled  by  what  were  called  the  extravagant  deduc- 
tions of  Kanfs  "  false  disciples," — and  who  sought  to  reinstate 
the  original  psychological  and  epistemological  premises  of  the 
Critical  Philosophy.  The  recognition  on  the  part  of  the  gov- 
ernment in  the  end  proved  detrimental  to  the  popularity  of 
Hegelian  philosophy.  An  "official  philosophy"  is  a  contra- 
diction. All  these  tendencies  helped  to  undermine  the  posi- 
tion of  Absolute  Idealism,  and  so  effectually  did  they  operate 
that  the  direct  influence  of  the  whole  movement  which  culmi- 
nates in  Hegel  had  grown  insignificant  by  the  middle  of  the 
century. 

ARTHUR   SCHOPENHAUER. 

During  the  years  immediately  succeeding  Hegel's  death  there 
arose  a  mystical  and  pessimistic  tendency  which  took  the  form 
of  a  reaction  against  his  system.  The  influences,  many  in 
number,  which  militated  against  the  further  extension  of  Absor 
lute  Idealism  in  its  Hegelian  form  were  summarized  in  the 
mystical  idealism  of  Schopenhauer.  At  the  beginning  of  this 
chapter  three  separate  tendencies  were  defined,  each  empha- 
sizing a  certain  aspect  of  the  Kantian  criticism.  Herbart 
sought  a  realistic  interpretation  of  the  "  thing-in-itself ,"  the 
movement  from  Eeinhold  to  Hegel  erected  an  objective  world 
about  the  transcendental  character  of  the  ethical  Ego,  and 
finally  Schopenhauer  brought  into  prominence  the  will-activity 
of  the  mind  in  the  creation  of  its  world. 


ARTHUR  SCHOPENHAUER.  275 

LIFE. 

Schopenhauer  was  born  at  Danzic,  in  Northeastern  Germany, 
on  February  22,  1788.  His  father  was  a  merchant  who  had 
travelled  much,  a  man  of  stern  character  and  morose  disposi- 
tion. The  young  Schopenhauer  was  intended  by  his  parents 
for  a  mercantile  career,  but  the  death  of  his  father  permitted 
him  to  adopt  the  life  of  a  student.  His  interests  covered  a  wide 
field, — the  ancient  classics,  history,  science,  and  philosophy. 
Early  travels  and  residence  in  France  and  England  gave  him 
an  opportunity  of  acquiring  more  than  an  ordinary  knowledge 
of  the  world.  He  first  attended  the  University  of  Gottengen, 
but  later  removed  to  Berlin,  where  he  heard  the  lectures  of 
Fichte,  then  at  the  zenith  of  his  fame.  The  philosopher  of 
Absolute  Idealism  was  positively  repugnant  to  him.  On  the 
cover  of  his  notes  of  Fichte's  lectures  he  is  said  to  have  written 
"  Wissenschafts  leere"  (science  of  emptiness). 

With  the  approaching  political  disturbances  of  1812  Schopen- 
hauer retired  to  the  Thuringian  forest  Here  he  prepared  an 
essay,  entitled  "  Concerning  the  Fourfold-Root  of  the  Principle 
of  Sufficient  Ground/' 48  which  was  accepted  by  the  University 
of  Jena  for  the  degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy.  Already 
Schopenhauer  had  become  conscious  of  the  fundamental  con- 
ceptions of  his  philosophy,  and  in  his  early  work  he  gave  to  the 
will  a  higher  position  than  it  had  hitherto  received  in  Germany. 
The  following  year  he  repaired  to  Dresden,  and  there  remained 
for  four  years.  During  this  period  he  thought  out  and  wrote 
his  classic  work,  "  The  World  as  Will  and  Presentation"  49 
published  at  Leipzig  in  1818.  A  second  edition,  containing  a 
restatement  and  further  additions  to  the  earlier  work,  was  pub- 
lished some  twenty-five  years  later.  During  this  Dresden  resi- 
dence an  incident  occurred  which  has  been  often  quoted.  On 
a  visit  to  a  botanical  conservatory  Shopenhauer,  who  evidently 

48  Ueber  die  vierfache  Wurzel  des  Satzes  vom  zureichenden  Grunde. 
"  Die  Welt  als  Wille  und  Vorstellung. 


276  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

acted  strangely,  was  asked  who  he  was.  "  If  you  can  tell  me 
who  I  am,"  he  is  said  to  have  replied,  "  I  shall  be  deeply 
obliged  to  you."  While  a  resident  at  Berlin  his  dislike  for 
the  Fichte-Hegel  philosophy  manifested  itself  very  prominently. 
A  course  of  lectures  announced  by  him  to  be  given  at  the  same 
hours  that  Hegel  had  his  fullest  audience  proved  a  failure. 
This  incident  by  no  means  tended  to  soften  his  opposition 
towards  the  Absolute  Idealism  and  his  prejudice  against  its 
disciples.  Like  Hume,  he  craved  for  literary  notoriety,  and  the 
apparent  contempt  for  his  writings  on  the  part  of  the  philo- 
sophical world  only  tended  to  aggravate  his  sensitive  disposi- 
tion, morbid  and  pessimistic  by  nature.  Schopenhauer's  tem- 
perament was  naturally  impulsive ;  strong  in  will  and  opinion, 
he  undoubtedly  controlled  his  powerful  emotions  as  few  others 
could  have  done.  Towards  women  he  entertained  a  profound 
contempt,  accountable  partially  to  the  lack  of  sympathy  be- 
tween his  mother  and  himself.  Keligion  also  was  especially  dis- 
tasteful to  him,  since  it  rested  on  the  emotional  rather  than  the 
intellectual  side  of  man.  In  1833  Schopenhauer  retired  to 
Frankfort-on-the-Main,  where  he  led  a  solitary  life  until  his 
death  in  1860. 

STAND-POINT. 

The  philosophy  of  Schopenhauer  is  directly  traceable  to  three 
sources, — the  transcendental  idealism  of  Kant,  the  ethical  mys- 
ticism of  India,  and  finally  the  emotional,  one  might  almost 
say  impulsive,  tendencies  of  his  personality.  Two  central  ideas 
dominate  his  thought, — the  world,  in  its  innermost  structure 
is  not  the  mere  appearances  (Kant),  but  its  inner  reality  is 
a  blind  force  struggling  for  self-assertion  (Buddhism). 

Behind  the  appearances  of  the  phenomenal  world  there  is  the 
reality  of  will.  "Will  is  the  ' thing-in-itself,'  the  inner  con- 
tent, the  true  essence  of  the  world.  Life,  the  visible  world,  the 
phenomenon,  is  only  the  reflection  of  the  Will."  B0  The  f  un- 

60  Die  Welt  als  Wille  und  Vorstellung,  Book  IV, 


ARTHUR  SCHOPENHAUER.  277 

damental  difference  between  Schopenhauer  and  Hegel  lies  in 
the  relative  importance  of  will.  To  Hegel  the  intellect  was 
the  highest  truth;  it  supplied  not  only  the  means  for  philo- 
sophic expression,  but  likewise  the  very  conception  of  the 
Absolute.  All  the  emotions,  impulses,  and  feelings  were  fun- 
damentally irrational,  and  could  be  admitted  into  philosophy 
only  if  tempered  by  reason.  To  Schopenhauer  thought  was 
only  a  secondary  product  of  will.  The  volitional  impulse, 
the  struggle  of  inner  forces  for  some  objective  expression,  was 
the  true  basis  of  philosophy  and  the  only  possible  approach  to 
the  Absolute.  In  his  personality  and  in  the  emphasis  on  the 
emotional  and  intuitive  aspect  of  life  Schopenhauer  recalls 
Bruno.  Both  were  monists  who  were  far  more  deeply  im- 
pressed by  a  mystical  appreciativeness  than  by  an  intellectual 
interpretation  of  the  Absolute.  Yet,  notwithstanding  the  mys- 
tical tendencies  of  Schopenhauer,  his  own  system  has  much 
more  in  common  with  the  school  of  Fichte  and  Hegel  than  he 
is  willing  to  admit.  Both  stand-points  interpret  the  given 
objects  of  the  world  as  mere  appearance,  and  look  for  a  tran- 
scendental reality  beyond;  and  in  details  of  expression 
Schopenhauer's  idealism  has  recourse  to  many  conceptions 
which  originated  in  the  other  school.  The  relation  between 
Schopenhauer  and  Schelling  was  especially  close;  "will"  re- 
sembles "self-conscious  limitation,"  the  unending  struggle  of 
the  universal  Will  recalls  the  infinite  productivity  of  Nature. 
Schopenhauer's  philosophy  of  art  differs  but  little  from  the 
treatment  by  the  Eomanticists.  Both  regard  art  as  the 
highest  sensuous  embodiment  of  Eeality,  and  both  look  to 
beauty  for  the  harmony  of  object  and  subject,  the  fact  and  its 
ideal. 

Buddhism. — It  is  quite  impossible  for  one  unfamiliar  with 
the  central  doctrines  of  Buddhism  to  understand  the  true  bear- 
ing of  this  modern  instance  of  a  pessimistic  will-philosophy. 
The  outward  appearance  as  well  as  the  deeper  meaning  of 
Buddhism  is  distinctly  opposed  to  Christianity.  Arising  as  it 


278  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

did  from  a  reaction  against  the  formalism  of  the  ancient 
Hindoo  Vedas  and  the  Upanishads,  Buddhism  is  distinctly 
humanistic.  Like  Christianity,  it  seeks  to  define  the  salvation 
of  man, — but  here  the  resemblance  ceases.  Christianity  in 
its  native  purity  may  be  said  to  have  had  no  metaphysical 
foundation,  no  other  theory  of  the  world  than  a  faith  which 
cannot  be  penetrated  by  reason.  Buddhism,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  grounded  on  a  definite  theory  of  reality, — the  blind  struggle 
for  an  unattainable  end,  the  eternal  truth  that  all  the  "con- 
stituents of  being  are  misery." 51  The  life  of  man  is  an  evil  in 
itself,  the  goal  of  human  endeavor  is  the  freedom  from  this 
misery  of  existence.  In  man  there  is  no  central  spiritual  ele- 
ment analogous  to  the  Occidental  conception  of  soul,  but  rather 
a  continuity  of  a  principle  of  consciousness*2  which  is  the 
direct  cause  of  future  rebirths.  All  life  arises  from  sensuous 
desire;  or  rather  from  the  longing  of  the  individual  for  the 
physical  gratification  of  those  will-emotions  which  prove  value- 
less when  attained.  "By  cleaving  to  anything  thus  done  one 
come  to  be."  53  Complete  salvation  results  only  when  the  per- 
son has  reached  the  supreme  thought  that  this  illusory  desire 
which  he  seeks  is  itself  merely  a  subjective  appreciation.  Then 
he  has  attained  to  complete  knowledge  of  the  world  and  has 
freed  his  "principle  of  consciousness"  from  the  curse  of 
future  being. 

Universal  pessimism  is  perhaps  the  most  apparent  conclusion 
from  even  a  superficial  acquaintance  with  Eastern  thought,  but 
yet  there  is  a  deeper  meaning  which  Europe  has  itself  long 

51  Augutta-Nikaya.     (Warren,  Buddhism  in  Translations,  p.  xiv.) 
52 1  have  here  used  the  term  "  principle  of  consciousness"  to  express 
that  Nidana  consciousness  which  is  alone  reborn;    it  is  not  an  element, 
but  rather  a  process.     The  word  "  self"  is  objectionable,  as  the  exist- 
ence of  the  Ego  or  soul  is  directly  denied.     ( See  Warren,  Buddhism  in 
Translations,     p.     133.       Buddha-ghosa's     Visuddhi-Magga,     Chapter 
xviii.) 
83  Samyutta-Nikaya.     (Warren,  Buddhism  in  Translations,  p.  161.) 


ARTHUR   SCHOPENHAUER.  279 

struggled  to  realize.  It  is  the  duality  of  worlds;  the  inner 
reality  of  an  uncaused  cause  in  contradistinction  to  its  causal 
manifestations  in  the  world  of  sense-perceptions.  It  is  a  con- 
ception which  is  found  in  all  those  systems  of  monism  that  find 
a  deeper  reality  than  is  given  in  the  flux  of  sense-phenomena. 
This  duality  of  the  real  and  the  apparent  is  to  be  discovered 
in  the  pantheistic  thinkers  of  the  mediaeval  school, — traceable 
from  them  through  the  Arabian  to  Oriental  sources.  It  forms 
a  fundamental  distinction  in  Bruno  and  in  Spinoza, — the 
"  natura  naturans"  representing  the  self -caused  reality  of  Sub- 
stance and  the  "natura  naturata"  its  manifestations  as  the 
world  of  experience.  It  is  the  distinction  between  the  "  thing- 
in-itself '  and  the  transcendental  elements  in  the  Critical  Phi- 
losophy. Traces  of  the  distinction  are  observed  in  Fichte,  and 
it  is  especially  prominent  in  Schelling,  who  employs  the  same 
terms  as  were  used  by  Spinoza. 

The  Influence  of  Personality. — Aside  from  both  the  direct 
influences  of  Buddhism, — with  its  metaphysic  of  the  will  and  its 
ethics  of  pessimism, — and  Kant's  system  of  transcendentalism, 
— with  its  two  worlds  of  appearance  and  reality, — Schopen- 
hauer's philosophy  is  to  a  large  extent  the  expression  of  his  own 
personality.  He  was  intense,  restless  of  mind,  easily  moved  by 
prejudice,  strong  in  his  likes  and  dislikes;  in  fact,  a  man  to 
whom  the  volitional,  the  expressive  side  of  his  nature  was  always 
in  the  foreground.  He  was  keen,  analytical,  and  fond  of  self- 
introspection ;  his  temperament  was  extremely  sensitive  to 
some  emotions,  such  as  the  artistic  and  the  sexual,  but  yet 
remained  inflexible  to  others.  Patriotism  and  religion  were 
ridiculed  by  him  because  irrational,  and  he  ignored  his  mother 
during  the  latter  part  of  her  life.  In  character  Schopenhauer 
seems  to  unite  in  a  most  original  manner  a  powerful  analytical 
mind  with  the  active  striving  side  of  human  nature.  The 
former  explains  the  grasp  which  he  undoubtedly  had  on  the 
deepest  problems  of  philosophy,  while  the  latter  gives  us  the 
key  to  his  fondness  for  Hindoo  literature,  with  its  cry  for  the 


280  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

cessation  of  the  turbulent  spirit  of  man.  He  sought  to  give 
philosophical  expression  to  a  self  which  struggles  for  unattain- 
able ends,  fully  recognizing  the  present  hopelessness  of  its  task. 


SYSTEM. 

Schopenhauer's  philosophy,  more  than  any  of  the  Occidental 
systems,  is  built  upon  the  fundamental  distinction  between  the 
immanent  reality  of  the  universe,  as  struggling  will,  and  its 
limiting  conditions.  The  first  part  of  "  The  World  as  Will  and 
Presentation"  deals  with  presented  fact.  It  is  epistemological 
in  character  and  defines  the  grounds  of  knowledge.  Once,  how- 
ever, he  had  discovered  the  solution  to  the  world  as  a  presenta- 
tion he  directed  his  attention  to  the  deeper  aspect  of  the  world, 
the  inner  reality  of  the  Uncaused  Will.  This  is  a  concept  only, 
and  valueless  as  a  precept  for  our  daily  existence.  He  there- 
fore returns  to  the  presented  world  as  it  is  unfolded  in  art. 
Beauty  is  to  him  a  transitory  realization  of  that  perfect  salva- 
tion attainable  only  by  the  submersion  of  the  individual  self  in 
the  Absolute  Will. 

Epistemology. — The  theory  of  knowledge  is  summarized  in 
Schopenhauer's  mind  by  the  quotation,  "  The  world  is  my 
presentation."  Following  his  masters,  Kant  and  Buddha,  he 
feels  that  the  given  world  becomes  vitalized  about  a  conscious 
centre  which  may  be  abstractly  termed  the  "  subject."  But  the 
ideas  which  compose  the  conscious  life  are  not  given  archetypes 
of  an  external  reality  beyond;  they  are  presentations  created 
by  my  own  subjectivity  from  the  principle  of  "  sufficient 
ground"  (zureichenden  Grunde).  Like  Kant,  Eeinhold,  Fichte, 
and  Hegel,  from  whom  Schopenhauer  differs  less  than  he  sup- 
poses, he  recognizes  the  presentation  as  such  to  be  the  direct 
product  of  transcendental  laws  or  roots  (Wurzel).  These  he 
finds  to  be  four  in  number:  The  logical  ground  according 
to  which  we  find  ourselves  able  to  think  a  conclusion  from 
given  premises, — the  transcendental  source  of  the  belief  in  the 


ARTHUR   SCHOPENHAUER.  281 

authority  of  the  laws  of  the  reason ;  secondly,  the  validity  of  the 
principle  of  causality ;  thirdly,  the  mathematical  forms  of  space 
and  time,  through  which  the  objects  stand  in  a  relation  which 
is  mutually  determined  by  each  other,  yet  a  relation  which  is 
nevertheless  purely  intuitional  in  character.  The  fourth  root 
is  by  far  the  most  important  in  Schopenhauer's  mind, — it  is 
the  necessary  manifestation  of  the  will-activity.  The  logical 
and  causal  roots  to  the  principle  of  sufficient  ground  have  been 
long  recognized;  whereas  Schopenhauer  conceived  the  two 
latter  to  be  original  with  Kant  and  himself. 

Metaphysic. — The  central  theme  of  the  Schopenhauerian 
philosophy  is  the  will.  He  recognizes,  as  all  the  transcenden- 
talists  did,  that  the  substratum  upon  which  the  mind  imposes 
its  forms  of  time,  space,  and  causality  must  be  explained  in 
some  way.  He  was  dissatisfied  with  the  unknowability  of  the 
"  thing-in-itself "  as  well  as  the  indefinable  self -consciousness 
of  the  Absolute  Idealists.  Schopenhauer  discovered  the  inner- 
most reality  of  the  world,  not  in  an  undefinable  external,  but 
rather  in  a  clearly  appreciable  subjective  force.  This  Absolute, 
the  ff  natura  naturans"  is  will,  an  unconscious  force  behind 
our  world  of  appearance.  Anselm  defined  the  Absolute  as 
Goodness,  Descartes  as  Perfection,  Spinoza  as  Self-being,  Kant 
as  Personified  Morality,  and  Schopenhauer  in  his  turn  identifies 
it  with  a  blind  and  insatiable  struggle  for  self -existence.  His 
metaphysic  is  an  approach  near  to  mystic  pantheism.  Nature 
is  the  expression  of  an  unthinking  force,  the  forms  of  which 
struggle  for  their  existence  in  the  temporal  and  spacial  order. 
In  its  innermost  reality  the  nature  of  the  Absolute  Will  can 
never  be  known  to  the  human  consciousness,  which  conceives  of 
every  thing  in  terms  of  its  transcendental  elements.  Yet  the 
desires,  the  ambitions,  the  struggles  which  control  the  con- 
scious life  of  every  individual  are  the  reflections  of  the  Supreme 
Will  beneath. 

After  having  defined  the  concept  of  the  Absolute  Will,  he 
again  turned  towards  the  world  of  presented  fact.  There  he 


282  HISTORY   OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

is  able  to  discover  successive  obj edifications  of  the  Will. 
The  lowest  of  these  is  represented  by  inorganic  nature  and  the 
highest  by  the  brain  of  man.  Each  separate  obj edification  of 
the  will  is  itself  the  embodiment  of  an  eternal  purpose  to  exist, 
"  a  will  to  be."  "  The  world  as  presentation  is  the  reflection 
of  the  Will  in  which  it  recognizes  itself  in  various  grades  of 
distinctness  and  completeness,  the  highest  of  which  is  man." 84 
Pleasure,  harmony,  and  progress  result  from  the  gratification 
of  this  "  will  to  be  ;"  pain,  discord,  and  decadence  follow  its 
arrest.  This  vain  struggle  of  the  will  for  a  fuller  expression  is 
wrong;  utterly  wrong.  The  duty  of  man  is  to  search  for  rest, 
some  state  in  which  his  "  will  to  be"  no  longer  yearns  for  the 
unattainable.  This  is  achieved  in  artistic  contemplation  and 
in  death. 

Esthetics. — To  many  Schopenhauer  is  known  only  as  the 
philosopher  of  the  world  of  art.  Yet  the  fine  arts,  as  such,  are 
regarded  by  him  as  important  only  as  corollaries  to  the  theory 
of  the  will.  Each  type  of  art  represents  a  certain  meaning  of 
the  Will;  in  architecture  it  is  force,  in  painting  action,  in 
poetry  temporal  order,  while  music,  as  the  highest  art,  repre- 
sents the  Will  in  its  inner  being.  The  presentation  of  art  serves 
for  the  moment  to  quell  the  struggle  of  the  human  "  will  to  be," 
for  the  personal  identity  of  the  subject  is  lost  in  the  contem- 
plation of  beauty.  The  individual  will,  as  the  will  of  the 
aesthetic  object,  are  both  momentarily  merged  in  the  Uni- 
versal Will.  The  object  of  beauty  serves  only  to  arrest  the 
terrible  struggle  of  existence  for  a  single  moment.  The  soul 
yearns  for  complete  rest,  the  eternal  suppression  of  the  finite 
in  the  Infinite ;  this  is  to  be  found  in  the  moral  denial  of  the 
individual  will. 

Ethics. — In  his  ethics  Schopenhauer  continues  to  observe 
the  same  duality  of  worlds  which  is  to  be  found  in  his  whole 
system.  Man  represents  the  highest  form  of  objectified  will 

84  Die  Welt  als  Wille  und  Vorstellung,  Book  IV. 


ARTHUR  SCHOPENHAUER.  283 

and  the  only  being  who  may  become  fully  conscious  of  the 
"  will  to  live."  Life  for  most  of  mankind  is  merely  an  inces- 
sant struggle  for  existence;  the  fear  of  death  is  the  chief  in- 
centive to  endure  this  struggle,  and  yet  death  is  its  inevitable 
climax.  Pain  is  the  unavoidable  accompaniment  of  this  un- 
ending strife;  and  eren  the  happiness  which  is  to  be  found  in 
life  is  purely  negative,  for  it  arises  merely  from  the  anticipation 
of  desires,  and  generally  disappears  at  the  moment  of  their 
fulfilment.  Aside  from  this  universal  "will  to  live,"  which 
however  extends  only  to  the  finite  individual,  there  is  the  desire 
to  propagate  the  finite  objectification  of  the  will  in  future 
generations.  The  sexual  passion  was  conceived  by  Schopen- 
hauer to  be  the  second  strongest  emotion  in  the  nature  of  man. 
He  is  said  to  have  declared  that  mankind  would  be  helpless  if 
there  existed  another  emotion  as  strong. 

The  simplest  acts  of  will  assertion  are  those  which  take  place 
as  mere  bodily  activities.  They  are,  however,  the  results  of 
purely  self-centred  motives,  in  which  the  will  of  one  person 
often  contracts  the  assertive  power  of  another.  This  gives  rise 
to  the  fundamental  distinction  between  right  and  wrong. 
When  the  finite  "  will  to  live"  of  one  person  breaks  through 
the  limits  which  are  required  by  the  "  will  to  live"  of  another, 
there  arises  wrong  in  its  various  forms.  Opposition  by  force  is 
less  wrong  than  interference  by  deceit,  because  the  latter  breaks 
the  bonds  of  mutual  trust  and  destroys  all  sympathy  and  hope- 
fulness. This  exhibits  at  once  the  fundamental  premise  of 
Schopenhauer's  ethics,  the  apparent  separateness,  the  egoistic 
strife  of  the  individual  beings  of  the  world,  and  the  true  unity 
of  all  mankind  in  the  Real  Will.  It  is  only  by  the  selfish 
assertion  of  the  will  that  we  are  separate ;  by  the  denial  of  the 
will  we  all  become  one.  The  suppression  of  the  finite  will, 
the  only  purely  rational  act,  is  accomplished  through  a  life  of 
honesty,  purity,  and  sympathy.  But  more  important  even  than 
these  moral  motives  is  the  recognition  of  the  one  truth  of  life, 
— all  existence,  all  assertion  of  the  will,  is  misery.  "  Before 


284  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

us  there  is  certainly  nothingness.  ...  To  those  in  whom  the 
will  has  denied  itself  this  world  of  ours — which  is  apparently 
so  real  with  all  its  suns  and  milky  ways — is  nothing."  M 

POSITION  OF  SCHOPENHAUER. 

The  pessimistic  idealism  of  Schopenhauer  represents  the 
reaction  against  the  formalism  of  the  Hegelians.  It  appeals  to 
a  different  side  of  character,  a  side  of  character  which  the  ad- 
vancing civilization  of  the  nineteenth  century  has  learned  to 
appreciate  more  and  more.  Hegel  is  seldom  read  except  by  the 
professional  philosopher;  Schopenhauer,  both  on  account  of 
his  brilliant  literary  style  and  his  masterly  expression  of  the 
struggle  of  life,  appeals  to  the  average  man.  He  philosophizes 
on  what  is  nearest  to  all  his  readers, — the  motive,  the  strife, 
and  the  ambition  of  active  life.  There  is  no  need  of  training 
to  understand  him,  there  are  no  subtle  meanings  which  are  only 
partly  expressed.  Schopenhauer  is  dogmatic,  but  yet  asserts 
his  opinion  so  lucidly  and  with  so  much  skill  that  its  force 
seems  irresistible  to  us.  Even  his  pessimism  finds  a  hearty  wel- 
come. The  current  industrial  problems,  the  reaction  away  from 
traditional  forms  of  religion,  in  fact  the  whole  social  back- 
ground of  the  present  period,  is  tending  towards  a  pessimistic 
view  of  the  world.  Individualism,  upon  which  the  whole 
Reformation  and  the  progress  of  the  northern  races  has  been 
founded,  is  being  discarded  for  a  degenerate  socialism.  In  all 
this  restlessness  and  demand  for  the  suppression  of  the  indi- 
vidual, Schopenhauer  is  pre-eminently  the  philosophical  apolo- 
gist. He  supplies  a  metaphysical  background  for  emotional 
convictions  and  arouses  an  enthusiasm  in  a  mystical  interpreta- 
tion of  man  and  his  social  relations.  For  all  these  reasons  the 
various  forms  of  mystical  idealism  are  to-day  the  most  popular 
expressions  of  transcendental  tendencies. 

65  Die  Welt  als  Wille  und  Vorstellung.  (Last  paragraph  of  the  first 
edition. ) 


CHAPTEE   VIII. 
RECENT   TENDENCIES   IN  PHILOSOPHY. 

THE  pessimistic  naturalism  of  Schopenhauer  was  the  last  of 
the  classic  reconstructions  of  the  Critical  Philosophy.  From 
the  publication  of  the  "  Critique  of  Pure  Reason"  to  the  death 
of  Hegel,  a  period  of  just  fifty  years,  Germany  was  the  scene 
of  a  wonderful  movement  in  the  history  of  human  thought, — a 
movement  which  has  acted  and  reacted  on  the  science,  the  lit- 
erature, and  the  ideals  of  the  nineteenth  century.  While  each 
of  the  classic  forms  of  German  transcendentalism  stands  for  a 
definite  meaning,  an  original  interpretation  of  Kant,  those  who 
have  since  written  are  concerned  with  the  assimilation  and  re- 
organization of  the  older  systems  rather  than  in  the  develop- 
ment of  new  issues.  English  empiricism  invaded  Germany 
towards  the  middle  of  the  century,  and  likewise  the  German 
idealism  began  to  influence  the  development  of  British  thought. 
The  result  of  this  intermixture  of  epistemological  stand-points 
has  been  the  convergence  of  all  philosophy  towards  a  state  of 
.equilibrium  in  which  are  to  be  found  elements  from  almost 
every  phase  of  philosophical  development. 

This  conciliatory  tendency  has  shown  itself  wherever  the 
influence  of  philosophy  is  felt.  It  has  sometimes  degenerated 
into  an  indefinite  attitude  of  mind  in  which  conflicting  and 
undigested  elements  are  harmonized  by  a  mere  verbalism,  and 
still  again  the  meeting  of  various  lines  of  thought  has  reacted 
on  literature  and  helped  to  define  more  artistic  conceptions  of 
life.  This  struggle  for  the  harmony  of  empiricism  and  critical 
rationalism  affected  ethics  and  metaphysics,  and  it  has  even 
penetrated  into  the  fields  of  science  and  psychology, — generally 
less  susceptible  to  the  influence  of  epistemological  controversies. 
It  is  the  intent  of  this  last  chapter  to  outline  some  of  the 

285 


286  HISTORY   OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

recent  tendencies  of  thought  which  have  influenced  the  funda- 
mental theories  of  philosophy.  In  this  brief  account  we  shall 
find  that  the  philosophy  of  the  Absolute  has  gradually  attained 
a  remarkable  importance.  That  beneath  science,  psychology, 
ethics,  and  metaphysics  there  is  an  undercurrent  of  thought 
which  finds  expression  in  a  Principle  of  Being  co-extensive 
with  the  Universe.  That,  whatever  stand-point  we  may  take 
towards  the  world  of  fact  experience,  whether  religious,  ethical, 
or  even  sceptical,  there  still  seems  to  remain  a  demand  which 
is  only  satisfied  in  the  presence  of  a  deeper  metaphysic.  The 
ultimate  conclusion  of  such  a  metaphysic  we  may  call  the 
Absolute;  and  its  development  from  experience  and  thought 
may  be  similarly  defined  as  the  Philosophy  of  the  Absolute.  It 
is  our  purpose  in  the  closing  pages  of  this  chapter  to  consider  a 
few  tendencies  and  stand-points  which  lead  in  this  general 
direction.  We  may  find  that  in  these  considerations  which 
point  towards  a  World-unity  we  are  introduced  to  a  concept 
dark  and  formless  in  itself,  yet  from  its  very  depth  and  uni- 
versality it  may  prove  to  be  the  logical  implication  of  the 
elements  of  experience  and  the  processes  of  thought. 

SOME  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASPECTS   OF  SCIENCE. 

Towards  the  close  of  the  eighteenth  century  there  were  a 
number  of  remarkable  developments  in  scientific  theory.  The 
French  materialists,  earlier  alluded  to  in  connection  with 
Locke,  were  impressed  with  the  mechanical  nature  of  the  entire 
universe  and  sought  to  establish  the  universality  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  material  causality.  This  absolute  reliance  on  the  ap- 
parent infallibility  of  observation  gave  an  unprecedented  stim- 
ulus to  scientific  inquiry  and  indirectly  produced  a  long  series 
of  discoveries.  It  was  the  time  when  such  men  as  D'Alembert 
and  Laplace  were  active  in  the  theory  of  mathematics,  and 
Priestly,  Lavoisier,  and  Dalton  in  chemistry.  Many  of  the 
men  who  contributed  to  the  scientific  activities  of  the  early  part 
of  the  nineteenth  century  are  to  be  regarded  as  specialists 


SOME   PHILOSOPHICAL   ASPECTS   OF  SCIENCE.         287 

within  a  single  field,  and  have  therefore  effected  only  an  indi- 
rect influence  on  the  history  of  philosophy.  Yet  there  were 
men  who  felt  the  demand  for  a  clearer  understanding  of  the 
meaning  of  scientific  conceptions  at  the  same  time  that  they 
recognized  the  advantage  of  their  use.  Among  those  who  gave 
a  wider  philosophical  interpretation  to  the  advances  of  science 
is  to  be  mentioned  the  Frenchman,  Auguste  Comte. 

AUGUSTE  COMTE. 

He  was  born  and  reared  under  two  distinct  influences,  each 
of  which  finds  a  place  in  his  system, — the  activities  of  the 
special  sciences  and  the  social  unrest  following  the  period  of 
Napoleon.  His  " Positive  Philosophy" 1  as  Comte's  stand- 
point is  called,  has  two  distinct  parts, — one  is  critical  and  the 
other  constructive.  In  the  critical  portion  Comte  discovers, 
after  a  careful  examination  of  the  history  of  scientific  theory, 
a  certain  law  of  progress  observable  in  the  development  of  all 
the  sciences.  With  this  law  in  mind  he  then  seeks  to  construct 
an  ideal  for  all  science  and  to  apply  it  within  the  field  of  so- 
ciology, a  subject  with  which  he  finds  himself  especially 
concerned. 

The  Stages  of  Science. — The  history  of  science  exhibits 
three  successive  stages  in  its  development, — a  religious,  a  meta- 
physical, and  finally  a  positive  period.  The  first,  or  religious, 
is  characterized  by  a  reference,  in  the  explanation  of  natural 
phenomena,  to  some  incomprehensible  spirit,  such  as  the  nature- 
gods  of  the  savage  pantheon,  or  a  supernatural  Being.  It  rep- 
resents the  scientific  views  of  both  the  race  and  the  individual 
in  their  periods  of  childhood.  Everything  in  nature  is  re- 
garded as  animated,  like  the  body  of  man ;  natural  phenomena 
express  the  personal  caprice  of  a  supernatural  agency.  The 
second,  or  metaphysical,  stage  represents  the  period  in  which 
the  point  of  reference  is  transferred  from  a  personal  agency  to 

1Cours  de  Philosophic  Positive, 


288  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

impersonal  force.  The  natural  processes  are  here  explained 
by  an  immanent  power  which  pervades  all  being.  This  force 
is  an  abstraction  which  nevertheless  is  regarded  as  real  in 
itself;  perfection,  necessity,  and  other  concepts  of  science  are 
believed  to  be  its  laws.  The  metaphysical  stage  of  explanation 
regards  true  nature  as  the  generating  source  of  all  natural 
phenomena;  it  differs  but  little  from  the  " natura  naturans" 
of  Spinoza.  In  brief,  the  metaphysical  period  in  science  repre- 
sents nature  as  the  expression  of  some  esoteric,  unknowable 
force  which  somehow  makes  itself  felt  but  yet  can  never  be 
directly  known;  whereas  the  religious  attitude  conceived  it 
as  the  expression  of  a  theistic  will. 

The  third,  or  positivistic,  stage  is  the  ideal  of  all  scientific 
inquiry.  It  has  recourse  neither  t6  the  will  of  God  nor  to  an 
impersonal  force  for  its  explanations.  It  interprets  the  pre- 
sented phenomena  simply  as  they  are  in  themselves,  without 
any  reference  to  their  ultimate  origin  or  meaning;  it  regards 
the  laws  of  nature  to  be  nothing  more  than  convenient  general- 
izations from  experimental  observation.  No  extravagant  hy- 
potheses are  employed;  only  those  formulae  or  simple  laws  are 
recognized  which  make  farther  observation  possible.  The  iso- 
lated experience  must  be  united  with  others  by  some  simple 
means;  but  this  abstract  law,  unlike  its  conception  in  the 
metaphysical  stage,  is  here  conceived  by  the  positive  stand- 
point to  have  no  reality  in  itself  apart  from  the  experiences 
by  which  it  is  defined. 

Division  of  the  Sciences. — With  this  interpretation  of  the 
history  of  science  in  mind,  Comte  next  applies  it  to  the  world  of 
sense-impressions.  For  this  purpose  he  divides  all  science  into 
six  fields,  according  to  the  facility  with  which  the  positive 
stage  may  be  attained  and  the  complexity  of  the  material  em- 
ployed. Mathematics  was  the  first  science  to  become  positive, 
and  at  the  same  time  its  material  is  the  simplest.  The  other 
five  sciences  in  the  order  of  their  increasing  complexity  are: 
Astronomy,  Physics,  Chemistry,  Biology,  and,  lastly,  Sociology. 


SOME   PHILOSOPHICAL  ASPECTS   OF   SCIENCE.         289 

The  phenomena  of  human  intercourse  and  the  interpretation 
of  the  laws  of  social  progress  comprise  the  science  of  sociology. 
It  is  the  last  of  the  abstract  sciences  to  attain  the  distinction 
of  the  positive  stage,  for  the  material  with  which  it  deals  is 
extremely  complex. 

Sociology. — The  theory  of  society,  with  which  Comte  is 
especially  concerned,  constitutes  the  constructive  phase  of  the 
Positive  Philosophy.  Society,  which  is  based  on  the  unity  of 
the  relations  among  men,  may  be  regarded  as  an  individual, 
the  development  of  which  is  characterized  by  the  fuller  ex- 
pression of  its  intellectual  faculties;  in  its  higher  stages  the 
nobler  elements  predominate  over  the  baser  passions.  Person- 
ality, as  the  force  of  the  social  order,  is  the  only  element  in 
nature  worthy  of  devotion  or  respect.  In  this  manner  posi- 
tivism develops  into  a  religion  of  humanity  and  an  ethics  of 
altruism. 

Position  of  Positivism.  —  The  influence  of  the  Positive 
Philosophy  has  been  somewhat  lessened  by  the  fact  that  its 
disciples  have  tended  to  recognize  two  phases  in  the  original 
system.  Comte's  first  philosophy  was  scientific  and  critical, 
whereas  in  his  later  writings  he  tended  to  emphasize  a  mystical 
or  religious  element.  Not  religion  in  its  ordinary  sense,  but 
rather  an  extravagant  religion  of  mankind  in  which  the  uni- 
versal man,  society  at  large,  was  deified.  Hero-worship  was  to 
be  substituted  for  God-worship;  the  feelings  of  sympathy  and 
altruistic  love  were  to  replace  the  intellect  in  the  control  of 
life.  Yet,  notwithstanding  these  later  developments  of  the 
Positive  Philosophy,  the  whole  attitude  of  mind  has  had 
a  momentous  influence  on  the  French  and  English  philosophy 
of  the  nineteenth  century.  As  well  as  calling  attention  to  the 
application  of  scientific  methods  and  philosophical  ideals  to 
the  interpretation  of  social  relations,  it  has  stimulated  a  phi- 
losophy of  science  by  demanding  a  more  accurate  expression  of 
its  fundamental  laws. 


19 


290  HISTORY   OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

HYPOTHESES  IN  SCIENCE. 

The  positivistic  stand-point  suggests  at  once  the  develop- 
mental character  of  the  world-process  in  the  Hegelian  dialectic, 
and  again  the  evolutionary  aspect  of  recent  British  philosophy. 
Yet  before  science  can  be  conceived  in  terms  of  a  philosophical 
theory,  the  use  of  scientific  hypotheses  must  be  examined. 
For  whatever  importance  we  may  discover  in  the  meaning  of 
evolution,  or  in  the  meaning  of  any  other  broad  scientific 
hypothesis,  it  is  valueless  with  reference  to  natural  phenomena 
unless  the  ground  of  its  application  has  been  already  deter- 
mined. 

Origin  of  Scientific  Hypotheses. — The  early  history  of 
any  science  is  necessarily  a  record  of  observations,  more  or 
less  accidental  in  their  method  of  procedure.  The  development 
of  science  was  possible  only  through  broadening  the  point  of 
view  by  means  of  a  wider  range  of  experience.  No  laws  or 
principles  could  be  formulated  until  there  was  a  clear  concep- 
tion of  the  materials  to  be  considered ;  and,  on  account  of  the 
limited  range  and  the  inaccuracy  of  methods  at  the  disposal  of 
the  early  scientists,  the  results  which  they  obtained  were  either 
too  narrow  or  else  too  broad.  Early  science  concerned  itself 
either  with  simple  uncritical  facts  of  experience  or  with  the 
explanation  of  these  facts  by  what  we  now  consider  to  be  ex- 
travagant hypotheses.  It  was  content  with  the  mere,  record 
of  perceived  experiments,  or  else  endeavored  to  explain  them 
by  artificial  constructions;  no  middle  course  seemed  possible. 
But  gradually  as  the  fields  of  the  separate  sciences  were  clearly 
understood,  as  each  became  the  object  of  special  and  detailed 
study,  the  old  hypotheses  were  remodelled  according  to  the 
demands  of  more  enlightened  knowledge.  Narrow  but  com- 
prehensive theories  were  substituted  for  ill-founded  generaliza- 
tions on  the  one  hand  and  mere  descriptions  of  facts  on  the 
other. 

As  new  laws  have  been  conceived  with  the  increasing  range 


SOME   PHILOSOPHICAL  ASPECTS   OF   SCIENCE.        291 

of  facts  at  the  disposal  of  the  scientists,  there  has  been  devel- 
oped a  tendency  to  inquire  into  these  laws.  And  the  further 
this  inquiry  is  carried  the  more  the  scientist  leans  on  philoso- 
phy, for  the  more  universal  do  his  principles  become.  It  is 
found  that  the  simple  fact  of  experience  points  to  a  principle 
behind  it,  and  this  in  turn  to  a  broader  law,  until  finally 
science  feels  compelled  to  postulate  an  hypothesis  so  universal 
as  to  comprehend  an  indeterminate  range  of  experience.  With 
the  growth  of  science  these  hypotheses  tend  to  attain  greater 
universality.  The  principle  of  multiplication  is  included 
within  the  binomial  theorem,  and  this  in  turn  finds  a  fuller 
expression  in  a  theorem  of  the  infinitesimal  calculus.  So  it  is 
throughout  all  science, — the  narrower  fact  is  subsumed  under 
the  broader  principle;  laws  of  the  most  diverse  character  are 
harmonized  by  some  universal  hypothesis.  But  yet  there  is  a 
marked  distinction  between  the  hypothesis  of  modern  science 
and  its  counterpart  in  ancient  speculation.  The  latter  had 
little  reality  beyond  the  imagination  of  the  inventor,  whereas 
the  hypothesis  as  now  employed  by  science  is  the  result  of 
extensive  and  correlated  observation. 

Implication  of  Scientific  Hypotheses. — It  must  be  further 
noted  that  the  existence  of  hypotheses  in  science  points  towards 
two  presuppositions  which  the  empirical  scientist  is  often  un- 
willing to  recognize.  It  may  be  observed  that  the  generaliza- 
tions— perhaps  those  through  which  science  has  achieved  its 
most  lasting  result — are  themselves  beyond  direct  experimental 
proof;  they  are  valid  only  so  long  as  they  find  indirect  support 
from  extensive  ranges  of  experience  and  can  serve  as  appro- 
priate forms  or  skeletons  to  indicate  the  unity  underlying  phe- 
nomena of  the  most  diverse  types.  Physics  finds  it  convenient 
to  postulate  "  energy"  as  the  point  of  reference  for  many  forms 
of  activity,  yet  energy  itself  can  never  be  perceived, — its  reality 
is  inferred  from  generalizing  the  phenomena  of  light,  mag- 
netism, chemical  affinity,  heat,  and  mechanics.  But  besides 
going  bejond  direct  experience  and  resting  its  authority  on  the 


292  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

implications  of  experience  in  general,  the  hypothesis  of  modern 
science  involves  another  presupposition,  that  of  the  organic 
unity  of  nature.  Unless  it  is  recognized  that  there  is  some 
ultimate  relationship  behind  the  forces  of  nature,  the  postula- 
tion  of  any  law  or  hypothesis,  itself  beyond  direct  experience, 
would  be  utterly  worthless  and  illogical.  The  force  of  this 
presupposition  is  by  no  means  lessened  even  if  science  regards 
the  hypothesis  as  simply  a  point  of  reference;  for  a  series  of 
experiences  which  on  their  surface  have  no  similitude  what- 
soever can  hardly  be  referred  to  a  simple  theory  for  their  expla- 
nation unless  the  ultimate  unity  of  nature  is  implicitly  as- 
sumed. In  their  outward  appearance  there  is  no  sameness 
in  the  moving  pendulum  of  a  clock  and  a  red-hot  stove,  the 
magnetic  current  and  a  ray  of  light,  yet  on  the  presupposition 
that  the  phenomena  of  nature  are  the  expressions  of  an  under- 
lying unity,  science  finds  itself  able  to  refer  each  to  a  some- 
thing, called,  if  you  like,  by  the  term  "  energy. " 

EVOLUTION. 

There  is  no  broad  generalization  of  scientific  theory  which 
has  influenced  the  development  of  science  during  the  nine- 
teenth century  more,  or  has  a  profounder  meaning,  than  the 
concept  of  Evolution.  Among  the  early  Greeks  the  idea  of  a 
gradual  transformation  of  lower  into  higher  forms  was  a  fa- 
vorite theme.  But  their  speculations  would  have  proved  to  be  of 
little  interest  to  the  modern  scientist,  with  his  just  abhorrence 
of  imaginative  constructions,  had  it  not  been  for  two  remark- 
able discoveries  in  biological  science.  One  of  these  was  in  the 
field  of  embryology  and  the  other  in  that  of  paleontology. 

Embryonic  Evidence  in  Support  of  Biological  Evolu- 
tion.— With  improved  methods  of  observation  the  biologist 
noted  a  remarkable  resemblance  between  certain  stages  of  em- 
bryonic life  and  other  animal  forms  of  a  less  complex  nature 
than  the  one  into  which  the  embryo  would  subsequently  de- 
velop. From  this  it  was  inferred,  as  the  general  but  not  exact 


SOME   PHILOSOPHICAL  ASPECTS   OF   SCIENCE.         293 

expression  of  a  law,  that  the  embryos  of  mammals  pass  through 
stages  in  their  development  which  are  comparable,  although 
hardly  identical,  with  lower  and  simpler  conditions  of  life. 
There  is  a  one-cell  stage  like  the  simplest  bodies  at  present 
known  to  biology;  and  still  again  there  is  stage  possessing 
gills,  which  is  strongly  suggestive  of  the  fish.  A  German 
zoologist,  Haeckel,  has  briefly  stated  this  remarkable  discovery 
in  a  familiar  quotation  "  Ontogeny,  or  the  development  of  the 
individual,  is  a  shortened  recapitulation  of  phylogeny,  or  the 
evolution  of  the  race." 

Evidence  from  Fossil  Forms. — The  evidence  from  paleon- 
tology, or  the  study  of  fossil  remains,  is  even  more  conclusively 
in  favor  of  the  evolution  of  organic  forms  than  that  derived 
from  the  comparison  of  embryos.  It  was  observed  that  the 
fossils  found  in  the  strata  of  rocks  laid  down  in  ancient  geo- 
logic times  could  be  easily  interpreted  as  the  antecedent  forms 
of  our  present  fauna  and  flora.  Skeletons  of  the  probable  pro- 
genitors of  the  horse  are  embedded  in  the  rocks  of  prehistoric 
ages;  and  further,  the  more  recent  the  surrounding  rock  the 
more  nearly  does  the  fossil  resemble  the  living  species.  Ke- 
markable  achievements  have  often  resulted  from  a  comparison 
and  correlation  of  material,  notwithstanding  the  limitations 
and  difficulties  of  the  task.  Hitchcock  believed  it  possible  to 
construct  a  wholly  new  classification  of  certain  birds  (?)  and 
reptiles  by  the  observation  of  their  footprints  in  the  Triassic  (?) 
sandstones  of  the  Connecticut  Valley.2 

Universal  Character  of  Evolution. — The  problem  involved 
in  biological  evolution  is  not,  therefore,  so  much  as  to  its 
existence  as  to  the  underlying  unity  of  nature  which  it  exem- 
plifies and  the  forces  which  are  operative  in  its  expression. 
The  deeper  phases  of  science  rest  unsatisfied  with  the  uncriti- 
cised  belief  that  the  hypothesis  of  evolution  has  a  value ;  they 

a  Ichnology  of  New  England  and  Supplement,  and  United  States 
Geological  Survey,  Monograph  XXIX. 


294  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

inquire  into  the  presuppositions  upon  which  it  is  based  and 
the  laws  by  which  it  becomes  manifested.  But  in  this  inquiry 
it  soon  becomes  evident  that  the  gradual  development  of  the 
higher  living  forms  from  simpler  conditions  is  only  a  single 
aspect  of  a  principle,  the  operation  of  which  extends  through- 
out all  nature;  that  in  the  interpretation  of  a  single  phase  of 
evolution  one  soon  discovers  that  there  is  involved  by  implica- 
tion the  conception  of  universal  evolution.  Kant,  Laplace,  and 
Herschel  had  established  on  a  firm  basis  the  evolution  of  planet- 
ary systems  from  original  nebulous  masses.  The  sciences  of 
history  and  sociology  have  long  recognized  that  the  develop- 
ment of  human  institutions  is  a  result  of  the  action  and  re- 
action between  the  individual  and  his  environment,  continued 
through  a  protracted  period  of  time.  Since  the  beginning  of  a 
scientific  interest  in  the  growth  of  language  the  philologist  has 
founded  all  his  inquiries  on  the  assumption  that  words  are  the 
result  of  a  development  from  earlier  and  simpler  forms. 

Even  in  speculative  thought  the  principle  of  evolution  is  by 
no  means  unfamiliar.  In  the  philosophy  of  the  Rationalists 
one  will  recall  the  evolving  series  of  monads  by  which  Leibnitz 
sought  to  explain  the  diversity  of  the  world.  The  German 
transcendentalists  were  very  familiar  with  the  concept  and 
desired  to  extend  it  to  even  a  wider  range  of  phenomena  than 
will  be  admitted  within  the  restricted  limits  of  the  physical 
sciences.  Fichte  wished  to  explain  the  mental  functions  as  a 
gradual  development  from  the  fundamental  will-activity.  And 
Schelling  expressed  objective  nature  in  terms  of  an  inner  force 
continually  limiting  itself  and  then  transcending  these  limits, 
while  the  subjective  life  gradually  unfolded  the  various  phases 
of  the  principle  of  self -consciousness.  Hegel,  both  in  the 
"  Phenomenology  of  Mind"  and  in  the  more  mature  expression 
of  his  system,  is  pre-eminently  the  philosopher  of  evolution. 
In  his  case  evolution  had  the  broadest  possible  significance,  and 
not  the  technical  meaning  with  which  it  is  employed  in  bio- 
logical science.  The  Universe,  with  all  possible  elements, — 


SOME   PHILOSOPHICAL  ASPECTS   OF  SCIENCE.         295 

concepts,  phenomena,  mental  states,  and  human  ideals, — was 
believed  to  be  the  expression  of  an  infinite  Thought-Idea, 
gradually  developing  into  a  richer  and  a  fuller  meaning.  It 
represents  an  evolution  according  to  meaning  or  thought,  and 
not  in  accordance  with  the  temporal  before  and  after ;  a  substi- 
tution of  the  logically  complex — richer  and  more  mature — for 
the  logically  simple  and  less  highly  organized.  But  in  the 
treatment  of  the  concept  of  evolution  in  science  and  in  specu- 
lative philosophy  there  seems  to  be  a  marked  difference  of  inter- 
pretation. Science  employs  the  principle  simply  as  a  con- 
venient hypothesis  to  explain  numerous  particular  phenomena 
altogether  inexplicable  without  reference  to  some  fundamental 
unity.  Philosophy,  on  the  other  hand,  interprets  evolution  as 
the  expression  of  a  universal  world-process.  On  the  scientific 
side  the  tendency  has  been  in  the  direction  of  a  more  and 
more  accurate  formula  which  could  be  definitely  applied  to 
organic  life,  a  formula  which  had  more  of  scientific  accuracy 
and  detail  than  is  suggested  by  the  indefmiteness  and  compre- 
hensiveness of  a  world-theory.  In  connection  with  this  em- 
pirical aspect  of  evolution  two  names  are  especially  noteworthy, 
Darwin  for  his  originality  and  Spencer  for  his  power  of  sys- 
tematization. 

Darwin. — However  universal  one  might  assert  the  evolu- 
tionary hypothesis  to  be,  its  application  to  biological  forms 
would  have  always  remained  in  doubt  unless  scientific  evidence 
could  be  accumulated  whereby  the  transition  of  one  organic 
species  into  another  might  be  established.  This  was  done  by 
Charles  Darwin.  Already  Lamarck  had  defined  evolution  in 
terms  of  acquired  characteristics  transmitted  from  generation 
to  generation  in  constantly  increasing  intensity.  Darwin,  how- 
ever, conceived  another  factor  in  the  development  of  a  species, 
which  seemed  to  be  susceptible  of  proof.  He  noted  on  a  voyage 
to  South  America  that  all  animals,  both  the  extinct  and  the 
living,  seemed  exactly  adapted  to  their  surroundings,  and  that  a 
peculiar  environment  seemed  to  be  responsible  for  a  peculiar 


296  HISTORY   OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

species.  And,  further,  he  noted  in  connection  with  breeders 
of  fancy  stock  that  a  species  can  be  changed  at  the  will  of 
man  by  properly  selecting  those  parents  which  have  the  char- 
acteristics desired  in  the  offspring.  With  these  two  scientific 
facts  before  him  Darwin,  in  his  work  "  The  Origin  of  Species 
ly  Means  of  Natural  Selection,"  published  in  1859,  formulated 
the  law  of  natural  selection,  or  "  the  survival  of  the  fittest,"  as 
it  has  been  called.  In  brief,  the  theory  is  this :  that  individual 
which  by  mere  accident  possesses  some  quality  through  which 
it  is  better  adapted  to  the  environment  than  its  fellows,  will 
win  in  the  struggle  for  existence.  Individuals  possessing  this 
superior  quality  will  tend  to  propagate  with  others  who  like- 
wise possess  it;  while  those  in  which  it  is  lacking  will  be 
stamped  out  before  they  attain  to  their  development.  The 
accidental  quality  will  thus  gradually  assume  the  importance 
of  a  racial  character,  and  that  species  resulting  from  this  trans- 
formation will  be  better  adapted  to  its  environment  than  its 
progenitor. 

Darwin  himself  recognized  that  acquired  characteristics  as 
well  as  natural  selection  were  factors  in  organic  evolution. 
Subsequent  biologists  have  disagreed  on  this  point.  Weis- 
mann  declares  that  no  acquired  characteristic,  however  strong, 
can  exert  any  influence  on  a  succeeding  generation.  He  points 
to  animals  which  differ  in  nowise  from  remote  ancestors, 
although  their  immediate  parents  possessed  some  marked  pecu- 
liarity. A  surgical  operation  performed  through  countless  gen- 
erations seems  in  nowise  to  affect  the  natural  conditions  of  the 
organ  in  the  next  following  generation. 

Spencer. — In  opposition  to  Weismann  there  have  been  those 
who  have  continued  to  recognize  the  original  position  of  Dar- 
win and  give  to  the  acquired  characteristics  an  important 
function  in  evolution.  Among  this  number  Herbert  Spencer 
stands  prominent  for  systematic  power  rather  than  for  original- 
ity of  mind.  Spencer  endeavors  to  reconstruct  positivism  on 
the  metaphysics  of  the  English-Scotch  school  (of  which  Hamil- 


SOME   PHILOSOPHICAL  ASPECTS   OF   SCIENCE.         297 

ton  was  representative)  and  the  scientific  theory  of  universal 
evolution.  Spencer  "  discovers"  that  religion  and  science  are 
not  only  antagonistic  to  one  another,  but  are  also  involved  in 
internal  contradictions,  unless  each  recognizes  that  the  Abso- 
lute is  itself  beyond  the  power  of  finite  thought.  This  "  Un- 
knowable" Eeality  exists  only  as  an  inference  from  observed 
phenomena;  its  true  nature  as  well  as  its  origin  is  involved  in 
hopeless  mystery.  Human  knowledge  is  restricted  to  the  world 
of  given  fact,  and  as  such  it  should  concern  itself  only  with  the 
given  facts  of  experience  and  their  relations.  "  Science  is  par- 
tially unified  knowledge;  Philosophy  is  completely  unified 
knowledge."  3 

But  even  philosophy,  in  its  struggle  to  unify  the  facts  of 
experience,  discovers  in  them  a  certain  incomprehensible  char- 
acter which  cannot  be  defined  in  relative  terms.  This  may  be 
symbolized  as  force,  and  the  formal  principle  of  its  activity  as 
causality.  Conservation  of  energy  and  causality  are  the  two 
fundamental  propositions  of  science,  and  the  nearest  approach 
to  the  Unknowable.  Alone,  however,  they  are  little  more  than 
meaningless  abstractions;  each  requires  a  deeper  principle  to 
which  the  concrete  phenomena  of  nature  may  be  referred.  This 
is  evolution.  Each  special  science  concerns  itself  with  partial 
truth  as  its  goal;  each  contributes  towards  the  unity  of  all 
knowledge  as  it  is  postulated  by  philosophy.  The  aim  of  each 
science  is  to  bring  its  restricted  data  into  such  continuity  that 
its  systematized  facts  are  able  to  find  a  place  in  the  general 
concept  of  evolution.  Each  science  refers  to  its  phenomena  in 
terms  of  some  static  element  as  matter,  and  some  dynamic 
element  as  motion,  and  the  general  principle  of  evolution  re- 
quires that  each  shall  pass  from  a  simple  to  a  more  complex 
form,  "from  a  relatively  indefinite,  incoherent  homogeneity 
to  a  relatively  definite,  coherent  heterogeneity."  * 


3  First  Principles,  Section  37. 
*  Ibid.,  Section  145. 


298  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

Although  there  is  nothing  strikingly  original  in  Spencer's 
stand-point,  the  systematic  power  of  his  mind  is  clearly  seen 
in  the  breadth  of  application  which  he  finds  for  this  initial 
principle.  He  is  able  to  construct  a  system  of  biology,  of  psy- 
chology, of  sociology,  and  of  ethics  on  the  evolutionary  hy- 
pothesis. And  he  is  eminently  successful  in  discovering  data 
within  each  of  these  fields  which  will  exhibit  the  scope  of  the 
evolutionary  hypothesis. 

Philosophical  Aspect  of  Evolution. — In  this  brief  review 
of  the  scientific  aspects  of  the  evolutionary  doctrine  one  per- 
ceives at  once  that  the  most  general  meaning  of  the  term  is  the 
same  both  in  science  and  speculative  philosophy,  and  that  the 
distinct  tendency  of  science  is  to  extend  its  application  until 
its  significance  approaches  near  to  the  universality  accredited 
to  evolution  by  German  transcendentalism.  The  value  of  the 
Spencerian  evolutionary  system  lies  not  in  its  originality,  but 
simply  in  the  fact  that  it  tends  to  suggest  in  a  popular  manner, 
and  after  the  ways  of  physical  science,  the  universality  and 
breadth  of  the  Hegelian  world.  But  notwithstanding  the  ten- 
dency to  seek  a  more  philosophical  basis  for  the  scientific  theory 
of  evolution,  there  is  yet  a  marked  distinction  between  the  con- 
clusions which  science  and  speculative  philosophy  draw  from 
the  same  facts.  Both  interpretations  agree  that  Nature  is 
fundamentally  a  process  of  development,  only  they  seem  to  dis- 
agree as  to  what  it  is  that  develops.  Biological  science  often 
declares  that  the  psychic  activities  of  man  are  the  direct  prod- 
uct of  continued  environmental  changes  reacting  on  the  lower 
forms  of  life,  that  mental  phenomena,  because  they  developed 
in  parallel  with  physical  changes,  differ  from  them  only  in 
degree.  This  scientific  interpretation  of  evolution  seems  correct 
as  far  as  it  goes,  Schelling  and  Hegel  would  probably  have 
said,  only  in  pointing  out  the  intimate  connection  between  the 
psychical  life  and  its  material  correlate  they  would  have  pre- 
ferred to  deify  matter  rather  than  materialize  mind.  Matter 
was  to  Hegel  merely  a  lower  form  of  a  universal  Principle 


SOME  PHILOSOPHICAL  ASPECTS  OF  SCIENCE.        299 

which  expresses  one  of  its  higher  stages  as  mind;  while  mind 
is  not,  as  the  scientists  often  infer,  a  more  or  less  accidental 
correlative  of  movements  of  matter.  The  scientist  reduces  mind 
to  matter;  whereas  the  transcendentalist  expresses  matter  as  a 
lower  phase  of  mind,  and  regards  them  both  as  different  aspects 
of  the  Absolute. 

THE  SCIENCE  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 

Besides  the  tendencies  which  spring  from  the  desire  on  the 
part  of  the  physical  sciences  to  understand  their  own  presuppo- 
sitions,— tendencies  which  lead  towards  a  fuller  and  deeper 
philosophy  of  science, — there  is  another  branch  of  research 
which  from  its  very  nature  lies  close  to  philosophy.  Psy- 
chology, until  comparatively  recent  years,  has  been  classed  as 
one  of  the  strictly  philosophical  subjects.  But  gradually  as 
the  introduction  of  improved  methods  of  research  and  increased 
laboratory  facilities  have  tended  to  develop  the  causal  nature 
of  our  mental  states  simply  as  such,  it  has  become  evident  that 
psychology  is  truly  an  empirical  science  like  physics  or  biology, 
and  should  be  no  longer  treated  as  a  branch  of  philosophy. 
Yet  nevertheless  the  fact  that  psychology  deals  with  the  causal 
nature  of  mental  states  makes  the  bearing  of  its  researches  on 
philosophy  which  deals  with  the  meaning  of  these  mental  states 
a  matter  of  considerable  importance.  All  knowledge  must  pro- 
ceed by  the  activities  of  the  human  mind,  and  the  science  which 
considers  these  psychic  states  as  empirically  given  data  will 
always  remain  a  subject  of  extreme  importance  to  every  branch 
of  human  inquiry. 

Introspective  Method. — It  has  only  been  within  the  last 
century  that  psychology  has  become  clearly  differentiated  from 
the  other  branches  of  philosophy.  The  Englishmen,  who  have 
always  been  psychologists  rather  than  metaphysicians,  have 
tended  to  recognize  the  importance  of  mental  analysis.  From 
Hobbes  and  Locke  to  the  present  time  they  have  sought  to  exam- 
ine the  contents  of  consciousness  by  the  method  of  introspection, 


300  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

believing  that  the  central  problem  of  all  philosophy  is  the  classi- 
fication and  causal  arrangement  of  every  element  of  our  mental 
life.  As  a  sure  ground  for  the  connection  of  our  ideas,  in  the 
Humeian  sense,  the  English  introspective  psychologists  have 
emphasized  association  and  the  memory.  In  the  strictest  sense 
the  basis  upon  which  these  rest  is  altogether  unexplained.  The 
self,  thought,  and  even  the  duality  of  objective  and  subjective, 
are  always  presupposed,  but  never  established.  It  is  chiefly  as 
introspective  psychologists,  in  whose  writings  metaphysics  and 
epistemology  are  hopelessly  confused,  that  the  "  Scotch  School" 
is  of  importance.  The  general  position  of  this  movement  was 
earlier  alluded  to  in  connection  with  Hamilton,  who  is  perhaps 
the  most  original  representative. 

Experimental  Psychology. — In  contrast  to  this  introspec- 
tion of  the  British  thinkers  there  has  arisen  a  clearly-defined 
tendency  to  introduce  into  psychology  the  experimental 
methods  of  other  sciences.  Herbart,  whom  we  have  earlier 
referred  to  as  a  Eealist,  may  be  regarded  as  the  originator  of 
this  important  movement.  He  follows  the  English  psycholo- 
gists, in  so  far  as  he  regards  consciousness  to  be  the  complex 
resultant  of  the  psychical  elements  of  sensation  and  ideas,  but 
further  suggests  that  the  rise  and  fall,  the  centring  of  atten- 
tion, or  the  inhibition  of  an  idea  may  be  expressed  by  exact 
mathematical  relations.  Herbart  attempts  to  correlate  the  ele- 
ments of  consciousness  with  mathematical  laws,  and  in  so  doing 
defines  the  basis  for  a  broader  and  more  scientific  psychology. 

Herbart's  suggestion,  impractical  as  it  may  appear  in  an 
exact  application,  was  not  without  immediate  effect.  There 
were  many  who  felt  his  influence  and  sought  to  discover  a 
foundation  for  psychology  in  physics,  biology,  and  anthropology 
rather  than  in  speculative  metaphysics.  The  most  remarkable 
advance  in  the  physico-biological  side  of  psychology  was  made 
by  Fechner  about  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century.  By 
means  of  a  simple  mechanical  law  he  believed  himself  able  to 
express  the  exact  relationship  between  the  psychical  and  physi- 


SOME   PHILOSOPHICAL   ASPECTS   OF   SCIENCE.         301 

cal  phenomena.  Briefly  expressed,  Fechner  conceived  that  the 
intensity  of  the  sensation  varied  as  the  logarithm  of  the  ex- 
ternal stimulus  to  which  the  sensation  could  be  referred.  A 
full  treatment  of  this  interesting  conclusion  may  be  found  in 
any  treatise  on  psychology.  From  these  suggestions,  made  by 
men  whose  interests  were  mainly  speculative,  there  has  arisen 
the  important  and  productive  field  of  experimental  psychology. 
Since  1874  Wundt  and  his  younger  pupils  have  been  especially 
active  in  this  field.  Empirical  methods,  extremely  accurate 
recording  instruments,  together  with  elaborate  laboratory  ex- 
periments, have  entirely  transformed  the  narrower  introspective 
psychology  of  previous  years. 

The  "  Aspect  Psychology."  —  Although  Fechner  is  chiefly 
known  in  connection  with  his  psycho-physical  theory,  his  own 
personal  interests  lay  in  the  solution  of  the  world  problem 
made  prominent  by  the  assimilation  of  German  transcendental- 
ism with  the  English  empirical  philosophy. 

Herbart  had  made  psychology  a  corollary  of  metaphysics, 
but  in  so  doing  had  found  it  necessary  to  postulate  a  thorough 
Realism  in  order  to  account  for  the  objective  element  in  our 
experience.  Fechner  was  an  idealist  in  the  strictest  sense  of 
the  word,  yet  he  acknowledges  the  value  of  all  observational 
science.  Both  the  speculative  and  the  empirical  demands  could 
be  recognized  only  on  the  supposition  that  each  was  an  aspect 
of  the  same  ultimate  Real.  Thought,  reason,  purpose  lead 
us  to  an  idealistic  monism,  experience  and  the  analyses  of 
science  lead  us  towards  an  extended  world  of  multiform  reality. 
The  law  of  psycho-physical  relationship  was  merely  an  expres- 
sion of  a  deeper  unity  between  the  singleness  of  thought  and 
the  variety  of  experience.  Each  unfolds  an  abstracted  char- 
acter of  the  same  conscious  Absolute. 

In  recent  years  the  double-aspect  theory  of  the  Universe, 
defined  by  Fechner,  has  received  considerable  attention  from 
those  psychologists  who  have  themselves  felt  the  influence  of 
the  Kantian  philosophy.  There  is  an  interesting  passage  by 


302  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

Fichte  in  which  he  expressly  declares  that  the  "  thing"  given 
as  fact,  or  represented,  and  the  representation  as  such,  belong 
to  two  different  series.  Universal  law,  causality,  and  the  other 
methods  of  the  exact  sciences  are  applicable  to  the  given  fact 
as  such;  but  the  representation,  on  the  other  hand,  belongs 
to  a  series  which  depends  on  the  original  assertion  of  the  Ego, 
an  act  of  asserting  which  never  can  itself  be  proved  by  the  laws 
of  the  former  series.5  Again,  it  will  be  remembered  that  Kant 
distinguished  between  the  mechanical  way  of  looking  at  real- 
ity, in  contradistinction  to  the  teleological,  between  the  stand- 
points of  science  and  of  life.  The  former  was  the  product 
of  causality  and  the  other  categories  of  the  understanding, 
the  latter  arose  from  conceiving  nature  in  terms  of  purpose  and 
value. 

MECHANISM. — Those  psychologists  who  find  it  convenient 
to  regard  Eeality  from  the  different  sides  of  science  and  pur- 
posive value  recognize  the  incompleteness  of  either  aspect  if 
taken  alone  as  the  whole  truth.  The  idealism  of  Fichte  laid 
its  entire  stress  on  the  teleological  stand-point,  and  the  system 
as  a  whole  failed  to  effect  a  more  lasting  influence  on  philosophy 
because  it  seemed  to  neglect  natural  science,  which,  from  the 
very  nature  of  the  subject,  is  founded  on  the  opposite  mechani- 
cal view.  There  is  at  present  an  important  tendency,  of  which 
Professor  Hugo  Miinsterberg  is  representative, — often  called 
the  Neo-Fichteian  movement, — which  is  impressed  with  the 
teleological  meaning,  the  moral  value  of  life,  but  yet  recognizes 
that  empirical  science  has  an  important  place.  Reality,  the 
Absolute,  is  not  a  duality;  it  is  rather  the  great  active,  moral, 
and  purposive  Principle  of  the  world,  which,  when  regarded 
from  the  different  stand-points  of  causal  science  and  life,  pre- 
sents the  world  according  to  two  aspects,  the  mechanical  and 
the  teleological.  On  the  one  side  the  empirical  science  of  psy- 
chology describes  and  seeks  to  explain  every  mental  fact  recog- 

•Ueber  den  Begriff  der  Wissenschaftslehre,  Section  7. 


SOME   PHILOSOPHICAL  ASPECTS   OF   SCIENCE.        303 

nizing  the  universality  of  causation  and  mechanical  law.  Psy- 
chology, from  the  empirical  stand-point,  is  thus  rendered  a 
purely  positive  science,  in  a  Comteian  sense.  Everything  is 
explained,  if  explained  at  all,  by  psychical  law;  the  states  of 
consciousness  are  treated  simply  as  the  necessary  resultants 
of  previous  physical  and  psychical  phenomena.  Man  is  con- 
ceived as  a  machine  causally  reacting  on  his  environment. 

TELEOLOGY. — This  objective  way  of  regarding  life  is  neces- 
sary for  the  empirical  science  of  psychology.  It  supplies  a 
ground  for  the  reduction  of  the  states  of  consciousness  to  law 
and  order.  But  it  is  not  the  stand-point  from  which  these 
same  states  are  regarded  by  consciousness  itself.  Life  may  best 
be  described  by  science  as  a  causal  series,  but  life  itself  refuses 
to  regard  the  causal  explanation  to  be  the  full  conception  of 
its  meaning.  Consciousness  demands  that  purpose,  value, 
moral  dignity  enter  into  the  inner  or  subjective  life  of  a  single 
personality,  and  that  these  ideals  cannot  be  expressed  in  the 
causal  series  of  psycho-physics.  Causality  is  sufficient,  if  ap- 
plied directly  to  empirical  facts,  but  altogether  insufficient  in 
the  estimation  of  value  and  purpose.  It  is  this  latter  purposive 
of  the  teleological  side  of  life  by  which  every  person  implicitly 
acknowledges  the  dignity  of  his  own  character  through  the 
mere  recognition  of  conscious  ideals.  One  prefers  to  regard  as 
real  what  is  reflected  in  one's  own  personality  rather  than  what 
is  discovered  by  the  causal  explanation  of  that  personality.  To 
this  teleological  side  of  our  life  belong  the  ideals  of  aesthetics, 
ethics,  and  religion;  the  purposes  with  which  we  define  char- 
acter and  the  motives  which  underlie  an  organized  life. 

THEORIES    OF   ETHICS. 

Empirico-Rationalistic  Ethics. — In  earlier  chapters  we 
were  able  to  distinguish  two  stand-points  with  regard  to  human 
conduct.  We  found  Hobbes,  Spinoza,  Locke,  and  Clarke  repre- 
sentative of  what  might  be  called  the  empirico-raiionalistic 
school  of  ethics.  These  thinkers  rested  the  authority  of  moral 


304  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

choice  on  the  observations  of  experience  and  the  laws  of  reason. 
Hobbes  believes  that  the  superior  convenience  of  the  accepted 
moral  laws  is  a  sufficient  ground  for  their  recognition,  while 
Locke  is  equally  positive  that  "  Morality  is  capable  of  demon- 
stration." 6  Spinoza  believed  that  the  fundamental  proposi- 
tions of  ethics  are  as  undeniably  true  as  the  axiom  that  "the 
whole  is  greater  than  any  of  its  parts ;"  and  Clarke,  the  English 
rationalist  in  ethics,  founded  the  moral  relations  among  men 
upon  certain  appropriate  correspondences,  as  certain  in  their 
own  field  as  the  truths  of  mathematics. 

Intuitional  Ethics. — In  opposition  to  this  school,  which 
thus  places  experience  and  reason  as  the  ultimate  criteria  of 
moral  conduct,  there  has  always  flowed  a  counter-current  of 
ethical  thought  which  has  tried  to  separate  the  field  of  the 
conscience  from  that  of  the  reason.  Shaftesbury,  Hume,  Kant, 
and  Fichte  suggest  this  intuitional  stand-point.  They  all  refer 
to  some  moral  sense  or  faculty  the  operation  of  which  cannot 
be  directly  estimated  by  the  reason ;  an  innate  conscience  whose 
dictates  are  universally  valid,  without  question,  for  all  man- 
kind. 

The  naturalistic  description  of  morality  developed  by  Hobbes, 
with  its  emphasis  on  an  egoism  controlled  by  the  exigencies  of 
reason  and  experience,  was  opposed  by  a  group  of  seventeenth- 
century  thinkers  known  as  the  Cambridge  Platonists.  The 
most  important  of  these  English  Neo-Platonists  was  Ralph 
Cudworth,  a  contemporary  of  Hobbes.  He  taught  a  thorough 
intellectualism  in  which  truth  and  the  ideas  of  truth  are  con- 
ceived as  eternal  and  immutable.  The  principles  of  morality 
were  recognized  to  be  necessary  and  fundamental,  like  the 
truths  of  thought-intuitions;  they  were  intuited  by  the  mind 
and  arose  from  an  objective  source  in  the  Being  of  God.  These 
moral  truths  could  not  change,  nor  could  they  develop  with 
the  requirements  of  the  social  compact,  as  Hobbes  believed,  but 

8  Locke's  Essay,  Book  IV.,  Section  18. 


THEORIES   OF  ETHICS.  305 

were  rather  the  unchanging  thoughts  of  God.  This  early  form 
of  intellectualism  may  be  regarded  as  the  beginning  in  England 
of  the  intuitional  school.  Shaftesbury  and  his  successors  ac- 
cepted the  immutability  of  morality  and  looked  upon  the  con- 
science as  the  peculiar  faculty  for  the  discernment  of  moral 
truth.  This  moral  sense  is  independent  of  the  reason  and 
experience,  and  its  intuitive  truths  are  uninfluenced  by  either 
individual  caprice  or  social  environment.  In  its  later  forms 
intuitionalism  has  become  less  distinct  and  has  been  inclined 
to  admit  an  external  or  universalistic  aspect  to  ethical  prin- 
ciples. Adam  Smith,  a  friend  of  Hume,  based  morality  on  the 
intuitive  sympathy  for  all  mankind,  while  recent  writers  have 
strongly  emphasized  an  intuitive  imitation  or  assimilation  of 
our  moral  environment. 

UTILITARIANISM. 

Cumberland. — The  first  attempt  to  reconcile  the  dynamic 
character  of  morality — the  empirico-rationalism  of  Hobbes — 
with  the  innate  conscience  of  the  Intuitionalists  was  attempted 
by  Richard  Cumberland,  who  lived  from  1632  into  the  early 
part  of  the  next  century.  He  is  generally  regarded  as  the  first 
advocate  of  the  universal  welfare  of  mankind  as  the  highest 
moral  law,  and  in  that  sense  he  appears  as  an  early  advocate  of 
the  recent  utilitarian  movement.  Cumberland  accepts  the  em- 
pirical stand-point  of  Hobbes  and  discards  the  uncritical  con- 
fidence of  the  Platonists  in  the  intuition  of  the  moral  sense. 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  he  is  especially  interested  in  refuting 
the  artificiality  of  the  Hobbesian  description  of  morality.  He 
would  prefer  to  regard  the  moral  laws  as  natural  and  the 
virtues  of  generosity  and  sympathy  as  the  expression  of  motives 
simple  and  natural  rather  than  acquired.  It  is  for  the  indi- 
vidual to  will  the  universal  Good, — sometimes  regarded  by 
Cumberland  as  perfection  and  sometimes  as  happiness, — and 
in  the  greatest  possible  good  of  all  mankind  we  have  the  highest 
moral  sanction.  The  movement  from  Cumberland  to  the  later 

20 


306  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

Utilitarians  is  from  an  emphasis  on  a  moral  perfection  to  an 
emphasis  on  universal  happiness,  from  ideal  good  to  material 
welfare. 

The  Sanction  of  Happiness. — One  of  the  early  Greek 
schools,  the  Cyrenaic,  conceived  the  momentary  pleasure  of  the 
individual  to  be  the  ultimate  moral  sanction,  and  their  fol- 
lowers, the  Epicureans,  transferred  the  emphasis  from  the  mo- 
mentary feeling  to  a  general  happiness  throughout  life.  In 
each  of  these  schools  two  presuppositions  may  be  noticed, — ex- 
perience qualifies  the  ground  for  happiness,  reason  determines 
its  application.  Every  act  is  the  result  of  an  "  hedonistic  cal- 
culus" an  arithmetical  computation  of  the  amount  of  happiness 
that  may  be  expected  to  arise  from  the  act.  Pleasures  can  be 
estimated  and  compared ;  this  is  the  fundamental  premise  of  all 
schools  of  ethics  that  recognize  happiness  as  the  ultimate  moral 
sanction. 

Bentham. — In  1789  Jeremy  Bentham  published  the  "Prin- 
ciples of  Morals  and  Legislation"  His  interest  in  ethics  was 
from  the  legal  rather  than  from  the  philosophical  side;  and 
he  therefore  brought  into  the  foreground  humanity  rather  than 
the  individual.  The  idea  of  the  organic  structure  of  society 
is  by  no  means  so  ancient  in  its  application  to  ethics  as  one 
might  presume.  Plato  pointed  out  the  similarity  between  the 
state  and  the  individual  person  and  the  analogous  functions 
pertaining  to  each,  and  Aristotle  described  man  in  terms  of  his 
social  environment;  but  it  was  not  until  comparatively  recent 
times  that  it  has  been  conceived  possible  to  construct  an  ethics 
on  the  presupposition  of  the  organic  structure  of  society. 

Bentham  unites  the  Epicurean  principle  of  happiness  with 
this  ideal  of  the  social  organism.  We  are  all  bound  together 
by  a  bond  of  sympathy,  all  tending  towards  the  ideal  of  maxi- 
mum happiness.  When,  therefore,  I  promote  the  general  hap- 
piness of  society,  I  truly  advance  my  own  pleasure.  The  good 
of  one  is  the  good  of  many;  the  vices  of  one  affect  every 
member  of  society.  The  ultimate  moral  sanction  is  therefore 


THEORIES  OF  ETHICS.  307 

the  "greatest  happiness  to  the  greatest  number."  Virtue  is 
determined  by  experience;  it  is  only  distinguishable  from  evil 
by  its  positive  effect  on  the  general  happiness  of  mankind. 

Mill. — The  Utilitarian  ethics,  thus  based  on  the  happiness 
of  all  mankind  and  the  organic  unity  of  society,  found  its 
most  influential  disciple  in  John  Stuart  Mill.  He  accepts  the 
general  position  of  Bentham,  but  yet  feels  distinctly  the  influ- 
ence of  the  idealistic  tendencies  of  thought.  "  Utility,  or  the 
Greatest  Happiness  Principle,  holds  that  actions  are  right  in 
proportion  as  they  tend  to  promote  happiness,  wrong  as  they 
tend  to  produce  the  reverse  of  happiness.  By  happiness  is 
intended  pleasure  and  the  absence  of  pain;  by  unhappiness, 
pain  and  the  privation  of  pleasure."  7  In  the  support  of  this 
thesis  Mill  departs  considerably  from  the  thoroughly  empirical 
stand-point  of  the  earlier  Utilitarians,  although  the  derivative 
character  of  morality  is  always  prominent.  Like  the  other 
Utilitarians,  he  recognizes  the  social  and  religious  grounds  of 
moral  distinction  impressed  upon  the  individual  from  without ; 
but,  besides  these,  Mill  acknowledges  the  existence  of  an  inter- 
nal sanction  or  conscience, — "  a  feeling  in  our  own  mind ;  a 
pain,  more  or  less  intense,  attendant  on  violation  of  duty." ' 
But  even  after  he  has  taken  this  decisive  step  he  shrinks  from 
the  admission  of  the  full  consequences  of  an  intuitive  element 
in  the  choice  of  action,  and  seeks  to  rest  the  conscience  on 
motives  superimposed  upon  the  character  from  without. 

In  the  treatment  of  the  possible  objections  to  his  theory  Mill 
feels  the  odium  of  placing  the  intellectual  and  physical  pleas- 
ures on  the  same  plane.  The  hedonistic  calculus  of  Mill  not 
only  recognizes  a  difference  of  quantity  among  pleasures,  but 
also  a  distinction  of  quality.  By  the  latter  term  he  would  dis- 
criminate between  pleasures  which  are  so  diverse  from  one 
another  that  no  quantity  of  the  one,  however  large,  would  be 


7  Mill's  Utilitarianism,  Chapter  ii. 

8  Ibid.,  Chapter  iii. 


308  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

comparable  with  the  smallest  quantity  of  the  other.  Thus  the 
intellectual  pleasures  are  of  an  inestimably  higher  quality  than 
the  sensual,  and  in  an  hedonistic  calculus,  which  regards  quan- 
tity alone,  a  comparison  between  them  is  impossible. 

IDEALISM  OF  GKEEN. 

Utilitarianism  and  the  Spencerian  ethics  of  evolution  repre- 
sent the  last  important  phases  of  the  English  ethics  of  empiri- 
cism. Both  of  these  theories  have  in  common  a  final  reference 
to  experience  and  a  disregard  for  the  problems  which  German 
metaphysics  has  impressed  on  the  philosophy  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  Among  those  who  have  recognized  the  importance 
of  metaphysical  issues  and  at  the  same  time  have  sought  to 
discover  the  elements  of  permanent  value  in  the  empirical 
theory  of  morals,  the  Englishman  Thomas  Hill  Green  is  per- 
haps the  most  remarkable.  Green  recognized  with  the  Utili- 
tarians the  unity  of  society,  but  hesitated  to  establish  the 
dignity  of  the  moral  life  on  the  ultimate  sanction  of  happiness. 
On  the  contrary,  the  ideal  of  society,  a  life  of  common  interest, 
results  only  from  the  perfection  of  all  the  self-conscious  per- 
sonalities of  which  it  is  composed.  By  this  emphasis  on  uni- 
versal perfection  he  brings  into  the  foreground  the  idealistic 
element  in  Cumberland,  although  personally  Green  was  influ- 
enced by  German  transcendentalism.  And  in  agreeable  contrast 
to  many  of  the  English  moralists,  Green  considers  at  length 
the  epistemological  and  metaphysical  foundations  of  ethics 
before  he  proceeds  to  construct  a  positive  theory  of  morality. 
Knowledge  and  nature  are  interpreted  idealistically.  Both  re- 
quire a  spiritual  principle  over  and  above  the  mere  object  of 
possible  experience,  "  a  self-distinguishing  consciousness" 
which  shall  be  itself  non-temporal  and  non-spacial.  This  eter- 
nal spiritual  Consciousness  is  partially  realized  in  each  indi- 
vidual man,  who  is  therefore  in  the  highest  sense  free, — owing 
to  this  relation  between  the  human  soul  and  the  original,  eternal 
Spirit.  Each  individual  act  is  free,  since  it  represents  the  iden- 


IMPORTANT  STAND-POINTS  IN  RECENT  METAPHYSICS.      309 

tification  of  the  inner,,  free  self  with  some  desire.  The  develop- 
ment or  progress  towards  perfection,  which  is  the  ideal  for  the 
individual  self,  is  possible  only  in  terms  of  the  common  good,  the 
well-being,  the  virtue,  and  the  perfection  of  all  mankind.  The 
self-consciousness  of  the  individual,  whereby  he  recognizes  the 
limitations  of  his  own  selfhood,  unites  him  with  the  absolute 
Self-Consciousness,  as  the  ideal  of  his  fulfilment,  "with  the 
constant  characteristic  of  self -consciousness  and  self -obj  edifica- 
tion, the  one  divine  mind  gradually  reproduces  itself  in  the 
human  soul.  In  virtue  of  this  principle  in  him  man  has 
definite  capabilities,  the  realization  of  which,  since  in  it  alone 
he  can  satisfy  himself,  forms  his  true  good."  9 

IMPORTANT   STAND-POINTS   IN   RECENT   METAPHYSICS. 

The  classic  systems  of  metaphysics  have  generally  empha- 
sized some  distinct  approach  to  reality  and  some  definite  attri- 
bute of  the  Eeal.  One  cannot,  however,  make  unalterable  rules 
for  the  classification  of  philosophical  systems,  because  in  each 
case  the  epistemological  elements  give  the  resulting  metaphys- 
ical structure  a  different  setting.  The  history  of  metaphysical 
studies  during  the  nineteenth  century  has  tended  to  develop  a 
system  in  which  intellectual,  emotional,  and  empirical  factors 
are  each  recognized  and  each  given  its  appropriate  place.  It  is 
doubtful  if  there  is  any  idealism  which  does  not  find  a  place 
for  the  achievements  of  science,  no  intellectualism  which  does 
not  lay  considerable  emphasis  on  experience,  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  modern  forms  of  realistic  pluralism  recognize, 
although  they  may  not  accept,  the  monistic  arguments. 

EUDOLPH  HERMANN  LOTZE. 

One  of  the  broadest  and  most  finished  systems  of  reconstruc- 
tion is  the  empirico-idealism  of  Rudolph  Hermann  Lotze,  who 
died  only  about  twenty-five  years  ago.  Like  Fechner,  whom 
he  recalls  to  mind  in  many  respects,  Lotze  feels  the  influence 

•Green,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  Book  III.,  Chapter  ii.,  Section  180. 


310  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

of  both  the  empirical  naturalism  of  science  and  the  idealistic 
monism  of  Fichte  and  Hegel.  He  studied  medicine,  physiology, 
and  physiological  psychology,  at  the  same  time  that  his  inter- 
ests were  centred  on  speculative  metaphysics.  The  product 
of  these  opposing  influences  is  an  idealistic  metaphysic  erected 
on  the  explanation  of  the  presuppositions  of  science. 

STAND-POINT. 

Lotze  is  dissatisfied  with  the  attempts  of  the  Absolute  Ideal- 
ists to  deduce  a  universe  of  variety  from  a  single  principle, — 
mere  Consciousness  or  Idea.  He  prefers  to  follow  the  lead  of 
Herbart  and  Hamilton,  and  first  analyze  the  given  "object." 
Lotze  discovers  that  the  "thing"  usually  referred  to  as  an 
object  of  conscious  perception  is  not  a  simple  ultimate,  but 
rather  a  logical  complex  of  relations,  subsisting  in  an  unper- 
ceived  ground  or  unity,  and  each  capable  of  undergoing  change. 
Three  elements  are  involved  in  the  concept  of  the  "thing:" 
its  qualities — as  they  appear  to  perception  in  the  form  of 
relations ;  a  real  substance — logically  required  as  the  ground  of 
these  relations ;  and,  finally,  a  "  Position"  10 — by  which  alone 
the  actual  "  thing"  is  distinguished  from  its  mere  thought. 

Theory  of  the  External  World. — This  analysis  of  the 
"object"  of  consciousness  illustrates  the  analytical  side  of 
Lotze ;  it  is,  however,  merely  an  introduction  to  the  speculative 
issues.  The  world  is  given  to  us  as  a  plurality  of  facts,  which 
as  objects  we  call  "  things ;"  thought  gives  to  these  facts  their 
deeper  meaning.  Each  of  the  elements  of  the  "thing" — its 
qualities,  its  essence,  its  position — requires  a  universal  element, 
which  in  the  end  can  be  nothing  else  than  a  form  of  the  Abso- 
lute. It  is  false  to  consider  the  "  thing"  as  something  merely 
external,  altogether  different  from  one's  own  self, — for  there 
is  a  close  analogy  between  the  three  elements  of  the  "  thing" 
and  the  human  personality.  Relation,  the  quality  element  of 

"Ladd's  Translation  of  Lotze's  Outline  of  Metaphysic,  Section  25. 


IMPORTANT  STAND-POINTS  IN  RECENT  METAPHYSICS.      311 

the  "  thing,"  is  subjective  in  its  nature,  and  is  therefore  easily 
comparable  with  the  flux  of  consciousness;  and,  furthermore, 
the  concept  of  selfhood,  or  Ego,  is  the  only  interpretation 
which  we  can  give  to  the  essence  of  the  "thing," — the  unper- 
ceived  unity  of  its  qualities.  Instead  of  the  unsurmountable 
barrier  between  subjective  and  objective,  Lotze  substitutes  a 
world  of  selves  like  the  monads  of  Leibnitz.  "Things"  and 
"  men"  differ  only  in  the  degree  of  this  selfhood. 

The  Absolute.— The  interrelatedness  of  all  "things,"  the 
eternal  reassertion  of  a  single  type  of  reality,  is  still  further 
illustrated  by  the  interreaction  of  all  the  parts  of  nature. 
Causality,  the  reaction  of  one  series  of  changes  upon  another, 
is  inexplicable  unless  it  is  admitted  that  these  two  series  are, 
in  their  innermost  structure,  the  expression  of  a  single  unity. 
And,  furthermore,  the  universality  of  purpose  throughout 
nature  and  the  infinite  ranges  of  feeling,  thought,  and  life  lead 
us  to  interpret  the  efficient  and  ideal  causes  of  the  Universe 
as  the  Infinite  Personality  of  the  Absolute.  God  represents 
the  complete  purpose,  as  it  is  more  or  less  reflected  in  the 
individual  selves, — the  Personality  that  consciously  expresses 
the  Universe. 

Among  the  recent  thinkers  who  have  felt  most  deeply  both 
the  idealistic  and  naturalistic  stand-points  two  names  are  espe- 
cially notable, — in  America,  Professor  Eoyce,  and  in  England, 
Mr.  Bradley.  Neither  hesitates  to  face  the  deeper  problems 
of  metaphysics,  and  both  rest  their  psychological  and  ethical 
studies  on  a  definite  theory  of  reality.  Both  derive  the  pre- 
mises of  their  philosophy  from  the  same  sources,  and  both 
arrive  at  conceptions  of  the  Absolute  which  are  comparable  but 
dissimilar.  Professor  Royce  feels  the  influence  of  the  pur- 
posive selfhood  of  Leibnitz  and  Lotze,  while  the  spirituality 
of  Hegel  and  the  infinite  struggle  of  will  of  Schopenhauer 
determine  the  outward  form  of  his  philosophy.  Mr.  Bradley, 
on  the  other  hand,  follows  the  traditions  of  Spinoza,  Kant,  and 


312  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

Schelling;  the  Absolute  is  infinitely  wealthy,  but  yet  so  rich, 
so  full  of  experience,  thought,  will,  and  the  ideals  of  life  that 
it  can  be  expressed  only  as  the  abstract  Unity  of  all 
Appearances. 

JOSIAH   ROYCE. 

The  Given  Experience. — The  initial  demand  of  every 
metaphysic  is,  above  all  else,  the  explanation  of  the  world  of 
given  experience;  and  the  manner  in  which  these  experiences 
are  defined  generally  determines  the  subsequent  conclusions. 
Royce,  influenced  by  that  desire  for  scientific  certitude  so  long 
a  prominent  characteristic  of  English  thinkers,  finds  in  the 
given  presentation  the  necessary  starting-point  for  every  phi- 
losophy, but  discovers  a  richness  of  meaning  in  every  experience 
which  ultimately  leads  us  beyond  the  fact  itself.  Every  expe- 
rience contains  within  itself  a  meaning  which  is  only  partially 
realized  in  its  fragmentary  finitude.  Every  fact  or  every  idea 
is  a  partial  expression  of  the  world-meaning ;  every  fact  is  the 
necessary  element  in  the  unity  of  the  whole.  Like  the  monads 
of  Leibnitz,  each  reflects  the  law  of  the  whole,  each  idea  is  a 
phase  of  the  ideal  goal,  and  each  partially  expresses  its  full 
meaning. 

Selfhood. — The  purposive  reality  of  simple  facts  is  the 
initial  premise  of  Professor  Royce's  philosophy.  But  full  of 
meaning  as  this  seems,  it  only  partially  expresses  the  richness 
of  these  facts.  Spinoza  and  Schelling  sought  to  bring  the 
objective  and  subjective  into  harmony  with  one  another.  But 
Professor  Royce  regards  the  abstract  Substance  of  Spinoza  or 
the  mere  Identity  of  Schelling  to  be  inadequate  to  express  the 
ultimate  world  of  facts,  since  these  are  so  full  of  meaning. 
Like  Lotze,  he  finds  the  true  value  and  purpose  of  the  frag- 
mentary experience  in  the  concept  of  selfhood,  rather  than  in 
mere  logical  subsistence.  Every  personality  feels  its  own 
finiteness  most  acutely  when  it  recognizes  the  infinite  possi- 
bilities of  its  development.  There  is  here  involved  a  kind  of 
contradiction;  the  self  is  most  infinite  when  it  realizes  its 


IMPORTANT  STAND-POINTS  IN  RECENT  METAPHYSICS.      313 

finitude.  This  illustrates  the  real  nature  of  the  self  as  essen- 
tially an  infinite  purposive  development.  In  its  logical  aspect 
it  is  comparable  to  the  whole  number  series, — each  separate 
term  representing  a  finite  stage  in  the  realization  of  the  infinite 
purpose  of  counting.  Each  separate  phase,  each  idea,  thought, 
and  act  of  the  human  self  is  a  partial  expression  of  the  purpose 
of  that  self, — the  infinite  purpose  of  self-expression.  No  finite 
act  of  the  self  is  a  full  expression  of  its  purpose, — there  is 
always  a  beyond  which  constantly  transcends  the  partially 
realized  present. 

The  Absolute. — Although  the  nature  of  the  self  is  infinitely 
rich,  it  differs  only  in  degree  from  the  fulness  of  meaning 
which  each  individual  experience  and  idea  only  partially  ex- 
presses. The  principle  of  self-consciousness,  through  which 
we  apprehend  this  process  of  infinite  self-realization,  is  re- 
flected in  the  deeper  meaning  of  every  "  object"  of  the  external 
world.  The  difference  is  only  in  degree ;  the  reality  of  purpose 
and  its  fulfilment  through  an  infinite  series  is  the  single  Prin- 
ciple of  the  Universe.  The  Absolute,  which  represents  in  its 
complete  selfhood  the  purpose  and  ideals  of  our  finite  world, 
is,  like  all  else,  a  self.  But  the  selfhood  of  the  Absolute  is 
incomparably  richer  than  any  of  its  phases.  It  is  more  than 
the  mere  sum  of  the  parts  of  the  world, — it  is  the  world  itself 
through  the  full  expression  of  its  purpose. 

F.  H.  BRADLEY. 

The  Absolute  of  Professor  Koyce  is  infinitely  rich  in  both 
content  and  meaning.  It  is  the  world,  because  It  expresses 
the  full  meaning  of  the  world.  Mr.  Bradley,  on  the  other 
hand,  defines  the  Absolute  in  much  more  formal  terms.  He 
discovers  that  the  common  elements  of  our  world  of  thought 
and  experience  involve  a  disagreeable  self-contradictory  process, 
which  renders  the  presuppositions  of  knowledge  unintelligible 
in  themselves.  Relations,  qualities,  changes,  even  things  and 
selves,  present  this  unintelligibility,  this  infinite  transcendency. 


314  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

It  is  remarkable  to  notice  that  both  Professor  Eoyce  and 
Mr.  Bradley  lay  stress  on  the  infinite  transcendency  of  the 
single  experience;  the  former  recognizes  in  it  a  reflection  of 
the  Absolute,  while  the  latter  regards  it  as  the  evidence  to 
show  that  experience  is  not  the  Absolute.  But  if  in  Mr.  Brad- 
ley's  mind  the  single  experience  is  only  an  appearance,  it  is 
nevertheless  the  appearance  of  the  Absolute.  The  finite  facts 
are  each  aspects  of  Eeality, — yet  aspects  which  reflect  the  nature 
of  Reality  in  different  degrees.  Behind  and  within  the  tran- 
sient forms  of  the  external  world,  the  momentary  thoughts, 
volitions,  and  feelings,  there  is  a  Unity  which  transcends  the 
inadequate  meaning  of  the  human  activities.  The  Absolute  is 
both  the  completeness  of  the  Mystic  One  and  the  actuality  of 
Hegel's  Thought-Idea. 

SIGNIFICANT  TENDENCIES   IN   THE   PHILOSOPHY   OP   THE 
PRESENT   TIME. 

There  is  a  striking  resemblance  between  the  development 
of  the  race  and  the  growth  of  a  single  individual.  This  simi- 
larity has  been  constantly  emphasized  by  those  who  have  made 
a  philosophical  study  of  history.  A  similar  resemblance  in 
development  is  often  observable  between  the  history  of  philoso- 
phy as  a  whole  and  the  intellectual  development  of  a  single 
person.  At  some  period  of  mental  growth  nearly  every  indi- 
vidual is  aroused  from  the  dogmatic  recognition  of  traditional 
theories  of  reality  to  a  personal  struggle,  often  only  half- 
consciously  realized,  with  the  same  questions  of  life  and  the 
world  which  have  perplexed  mankind  throughout  all  ages.  In 
this  personal  contest  of  the  individual  reason  with  the  full 
truth  the  historical  study  of  philosophy  is  perhaps  of  special 
significance.  It  presents  a  phase  of  the  development  of  civiliza- 
tion which,  although  apparently  insignificant  when  compared 
with  the  forces  of  active  life,  is  yet  remarkable  as  the  specific 
expression  of  those  intellectual  conditions  which  lie  at  the 
foundation  of  human  progress. 


SIGNIFICANT  TENDENCIES.  315 

While  introducing  us  to  an  independence  of  thought  and 
supplying  the  ideals  for  mankind  separately  and  collectively, 
the  historical  study  of  earlier  philosophy  may  perhaps  indicate 
the  general  direction  of  future  tendencies.  Among  these  move- 
ments which  we  have  followed  from  the  period  of  the  Renais- 
sance  to  the  interpretation  given  them  by  men  now  living 
there  seems  to  be  none  of  greater  importance  than  the  general 
monistic  tendency.  Not  that  the  history  of  thought  has  grad- 
ually evolved  a  compact  and  thoroughly  satisfactory  explana- 
tion of  the  unity  of  the  world, — on  the  contrary,  there  is  no 
question  more  seriously  discussed  at  the  present  time, — but  only 
that  historical  study  has  taught  us  that  some  world-unity  lies 
behind  almost  every  notable  system  of  philosophy.  The  mate- 
rialist believes  that  the  ultimate  homogeneity  of  the  world  is 
intelligible  only  in  terms  of  a  single  material  substance  coexten- 
sive with  thought  and  matter,  while  the  pluralistic  realist, 
however  he  may  resist  the  Unity  of  Being,  is  yet  compelled 
to  recognize  that  the  plurality  of  elements  can  be  conceived 
only  through  a  process  of  thought-unity. 

This  monistic  tendency  in  philosophy  is  not  due  to  a  narrow 
point  of  view.  The  recent  systems  of  monistic  idealism,  of 
which  those  of  Green,  Professor  Royce,  and  Mr.  Bradley  are 
excellent  examples,  well  illustrate  a  certain  significant  depth 
and  comprehensiveness.  It  is  further  true  that  not  only  this 
absolutistic  stand-point  but  also  the  other  important  ten- 
dencies of  the  last  few  years  indicate  that  philosophy  as  a 
whole  rests  on  certain  broad  and  general  points  of  view,  and 
that  the  individual  movements  are  to  be  regarded  as  types  of 
thinking  rather  than  as  specific  formulations  of  dogmatic  prin- 
ciples. These  types  of  thinking  are  each  of  them  the  result 
of  extensive  correlation  of  various  historical  stand-points ;  each 
important  movement  is  influenced  by  the  broadest  study  of 
empiricism  and  rationalism,  of  idealism  and  realism.  They 
are  quite  different  in  character  from  the  earlier  phases  of 
modern  philosophy  in  which  each  thinker  could  be  definitely 


316  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

connected  with  a  certain  national  or  restricted  movement  and 
had  little  appreciation  for  other  philosophical  stand-points. 
But  at  the  present  time  there  is  no  single  school  or  movement 
of  importance  which  has  not  felt  the  influence  of  the  many 
different  attitudes  of  mind  which  have  composed  the  history 
of  philosophy;  there  is  no  significant  tendency  of  thought 
which  can  be  said  to  have  directly  sprung  from  a  single  philo- 
sophical system  in  the  same  sense  that  Berkeley  sprung  from 
Locke  or  Fichte  from  Kant. 

While  referring  in  a  very  brief  manner  to  what  might  seem 
to  be  important  tendencies  in  the  philosophical  thought  of  the 
present  time  it  might  be  well  to  recognize  certain  matters 
which  no  philosophy  can  ever  afford  to  disregard, — the  starting- 
point  and  the  method  of  procedure.  There  are  many  details  in 
every  philosophical  stand-point  which  the  variety  of  conditions 
have  made  it  necessary  to  change  in  the  past,  and  which  can 
hardly  retain  their  present  significance  unaltered  throughout 
the  future,  but  yet  it  is  possible  to  believe  as  a  permanent  truth 
that  any  system  of  philosophy  must  have  some  starting-point 
as  well  as  some  method  to  guide  its  inquiries.  The  determina- 
tion of  the  starting-point  and  the  method  must  depend  on  cir- 
cumstances; yet  the  fact  that  some  starting-point  and  some 
method  are  required  is  perhaps  a  fundamental  truth  in  any 
system  of  philosophy.  With  this  in  mind  it  might  be  of  advan- 
tage to  inquire  into  the  meaning  of  the  presuppositions  of  phi- 
losophy,— as  presuppositions  are  often  considered  to  be  the 
necessary  starting-points  for  any  investigation.  This  question, 
however,  would  naturally  lead  us  to  a  consideration  of  the  use  of 
experience  and  thought,  for  historical  study  shows  the  im- 
portance of  these  elements,  not  only  as  the  usual  starting- 
points,  but  also  as  the  means  for  the  regulation  of  philosophical 
method.  But  before  these  more  specific  problems  are  consid- 
ered the  general  nature  of  the  meaning  to  be  attributed  to  the 
term  "  presupposition"  is  certainly  worthy  of  investigation.  We 
may  notice  among  the  prominent  tendencies  of  the  present 


SIGNIFICANT   TENDENCIES.  317 

time,  in  both  science  and  philosophy,  the  desire  to  examine  with 
considerable  care  the  assumptions  on  which  any  inquiry  rests. 
One  recognizes  a  feeling  of  sceptical  questioning  when  some 
axiom  or  fact  is  asserted  to  be  undeniably  true  and  beyond 
legitimate  inquiry. 

THE  MEANING  OF  PRESUPPOSITION. 

Since  the  time  of  Descartes  the  ideal  method  by  which  phi- 
losophy has  sought  to  proceed  begins  with  the  recognition  of 
no  presupposition  and  from  this  negative  ground  erects  a  con- 
ception of  reality  considered  to  be  sufficient  in  itself.  But 
even  such  a  procedure  implicitly  recognizes  a  starting-point, — 
thought,  substance,  or  activity, — which,  although  regarded  as 
the  most  fundamental  principle  of  all  knowledge,  still  retains 
the  character  of  an  assumption,  since  the  proof  of  such  a  prin- 
ciple, by  a  reduction  to  simpler  terms,  is  from  its  very  nature 
intuitively  denied.  The  relinquishing  of  this  classic  search  for 
the  highest  principle  of  knowledge  is  a  significant  aspect  of 
recent  philosophy  and  may  seem  to  many  to  be  the  same  as  the 
abandonment  of  all  hopes  for  any  philosophy  whatsoever  and 
the  first  step  towards  an  uncompromising  scepticism.  But 
such  a  misunderstanding  can  arise  only  from  a  narrow  and 
uncritical  interpretation  of  the  nature  of  presupposition.  By 
defining  a  new  meaning  for  the  term  it  is  perhaps  possible  to 
suggest  a  starting-point  for  philosophy  which  shall  not  require 
the  unending  search  for  a  "first  and  unconditionally  funda- 
mental proposition"  beneath  all  knowledge,  but  which  shall  em- 
phasize the  organic  structure  of  philosophy  and  the  unity  of 
those  constituent  elements  which  can  be  unfolded  from  a  single 
premise. 

This  is  possible  if  we  would  consider  a  usage  of  postulate, 
axiom,  or  presupposition  which  has  often  appeared  in  recent 
mathematical  discussions.  Instead  of  indicating  by  the  word 
"  presupposition"  some  premise  necessarily  true,  some  assertion 
too  self-evident  to  need  further  comment,  we  may  mean  by  the 


318  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

term  simply  a  conception  of  such  a  nature  that  it  defines,  as 
nothing  else  can,  the  problem  we  seek  to  investigate.  A  pre- 
supposition, according  to  this  view,  would  be  simply  a  necessary 
condition  for  the  possibility  of  the  inquiry  in  question,  some 
assertion  that  makes  the  problem  possible.  The  so-called 
axiom,  "a  whole  is  greater  than  any  of  its  parts,"  may  be 
regarded,  not  as  an  improbable  postulate,  but  rather  as  a  pre- 
supposition without  which  the  branches  of  mathematics  dealing 
with  finite  magnitudes  would  be  valueless.  The  assumption 
of  this  presupposition  makes  possible — as  no  other  proposition 
can — the  possibility  of  the  conclusions  of  those  mathematical 
sciences  above  mentioned.  It  is  a  determining  condition ;  upon 
its  truth  an  unlimited  range  of  propositions  may  be  firmly 
established,  but  with  its  falsity  they  also  become  false.  No 
attempt  is  made  to  prove  that  such  a  proposition  is  true  by 
deducing  it  from  other  propositions, — such  a  process  would 
be  endless, — its  only  "  proof  lies  in  the  unity  of  mathematics, 
of  which  it  is  an  indispensable  factor. 

As  far  back  as  the  time  of  Baumgarten,  a  disciple  of  the 
Leibnitz- Wolffian  philosophy,  the  meaning  of  presupposition 
began  to  take  this  form,  and  the  brilliant  investigation  of  Kant 
into  the  presuppositions  of  sense  and  understanding — as  the 
conditions  which  make  the  operation  of  these  faculties  possible 
— followed  this  general  movement.  But,  unfortunately,  many 
of  Kant's  disciples  sought  to  bring  unity  into  the  Critical  Phi- 
losophy by  discovering  a  single  fundamental  axiom,  rather 
than  pursuing  more  carefully  Kant's  meaning.  One  may  ob- 
serve a  suggestion  of  this  attitude  towards  "  presupposition"  in 
Samuel  Clark's  treatment  of  miracles,  as  far  back  as  the 
opening  of  the  eighteenth  century.  While  mathematics,  so 
often  the  forerunner  of  philosophy  in  such  matters,  has  grad- 
ually assumed  this  attitude  towards  its  postulates ;  mathemati- 
cal science  has,  since  the  time  of  Kiemann,  regarded  its  axioms 
or  presuppositions  to  be  merely  the  necessary  conditions  for  its 
procedure,  and  has  relinquished  the  vain  endeavor  of  verifying 


SIGNIFICANT  TENDENCIES.  319 

one  postulate  by  another.  And  it  becomes  a  matter  of  consid- 
erable importance  that  philosophy  should  likewise  relinquish 
its  hope  of  the  discovery  of  a  fundamental  principle  of  all 
knowledge,  itself  independent  of  all  else,  and  investigate  more 
carefully  the  presuppositions  or  conditions  which  lie  at  the 
very  heart  of  its  existence,  those  postulates  which  make  intelli- 
gible and  possible  the  very  conception  of  philosophy.  Although 
these  considerations  may  show  that  philosophy  must  have  a 
general  conception  of  its  starting-point,  they  by  no  means  ex- 
hibit its  character.  While  denning  its  presuppositions  it  is 
readily  seen  that  philosophy  must  begin  with  the  simplest 
conceptions,  but  yet  these  conceptions  must  implicitly  contain 
all  the  richness  of  meaning  which  may  be  subsequently  un- 
folded. If  they  should  not  possess  this  implicit  breadth,  its 
presuppositions  would  be  insufficient.  In  brief,  the  starting- 
point  of  philosophy  is  fully  defined  by  those  necessary  and 
sufficient  conditions  without  which  philosophy  would  be  im- 
possible and  yet  which  implicitly  contain  all  the  world  of  mean- 
ing which  philosophy  can  unfold. 

THE  DUAL  PRESUPPOSITION  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

This  problem  of  discovering  the  foundations,  or  rather  the 
necessary  presuppositions,  which  make  possible  the  problem  of 
philosophy,  is  the  most  elemental  and  at  the  same  time  the 
most  general  inquiry  of  human  knowledge.  Its  solution  defines 
abstractly  the  field  within  which  is  contained  all  derivative 
truths,  either  simple  or  complex.  For  this  reason  the  problem 
cannot  be  approached  by  the  observational  method  alone,  for 
observation,  however  extensive,  cannot  establish  the  validity 
of  the  ground  upon  which  it,  as  mere  observation,  is  founded. 
Nor,  on  the  other  hand,  can  thought  extend  its  dominion  to 
those  regions  of  mere  illusory  appearance  where,  instead  of  the 
sound  guide  of  experience,  it  meets  with  no  other  resistance 
than  its  own  arbitrary  will.  From  this  consideration  we  have 
at  once  a  clue  which  the  philosophy  of  the  present  time  has 


320  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

recognized  by  uniting  English  empiricism  with  German  tran- 
scendentalism; we  see  that  both  experience  and  thought  are 
indispensable  to  philosophical  inquiry.  The  one  cannot  be 
conceived  without  the  other.  Each  is  an  abstraction  in  itself, 
and  yet  each  is  the  supplement  of  the  other.  This  dual  pre- 
supposition which  seems  to  supply  the  necessary  conditions  for 
all  philosophical  inquiry  is  certainly  a  starting-point  which 
nearly  all  of  the  tendencies  of  the  present  either  consciously 
or  unconsciously  recognize.  Our  present  problem  of  interpre- 
tation would  therefore  seem  to  take  the  form  of  a  more  careful 
examination  into  the  meaning  of  both  experience  and  thought 
in  order  to  unfold  their  relationship.  But  since  we  have  noticed 
the  importance  of  the  monistic  tendency  in  our  contemporary 
philosophy,  we  would  soonvbe  led  to  inquire  into  the  relation 
of  the  inner  Unity  of  the  world  to  our  limited  experience  and 
to  our  finite  thought.  In  view  of  these  considerations,  a  more 
careful  estimate  of  experience,  thought,  and  their  relation  in 
the  Absolute  might  prove  of  some  assistance  to  the  intelligent 
appreciation  of  the  philosophical  movements  of  the  present 
time. 

EXPERIENCE. 

When  we  turn  to  experience  in  our  search  for  its  contribu- 
tion to  philosophy  we  meet  with  a  peculiar  difficulty.  The 
whole  world  seems  to  our  unreflective  minds  to  be  nothing  but 
a  flow  of  heterogeneous  facts,  possessing  little  intelligible  order. 
The  existence  and  continuous  flux  of  these  facts  is  perhaps  the 
initial  premise  of  psychology,  and  likewise,  because  of  the 
apparent  simplicity  of  the  given  facts,  it  may  be  regarded  as  a 
standpoint  of  fundamental  importance  to  philosophy  in  gen- 
eral. It  is  possible  that  these  so-called  "  facts"  are  more 
complex  than  they  appear  at  first  sight,  but  as  presented  ele- 
ments their  genetic  simplicity  should  not  be  overlooked.  And 
it  is  the  belief  in  the  simplicity  of  these  "  facts"  of  our  mental 
life  which  arouses  that  feeling  of  confidence  and  certainty  in 
the  "  given"  character  of  experience.  For  the  reason  that  we 


SIGNIFICANT  TENDENCIES.  321 

must  begin  with  empirically-given  mental  facts  of  some  kind 
in  order  to  proceed  with  any  inquiry,  it  seems  as  if  psychology 
as  the  science  of  introspection  is  certainly  of  especial  import- 
ance to  all  philosophical  research;  but  nevertheless  this  indi- 
vidualistic psychology,  which  merely  attempts  to  unfold  the 
activities  of  a  single  consciousness,  should  be  carefully  distin- 
guished from  the  broad  and  universal  science  of  psychology, 
which  considers  the  mental  activities  of  all  mankind. 

Starting  with  this  so-called  "  given  something,"  the  premise 
of  all  introspective  psychology,  we  are  able  to  discover  in  a 
reflective  state  of  mind  that  this  experience  is  not  a  single 
differentiated  and  uniquely  given  element,  but  rather  a  point 
of  reference  or  centre  of  thought.  That  is,  what  I  call  "  object" 
is  for  me  a  point,  a  centre,  an  x,  which  is  real  only  as  a  point 
of  reference  to  which  I  may  direct  a  process  of  thought.  It  is 
known  only  through  a  recognition  in  thought;  it  is  temporally 
determined  as  the  present  by  the  past  and  future  series  of 
thought-processes.  Such  an  unanalyzed  something,  which 
occurs  as  a  node  or  point  in  the  flow  of  consciousness,  might 
be  called  a  psychological  experience,  owing  to  the  fact  that  it 
comes  into  the  conscious  life  as  an  empirically  given  datum. 
It  is  merely  a  conscious  centre;  it  is  surrounded  by  thought- 
processes  and  possesses  a  kind  of  individuality  or  distinctness  of 
its  own,  because  it  seems  to  come  from  a  somewhere  outside  of 
consciousness.  It  is,  in  fact,  the  single  experience  of  our 
ordinary  life. 

The  Aspects  of  Experience. — In  this  description  of  the 
unanalyzed,  given,  or  psychological  experience  it  would  very 
naturally  occur  that  perhaps  it  is  not  so  simple  as  might  appear 
at  first  sight.  It  is  possible  that  there  is  a  kind  of  manifold- 
ness  in  the  empirical  fact,  a  variety  of  aspects  which  may  be 
discovered  from  a  more  careful  analysis  of  its  mere  "given- 
ness."  Not  that  the  experience  itself  is  capable  of  division, 
but  that  it  appears  differently  when  regarded  from  two  stand- 
points. From  this  difference  of  point  of  view  it  is  possible  to 

21 


322  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

discover  two  aspects  or  sides  to  this  empirically  given  centre 
of  consciousness.  The  first  of  these  may  be  called  its  individ- 
uality aspect,  by  which  the  particular  conscious  centre  or  expe- 
rience is  separated  from  all  else, — that  which  gives  this  single 
experience  an  individuality  of  its  own  in  the  flow  of  conscious- 
ness. And  also  there  is  the  relativity  aspect,  by  which  the 
experience  may  be  viewed  as  intimately  connected  or  united 
with  all  the  other  experiences  in  the  flow  of  consciousness.  We 
will  consider  each  of  these  aspects  in  their  order. 

THE  INDIVIDUALITY  ASPECT  GIVES  AN  EXPERIENCE  DIS- 
TINCTNESS.— In  our  common  speech  it  is  customary  to  refer 
to  a  certain  "  object"  as  itself,  and  no  other.  There  is  some- 
thing about  every  experience  which  leads  us  to  regard  it  as  a 
unique  something,  as  a  distinct  element  of  our  life  which  can 
never  come  to  us  in  just  the  same  manner  again.  When  I 
perceive  a  mountain,  a  tree,  or  anything  else,  the  experience 
exists  for  me  as  an  original  something,  as  new  and  at  the  same 
time  never  to  be  repeated.  Certain  qualities,  ideas,  or  whatever 
one  wishes  to  call  them,  distinguish  the  mere  "  this"  experience 
from  all  else;  it  seems  to  possess  an  individuality  in  the  con- 
scious life.  This  character  of  separateness,  of  difference  from 
all  else,  may  perhaps  be  called  the  individuality  aspect  of  every 
experience, — using  the  term  as  just  defined.  But  a  perplexity 
immediately  presents  itself.  How  do  I  know  that  it  is  an 
individual  experience  unless  I  am  able  to  place  it  in  a  negative 
relation  to  all  other  experiences?  In  other  words,  the  knowl- 
edge that  it  is  an  individual  fact,  object,  or  experience  implies 
that  I  have  compared  or  related  it  to  the  rest  of  my  conscious 
life.  This  introduces  us  to  the  second  or  relativity  aspect  of 
all  empirical  data. 

THE  EELATIVITT  ASPECT  GIVES  AN  EXPERIENCE  MEDIATION. 
— Every  psychological  experience  as  the  point  of  reference  or 
centre  of  our  consciousness  possesses  a  certain  character  which 
unites  it  with  all  other  experiences.  I  know  this  tree,  because 
I  have  previously  seen  other  trees.  I  know  that  this  is  a  noise, 


SIGNIFICANT  TENDENCIES.  323 

because  I  have  heard  similar  sounds.  The  footstep  of  a  friend 
is  recognized,  not  as  a  mere  immediate  sensation,  but  rather 
as  a  particular  centre  in  consciousness  connected  with  other 
experiences  extending  indefinitely  into  the  past.  A  sudden 
explosion  is  always  apprehended  together  with  its  setting  in 
consciousness, — its  spacial  characteristics,  its  probable  cause, 
or  its  possible  effect  on  the  person, — and  never  merely  as  a 
simple  unconnected  point.  It  is  this  intimate  interrelatedness 
of  all  the  centres  in  the  flow  of  consciousness  that  makes  each 
present  experience  an  indispensable  part  in  the  whole  conscious 
life.  This  aspect  of  every  psychological  experience,  or  centre 
in  consciousness,  might  be  called  its  relativity  aspect. 

The  Logical  Experience  as  a  Limiting  Individuality.— 
We  have  discovered  in  the  psychological  or  common  experience 
two  general  characters, — an  individuality  aspect,  by  which  we 
recognize  it  as  a  unique  experience,  and  a  relativity  or  mediate 
aspect,  by  which  we  connect  it  with  other  experiences.  But 
the  proportional  intensity  of  these  two  aspects  is  not  constant 
for  every  experience.  The  sudden  flash  of  light  is  certainly 
less  mediated  than  the  recognition  of  a  friend's  face.  They 
both  possess  the  mediate  or  relativity  aspect,  but  the  former  to 
a  lesser  extent  than  the  latter.  And,  furthermore,  we  can 
easily  observe  that  this  degree  or  intensive  value  of  the  mediate 
aspect  is  different  for  every  experience, — the  relativity  of  the 
present  to  the  past  varies  with  each  presented  fact.  This  at 
once  defines  a  serial  ground  for  our  experiences,  depending  on 
the  intensive  value  of  the  mediation  present  in  each.  No  expe- 
rience is  known  to  us  which  has  not  this  relativity  aspect,  so 
that  there  is  no  experience  which  cannot  be  placed  in  such  an 
orderly  arrangement.  In  one  direction  of  such  a  series  the 
psychological  experiences  would  become  more  individualistic, 
more  defined  by  their  distinctness  and  unrelatedness,  while 
if  followed  in  the  opposite  direction  the  mediation  would  come 
more  and  more  into  the  foreground.  Now  the  limit  of  the 
series,  followed  in  the  direction  of  the  diminishing  intensity 


324  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

of  the  relativity  aspect,  may  be  regarded  as  an  "experience" 
of  a  peculiar  kind.  As  the  limit  of  the  series,  as  a  something 
totally  devoid  of  any  mediacy  and  possessing  mere  individual- 
ity, it  is  a  kind  of  experience  which  has  only  an  implied  reality, 
a  sort  of  logical  or  hypothetical  existence.  It  is  never  per- 
ceived by  our  human  consciousness,  for  all  the  experiences  of 
our  daily  life  possess  relativity  as  well  as  individuality.  This 
logical  experience  is  only  inferred  as  that  realistic  entity  pos- 
sessing mere  individuality  and  uniqueness;  it  would  corre- 
spond to  the  experience  of  such  a  mind  as  could  apprehend 
without  mediacy. 

Before  turning  to  inquire  into  the  significance  of  our  thought 
in  the  problem  of  philosophy  it  might  be  well  to  review  certain 
points  suggested  by  this  analysis  of  experience.  It  is  to  be 
especially  remarked  that  an  experience  of  pure  individuality 
or  pure  relativity  is  never  given  to  us;  and  yet  at  the  same 
time  it  is  equally  incorrect  to  recognize  that  an  experience  is 
a  mere  undifferentiated  oneness.  The  empirically  given  comes 
to  us  as  a  two-sided  something,  and  should  either  of  the  two 
aspects  be  absent,  the  something  could  not  be  known  to  our 
human  consciousness.  An  experience  possessing  only  the  indi- 
viduality aspect  would  have  merely  a  logical  existence  (i.e.,  in- 
ferred as  the  limit  of  a  series)  inappreciable  to  human  con- 
sciousness. On  the  other  hand,  the  experience  possessing  the 
relativity  aspect  alone  would  correspond  to  a  relation  without 
terms,  a  concept  applicable  only  to  the  Absolute  and  incom- 
prehensible as  an  empirical  fact.  This  is  a  matter  of  extreme 
importance.  Experience  never  itself  gives  us  a  oneness,  it 
always  appears  in  the  form  of  a  duality.  The  two  aspects  are 
the  necessary  and  sufficient  terms  of  the  experience.  Neither 
can  exist  without  the  other,  and  neither  has  any  meaning 
except  in  connection  with  the  other.  Our  world  of  experience, 
as  such,  is  founded  on  a  realistic  dualism,  and  not  on  a  single 
"fundamental  proposition."  This  dualism  of  the  empirically 
given,  however,  immediately  suggests  a  monism  in  thought. 


SIGNIFICANT  TENDENCIES.  325 

THOUGHT. 

The  Category  of  Reality. — The  boundary,  uncertain  and 
difficult  to  perceive,  between  psychology  on  the  one  hand  and 
logic  and  metaphysics  on  the  other  is  where  the  given  in  expe- 
rience can  no  longer  explain  itself.  Where  the  individual 
centre  in  consciousness  requires  for  its  full  meaning  an  expla- 
nation that  cannot  arise  from  its  own  empirically-given  nature. 
Both  the  individuality  and  the  relativity  aspects  are  united  by 
our  common  meaning  of  experience,  and  when  our  thought 
process  endeavors  to  grasp  and  employ  this  experience  it  finds 
it  necessary  to  require  that  both  aspects  shall  refer  to  one  and 
the  same  ground.  This  ground  of  the  unity  of  the  two  em- 
pirically-given aspects  can  never  itself  be  recognized  in  expe- 
rience, although  it  is  always  implied  as  soon  as  we  begin  to 
employ  any  empirical  fact  in  thought.  The  unity  of  the  two 
aspects  of  the  psychological  experience  is  thus  the  necessary 
condition  on  the  ground  of  which  the  experience,  as  the  em- 
pirically given,  can  be  employed  in  the  processes  of  thought. 
In  other  words,  the  individuality  and  the  relativity  aspects  are 
alone  given  in  the  bare  psychological  experience  itself;  their 
unity  is  required  by  thought.  This  ground  of  unity,  necessary 
for  the  operation  of  thought-processes,  may  be  called  the  Cate- 
gory of  Reality.  Introspection  presents  us  with  the  two  aspects 
of  experience, — individuality  and  relativity, — the  ground  for 
their  deeper  unity  must  be  discovered  by  thought;  and  the 
category  of  reality  is  the  abstract  representation  of  this  ground 
in  thought. 

ORDINARY  USAGE  OF  EEALITY. — This  usage  of  reality,  as 
that  which  holds  together  the  two  different  characters  of  our 
given  experience,  is  unconsciously  employed  by  all  of  us.  It 
is  not  an  unfamiliar  question  to  ask  ourselves:  Is  this  expe- 
rience real  or  not?  And  in  meeting  this  problem  we  uncon- 
sciously regard  reality  as  that  which  is  the  bond  of  unity,  or 
ground,  of  the  two  aspects  earlier  mentioned.  One  may  observe, 


326  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

in  our  common  speech,  that  it  is  customary  to  require  that  two 
conditions  shall  be  fulfilled  in  order  that  we  shall  conceive  this 
or  that  something  to  be  real.  It  must  be  capable  of  direct 
appreciation,  and  again  it  must  find  a  place  in  the  conscious 
life.  We  call  this  table  real  because  of  two  indispensable  lines 
of  evidence.  In  the  first  place,  the  table  is  capable  of  percep- 
tion, of  appreciation, — it  can  be  distinguished  from  the  barren 
concept  of  "no-thing;"  and  again  this  table  has  a  meaning 
for  me, — the  present  perception  of  it  is  intimately  associated 
with  the  recollections  of  other  times.  Without  any  exaggera- 
tion it  may  be  universally  asserted  that  if  either  of  these  two 
characters  is  absent  the  thing  referred  to  could  be  called  unreal 
in  a  perfectly  definite  sense.  A  mermaid  is  considered  unreal, 
from  a  scientific  stand-point,  for  it  lacks  the  first  character; 
in  daily  life  we  would  say,  "  it  cannot  be  perceived  directly  or 
indirectly  by  the  senses."  The  mermaid  is  real  to  Greek 
mythology,  because  its  existence  in  that  universe  of  discourse 
can  be  appreciated  by  definite  means.  And  beside  the  demand 
which  all  of  us  feel,  that  an  experience  in  order  to  be  real 
must  be  capable  of  definite  appreciation, — by  some  means  at 
least, — we  also  feel  that  it  must  be  intelligible,  that  it  must 
have  a  definite  relation  to  the  rest  of  the  conscious  life.  The 
meaning  of  a  word  in  an  unknown  language  is  unreal,  because 
it  has  no  meaning  for  me,  no  place  in  my  life;  or,  in  other 
words,  it  is  not  related  to  the  flow  of  consciousness. 

FUNDAMENTAL  NATURE  OF  THE  CATEGORY  OF  EEALITY. — 
These  considerations  suggest  the  fundamental  importance  of 
the  category  of  reality  in  our  thought.  Without  it  the  processes 
of  thought  would  be  impossible,  for  they  would  then  be  unable 
to  refer  to  experience.  In  this  sense  reality  lies  at  the  very 
foundation  of  our  active  mental  life;  as  the  basis  of  thought- 
processes  it  becomes  the  ground  for  all  the  derivative  categories 
and  forms  of  thought.  As  the  broadest  category  it  refers  to  the 
general  possibility  of  all  experience,  and  in  this  broad  usage 
gives  rise  to  other  categories — directly  founded  on  reality — 


SIGNIFICANT  TENDENCIES.  327 

which  enable  thought  to  refer  more  specifically  to  restricted 
ranges  of  observation.  Perhaps  objectivity  and  subjectivity  are 
the  most  important  of  these  secondary  categories,  because  they 
seem  to  refer  directly  to  the  two  aspects  of  every  experience, — 
the  former  to  the  individuality  the  latter  to  the^jglajjyjfcy. 
But  it  is  only  the  specialists  in  logic  who  are  interested  in  this 
very  important  field  of  the  nature  and  order  of  the  categories, 
so  that  it  is  advisable  to  pass  over  these  more  detailed  inquiries 
while  merely  concerned  with  a  general  problem. 

Difference  Between  Aspect  and  Category. — There  are, 
however,  a  few  matters  which  naturally  recur  at  this  point. 
Especially  suggestive  is  the  difference  between  aspect  and  cate- 
gory. The  former,  as  we  have  here  used  the  term,  applies  only 
to  the  given  in  experience,  while  category  is  almost  universally 
associated  with  a  condition  of  thought.  One  is  found  in  expe- 
rience, the  other  is  required  by  thought.  This  distinction  is 
of  fundamental  importance,  for  it  indicates  the  transition  from 
mere  experience  to  the  employment  of  that  experience  in  our, 
thought-processes.  The  aspects,  just  because  they  are  empiri- 
cally given,  precede,  both  logically  and  genetically,  the  employ- 
ment of  experience  by  the  categories  of  thought.  But,  further- 
more, these  aspects  of  experience  give  rise,  through  the  ground 
of  their  unity,  to  the  logical  category  of  reality.  This  latter 
may  be  regarded  as  extremely  important  both  to  logic  and  to 
metaphysics,  since  it  serves  on  the  one  hand  as  the  basis  for 
all  the  forms  of  our  thinking  process,  and  on  the  other  it  sug- 
gests the  ultimate  unity  of  experience  and  thought  in  the 
Absolute. 

The  Implied  Existence  of  "  Object"  and  "  Subject."— 
There  is  another  matter  which  illustrates  this  method  of  dis- 
covering truth  by  the  mutual  implications  of  experience  and 
thought.  Without  entering  into  details,  it  may  be  interesting 
to  note  that  the  ordinary  expressions  of  "subject"  and  "ob- 
ject" appear  merely  as  abstraction  of  thought,  as  general  con- 
ceptions which  have  no  other  than  a  logical  or  implied  exist- 


328  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

ence.  "  Object"  is  only  an  abstract  expression  for  that 
something  in  our  experience  which  thought  refers  to  as  an 
individuality.  In  its  strictest  sense  it  is  only  that  hypothetical 
limit  of  a  series  of  experiences  in  which  the  relativity  aspect 
diminishes  towards  zero;  but  in  our  ordinary  speech  we  mean 
by  "  object"  anything  that  comes  to  us  in  experience  with  the 
individuality  aspect  prominent.  And  from  a  similar  stand-point 
the  "  subject,"  or  Ego,  is  merely  a  general  or  abstract  expres- 
sion for  that  continuum  by  which  thought  interprets  the  rela- 
tivity of  our  experiences.  It  seems  necessary  to  presuppose 
some  abstract  element,  the  subject,  common  to  all  the  expe- 
riences of  a  single  consciousness,  since  if  these  experiences  had 
absolutely  nothing  in  common  there  could  be  no  personal  con- 
tinuity, and  therefore  no  relativity  among  the  empirically 
given  facts. 

It  was  earlier  suggested  that  experience  comes  to  us  as  a 
flux  of  conscious  centres,  each  of  which  contains  two  aspects. 
And  we  further  discovered  that  this  empirical  duality  could 
not  be  employed  by  thought  unless  the  category  of  reality  was 
presupposed  as  the  ground  of  the  unity  of  the  two  aspects. 
We  were  therefore  led  to  recognize  that  experience  demands 
thought,  and  likewise  thought  demands  experience ;  while  both 
of  them  together  form  the  necessary  and  sufficient  condition 
for  all  philosophical  inquiry.  This  general  interpretation 
might  be  suggested  to  explain  the  movement  in  philosophy 
which  seeks  to  inquire  more  carefully  into  the  meaning  and 
use  of  presuppositions  and  which  seeks  to  unfold  truth  by  the 
method  of  implication  rather  than  by  that  of  direct  logical 
proof.  It  is  to  be  observed  that  nothing  was  presupposed  as  true 
without  proof;  nothing  was  assumed  as  an  absolute  or  funda- 
mental proposition.  On  the  contrary,  experience  and  thought, 
with  their  intimate  connection,  were  considered  as  the  neces- 
sary and  sufficient  conditions  for  philosophical  inquiry,  but 
no  attempt  was  made  to  prove  their  fundamental  nature.  Ex- 
perience requires  thought,  and  on  the  other  hand  thought  is 


SIGNIFICANT  TENDENCIES.  329 

only  such  in  connection  with  experience.  It  is  contended  that 
this  dual  unity — this  mutual  supplementation  of  these  two 
presuppositions  of  philosophy — contains  within  itself  all  that 
can  ever  be  known  and  that  philosophy  itself  is  merely  the 
unfolding  of  what  is  implicitly  contained  within  the  almost 
unlimited  scope  of  its  dual  presupposition. 

THE  ABSOLUTE. 

That  tendency  of  philosophy  which  was  earlier  alluded  to  in 
connection  with  the  monists  is  not  restricted  to  the  empirically 
given  and  its  ground  in  thought.  The  meaning  of  philosophy 
is  by  no  means  exhausted  when  the  connection  between  thought 
and  experience  is  unfolded;  but,  on  the  contrary,  the  whole 
purpose  of  transcendental  modes  of  inquiry  is  to  develop  the 
ultimate  unity  of  the  world,  the  final  completion  or  tran- 
scendence in  the  Absolute  of  our  limited  experience  and  of  our 
finite  thought. 

In  the  earlier  chapters  of  this  volume  we  have  followed  the 
history  of  monistic  metaphysic  through  its  religious,  panthe- 
istic, materialistic,  idealistic,  and  even  mystic  phases,  so  that 
the  concept  of  the  Absolute  is  by  no  means  unfamiliar.  In 
the  following  pages  it  is  not  the  purpose  to  prove  the  existence 
of  any  monistic  Ultimate,  and  much  less  to  connect  it  with  any 
religious  hypothesis.  The  purpose  is  to  show  that  both  expe- 
rience and  thought  imply  by  their  very  nature  an  all-inclusive 
Unity,  which  may  be  expressed  by  the  Reality  of  the  Absolute. 
This  conclusion,  developed  from  the  implications  of  both  expe- 
rience and  thought,  is  more  fundamental  than  the  results  of 
demonstrative  proof, — for  the  latter  always  implies  an  un- 
proved ground,  which  is  itself  of  greater  importance  than  the 
result  which  may  be  obtained  from  it  by  subsequent  deduction. 
From  the  fact  that  all  philosophy  rests  on  a  double  presuppo- 
sition, the  approach  to  the  concept  of  the  Absolute  is  two-fold, 
— experience  and  thought.  By  the  former  it  is  perhaps  possible 
to  discover  a  monistic  background  for  all  consciousness,  accord- 


330  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  PHILOSOPHY. 

ing  to  which  the  Absolute  becomes  the  highest  form  of  expe- 
rience, formal  only  and  beyond  the  limitations  of  internal 
differentiation.  By  the  implications  of  thought,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  conception  of  the  Absolute  develops  into  the  ultimate 
comprehension  of  all  thought-processes,  the  deepest  meaning 
of  the  category  of  reality,  and  the  identity  of  all  categories 
and  forms  of  thought. 

Experience  and  the  Absolute. — From  our  analysis  of  the 
empirically  given,  it  was  discovered  that  the  two  aspects  of 
experience  exist  in  a  different  ratio  of  intensity  for  every  psy- 
chological experience.  And  it  was  earlier  suggested  that  an 
experience  could  be  defined — having  a  logical  reality  only — in 
which  the  relativity  aspect  was  entirely  absent.  Such  a  logical 
experience  was  an  individuality  in  the  strictest  sense,  a  mere 
"this  object"  inappreciable  except  perhaps  to  an  immediate 
consciousness.  This  logical  experience  was  conceived  as  the 
limit  of  the  series  of  experiences,  in  which  the  relativity  aspect 
gradually  diminishes;  and  likewise  it  would  seem  possible, 
from  the  opposite  stand-point,  to  conceive  and  define  an  expe- 
rience in  which  the  individuality  aspect  should  be  deficient. 
Such  an  experience  would  represent  the  upper  limit  of  a  series 
of  psychological  experiences  wherein  the  relativity  aspect  alone 
existed.  This  limit,  as  the  complete  relativity  and  perfect 
mediacy,  suggests  the  Absolute  from  the  stand-point  of  expe- 
rience. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  complete  relativity  of  the  limit 
of  this  series  carries  us  at  once  beyond  the  finite  experiences 
of  our  daily  life  and  introduces  us  to  an  "  experience"  which 
differs  essentially  from  the  elements  of  human  consciousness. 
This  will  become  apparent  from  an  examination  of  such  a 
limiting  "experience."  To  our  ordinary  consciousness  it  is 
the  individuality  aspect  of  every  conscious  fact  which  intro- 
duces the  novel,  the  new,  or  the  hitherto  unperceived  element 
into  our  life.  It  is  the  relativity  aspect  which  co-ordinates  this 
present  newness  with  past  experiences;  establishes  a  relativity 


SIGNIFICANT  TENDENCIES.  331 

between  the  related  and  the  unrelated.  Consider  now  this 
highest  "experience"  in  which  the  individuality  aspect  is  ab- 
sent. A  momentous  change  is  implied;  our  finite  conscious-? 
ness,  limited  for  its  material  to  the  variety  in  the  flow  of 
perceived  facts,  becomes  an  all-inclusive  conception  in  which 
there  is  no  possible  newness,  no  appreciable  points  or  centres, 
and,  further,  no  limitation  with  respect  to  finite  conditions. 
The  richness  of  an  experience  will  depend  on  the  intensive 
value  of  its  relativity  aspect;  the  richest  experience  will  be 
the  one  most  intimately  connected  with  all  our  past  life,  and 
therefore  the  one  which  mediates  or  synthesizes  the  greatest 
number  of  finite,  individual  facts  into  an  homogeneous  unity. 
And  the  Absolute,  as  the  relativity  of  all  possible  relativity, 
will  be  like  a  relation  with  all  possible  terms, — the  Universal 
of  universals  in  which  every  element  of  the  universe  finds  a 
place.  This  is  readily  recognized  from  the  very  fact  that  the 
Absolute  is  represented  by  an  "  experience"  in  which  the  indi- 
viduality aspect  is  absent,  for  this  implies  that  the  newness  or 
variety  upon  which  individuality  depends  is  also  lacking. 
And,  furthermore,  the  complete  universality  of  the  relativity 
aspect  denotes  that  all  possible  variety  is  synthesized  by  the 
unlimited  breadth  of  this  single  "  experience." 

Thought  and  the  Absolute. — By  means  of  the  foregoing 
we  were  able  to  suggest  a  formal  definition  of  the  Absolute  as 
the  limit  of  a  series  of  experiences  increasing  in  relativity  and 
comprehensiveness.  The  Absolute  so  described  is  purely  formal 
in  its  nature  and  possessed  of  merely  a  logical  reality.  When, 
however,  we  approach  this  conception  from  the  stand-point  of 
thought,  we  are  able  to  discover  a  new  meaning  altogether 
unattainable  by  the  implications  of  experience  alone. 

While  considering  the  relations  of  thought  to  experience  it 
was  suggested  that  the  category  of  reality  supplied  the  unity 
to  the  two  aspects  of  experience;  as  the  ground  by  which  the 
empirically  given  this-fact,  with  its  two  aspects,  can  be  em- 
ployed by  thought  as  a  single  element,  the  category  of  reality 


332  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

must  be  looked  upon  as  the  basis  for  all  the  other  categories 
and  forms  of  thought.  When  conceived  in  this  position,  real- 
ity would  seem  to  contain  all  the  richness,  all  the  variety — in 
fact,  all  the  depth  and  meaning — of  our  thought-processes. 
No  conception,  however  false,  crude,  or  barren,  but  is  defi- 
nitely contained  within  this  broadest  conception  of  the  category 
of  reality.  By  this  general  characterization  of  reality  two  rep- 
resentations of  it  are  possible.  On  the  one  side  reality  appears 
as  the  mere  logical  ground  for  experience  and  thought,  and  on 
the  other  as  the  conceptual  comprehension  of  all  the  value  and 
meaning  of  thought-processes.  In  the  former  sense  reality  is 
abstract  and  formal,  merely  the  ground  for  the  conceptual 
unity  of  the  individuality  and  relativity  of  each  experience; 
in  the  latter  sense,  however,  when  reality  is  conceived  as  the 
identity,  the  togetherness,  or  the  comprehension  of  all  cate- 
gories and  forms  of  thought,  it  becomes  the  Absolute,  the 
complete  homogeneity  within  which  there  is  no  differentiation, 
not  even  the  antithesis  of  subject  and  object. 

This  distinction  between  the  two  representations  of  reality 
is  of  extreme  importance.  As  we  are  accustomed  to  employ 
the  term,  it  means  simply  the  logical  ground  of  thought,  but 
when  this  logical  ground  is  recognized  to  contain  all  the 
wealth  and  meaning  and  depth  that  is  implicitly  contained  in 
thought  itself,  the  conception  assumes  a  new  significance  which, 
on  account  of  its  breadth  and  comprehensiveness,  is  the  con- 
ception of  the  Absolute.  As  such,  reality  contains  not  only 
my  finite  restricted  thought,  but  likewise  all  possible  thought 
of  all  thinking  beings.  The  Absolute,  as  the  perfect  mediacy 
of  all  experience,  becomes  synonymous  with  reality  invested 
with  all  the  richness  and  depth  of  thought.  There  could  be 
no  thought,  idea,  or  concept  which  has  not  its  appropriate 
place  in  this  Highest  Conception,  just  as  we  have  previously 
seen  that  it  implicitly  contains  every  fact  or  experience. 

This  develops  more  clearly  the  internal  unity  of  both  expe- 
rience and  thought,  for  in  the  Absolute  relativity  and  com- 


SIGNIFICANT  TENDENCIES.  333 

prehensiveness  become  coextensive  and  identical.  In  this  sense, 
therefore,  as  the  mediacy  of  all  possible  experiences  and  as 
the  comprehension  of  all  thought,  the  Absolute  becomes  the 
ultimate  unity  of  experience  and  thought.  And  because  these 
were  taken  to  be  the  necessary  and  sufficient  presuppositions 
of  philosophy  in  general,  the  Absolute  is  to  be  regarded  as 
Ideal  for  the  explanation  of  man  and  the  world. 

Formal  Nature  of  the  Absolute. — Undoubtedly  the  con- 
ception of  the  Absolute  which  has  been  here  defined  may  appear 
too  formal  to  be  of  any  value.  In  the  search  for  a  monism 
which  should  include  all  the  facts  and  all  the  meaning  of  the 
world  there  is  an  undoubted  temptation  to  employ  terms  so  ab- 
stract in  their  nature  that  the  purpose  of  interpretation  and  ex- 
planation is  obscured.  But  perhaps  this  difficulty  is  not  so  im- 
portant as  we  are  inclined  to  believe.  And  although  it  must  be 
recognized  that  there  can  be  no  finite  differentiation  within  the 
being  of  the  Absolute,  and  for  that  reason  it  is  to  be  regarded 
as  an  abstract  conception  very  far  removed  from  ordinary  life, 
yet  is  is  perhaps  doubtful  if  more  definite  terms  can  be  em- 
ployed to  describe  a  conception  which  from  its  very  nature 
transcends  all  internal  or  external  limitation.  It  cannot  be 
referred  to  in  terms  of  goodness,  perfection,  morality,  will,  or 
purpose  without  implying  one  of  two  alternatives.  Either  these 
terms  mean,  when  applied  to  the  Absolute,  something  alto- 
gether different  from  their  significance  in  our  ordinary  appre- 
ciation of  them,  or  else  they  limit  the  Absolute  to  a  mere 
anthropomorphous  fancy. 

The  Absolute  not  Personal. — And,  furthermore,  it  is  per- 
haps interesting  to  note  that  the  nature  of  the  Absolute,  as  the 
limiting  Ideal  of  thought  and  experience,  transcends  the  usual 
conditions  by  which  our  own  experience  is  defined.  We  cannot 
describe  it  in  terms  of  consciousness, — as  we  understand  the 
term, — for  consciousness  implies  internal  centres  analogous  to 
our  own  experience,  while  the  Absolute  is  an  homogeneous 
Unity,  devoid  of  all  differentiation  except  as  this  differentiation 


334  HISTORY  OF   MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

is  implied  by  its  unity.  Nor,  on  the  other  hand,  can  the 
Absolute  be  denned  as  self -consciousness,  for  this  requires  an 
antithesis  of  self,  and  self  that  is  conscious.  The  difficulty  of 
this  latter  contradiction  can  be  avoided  only  by  conceiving  the 
self-conscious  Absolute  as  an  infinite  process, — a  self -repeating 
series.  This  conception  is  certainly  the  least  objectionable, 
if  one  wishes  to  use  the  term  consciousness  in  some  form ;  but 
it  seems  to  be  nevertheless  an  incomplete  characterization  of 
the  Absolute.  A  process  implies  a  logical  succession  of  stages, 
each  of  which  denotes  an  element  in  the  infinite  series  of 
which  it  is  a  part ;  but  as  element  it  is  distinguishable  from  its 
logical  predecessors  and  successors,  and  the  Absolute,  as  the 
law  of  the  unity  of  these  elements,  is  itself  defined  by  each. 
Such  an  "  Absolute"  would  be,  therefore,  only  relative,  since 
it  is  determined  strictly  by  internal  differentiation.  In  fact, 
it  cannot  be  too  strongly  urged  that  such  terms  as  conscious- 
ness should  not  be  used  in  this  connection,  since  personal  attri- 
butes of  any  kind  seem  to  introduce  either  an  ambiguity  or  a 
contradiction.  It  is  a  constant  ambition  on  the  part  of  philoso- 
phy to  establish  the  existence  of  an  Absolute  which  shall  meet 
the  demands  of  a  consistent  monism  and  at  the  same  time 
possess  personal  attributes.  The  difficulty  of  such  an  attempt 
is  fundamental.  Personality,  however  defined,  implies  a  limi- 
tation and  a  differentiation.  In  the  former  case  the  personal 
attribute  is  such  because  it  is  defined  in  terms  of  a  logically 
existent  "not."  This  "not"  is  excluded  from  the  Being  of 
the  Personal  Absolute,  and  hence  the  latter  is  defined  with 
respect  to  the  limitations  of  the  "  not."  Such  a  Being  is  not 
Absolute,  but  only  relative.  And  again  the  personal  attribute 
may  lay  stress  upon  finite  differentiation  within  the  being  of 
the  Absolute.  In  this  case  the  differentiation  must  observe  a 
certain  law,  or  rather  a  ground,  for  the  relation  of  the  differ- 
entiated elements.  This  law  or  ground  becomes,  therefore,  the 
true  Absolute,  which,  because  of  its  formal  character,  should 
be  conceived  as  impersonal.  But  even  if  one  should  contend 


SIGNIFICANT  TENDENCIES.  335 

that  this  law  was  itself  personal,  owing  to  some  internal  char- 
acter, then  it  would  be  possible  to  define  a  still  more  funda- 
mental Absolute  which  should  express  the  ground  for  the  appli- 
cation of  this  internal  character  to  the  law  itself. 

The  formal  terms  with  which  it  is  necessary  to  allude  to 
the  Absolute  do  not  permit,  with  certainty,  the  application  of 
infinity,  except  figuratively.  Finiteness  and  infiniteness  are 
conditions  of  human  thought  dependent  on  the  conception  of 
limitation.  As  we  approach  the  Absolute,  however,  the  dis- 
tinction no  longer  remains  applicable,  because  the  antithesis 
of  limited  and  unlimited  is  transcended.  Eecent  progress  in 
the  application  of  mathematics  to  logic11  has  developed  the 
logical  aspect  of  the  infinite  to  such  a  degree  that  it  is  now 
impossible  to  employ  the  concept  as  a  synonyme  for  mere  im- 
mensity or  greatness.  There  is  no  implication  in  our  original 
conception  of  the  Absolute  which  could  lead  us  to  believe  that 
it  is  referable  to  the  finite  or  to  some  degree  ("  dignity")  of 
the  infinite.  Perhaps  it  is  a  kind  of  existence  which  is  some- 
how both  finite  and  infinite,  or  perhaps  neither  term,  in  its 
ordinary  significance,  can  be  used. 

In  these  brief  suggestions  concerning  the  interpretation  of 
the  monistic  tendencies  in  speculative  thought  several  prob- 
lems are  especially  significant.  The  view  towards  its  axioms 
which  post-Kantian  philosophy  has  gradually  come  to  accept 
demands  a  thorough  investigation,  not  only  of  the  first  princi- 
ples of  our  knowledge,  but  even  of  the  presuppositions  of  these 
principles.  At  no  time  in  the  history  of  philosophy  has  this 
need  been  more  apparent  than  now.  We  are  no  longer  satisfied 
with  a  merely  empirical  or  psychological  analysis,  such  as  has 
characterized  a  considerable  portion  of  British  philosophy  even 
to  the  present  time,  but,  on  the  contrary,  we  demand  an  inves- 
tigation into  the  bases  and  grounds,  the  conditions  and  pre- 

11  Reference  is  made  to  the  work  of  Dedekind,  Cantor,  and  Royce. 


336  HISTORY  OF  MODERN   PHILOSOPHY. 

suppositions,  upon  which  all  analysis,  introspective  or  tran- 
scendental, must  ultimately  rest 

Closely  connected  with  this  question  of  the  necessary  and 
sufficient  presuppositions  of  philosophy,  there  still  remains  the 
central  problem  of  all  systems  of  monism, — the  reconciliation 
of  unity  and  variety,  of  the  one  and  the  many.  However  deep 
we  may  go,  there  are  still  unexplored  regions  beyond  which 
somehow  seem  to  transcend  our  human  thought  and  knowledge. 
Although  the  progress  of  philosophy  has  gradually  unfolded 
what  seemed  to  be  a  deeper  and  truer  interpretation  of  Reality, 
there  still  remains  no  more  significant  tendency  in  philosophy 
to-day  than  the  demand  for  the  careful  consideration  of  its 
central  problem.  Within  the  limited  sphere  of  our  own  con- 
sciousness we  are  restricted  to  some  form  of  a  duality,  the 
subject  and  the  object.  The  classic  attempts  to  transcend  this 
duality  have  all  proved  objectionable  in  some  respect.  It  has 
been  found  very  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  define  either 
subject  or  object  without  implying  the  other.  And  although 
we  may  avoid  certain  aspects  of  this  antithesis  by  restricting 
the  duality  to  experience  and  thought,  still  the  central  problem 
of  their  unity  remains  unanswered.  The  fundamental  dis- 
tinction between  the  empirically  given  variety  and  the  concep- 
tional  unity  cannot  be  solved  by  neglecting  either;  on  the 
contrary,  a  new  philosophy  must  be  born  from  the  deeper  union 
of  experience  and  thought,  which,  if  completely  understood, 
would  define  as  its  Ideal  the  conception  of  ultimate  truth  and 
the  Philosophy  of  the  Absolute. 


INDEX. 


Abelard,  Pierre,  founder  of  mediaeval  conceptual  ism,  51 

Absent  objects,  how  real  to  Berkeley,  162 

Absolute  Idealism,  228,  235,  273 

Absolute,  The,  Bradley,  314;  Fichte,  241;  formal  nature  of,  333; 
Green,  309;  Hegel,  272;  Lotze,  311;  not  personal,  333;  promi- 
nence of  conception,  286 ;  relation  to  experience,  330 ;  relation  to 
thought,  331;  Royce,  313;  Schelling,  255;  the  unity  of  the 
world,  329 

Abstract  ideas,  Locke,  128;    Berkeley,  158;   Hume,  170 

Ac -tivity  as  self,  Fichte,  241 

Analytic  judgments,  Kant,  191 

Anaxagoras,  quoted,  30 

Anaximenes,  quoted,  29 

Anselm,  ontological  proof,  83 

Antimonies  of  cosmology,  Kant,  208 

Antithesis  of  dialectic,  263 

A  posteriori  judgments,  192 

Appearance,  Herbart,  231 

A  priori  judgments,  192 

Aristotle,  dualism  of,  48 

Arnauld,  Cartesian,  87 

Association  of  ideas,  170 

Atheistic  controversy  of  Fichte,  239 

Attributes,  with  Spinoza,  96 

B. 

Bacon,  Francis,  division  of  sciences,  68;    Great  Regeneration,  67;    life 

of,  66;    position  of,  70 
Bacon,  Roger,  mediaeval  empiricist,  53 
Boin^',  Hegel's  doctrine  of,  269 
Bentham,  Jeremy,  306 
Berkeley,  George,  answers  to  opponents,  162;    epistemology,  154;    life 

of,  150;    metaphysics,  155;    stand-point,  153 

22  337 


338  INDEX. 

Boehme,  Jacob,  cosmology,  65 ;    life  of,  64 ;    theology,  64 

Bradley,  F.  H.,  313 

Brahma,  the  Hindoo  Universal  Self,  47 

Bruno,  Giordano,  ethics,  61;    life  of,  57;    pantheism,  58;    physics,  59; 

position,  61 
Buddhism,  40,  47,  277 
Butler,  Joseph,  ethics,  146 

C. 

Cabanis,  French  materialist,  141 

Cambridge  Platonists,  304 

Campanella,  56 

Cartesian  School,  87 

Categorical  Imperative,  215 

Categories,  with  Kant,  202 

Causality,  Hume,  171;    Kant,  203 

Chubb,  Thomas,  English  deist,  143 

Cicero,  quoted,  15 

Clarke,  Samuel,  English  moralist,  144 

Collier,  Arthur,  English  idealist,  158 

Comte,  Auguste,  French  positivist,  287 

Conceptualism,  general  idea  real  in  mind,  51 

Condillac,  Etie"nne  de,  life  of,  138;    materialism,  138;    sensationalism, 

138 
Consciousness,  Buddhism,  278;    Descartes,  82;    Reinhold,  237;    Hegel, 

266 

Copernicus,  56 
Cordemoy,  87 
"  Critiques,"  of  Kant,  184 

Cudworth,  Ralph,  ethics,  304;    relation  to  Locke,  122 
Cumberland,  Richard,  ethics,  305 
Cyrenaics,  Greek  hedonists,  39 

D. 

Darwin,  Charles,  English  biologist,  295 

Da  Vinci,  Leonardo,  58 

Deductive  method,  34 

Deed-act,  Fichte,  241 

Deists,  English,  142 

Descartes,  Rene",  foundations  of  philosophy,  81;     influence,   86;    life 

of,  77;    metaphysics,  84;    method  in  philosophy,  79 
Determinism,  37;    Hobbes,  74;    Locke,  135;    Spinoza,  104 


INDEX.  339 


D'Holbach,  French  materialist,  141 
Dialectic  movement,  261 
Diderot,  Denis,  French  encyclopaedist,  139 
Dualism,  29 


Eckhart,  Meister,  Christian  mystic,  63 

Eclecticism,  179 

Edwards,  Jonathan,  152 

Ego,  primacy  of,  in  Fichte,  241;    transcendental,  201.     See  Self. 

Emotional  philosophy,  251 

Empedocles,  quoted,  30 

Empiricism,  26;    contrasted  with  rationalism,  119 

Encyclopaedia  of  Philosophical  Sciences,  Hegel,  269 

Encyclopaedists,  French,  139 

English  Empiricism,  65 

English  ethics,  143 

Epicureans,  48,  306 

Epistemology,  Berkeley,  154;  defined  as  theory  of  knowledge,  25; 
Descartes,  85;  Hobbes,  71;  Hume,  168;  Kant,  189;  Locke,  127; 
Nicolas  of  Cusa,  55;  Schopenhauer,  280;  Spinoza,  100;  stand- 
points contrasted,  147 

Essence,  Hegel,  269 

Ethics,  axioms,  36;  Bruno,  61;  Butler,  146;  Clarke,  144;  defined  as  the 
"ought"  of  conduct,  35;  English,  143;  Fichte,  248;  Hegel,  271; 
Hobbes,  73;  Hume,  175;  empirico-rationalistic,  303;  intuitional, 
304;  practical,  40;  recent  theories,  303;  Schopenhauer,  282; 
Shaftesbury,  145;  Spinoza,  101;  theoretical,  38 

Evolution,  292 ;  embryological  evidence,  292 ;  paleontological  evidence, 
293;  philosophical  aspect  of,  298;  universal  character,  293 

Existence,  Descartes,  81 

Experience,  aspects,  321;  centre  in  thought,  321;  presupposition, 
320 

F. 

Faculties  of  mind,  Kant,  194 

Fechner,  300 

F6n6lon,  87 

Fichte,  J.  G.,  ethics,  248 ;    life  of,  237 ;    primacy  of  Ego,  241 ;    relation 

to  Hegel,  259 ;    stand-point,  240 ;    The  Absolute,  247 
Freedom,  Fichte,  246;    Kant,  218 


340  INDEX. 

G. 

Galileo,  57 

Gassendi,  57 

General  ideas,  controversy  in  scholasticism,  49 

Geulincx,  Arnold,  Cartesian,  87 

God,  existence,  see  cosmological,  ontological,  and  teleological  proofs; 

postulate,  Kant,  219 
Great  Regeneration,  Bacon,  67 
Greeks,  humanistic  attitude,  15;    philosophy, -47 
Green,  T.  H.,  ethics  of  idealism,  308 


Hamilton,  Sir  William,  177 

Hedonism,  ethics  of  individual  pleasure,  39 

Hedonistic  calculus,  306 

Hegel,  G.  W.  F.,  influence,  273;  life  of,  257;  "Phenomenology  of 
Mind,"  265;  relation  to  former  idealists,  259;  system,  268 

Heliocentric  cosmology,  56 

Herbart,  J.  F.,  influence,  234;  life  of,  230;  metaphysics,  231;  psy- 
chology, 300 

Hindoo  philosophy,  46 

History,  philosophy  of,  43 

Hobbes,  Thomas,  epistemology,  71;  estimate,  75;  life  of,  70;  mate- 
rialism, 72;  metaphysics,  72;  naturalism,  73;  sociology,  74; 
theory  of  man,  73 

Humanistic  philosophy,  15 

Human  Knowledge,  Berkeley's  Principles  of,  151 

Human  Nature,  Hume's  treatise  of,  165 

Human  Understanding,  Locke's  essay  concerning,  123 

Hume,  David,  ethics,  175;  epistemology,  168;  life  of,  164;  meta- 
physics, 169;  position,  176;  scepticism,  173;  stand-point,  168 


I. 

Idea,  various  meanings:  Berkeley,  element  of  perceptual  world,  155; 
Descartes,  states  of  the  soul,  85 ;  Hegel,  The  "  Idea,"  logical  evo- 
lution of  finite  forms  of  world,  265 ;  Hume,  derived  processes  of 
mind,  169;  Kant,  illusory  conceptions  of  reason,  206;  Locke, 
object  of  mind  when  it  thinks,  127 ;  Royce,  expression  of  purpose, 
313;  Spinoza,  modification  of  thought,  99 


INDEX.  341 

Ideal  of  theology,  Kant,  209 

Idealism,   Absolute,   228,   235;     Berkeley,    157;     comparison   of,   229; 

Green,    308;     Kant,    205;     Leibnitz,    112;     mystic,    229;     Royce, 

312;    transcendental,  see  Kant 
Identity,  judgment  of,  Fichte,  243;    Kant,  191 
"  Idols"  of  Bacon,  68 

Immanent  Reality  of  Spinoza's  Substance,  96 
Immortality,  Kant,  219 
Imperatives,  Kant,  214 
Individuality   aspect  of  experience,  322 
Inductive  method,  34 

Innate  ideas,  Descartes,  85;    Locke's  opposition,  126 
Intellectual  awakening  of  Renaissance,  53 
Intellectual  love  of  God,  Spinoza,  103 
Intellectual  space,  Herbart,  233 
Intuitionalism,  ethics,  39,  304 

J. 

Judgment,  Kant's  "  Critique"  of,  220 


K. 

Kant,  Immanuel,  influence  on  Fichte,  238;  influence  on  philosophy, 
224;  life  and  character  of,  180;  problems  of  the  Critical  Phi- 
losophy, 189;  refutation  of  Berkeley's  idealism,  163;  scope  of 
system,  223;  theory  of  heavens,  182;  the  three  "Critiques," 
184;  the  "  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,"  191;  the  "  Critique  of  Prac- 
tical Reason,"  212;  the  "  Critique  of  Judgment,"  220 

Kepler,  57 

Knowledge,  kinds  of,  Nicolas  of  Cusa,  55;  Spinoza,  100;  limits  of, 
Locke,  133 

L. 

Lamarck,  biologist,  295 

La  Mettrie,  French  materialist,  139 

Leibnitz,  G.  W.,  comparison  with  Locke,  135;   doctrine  of  monads,  109; 

freedom,    113;     life  of,    106;     metaphysics,    108;     optimism,    114; 

"  Pre-established  Harmony,"  112;    scope  of  system,  114;    theology, 

113 

Leviathan  of  Hobbes,  71 
Libertarianism,  36 
Locke,  John,  doctrine  of  ideas,  127;    ethics,  134;    influence,  135;    life 

of,  120;    object  of  philosophy,  125;    theory  of  knowledge,  132 


342  INDEX. 

Logic,  axioms  of,  33 ;  defined  as  "  ought"  of  thought,  32 ;    Hegel,  258, 

269;    methods,  33;    rules,  33 
Lotze,  R.  H.,  Absolute,  311;    stand-point,  310 
Lucretius,  definition  of  religion,  21 
Luther,  62 


Malebranche,  Nicolas,  Cartesian,  87 

Mandeville,  English  sociologist,  145 

Materialism,  Cabanis,  141;  defined,  72;  D'Holbach,  141;  French 
eighteenth  century,  138;  Hobbes,  72;  La  Mettrie,  140;  position 
of,  141 

Mathematical  method,  Descartes,  80;    Hobbes,  71;    Spinoza,  93 

Mathematics,  Kant,  198 

Matter,  Berkeley,  157 

Mechanism,  302 

Mediaeval  philosophy,  48 

Melanchthon,  Philip,  62 

Memory,  Hume's  ground  of  selfhood,  174 

Metaphysics,  or  ontology,  Bacon,  69;  base  of  sciences,  27;  Berkeley, 
155;  Bradley,  313;  Fichte,  241;  Hegel,  269;  Herbart,  231; 
Hume,  169;  Kant,  206;  Lotze,  310;  recent  stand-points,  309; 
Royce,  312;  Schopenhauer,  281;  science  of  reality,  28;  Spi- 
noza, 93 

Mill,  J.  S.,  English  utilitarian,  307 

Modes,  Locke,  131;    Spinoza,  98 

Monads,  Leibnitz,  109 

Monism,  29,  286,  315,  336 

Montaigne,  quoted,  15;    philosophy,  76 

Montesquieu,  137 

Moral  law,  Fichte,  248;    Kant,  215 

Morality,  influence  to,  Kant,  189 

Miinsterberg,  Hugo,  302 

Mystical  Idealism,  229,  280,  284 

N. 

National  characteristics  of  Renaissance,  53 
Natura  naturans,  Schelling,  252;    Spinoza,  96 
Natura  naturata,  Schelling,  252;    Spinoza,  96 
Natural  history  of  mental  processes,  Fichte,  246 ;    Hegel,  266 ;    Kant, 

195;    Schelling,  254 
Natural  selection,  296 


INDEX.  343 

Naturalism,  pessimistic,  228 

Naturalistic  philosophy,  16 

Nature  Philosophy,  Hegel,  270;    Schelling,  252 

Nebular  hypothesis,  182 

Neo-Fichteian  movement,  302 

Newton,  controversy  with  Leibnitz,  107;    relation  to  Locke,  124 

Nicolas  of  Cusa,  life  of,  54;    philosophy,  55 

Nicole,  Cartesian,  87 

Nominalism,  mediaeval,  general  idea  only  name,  50 

Non-Ego,  Fichte,  244' 

Normative  sciences,  use  of  "  ought,"  31 

Noumenon,  Kant,  205 

Novalis,  Romanticist,  251 

Novum  Organum,  Bacon,  67 

0. 

Object,  implied  existence,  327 

Observed  sequence,  Hume,  172 

Occam,  William  of,  mediaeval  nominalist,  50,  53 

Occasionalism,  87 

Omar  Khayyam,  quoted,  38 

Ontogeny,  293 

Ontological    proof    of    God's    existence,    Anselm,    83;     Descartes,    83; 

Kant,  209;    Spinoza,  96 
Optimism,  definition,  39;    Leibnitz,  114 
Origen,  Christian  mystic,  63 

P. 

Pantheism,  47 

Paracelsus,  55 

Paralogisms  of  psychology,  Kant,  207 

Perception,  definition,  24 

Personal  identity,  Locke,   132;    Hume,  173 

Pessimism,  definition,  40;    Schopenhauer,  282 

"  Phenomenology  of  Mind,"  Hegel,  265 

Phenomenon,  Kant,  198 

Philosophy,  defined  as  the  rational  unification  of  facts  of  experience, 
18;  different  from  religion,  20;  different  from  science,  19;  gen- 
eral history,  45;  meanings  of,  13;  problems,  22;  scope,  18;  two 
attitudes,  15;  value,  314 

Phylogeny,  293 

Physics,  early  advances,  56 


344  INDEX. 

Pineal  gland,  Descartes,  86 

Plato,  Greek  idealism,  48 

Pluralism,  Leibnitz,  108 

Pomponatius,  55 

Positivism,  287 

Postulates  of  practical  reason,  Kant,  217 

Practical  Reason,  Kant's  "  Critique"  of,  212 

"  Pre-established  Harmony,"  Leibnitz,  112 

Presentation,  world  as,  280 

Presupposition,  meaning  of,  317;    of  philosophy,  319 

Protagoras,  15 

Protestantism,  53 

Psychology,  aspect  theory,  301;    defined  as  science  of  mental  states, 

23;    element  of,  24;    introspective  method,  299;    science  of,  299 
Psycho-physical  parallelism,  definition,  24;    Spinoza,  98 
Pure  Reason,  Kant's  "  Critique"  of,  191 
Purpose,  Kant,  221;    Royce,  312 

Q. 

Qualities,  primary  and  secondary,  Locke,  131 ;    Berkeley,  157 

R. 

Rationalism,  definition,  27 ;  Continental,  compared  with  empiricism, 
148;  deeper  meaning,  117;  school  as  whole,  115;  problem  of, 
115 

Realism,  mediaeval,  general  idea  objectively  real,  49 

Realism,  transcendental,  227,  232 

Reality,  category  of,  325 

Reals,  Herbart,  232 

Reason,  faculty  of,  Kant,  206 ;    Absolute,  Schelling,  255 

Reformation,  The,  62 

Reid,  Thomas,  177 

Reinhold,  K.  L.,  life  and  stand-point,  236 

Relativity  aspect  of  experience,  322 

Religion,  different  from  philosophy,  20;  mental  origin  of,  20;  phi- 
losophy of,  43 

Renaissance,  scepticism  of,  76;    tendencies  of,  52 

Right,  Hegel,  271 

Romanticists,  250 

Roscellinus,  50 

Royce,  Josiah,  312 

Rules  of  living,  Descartes,  80 


INDEX.  345 

S. 

Sanction  of  happiness,  306 

Scepticism,  Hume,  173;    Renaissance,  76 

Schelling,  F.  W.,  life  of,  251;  stand-point,  252;  position  of,  284; 
relation  to  Hegel,  259 

Schleiermacher,  definition  of  religion,  21 

Scholasticism,  philosophy,  48 

Schopenhauer,  Arthur,  life  of,  275;  stand-point,  276;  system,  280; 
position,  284 

Science,  Comte,  288;  different  from  philosophy,  19;  Hume,  172;  hy- 
potheses in,  290;  Kant,  204;  of  knowledge,  Fichte,  239;  Locke, 
133;  philosophy  of,  40;  recent  tendencies,  286 

Scotch  school,  177 

"  Seeing  all  things  in  God,"  86 

Self,  theories  of,  Berkeley,  160;  Descartes,  81,  85;  Fichte,  241;  Hegel, 
271;  Hume,  173;  Kant,  207,  217;  Leibnitz,  111;  Locke,  132; 
Lotze,  311;  Royce,  312;  Schelling,  253;  Spinoza,  97 

Self-consciousness,  Hegel,  267 ;    Schelling,  253 

Sensation,  definition,  24 

Sensationalism,  French,  137;    Condillac,  138 

Sensibility,  faculty  of,  Kant,  197 

Shaftesbury,  educated  by  Locke,  122 ;    ethics,  145 

Significant  tendencies  in  present  philosophy,  314 

Smith,  Adam,  166 

Society,  philosophy  of,  42 

Sociology,  Comte,  289 ;    Hobbes,  74 

Solipsism,  250 

Space,  Berkeley,  156;  Herbart,  233;  Kant,  197;  Leibnitz,  110; 
Schopenhauer,  281 

Spencer,  296 

Spinoza,  Benedict  de,  attributes,  96;  epistemology,  100;  ethics,  92; 
fatalism,  104;  importance,  105;  life  of,  90;  metaphysics,  93; 
modes,  98;  naturalism,  103;  psychology,  102;  rationalistic  ten- 
dency, 89;  Substance,  94 

Spirit,  Berkeley,  159 

Stoics,  48 

Subject,  implied  existence  of,  327 

Sublimity,  Kant,  222  * 

Substance,  various  meanings:  Berkeley,  spiritual  not  material,  158; 
Descartes,  three  primary  reals,  85;  Hume,  idea  contradictory, 
170;  Leibnitz,  active  force-atoms,  109;  Locke,  substratum  of 
qualities,  130;  scholastic,  universal  substratum,  131 


346  INDEX. 

Sufficient  ground,  principle  of,  280 
Synthetic  stage  of  dialectic,  263 

T. 

Taste,  judgments  of,  221 

Tauler,  John,  04 

Taurellus,  55 

Teleology,  contrasted  with  mechanism,  222,  303;    judgments,  221 

Teleological  proof,  Leibnitz,  112;   Kant,  211 

Telesius,  55 

Theodicy,  Leibnitz,  108 

Theology,  Berkeley,  161;  definition,  30;  different  from  religion  and 
metaphysics,  31 ;  Leibnitz,  108 

Theory  of  knowledge,  25 

Thesis  stage  of  dialectic,  268 

"  Thing-in-itaelf,"  Kant,  195 

Thomas  a  Kern  pi*,  63 

Thought,  Descartes,  85;    Hegel,  265 

Time,  Kant,  197;    Schopenhauer,  281 

Toland,  John,  deist,  143 

Transcendental  forms,  Fichte,  241;  Herbart,  232;  Kant,  199;  Rein- 
hold,  237;  Schopenhauer,  281 

Transcendental  idealism,  see  Kant;   of  Schelling,  253 

Transcendental  self,  201 

Transcendentalists,  the  German,  226 


U. 

Understanding,  faculty  of,  Kant,  200;    Hegel,  267 

Upanishads,  147,  278 

Utilitarianism,  ethics  of  universal  happiness,  39,  305 

V. 

Vedic  hymns,  46,  278 
Vision  theory,  Berkeley,  155 
Voltaire,  137 


Weismann,  biologist,  296 

Will,  Fichte,  246;    Kant,  213;    Schelling,  254;    Schopenhauer,  280 

Wrong,  Schopenhauer,  283 


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